Webb v. The City of Batavia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARTRELL WEBB,

Plaintiff,

No. 22 CV 228

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

THE CITY OF BATAVIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Martrell Webb made a 911 call about a domestic violence incident with a

female occupant in his apartment. Two Batavia Police Department officers responded

to the call. After communicating with the two people on the scene, the officers

arrested Webb for domestic battery. Webb now brings a § 1983 claim against the

officers in their individual capacities for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights. He also seeks to hold the City of Batavia liable under § 1983 and under state

law for indemnification.

I. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment may be granted when “the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute of fact is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party

… [and] [t]he substantive law of the dispute determines which facts are material.”

Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal citations

omitted). I do not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. See id. at 741.

I view all the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party

to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Uebelacker v. Rock

Energy Coop., 54 F.4th 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 2022).

II. Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures that parties must follow when filing or

opposing motions for summary judgment. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1. The moving

party must file a “statement of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d) and that

attaches the cited evidentiary material.” N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(a)(2). The statement

of material facts must contain concise numbered paragraphs and “[e]ach asserted fact

must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the

specific page number, that supports it.” N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(d). The court has

discretion to “disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.”

N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(d)(2). The non-moving party must file a response to the

movant’s statement of facts. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(2). The response must

contain numbered paragraphs that correspond to the numbered paragraphs in the

movant’s statement of facts and cite to specific evidentiary material when disputing

an asserted fact. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(e). Compliance with the Local Rules is

required, even for pro se litigants. See Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir.

2009) (“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow procedural rules.”). A party moving for

summary judgment against a pro se litigant is required under Local Rule 56.2 to

provide them an explanation of the summary-judgment procedure. See N.D. Ill. Local

R. 56.2.

Defendants filed a Rule 56.1(a)(2) statement of facts, [44], a Rule 56.2 Notice

to Unrepresented Litigants Opposing Summary Judgment, [45], and a response to

Webb’s Rule 56.1(a)(2) statement of facts, [57].1 Webb filed a Rule 56.1(a)(2)

statement of facts, [52] at 12–13, but he did not file a response to the defendants’

statement of facts.2 Because Webb has not filed a response to defendants’ statement

of facts, I accept those facts as undisputed. See Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d

625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the

facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule,

those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.”). While I accept the

defendants’ facts as undisputed, I view those facts in the light most favorable to

Webb. See Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]

nonmovant's failure to respond to a summary judgment motion, or failure to comply

with Local Rule 56.1, does not, of course, automatically result in judgment for the

movant.”). The burden remains with the defendants to show that they are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket and page numbers refer to

the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings.

2 Defendants object to ¶¶ 6–11 of Webb’s affidavit, [52] at 22–23, for being conclusory,

argumentative, and without proper foundation. [56] at 3–4. Defendants also object to several

of Webb’s facts in his Rule 56.1 statement for being immaterial, argumentative, and without

proper foundation. See [57] at ¶ 5–11. I consider the merits of defendants’ objections below

and disregard any unsupported facts in Webb’s Rule 56.1 statement.

III. Facts

Webb made a 911 call to the Batavia Police Department about removing

Dakota Williams, a female occupant, from his apartment. [44] ¶ 5. Officers Miller

and Sulaver responded to the call and first spoke to Webb and Williams in separate

rooms. [44] ¶¶ 6–7. Williams told Officer Sulaver that she had been the one to ask

Webb to call the police because she did not feel free to leave the apartment. [44] ¶ 8.

After Officer Sulaver rejoined Webb and Officer Miller, Webb said that he wanted

Williams to leave the apartment but did not want to press any charges against her.

[44] ¶ 10. Officer Sulaver then rejoined Williams, who said that she wanted to press

charges against Webb for “putting his hands” on her. [44] ¶ 12.

This back-and-forth between the two rooms continued as both Webb and

Williams gave their version of events to the officers. Officer Sulaver asked Webb

about the markings on Williams’s neck, which Webb explained resulted from him

“restraining” Williams when she chased him around the apartment with a pair of

scissors. [44] ¶ 14. Williams denied this and explained that Webb had choked her

because she had changed her phone password and denied him access to her phone.

[44] ¶¶ 15–16. She admitted to grabbing a pair of scissors but only after Webb had

touched her. [44] ¶ 15. Webb responded, “I did,” when confronted with Williams’s

accusation that he grabbed her before she picked up the scissors, and then began

describing a different incident in which Williams had looked through his phone while

sleeping. [44] ¶ 17. He told the officers that the markings on Williams’s neck were a

result of his “mental frustration” of “trying to have a conversation” and being told to

“leave her alone.” [44] ¶ 17. After speaking to Officer Sulaver and confirming her side

of the story, Williams agreed to provide a written statement. [44] ¶ 18. The officers

then told Webb that he was being arrested and charged for domestic battery and took

him into custody. [44] ¶¶ 19–20. The officers allowed Williams to leave the

apartment. [44] ¶ 24.

Webb filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued the officers in their individual

capacities for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection based

on his sex and the City of Batavia under a theory of Monell liability. He also brings a

state law claim for indemnification against the City. [6].3

IV. Analysis

To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show

that the policy “had a discriminatory effect” and that the defendants were “motivated

by a discriminatory purpose.” See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635–36

(7th Cir. 2001). To show discriminatory effect, a plaintiff must show that “he was a

member of a protected class and he was treated differently from a similarly situated

member of an unprotected class.” Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th

Cir. 2017). “[T]o show discriminatory purpose, a plaintiff must show that the

3 Webb filed an Amended Complaint without leave to file one. [31]. I struck the Amended

Complaint for failure to file a motion seeking permission to amend. [34]. He now attempts to

include claims from his Amended Complaint in his response brief. See [31] (state law claims

for false arrest and battery); [52] at 2–4. A plaintiff may not attempt to amend his complaint

through his response brief. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v.

Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011). Webb also brought a § 1983 claim against

defendants for conspiracy to deprive his constitutional rights. He expressly abandons this

claim in his response brief. [52] at 9. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the

conspiracy claim based on Webb’s abandonment and I disregard any attempt to introduce

other claims into the case at this late stage.

decisionmaker ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part

‘because of’… its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’” Id. at 908.

A. Individual Liability of Officers

Webb brings a § 1983 claim against Officers Miller and Sulaver for sex

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Webb alleges that his

arrest was discriminatory because the officers arrested him based on the belief that

he was “the aggressor and a black male.” [52] at 4.4

Even when viewing all facts in a light most favorable to Webb, there is no

evidence in the record to support an inference that the officers acted with

discriminatory intent. The undisputed facts show that the officers weighed several

factors when making the decision to arrest Webb. None of these factors were based

on gender. These factors included: Williams’s assertion that Webb would not let her

leave the apartment, her statement (partially confirmed by Webb) that she had

grabbed scissors only after Webb had gotten physical, and the strangulation marks

on Williams’s neck. [44] ¶¶ 8, 12–13, 15. They also considered Webb’s side of the story:

his assertion that he wanted Williams to leave the apartment, that Williams was

chasing him around the apartment with scissors, and that Williams’s bruises were a

result of his “mental frustration” of “trying to have a conversation” and being told to

“leave her alone.” [44] ¶¶ 10, 14, 17. He denied Williams’s account and told the officers

that he did not touch Williams until she “got the scissors.” [44] ¶ 17. The officers also

4 Webb’s Complaint only alleges sex discrimination. [6]; see also footnote 3 above. Webb’s

mention of his race in his response brief does not bring a race-discrimination claim into the

case.

considered Webb’s preference not to press charges against Williams and Williams’s

willingness to file a statement and press charges against Webb. [44] ¶¶ 10, 12, 18, 26.

These factors do not relate to Webb’s or Williams’s gender. Nor does Webb

present evidence that suggests the factors that the officers considered were pretext

for discrimination. To prove discriminatory prosecution on the basis of sex, a plaintiff

must show that “the police failed to bring charges against female lawbreakers who

were similarly situated to him in all relevant respects.” Sides v. City of Champaign,

496 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007). Webb offers no evidence to support such an

inference. He repeats conclusory statements unrelated to his equal protection claim

that the officers lacked the authority to arrest him without a valid warrant. [52] at 7.

But his affidavit does not supply a proper foundation of personal knowledge about

the officer’s intent, and the presence or absence of an arrest warrant is irrelevant.5

He argues that the arrest was based on Officer Sulaver’s belief that “Plaintiff was the

aggressor, yet both parties had damages. Some of Plaintiff’s property was damaged.”

[52] at 7. He also seems to suggest that Williams was being dishonest to the police.

5 Webb cannot now add a claim for false arrest under the Illinois Constitution. See footnote

3. Additionally, “[w]hen a person with authority over the premises consents to an entry by

law enforcement, that entry is reasonable and does not infringe on the person’s Fourth

Amendment rights.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015). Webb made a 911

to the Batavia Police Department and consented to the officers’ entry. See [44] 5–6. And

“[p]robable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against

police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.” Id. Here,

the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the officers had an eyewitness account from a

victim, corroborating marks on her neck, and partial corroboration from the alleged

aggressor. The presence of a competing account from Webb does not defeat probable cause.

See Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 2003) (“it is not the

function of the police to establish guilt; the responsibility of sorting out conflicting testimony

and assessing the credibility of putative victims and witnesses lies with the courts”); see also

Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986).

[52] at 7. Webb argues that these factors point to a “factual uncertainty,” but there

are no disputed material facts here. The undisputed facts in the record do not support

a reasonable inference of gender discrimination by the officers. Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

Because I find that there was no violation of a constitutional right, Officers

Miller and Sulaver are also entitled to qualified immunity. See Taylor v. Ways, 999

F.3d 478, 487 (7th Cir. 2021) (“On summary judgment, the qualified immunity

defense depends on two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and

(2) whether the constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time. If the

answer to either question is no, the defendant official is entitled to summary

judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Municipal Liability

Webb also brings a § 1983 claim against the City of Batavia. To succeed on

such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that the municipality maintained a policy or

custom that was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may

prove existence of such a policy or custom in three ways: “(1) an express policy that

causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is

so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final

policymaking authority.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019).

Webb argues that the City’s arrest policy is based on gender and violated his equal

protection rights. [52] at 4, 10.6

Two alleged policies are at issue. The first is a newsletter from the Kane

County State’s Attorney Office that Officer Sulaver admits he relied on when making

the arrest. [44-2] ¶ 16; [44-2] at 7. Defendants argue that the newsletter is not an

official policy of the City and that there is no evidence to establish that it is

widespread enough to constitute a custom. [56] at 9. Indeed, the article appears to be

a “supplemental newsletter for the Kane County, Illinois, law-enforcement

community” distributed by the Kane County State’s Attorney. [44-2] at 7. A

newsletter from the Kane County State’s Attorney cannot be attributed to the City of

Batavia. Moreover, to prove the existence of a custom or practice, a plaintiff must

show that there are enough similar incidents that point to a pattern of conduct rather

than an isolated incident. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir.

2017). Webb has not identified any other incidents outside of his own arrest to suggest

that officers relied on the newsletter in a manner that constituted a custom. See [52]

at 9–10.

The second policy at issue is the City of Batavia’s Policy on Domestic Violence.

[44-5] at 4–13. Webb does not dispute that the policy is facially neutral. See [52] at 4.

The Policy provides that officers should avoid making cross complaints and try to

6 Webb cites to Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2007), a case involving Monell

liability for failure to train. [52] at 9–10. But alleging a “policy of inaction” is a different

theory of liability that Webb does not offer any support for. See J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d

367, 378 (7th Cir. 2020) ([T]he path to Monell liability based on inaction is steeper because,

unlike in a case of affirmative municipal action, a failure to do something could be

inadvertent and the connection between inaction and a resulting injury is more tenuous.”).

identify the dominant aggressor. [44-5] at 10. The policy lists the following factors

that an officer shall consider: (a) the intent of the law to protect victims of domestic

violence from continuing abuse; (b) the threats creating fear of physical injury; (c) the

history of domestic violence between the persons involved; and (d) whether either

person acted in self-defense. [44-5] at 10.

When a policy is facially gender-neutral, a plaintiff must show that the

“adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.” See Pers. Adm’r of

Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). In other words, both

discriminatory effect and purpose must be proven. See Alston, 853 F.3d at 906. A

plaintiff may use statistics to prove discriminatory effect, but “[s]tatistics are relevant

only if they address the pertinent question” of whether the plaintiff “was treated

differently from a similarly situated member of the unprotected class.” Id. at 907.

In support of his argument, Webb presents statistics that the City arrested

more men than women for domestic battery.7 [52] at 13. He draws this conclusion

based on a record of arrests for domestic battery in Batavia from 2018 to 2022, [52]

at 40–47, and asserts that over sixty percent of the arrestees are men. [52] at 5.

Defendants object to the use of the statistics because Webb failed to produce the

document in discovery and failed to lay a proper foundation for it. [57] ¶ 9. The City

7 Webb cites to the Violence Against Women Act and various cases that do not bear on the

question of whether the City had an unconstitutional policy of gender discrimination. See [52]

at 5–6. Webb also offers statistics about national incidents of domestic violence to argue that

“many men underreport or fail to report incidents of domestic violence due to embarrassment,

fear of disbelief, and society’s view that men cannot (or possibly, should not) be victims of

domestic abuse.” [52] 6–7. National statistics about domestic violence do not address the

pertinent question of whether gender discrimination motivated Webb’s arrest.

also points out that the data does not list the gender of the arrestees. [57] ¶ 9. Because

Webb includes the document without any explanation of where or how he obtained it,

I exclude the evidence for failure to properly authenticate the document. See Woods

v. City of Chi., 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he party seeking to offer the

business record must attach an affidavit sworn to by a person who would be qualified

to introduce the record as evidence at trial, for example, a custodian or anyone

qualified to speak from personal knowledge that the documents were admissible

business records.”).

But even if the statistics that Webb offers were admissible and represent what

Webb purports them to be, discriminatory effect cannot be reasonably inferred from

these statistics. To show disparate impact, statistics must be so stark that they are

“unexplainable” on other grounds, “leading to the inescapable conclusion” of

discriminatory intent. See Alston, 852 F.3d at 908 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364

U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). The statistics lack sufficient details to support the inference

that similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated differently

than Webb—there is no information about the gender of the arrestee, whether the

arrests were made in cross complaint domestic violence incidents, or whether the

parties in the dispute were opposite genders. Moreover, even if Webb’s conclusion is

correct, a sixty percent arrest rate for men is not so stark as to inescapably lead to a

conclusion of discriminatory intent. Because Webb has failed to provide sufficient

evidence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose of the City’s Domestic

Violence Policy, his Monell claim does not survive summary judgment.

C. Indemnification

Webb brings a state law indemnification claim against the City based on his

sex discrimination claim against the officers. [6]. Because I find no constitutional

violation by the officers, the derivative claim for indemnification fails. See Patrick v.

City of Chicago, 81 F.4th 730, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2023).

V. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [42], is granted. Enter judgment

and terminate civil case.

ENTER:

LAS AA.

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: October 13, 2023

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