Daval v. Zahtz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Paul Daval,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:19-cv-50147

v.

Honorable Iain D. Johnston

Dr. Merrill Zahtz, John Varga, Wexford

Health Sources Inc., Cathy Smith, Kay

Hood, and Amber Allen,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Paul Daval (“Daval”),1 who is incarcerated at Dixon Correctional

Center (DCC), brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his

Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. His claims

center around continuous delays in his medical treatment, specifically with the

scheduling of necessary visits to eye specialists to treat his sarcoidosis.

Daval reached a settlement agreement with nearly all the defendants, except

for Defendant Amber Allen (“Allen”). Allen now moves for summary judgment. For

the reasons explained below, Allen’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

1 Daval is represented by Alec Solotorovsky, Jordan V. Hill, and Margaret G. Houseknecht.

The Court thanks them for their representation of Daval in this action. The Court notes

that this is not attorney Solotorovsky’s first case in which he has acted as pro bono counsel.

His efforts in this regard are not unnoticed, but, instead, are greatly appreciated.

I. Legal Standard

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must construe the “evidence and all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under

consideration is made.” Rickher v. Home Depot, Inc., 535 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.

2008). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmovant; it does not require that the dispute be resolved

conclusively in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248-49 (1986). However, “[s]peculation is insufficient to withstand summary

judgment.” Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1127 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed,

“the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

B. Local Rule 56.1

“On summary judgment, the Court limits its analysis of the facts to the

evidence that is presented in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements.” Kirsch v.

Brightstar Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 676, 697 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The statements serve a

valuable purpose: they help the Court in “organizing the evidence and identifying

disputed facts.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627,

633 (7th Cir. 2005). “District courts are ‘entitled to expect strict compliance’ with

Rule 56.1, and do not abuse their discretion when they opt to disregard facts

presented in a manner that does not follow the rule’s instructions.” Gbur v. City of

Harvey, 835 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606-07 (N.D. Ill. 2011); see also Waldridge v. Am.

Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994); Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581,

583 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Factual allegations not properly supported by citation to the

record are nullities.”).

II. Background2

Allen was the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) at Dixon

Correctional Center (“DCC”). See Dkt. 139 ¶ 4. She worked in a lateral role to the

medical director, and she was responsible for overseeing the Health Care Unit at

DCC and other correctional centers to ensure that individuals in custody had access

to healthcare. Dkt. 141 ¶¶ 4, 7-8. She did not personally provide medical care or

schedule appointments for individuals, but she sometimes intervened if there were

issues with scheduling appointments. Dkt. 139 ¶¶ 4-5; Dkt. 141 ¶¶ 5-6. As part of

her duties, Allen also reviewed individuals’ medical records when responding to

grievances regarding medical treatment or a request for a referral. Dkt. 139 ¶ 9;

Dkt. 141 ¶ 9. After reviewing an individual’s medical records, she would provide a

written response on a specific form to the correctional counselor. Dkt. 139 ¶ 10.

Allen was familiar with Daval and his situation from reviewing his medical chart,

but also from receiving phone calls from Daval’s mother. Dkt. 143 ¶ 19.3

2 The facts are drawn from Allen’s statement of facts, Dkt. 139; Daval’s response to Allen’s

statement of facts, Dkt. 141; Daval’s statement of additional facts, Dkt. 143; and Allen’s

response to Daval’s statement of facts, Dkt. 149.

3 The parties dispute when the phone calls from Daval’s mother began. Dkt. 153 ¶ 20; Dkt.

149 ¶ 20.

Daval suffers from sarcoidosis, which in his case causes inflammation in his

left eye. Dkt. 143 ¶ 1; Dkt. 149 ¶ 1. Prolonged periods of elevated pressure can

damage the optic nerve and cause a loss of peripheral vision. Dkt. 143 ¶ 3; Dkt. 149

¶ 3.

When Daval arrived at DCC in 2017, he received prescription eye drops for

the inflammation. Dkt. 143 ¶ 2; Dkt. 149 ¶ 2. On November 7, 2017, Daval saw an

optometrist at DCC, who made an urgent referral for Daval to see an

ophthalmologist. Dkt. 143 ¶¶ 4, 6; Dkt. 149 ¶ 4. During that visit, Daval’s

intraocular pressure (“IOP”)4 for his left eye was measured to be 40 mmHg. Dkt.

143 ¶ 4.5 Over the next couple months, Daval’s IOP was measured three more

times, yielding 26, 38, and 27 mmHg. Dkt. 143 ¶ 8. The normal range for IOP is 10-

23 mmHg. Id. ¶ 5.

4 “Intraocular pressure” is the fluid pressure inside the eye and measured in millimeters of

mercury (mmHg). Flournoy v. Ghosh, 881 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

5 Allen’s counsel objects to all asserted facts that contain an IOP measurement on the basis

that she is not an optometrist and therefore cannot admit or deny whether a medical record

states that Daval’s IOP was the asserted measurement. E.g., Dkt. 149 ¶ 4. This objection is

meritless on multiple levels, including these two. The first being that if the state of Illinois

is too stingy or lazy to investigate a fact, that’s its own choice, which should not prejudice

Daval. A party can’t seek summary judgment by ignoring unhelpful facts. Second, there’s

no medical or scientific opinion being offered—and an opinion witness is not needed for

factual testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 (limiting only opinion testimony). Indeed, other

courts in this circuit have considered IOP measurements gleaned from medical records at

summary judgment. See, e.g., Williams v. Duncan, No. 17-CV-376, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

78679, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ill. May 5, 2020); Watts v. Kidman, No. 18-cv-49, 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 184988, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 2020); cf., e.g., McCaskill v. Manila, No. 13 C 3166,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179186, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2014) (reciting a fact about the

plaintiff’s blood pressure as measured in mmHg).

Daval had yet to see an ophthalmologist two and a half months after the

referral, so he filed a grievance on January 22, 2018 (the “January 2018 grievance”).

Dkt. 139 ¶ 11. In it, he wrote that:

(1) he had been “diagnose[d] with a c[h]ronic disease in [his] left eye,”

(2) he was “having vision problems for over 4 months,” (3) “the eye doctor

[] at Dixon” “refer[red Mr. Daval] to see an eye specialist and that it was

‘Urgent,’” (4) “this was in early November of 2017 and it’s now January

of 2018 and [he had yet to see] a specialist,” and (5) he requested to “see

a[n] eye specialist, [because] the doctor said that it is urgent and that

[he] could lose [his] vision in [his] left eye if not treated.

Dkt. 143 ¶ 16 (alterations in original).

Before receiving any response on the grievance, Daval had his first visit to

the ophthalmologist at the Hauser-Ross Eye Institute (HREI) on March 1, 2018. Id.

¶¶ 7, 9. He was seen again at HREI on March 9, 2018. Id. ¶ 9.

March 2018 was also “around the time” Allen first learned about Daval’s eye

condition. Id. ¶ 18. She responded to the grievance during this time; based in part

on her response, Daval’s correctional counselor responded to the January 2018

grievance on March 23, 2018, with the written note:

Per Health Care Administrator & writ officer this inmate has been seen

multiple times for this issue band [sic] is being treated.

Id. ¶ 17; Dkt. 139 ¶ 12. The grievance then went to the DCC grievance officer, who

received it on April 4, 2018. Dkt. 139 ¶ 13.

Daval saw an HREI ophthalmologist one more time—on April 5—before the

DCC grievance officer responded to the January 2018 grievance. Id. ¶ 14; Dkt. 143

¶ 9. The grievance officer’s response on May 11, 2018, acknowledged the then three

HREI appointments that Daval had as well as an upcoming one:

Per Health Care, Inmate Daval has been seen and treated numerous

times. Movement records indicate that Offender Daval has seen eye

specialists at Hauser Ross on 3-1-18, 3-9-18, 4-5-18 and has another

appointment this month.

Dkt. 139 ¶ 14.

From March to September 2018, Daval saw an ophthalmologist at HREI on a

regular basis. See Dkt. 143 ¶ 9. In addition to the appointment on April 5, Daval

had four more appointments. See id. After the last one on September 21, 2018, the

ophthalmologist ordered a follow-up visit in 2-4 weeks or as needed. Id. ¶ 10; Dkt.

149 ¶ 10. Through the rest of 2018, Daval did not have any appointments at HREI,

but he did have some appointments with an eye doctor at DCC. Dkt. 143 ¶ 11; Dkt.

149 ¶ 11.

On January 11, 2019, Daval was seen at HREI, and his IOP was measured to

be 43 mmHg. Dkt. 143 ¶ 11. Less than a month later, on February 1, his IOP had

risen to 53 mmHg, and the ophthalmologist prescribed “max[imum] medications” to

see if Daval’s IOP could be improved without surgery. Id. ¶ 12 (alteration in

original). The increased dosage did not help, so four days later an ophthalmologist

ordered that Daval undergo emergency surgery “within the week.” Id. ¶ 13.

One week later, on February 12, Daval filed an emergency grievance

requesting to be sent out for surgery as soon as possible, noting that the

ophthalmologist recommended the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center

(“UIC”) or wherever he could be sent for immediate care. Dkt. 139 ¶ 15; Dkt 142-3

at DAVAL 00007. The grievance was deemed a non-emergency grievance, and

there’s no indication that the grievance was forwarded to the Health Care Unit for

review. Dkt. 139 ¶ 16.

About two weeks after the order for emergency surgery, on February 18,

2019, Daval underwent surgery at UIC. Dkt. 143 ¶ 14. Despite the surgery, Daval

lost his peripheral vision in his left eye. See id. ¶ 15; Dkt. 149 ¶ 15; Dkt. 141 at 4;

Dkt. 139-1 at 59:14-15.

On April 3, 2019, Daval filed a grievance requesting to see an eye doctor after

having undergone surgery (the “April 2019 grievance”). Dkt. 139 ¶ 18. A

correctional counselor received the grievance on April 19. Id. Daval filed another

grievance on May 2, 2019, “requesting that it be noted that the Medical Director

was negligent for failing to schedule an appointment for him and taking him off

medication without consulting with his UIC doctor” (the “May 2019 grievance”). Id.

¶ 19.

Six days after the May 2019 grievance, Allen responded to the April 2019

grievance with a note that she had reviewed his medical chart and called UIC

because it canceled his appointment without rescheduling. Id. ¶ 20. After another

month and a half, on July 26, the correctional counselor then responded to the April

2019 grievance with an almost identical note, merely adding “Per HCUA Allen” to

the beginning. Id. ¶ 21. Nearly two months later, the DCC grievance officer added a

response that noted Allen’s finding about the cancelation and that listed Daval as

having gone to UIC on May 16, August 1, and August 29, 2019. Id. ¶ 22.

As for the May 2019 grievance, over five months passed before it received a

response; on October 28, 2019, a correctional counselor responded with a note that

Allen had contacted UIC about the appointment, that the scheduler had deemed it

not urgent, and that Daval had been seen on May 16. Id. ¶ 23.

Sometime during the spring of 2019, Allen requested a meeting between

Wexford and the Office of Health Service because there was an issue with the UIC

employee who scheduled appointments for individuals from DCC. Id. ¶ 25; Dkt. 141

¶ 25. Delays in getting appointments at UIC had been an ongoing issue, and there

were regular complaints. Dkt. 141 ¶ 25. Allen requested the meeting with Wexford

when she discovered that the cause of these delays was with the UIC scheduler. Id.

This prompted “ongoing conversations” throughout the summer and fall that year.

Id. However, it appears that the scheduling issue persisted, as on February 7, 2020,

Allen wrote in an email:

Paul Daval R68365 keeps getting cancelled and rescheduled by UIC

because it seems like they do not have communication at UIC of who

should be seeing him which further delays his care. He has litigation

going on and a mother that calls all the time. I got involved and after

some back and forth they put him back on for today, which screwed up

manpower for the major as our writ office already advised he was

cancelled and they had to start over again.

Dkt. 139 ¶ 24.

III. Analysis

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who,

under color of a state’s “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” deprives

any person of a right secured by the federal Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liability

must be based on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678

F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012), which may include either direct participation in the

“offending act,” acting or failing to act with reckless disregard of someone’s

constitutional rights when under a duty to safeguard them, or allowing an offending

act to occur with one’s knowledge or consent. Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433,

439-40 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner's

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To make a claim

of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show (1) an objectively serious medical

need (2) to which the defendant was deliberately indifferent. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834, 847 (1994); see also Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605,

614 (7th Cir. 2022). In addition, the plaintiff must show that the deliberate

indifference injured the plaintiff. Stockton, 44 F.4th at 614.

The parties do not dispute that Daval had an objectively serious medical

condition. See Dkt. 140 at 3; Dkt. 141 at 3 n.1. The remaining questions are whether

Allen acted with deliberate indifference and whether this deliberate indifference

caused harm to Daval.

“Deliberate indifference requires a look into the subjective state of the

defendant[’s] mind.” Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2022). To

have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” the defendant must be subjectively

aware of the specific, serious medical need or risk and must disregard it by “failing

to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 847; Johnson v.

Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006). The defendant must know of the facts

from which the risk is inferred, and the defendant must draw that inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Mere negligence or even civil objective recklessness

simply is not enough.” Brown, 38 F.4th at 550 (citing Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,

728 (7th Cir. 2016)) (cleaned up). Deliberate indifference is a demanding standard

“because it requires a showing [of] something approaching a total unconcern for the

prisoner's welfare in the face of serious risks.” Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710

(7th Cir. 2022).

Deliberate indifference can be proven through direct or circumstantial

evidence. Brown, 38 F.4th at 550. Circumstantial evidence that “can permit a jury

to reasonably infer deliberate indifference” includes “denial of medical treatment

altogether, delay of medical care,” and “ignoring an obvious risk.” Id. (citations

omitted). When a claim of deliberate indifference is based on a delay in treatment,

the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions or inaction caused the delay.

Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019). The

plaintiff generally must also produce some “verifying medical evidence” that the

delay (and not the underlying condition) “caused some degree of harm.” Jackson v.

Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013); Petties, 836 F.3d at 730-31. But at the

summary judgment stage, if there is evidence that would allow a jury to infer that a

delay in treatment caused harm, that is enough to reach trial. Gayton v. McCoy, 593

F.3d 610, 625 (7th Cir. 2010).

Allen argues that she was “con[scien]tious, thorough, and caring” as the

HCUA at DCC. Dkt. 140 at 4. Daval argues that this is not supported by undisputed

evidence and that Allen “took little to no action” despite knowing about his

condition and the delays in treatment. Dkt. 141 at 10. He characterizes this as

failing to “accelerate” his medical treatment, despite being aware of his condition

and the delays in his treatment. Id. at 8. Although Allen is right that Daval’s cited

cases don’t also use the word “accelerate,” her reply brief’s focus on the word

“accelerate” sometimes misses the forest for the trees. From the context of the

situation painted by Daval, if Allen had prevented the delays in treatment, that

would have “accelerated” the slow treatment that Daval received to a pace that

Daval argues he should have experienced. And delays can allow an inference of

deliberate indifference. Brown, 38 F.4th at 550.

The factual record shows that Allen was involved in the responses to Daval’s

January 2018, April 2019, and May 2019 grievances;6 in calling UIC to try to

schedule an appointment in 2019; and in working to address the broader issues of

delayed referrals to UIC. In Daval’s response brief, he identifies three ways that

Allen’s inaction led to the delay in treatment of Daval’s sarcoidosis: contributing to

the denial of Daval’s January 2018 grievance, not investigating the delay described

in that grievance, and not addressing the broader issue of delayed referrals to UIC.

Dkt. 141 at 7.

6 There is no evidence that the grievance filed on February 12, 2019, was forwarded to the

Health Care Unit, Dkt. 139 ¶ 16, so there’s no inference that Allen was involved in the

response.

A. Denial of the January 2018 grievance

Daval argues that Allen’s response led to his January 2018 grievance being

denied. Id. at 6. Allen wasn’t aware of Daval’s situation until sometime around

March 2018, so she can’t have been deliberately indifferent before then because she

wouldn’t have known there was a risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

The space-time continuum doesn’t work that way. This is basic causation. It’s

unknown exactly when in March 2018 that Allen first learned of Daval’s situation;

it’s possible that she would have seen Daval’s March 1 appointment at HREI when

reviewing his medical chart, in which case the grievance’s request had already been

fulfilled when Allen looked at it. But drawing inferences in favor of Daval, Allen’s

response that Daval had been seen multiple times may have referred only to his

optometrist appointments at DCC.

Even if Allen did ignore Daval’s need for an ophthalmologist appointment,

there is no causal connection between that and Daval’s peripheral vision loss. The

Court does find that there is enough evidence in this case to infer that the delay in

treatment caused a loss of peripheral vision for Daval. High pressure over a course

of time can lead to loss of peripheral vision. Dkt. 143 ¶ 3; Dkt. 149 ¶ 3. (Perhaps

this is why the Wexford defendants settled.) During the period of time that Daval

spent trying to see an eye specialist and undergo surgery, his IOP was higher than

the normal range. See Dkt. 143 ¶¶ 4-5, 8, 11-12. And Daval now has no peripheral

vision in his left eye. Dkt. 141 at 4; Dkt. 139-1 at 59:14-15. That the pressure over

time can lead to this loss of vision allows for the reasonable inference that a delay in

treatment, increasing the length of time during which Daval suffered this high

pressure in his eye before his eye surgery, could have led to his loss of peripheral

vision.

But by the time the correctional officer, relying on Allen’s response, denied

the grievance, Daval had gone to HREI twice. See Dkt. 139 ¶ 12; Dkt. 143 ¶¶ 9, 17.

Likewise, the DCC grievance officer’s response on May 11, 2018, which appears to

reference Allen’s finding (“Per Health Care”), noted the three HREI appointments

that Daval had by then and an upcoming appointment that month. See Dkt. 139

¶ 14. Even if Allen were responsible for the grievance being denied, as Daval

argues, Dkt. 141 at 6, the denied grievance didn’t create a delay in Daval getting an

appointment. Nor did Allen’s response—by the time she learned of Daval’s

situation, he already at least been scheduled for that first HREI appointment. This

is unlike Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., which Daval cites, where the

plaintiff never received any appointments for two years and the plaintiff’s

complaints were ignored. No. 14-cv-122, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151245, at *19 (S.D.

Ill. Sept. 18, 2017). Allen’s response didn’t create a delay in treatment, so it does not

show deliberate indifference. See Walker, 940 F.3d at 964 (7th Cir. 2019).

B. Investigation of delayed ophthalmologist appointments

Not only did Allen’s response to the January 2018 grievance show deliberate

indifference, Daval argues, but she also failed to investigate the cause of the delay

described in that grievance. Dkt. 141 at 7. Allen admits that her job was to “identify

and correct issues preventing or delaying access . . . to medical treatment,” Dkt. 140

at 5, and she did investigate delays with the UIC scheduler. But there is no

evidence that she did so when confronted with the delay that Daval described in his

January 2018 grievance. See Dkt. 141 at 10. Strangely, nor does her counsel address

this lack of investigation in the reply brief.

However, there is no evidence that Allen knew about the further delays in

Daval’s treatment. The January 2018 grievance covered the delay from November

2017 to March 2018. Dkt. 143 ¶ 16. After that, Daval had “regular” appointments

from March to September 2018. Dkt. 141 at 3. Daval alleges that his appointments

“were again delayed for months” between September 2018 and January 2019,

during which he saw only the optometrist at DCC instead of the ophthalmologist at

HREI. Dkt. 141 at 4; Dkt. 149 ¶ 11. But Daval filed no grievances during this time.

It’s possible that Daval’s mother called Allen during this period, but it requires

speculation to infer how long before Daval’s surgery that his mother started calling

Allen. See Dkt. 143 ¶ 20; Dkt. 149 ¶ 20. And speculation is not enough to survive

summary judgment. Ortiz, 94 F.3d at 1127.

Without evidence that Allen would have known about the subsequent delays,

the lack of investigation following the January 2018 grievance isn’t enough for a

reasonable jury to infer that Allen had the subjective state of mind required for

deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1010.

Even if Allen should have done more to address the concern raised by the January

2018 grievance, mere negligence isn’t enough. Brown, 38 F.4th at 550.

C. Delayed referrals to UIC

Both parties discuss Allen’s actions in trying to remedy the delayed referrals

to UIC. Daval argues that there’s no evidence Allen took any steps to fix the

problem before the spring of 2019, and that the only result was for some “ongoing

conversations” with Wexford later in 2019. Dkt. 141 at 7-8. Allen argues that she

“helped identify and correct an issue” that delayed Daval’s treatment, showing that

she did not delay or deny Daval’s access to treatment. Dkt. 150 at 7. Allen’s

February 2020 email indicates that she wasn’t able to resolve the issue, but it does

show that this was part of her responsibility in ensuring access to medical

treatment and she was taking steps to address the problem. See Dkt. 140 at 6.

The first time in this case that Allen acted on this issue was in response to

Daval’s April 2019 grievance, when Allen called UIC upon discovering that it had

canceled an appointment without rescheduling. Dkt. 139 ¶ 20. Later grievance

responses indicate that Daval was able to get an appointment at UIC on May 16,

2019, nearly three months after his surgery. See Dkt. 139 ¶¶ 22-23. But Daval does

not argue that the delay in his post-surgery appointments caused his vision loss.

See Dkt. 141 at 8.7

There is no evidence that Allen intervened with the delay in scheduling

Daval’s eye surgery at UIC, which is the only time before the April 2019 grievance

that the facts show Daval needing to go to UIC. She may not have known about

Daval’s emergency grievance when the surgery wasn’t “within a week” like the

doctor ordered, but Allen was aware that scheduling appointments with UIC had

generally been a problem. Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Daval, it

appears that these delays had been occurring for years, but it wasn’t until spring

7 Daval argues that he suffered vision loss despite the surgery, and there are no allegations

of high IOP measurements after the surgery, so Allen’s actions after the surgery—including

her responses to Daval’s April and May 2019 grievances and her lack of resolution with the

UIC scheduler issue—cannot have caused the harm that Daval alleges.

2019 that Allen discovered that the issue was caused by the UIC scheduler. Dkt.

141 ¥ 25. However, that is not enough to show that Allen was deliberately

indifferent toward Daval because although she could have investigated the UIC

scheduling delays in February 2019 (when Daval’s surgery had been ordered), she

needs to have known that there was a serious risk to Daval’s health because of this

scheduling issue to have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834; Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1010.

IV. Conclusion

Viewing the evidence in Daval’s favor, the facts do not show that Allen acted

with deliberate indifference toward the delays in medical treatment that Daval

faced. The Court grants Allen’s motion for summary judgment. This case is

dismissed with prejudice.

Date: December 1, 2023 S&.—

Honorable Iain D. Johnston

United States District Judge

Northern District of Illinois

Western Division

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