Hall v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

John Hall, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 22-cv-3585

v. )

) Judge Joan B. Gottschall

International Association of Bridge, )

Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing )

Iron Workers, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After he was banned from union property and removed from union office, plaintiff

John Hall (“Hall”) filed a three-count complaint alleging claims under Title I of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as amended (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 401

et seq., and a related claim for breach of contract. The complaint names three defendants—the

International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers (the

“International” or “BSOIW”); Architectural and Ornamental Iron Workers Union Local No. 63

(“IW Local 63”), an affiliate of the International with jurisdiction to represent union members in

Cook County, Illinois, and specified surrounding areas; and Paul Wende (“Wende”), an IW

Local 63 business manager. See Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 1. The court has three motions before

it. The International moves under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer this case to the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia based on a venue and forum-selection clause in its

constitution. Separately, defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the court denies the motion to transfer and

stays this case to allow Hall to pursue his internal union remedies in accordance with the

International’s constitution. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).

I. Background

The following facts come from Hall’s complaint. Defendants dispute many of Hall’s

factual allegations and the inferences he draws from them. See, e.g., IW Local 63 and Wende’s

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Local 63 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss”) 1–2, ECF No. 23.

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the

court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accept all well-

pleaded facts as true, and draw reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.” Taha v. Int’l Broth. of

Teamsters, Loc. 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d

911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013)). The court recites the facts in keeping with these principles but does

not vouch for the facts alleged in the complaint. See, e.g., Northen v. City of Chicago, 126 F.3d

1024, 1025 (7th Cir. 1997).

Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the International “conducts business throughout the

United States.” Compl. ¶ 2. Its president appointed defendant Wende as business manager of

IW Local 63 in 2018. Compl. ¶ 4. IW Local 63 must follow its own constitution and bylaws as

well as the constitution and bylaws of the International. See Compl. ¶¶ 3–4. The membership of

IW Local 63 elected Hall to the office of business agent in June 2013. Compl. ¶ 9. He was

reelected to consecutive three-year terms in 2016 and 2019. Id. Under IW Local 63’s

constitution and bylaws, its president appoints all members of the board of trustees of the union’s

pension and benefit funds. See Compl. ¶ 49. Hall was initially appointed to several board and

liaison positions, including an appointment as a trustee of IW Local 63’s defined contribution

pension trust fund. See Compl. ¶ 11.

“As a Business Agent, HALL was a vocal critic of policies and positions taken by the IW

LOCAL 63 leadership, which he felt were contrary to the interests of the Local’s membership.”

Compl. ¶ 12. The complaint describes in detail a series of rancorous, and sometimes violent,

disputes Hall had with IW Local 63 leadership between 2015 and 2020. See Compl. ¶¶ 13–59.

These events culminated in an incident referred to in the complaint as the “union hall brawl.”

See Compl. ¶¶ 53–55, 57–58. The events described in the complaint include:

• November 2015: Hall sent written questions to the law firm that regularly represented

IW Local 63. Hall inquired about possible conflicts of interest created by the firm’s

representation of union members in workers’ compensation and personal injury

matters. See Compl. ¶ 13.

• November 2015: A fellow union member physically attacked Hall at an IW Local 63

social event “for no identifiable reason.” Compl. ¶ 14. Despite being the victim, Hall

was later reprimanded for this incident, but his attacker was not disciplined. Compl.

¶ 15.

• January 2016: Hall made a motion at a quarterly board meeting calling for the

pension trust fund to use a competitive bidding process to select a vendor to

administer the fund rather than, as was proposed, hiring the previously retained

administrator without issuing a request for proposals (“RFP”). See Compl. ¶¶ 17–19.

The motion passed, and Hall was removed from the pension fund’s board shortly

thereafter. See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 22.

• April 2016: Paul Thompson (“Thompson”), who was then the president of IW

Local 63, attempted to prevent Hall from being reelected as a business manager via a

procedural maneuver, specifically by abruptly opening nominations for candidates

after Hall had left the union hall. See Compl. ¶¶ 20–21. Someone “tipped off” Hall,

and he returned in time to be nominated and ultimately reelected. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29.

• Later in 2016: Hall was removed from several appointed positions “for scrutinizing,

raising questions, and speaking out, about the Local’s benefit plans, and the excessive

fees, management, and performance of its plans and trust funds,” as well as for other

activities contrary to the interests of union leadership. See Compl. ¶ 24; see also

Compl. ¶¶ 22–23, 25–27. For the first time in 20 years, the board closed executive

board meetings to business managers, including Hall. Compl. ¶ 28.

• November 2017: Hall attempted to file charges with the National Labor Relations

Board (“NLRB”) against two construction companies because members of their

management teams were allegedly serving as union officials. See Compl. ¶ 32.

• December 2017: Hall attended a meeting in Chicago arranged by the International’s

president, Eric Dean (“Dean”). At the meeting, “Hall [was] directed to abandon the

NLRB charges.” Compl. ¶ 34. The meeting became heated. At one point, Dean

moved his chair, blocked Hall from leaving, and threatened to remove him as

business agent. Id. Hall did “not proceed with the NLRB charges for fear of

retaliation, and losing his job.” Compl. ¶ 35.

• June 2018: Thompson declined to reappoint Hall to a committee when his

appointment lapsed. Compl. ¶ 36. With the lapse of this and prior appointments, Hall

became “the only business agent for IW Local 63 not assigned to any committees.”

Id.

• June 2019: Defendant Wende, IW Local 63’s newly elected business manager,

reinstated some of Hall’s responsibilities and committee appointments. See Compl.

¶ 38.

• August 2019: Hall objected to a decision, announced by Wende, that IW Local 63

would purchase real property located next to the union hall. See Compl. ¶¶ 39–41.

Wende had represented to union membership that the fair market value of the

property was $900,000, but Hall uncovered evidence that it had been appraised for

substantially less than the fair market value and the agreed purchase price. See

Compl. ¶¶ 39–40. The Chief Financial Officer of the company that manages IW

Local 63’s pension benefit fund owned an interest in the property. See Compl. ¶ 40.

After Wende declined to cancel the purchase, Hall contacted the U.S. Department of

Labor. See Compl. ¶¶ 41–42. Hall’s complaint resulted in the purchase being

“tabled” due to the low appraisal value. See Compl. ¶¶ 42–43. Wende confronted

Hall about his interference in the purchase. See Compl. ¶ 43.

• October 17, 2019: The same IW Local 63 member who assaulted Hall in

November 2015 physically attacked Hall again, without provocation, while he was

attending a lunch meeting with other union members. See Compl. ¶ 44. 1 Hall

alleges on information and belief that his “enemies within the IW LOCAL 63’s

leadership orchestrated the attack.” Compl. ¶ 44. Hall initiated union charges against

his attacker and also filed a civil lawsuit in Cook County Circuit Court alleging a

battery claim.2 See Compl. ¶¶ 44a-46. Hall won at the union trial, but his attacker

received a “minimum fine,” which union leadership did not enforce. See Compl.

¶ 45.

• January 2020: Wende revoked one of Hall’s appointments after making a pretextual

charge of insubordination. Compl. ¶ 47. Hall was also charged in a union proceeding

in connection with the November 2015 assault based on a false claim that he was

responsible for the altercation. Compl. ¶ 48.

• February 2020: Hall introduced a resolution to amend IW Local 63’s constitution and

bylaws to provide for direct election of trustees who sit on the boards of its various

trust funds. See Compl. ¶ 49.

In response to Hall’s proposed resolution, Wende and/or Thompson

circumvent[ed] the established constitutional protocol for the

————————————————————

1 The complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 44 and two paragraphs numbered 73. See

Compl. 11, 21‒22. This opinion distinguishes between these paragraphs by citing the second

paragraphs as “44a” and “73a,” respectively.

2 Hall alleges that the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a judgment on his civil battery

claim against this assailant, including an award of punitive damages. Compl. ¶ 46. Hall does not

provide the date of the judgment or the case number. See Compl. ¶ 46. This court has located the

docket of Hall v. Machek, 2020L065006 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct., Ill., filed Jan. 17, 2020), but the

complaint asserts claims for negligence and willful and wanton conduct stemming from an incident

that occurred on the date in question, October 17, 2019. See Compl. 1, 2, id. (Jan. 17, 2020). A

default judgment in the amount of $51,796 was entered on October 15, 2020. However, the defendant

subsequently appeared, and the case’s present status is unclear from the state court’s docket sheet.

Most recently, the docket sheet reflects that an unspecified motion was filed on March 4, 2022, but no

disposition of that motion is indicated on the docket sheet.

presentment, consideration, and passage of amendments to the

constitution & by-laws, by soliciting the untimely intervention of

the BSOIW General Executive Board, or certain of its members, to

prevent HALL’s resolution from coming to the floor to be voted on,

and instead declare the resolution “out of order” before its second

reading.

Compl. ¶ 50.

• March 2020: A jury of union members found Hall not guilty of the charges stemming

from the November 2015 assault. Compl. ¶ 51. Other charges were filed against Hall

on the day he was acquitted, but they were dismissed without a hearing. See Compl.

¶ 52.

• July 10, 2020: The “union hall brawl” occurred. “[D]uring a debate at the regular

monthly union hall [sic], HALL is surrounded by IW Local 63’s officers and

physically attacked by multiple people, including one of the Local’s other business

agents, and an organizer, is thrown to the ground, struck and punched.” Compl. ¶ 53.

Hall alleges on information and belief that his opponents in IW Local 63 leadership

orchestrated the union hall brawl to create a pretext to discipline him and disqualify

him from holding office. Compl. ¶ 55.

On July 12, 2020, Wende permanently banned Hall from union property, citing as reasons

“acts of violence against members of the local, being disruptive at union hall meetings, and the

July 2020 union hall brawl.” Compl. ¶ 56. Wende also suspended Hall from carrying out his

duties as business agent. Id. IW Local 63 did not discipline anyone else involved in the

July 2020 union hall brawl. Compl. ¶ 57.

On July 20, 2020, Wende sent a letter to IW Local 63 members falsely blaming Hall for

the union hall brawl and otherwise defaming Hall. Compl. ¶ 58; ECF No. 23-3. The letter stated

that Hall was banned from IW Local 63 property, which includes the union hall. Compl. ¶ 58.

Wende also seized Hall’s work vehicle, laptop computer, cell phone, and credit card. Compl.

¶ 58.

On November 6, 2020, Wende terminated Hall’s role as business manager without filing

formal charges or holding a hearing. Compl. ¶ 59. Wende also sent a second letter to all

members of IW Local 63 stating that Hall had been removed from office and making other “false

defamatory statements” (not further specified in the complaint). See Compl. ¶ 59; ECF Nos. 23-

2, 25-3.

The complaint’s first two counts arise under the LMRDA. Section 101(a)(1) of the

LMRDA states that, subject to certain exceptions, “Every member of a labor organization shall

have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in

elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to

participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 411(a)(1). In count I, Hall pleads a claim under § 101(a)(2), which provides in part, “Every

member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other

members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). Referring

to the events of 2015–20 pleaded in the complaint, Hall alleges that defendants’ retaliatory acts

trampled HALL’s rights and deprived him of his job as Business Agent of IW

Local 63; and his right to go to the IW Local 63 union hall, to meet and assemble

freely with other members, to recertify his welding training and certificate, and to

secure employment as an iron worker through the union hall.

Compl. ¶ 62.

In count II, Hall alleges that defendants violated § 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA by

suspending him and banning him from the union hall without first serving him with a written

charge of wrongdoing and holding a hearing. See Compl. ¶¶ 66–70. Section 101(a)(5) states,

“No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise

disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless

such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to

prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). Hall pleads

that the ban has “effectively stripped him of membership rights, including the right to participate

in the democratic processes of the union, to meet and assemble freely with other members, to

recertify his welding training and certificate, and compromised his ability to secure employment

as an iron worker in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).” Compl. ¶ 68.

Count III is a breach of contract claim under Illinois law. See Compl. 20; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction). Hall asserts that defendants “breached the promises,

guarantees, and due process rights contained in the IW Local 63[’s], and The International

Union’s Constitutions and Bylaws, when HALL was banned, suspended, and terminated,

including, but not limited to, the . . . promises, guarantees, and rights described in Article XXVI

of the BSOIW constitution.” Compl. ¶ 73.

II. Motion to Transfer Venue

The International bases its motion to transfer venue entirely on the following venue and

forum-selection clause in its constitution: “Any suit or legal action brought by any member,

person, firm, entity claiming any benefit, privilege or right under this Constitution or against The

International Association shall be brought in the tribunal of competent jurisdiction located in the

city where the Headquarters of this International Association is located.” 2016 Const. of the

International (“2016 Int’l Const.”), art. XIII, § 10(b), Mot. to Transfer Ex. B at 46, ECF No. 24-

2. The International maintains that this clause requires this case to be transferred to the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, where its headquarters is located. See Mot. to

Transfer 4, ECF No. 24; Compl. ¶ 2.

Title 28, United States Code, § 1404(a) provides, “For the convenience of parties and

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other

district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all

parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In analyzing a motion to transfer under

§ 1404(a), the court must balance “all relevant private and public interest factors.” In re Ryze

Claims Sols., LLC, 968 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Piper Aircraft

Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)). As private interest factors, “courts generally consider

the availability of and access to witnesses, and each party’s access to and distance from resources

in each forum.” Rsch. Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978

(7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “[T]he ‘interest of justice’ is a separate element of the

transfer analysis that relates to the efficient administration of the court system.” Id. at 978 (citing

Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 626‒27 (1964)). Factors to be considered include “docket

congestion and likely speed to trial in the transferor and potential transferee forums, each court’s

relative familiarity with the relevant law, the respective desirability of resolving controversies in

each locale, and the relationship of each community to the controversy.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). Courts balancing the private and public interest factors must give a valid and

enforceable forum-selection clause “controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.” In

re Ryze Claims Sols., 968 F.3d at 705 (quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for

the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013)).

Ordinarily, the party moving for a change of venue under § 1404(a) “has the burden of

establishing, by reference to particular circumstances, that the transferee forum is clearly more

convenient.” Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219–20 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations

omitted). However, the presence of a valid forum-selection clause “requires district courts to

adjust their usual § 1404(a) analysis in three ways.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. First, where a

valid forum-selection clause is present, the burden shifts to the party opposing transfer to

establish “that transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted.” Id. at 63.

Second,

a court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer based on a forum-

selection clause should not consider arguments about the parties’ private interests.

When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge

the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their

witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.

Id. at 64. “Third, when a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its contractual

obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with it

the original venue’s choice-of-law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect public-

interest considerations.” Id. at 64 (citation omitted).

Hall offers several arguments against transfer, including that the forum-selection clause in

the International’s constitution was not the product of any meaningful bargaining, rendering it

unenforceable. See Resp. Opp’n Mot. to Transfer 4–12, ECF No. 33. This argument creates

tension with the complaint’s breach of contract claim, which seeks to enforce Hall’s contractual

rights under, among other things, the International’s constitution and bylaws. See Compl. ¶¶ 72–

73a. The court need not reach these arguments, however, because Hall is correct that enforcing

the forum-selection clause in the International’s constitution would contravene public policy

established in the LMRDA. See Resp Opp’n Mot. to Transfer 8‒10.

In Title I of the LMRDA, Congress enacted “an exhaustive ‘Bill of Rights’ [for union

members] enforceable in federal court.” Loc. No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley,

467 U.S. 526, 536 (1984) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 411–15). “In particular, Title I is designed to

guarantee every union member equal rights to vote and otherwise participate in union decisions,

freedom from unreasonable restrictions on speech and assembly, and protection from improper

discipline.” Id. at 535–36 (citing Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435–36 (1982); other citation

omitted). To enforce these rights, Congress included a provision in § 102 of the LMRDA

allowing individual union members to sue in federal district court. See Crowley, 467 U.S.

at 537–38 (discussing legislative history).

The second sentence of § 102 specifies a special venue for suits arising under Title I of

the LMRDA:

Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been

infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district

court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be

appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the

district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation

occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.

29 U.S.C. § 412.

The second sentence makes venue proper (1) where the “violation occurred;” or

(2) where the defendant labor organization’s “principal office” is located. Id.; Serpico v.

Laborers’ Int'l Union of N. Am., 1995 WL 479569, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1995). Most, if not

all, of the material events, confrontations, and decisions on which Hall’s claims are based

occurred in this district. See Compl. ¶¶ 13–59. The International contends in its reply that some

of the events also occurred in Washington, D.C., where Hall sent documents to appeal

unsuccessfully to the International and where the International decided his appeal. See Reply

Supp. Mot. to Transfer 3, ECF No. 38. Depending on the facts alleged, there is support for the

proposition that, under § 412, venue may lie where the union’s challenged decision was made.

See, e.g., Michael v. Thompson, 2007 WL 4390342, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2007); Serpico,

1995 WL 479569, at *4; see also Foster v. Int’l Broth. of Boilermakers, 1987 WL 16236, at *1–2

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1987). On the other hand, the Second Circuit has held, “Where, as here, a

member charges that his union has interfered with his rights under the Act, that interference must

be said to have occurred where it actually took effect upon the member, not where the union

determined its plan of action.” Giordani v. Upholsterers Int’l Union of N. Am., 403 F.2d 85, 88

(2d Cir. 1968).

Determining where the International’s appeal decision occurred for § 412 purposes is

unnecessary in this case. Regardless of the answer, the complaint, with inferences favorable to

Hall, alleges interference by the International occurring in Cook County, Illinois. These

allegations include the International’s president, Dean, meeting with and threatening Hall in

Illinois in December 2017, and the International’s executive board sending a representative to an

IW Local 63 meeting in Illinois to declare “out of order” Hall’s proposed amendment to IW

Local 63’s bylaws and constitution. See Compl. ¶¶ 33–34, 49–50. Based on these alleged acts

occurring in this district, the LMRDA’s special venue provision in § 412 gives Hall the right to

bring an action against the International in the Northern District of Illinois and in Washington,

D.C. See Serpico, 1995 WL 479569, at *3.

Therefore, as interpreted by the International, the forum-selection clause in Article XIII

of its constitution withdraws Hall’s statutory right to sue in this federal district court, making the

place of its headquarters the exclusive venue for this LMRDA suit. See Mot. to Transfer 2–4. So

interpreted, the International’s constitution runs afoul of the following provisions of the LMRDA

bill of rights:

(a) . . .

(4) Protection of the right to sue. No labor organization shall limit the right of

any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before

any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization

or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or

proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a

witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition

any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such

member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to

exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting

legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer

thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or employer

association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in,

except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.

* * * *

(b) Any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization which

is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no force or effect.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), 411(b).

Hall argues that § 411(a)(4) renders the forum-selection clause in the International’s

constitution unenforceable because it limits his statutory venue rights, but he cites no case so

holding. See Resp. Opp’n Mot. to Transfer 8–10. The International does not address this

argument in its reply. See ECF No. 38.

Federal courts of appeals have construed § 411(a)(4) broadly: “If a union member’s right

to sue is to have any meaning, courts must be ever vigilant in protecting that right against

indirect and subtle devices as well as against direct and obvious limitations.” Serv. Emps. Int’l

Union v. Loc. 1199 N.E., 70 F.3d 647, 654 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Phillips v. Int’l Ass'n of

Bridge Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1977); other citation omitted). Consistent with this

construction, the court in Serpico applied § 411(a)(4) to hold unenforceable a forum-selection

clause in a union constitution similar to the one at issue here. See Serpico, 1995 WL 479569,

at *1–3. The constitution in Serpico included the following clause: “Venue to litigate any action

arising out of contractual rights allegedly premised upon the Union Constitution shall exist only

in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.” Id. at *1 (alterations omitted). In

holding that this clause was incompatible with the LMRDA, the court reasoned that “a forum-

selection clause, by depriving the union member of a preferred and otherwise available forum,

may impose costs that deter litigation.” Id. at *2.

The facts before the court in the case at hand illustrate this point. Hall lives in Oak Lawn,

Illinois. Compl. ¶ 30. He has submitted an uncontested affidavit averring that he has limited

financial resources and that litigating this case in Washington, D.C., would be a “severe financial

hardship.” Aff. of J. Hall ¶ 4, Resp. Opp’n Mot. to Transfer Ex. 1, ECF No. 33-1. Based on

Hall’s averments and the foregoing authorities, the court holds that § 411(a)(4) of the LMRDA

“makes Congress the exclusive source of limitations on a members’ right to sue.” Serpico,

1995 WL 479569, at *3. Because §§ 411(a)(4) and (b) render the forum-selection clause in the

International’s constitution unenforceable insofar as it deprives Hall of his statutory right to

venue in this court, the International’s motion to transfer is denied.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard and Facts Considered

Defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions “test[ ] the sufficiency of

the complaint, not the merits of the case.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873,

878 (7th Cir. 2012). A complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the short and plain statement must overcome two hurdles. First, the complaint’s factual

allegations must be sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Second, the complaint

must contain sufficient allegations based on more than speculation to state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face. Id. For purposes of resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts

the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in

the plaintiff’s favor. See Hernandez v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 63 F.4th 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing

Crescent Plaza Hotel Owner, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 303, 308 (7th Cir. 2021)).

Hall objects that many of defendants’ arguments are based on facts not alleged in his

complaint and exhibits attached to defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Resp. Opp’n Mots. to

Dismiss 4, 5–6, 11–13, 14, ECF No. 34. Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the complaint’s

sufficiency, the court’s resolution of such a motion “can be based only on the complaint itself,

documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to

in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago,

675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) and Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1 (1986); other citations omitted). Under this standard, the court must

disregard facts asserted by defendants in their Rule 12(b)(6) briefing that contradict the

complaint’s well-pleaded allegations and any exhibits properly before the court. See Geinosky,

675 F.3d at 745 n.1; Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that

formally striking a defendant’s briefing is unnecessary); Plumbers’ Pension Fund, Local 130 v.

Republic Piping Sys., Inc., 2020 WL 4437846, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2020) (Gottschall, J.);

TCF Mortg. Corp. v. Gelber Holding Co., 1991 WL 127587, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1991).

Accordingly, the court “disregards the factual assertions in [defendants’] briefing that either

conflict with or go beyond the complaint.” Republic Piping, 2020 WL 4437846, at *2.

“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented

to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Neither side asks the court to convert defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)

motions to summary judgment motions. Defendants nevertheless ask the court to consider

several exhibits on the theory that they are referenced in the complaint and central to its

allegations. See Local 63 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 23; International’s

Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 25. When the plaintiff does not attach a document to the complaint,

it can still be considered if the complaint refers to it, it is “central to the plaintiff[’s] claim,” and it

is “concededly authentic.” Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 679 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2009)); Venture Assocs. Corp. v.

Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). Defendants’ exhibits consist of (i) the

constitutions of the International and IW Local 63 (ECF Nos. 23-1, 23-4, 25-2) and (ii) Wende’s

letters to IW Local 63 membership dated July 20 and November 6, 2020 (ECF Nos. 23-2, 23-3,

25-3).

Hall argues that the union constitutions are not central to his LMRDA claims. See Resp.

Opp’n Mots. to Dismiss 5–7. The court cannot agree. The exception allowing consideration of

documents central to a plaintiff’s complaint “is a narrow exception aimed at cases interpreting,

for example, a contract.” Levenstein, 164 F.3d at 347. International and local union

constitutions create contractual rights. See generally Korzen v. Loc. Union 705, Int’l Broth. of

Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996). Hall alleges that several of the acts which violated

his LMRDA rights, including his suspension and removal without filing charges or holding a

hearing, also violated the union’s constitution and bylaws. See Compl. ¶¶ 48, 50, 56, 58–59.

These allegations put the applicable constitutions and bylaws sufficiently at issue to trigger the

exception for documents referenced in and central to the complaint. See Wood v. Dennis,

489 F.2d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1973) (considering union constitution when reviewing a decision on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); see also, e.g., Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714, 718

n.4 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering contract referenced in the complaint); Venture Assocs., 987 F.2d

at 431‒32 (same).

The complaint references Wende’s letters dated July 20 and November 6, 2020, by way

of background and specifically alleges that both letters made false and defamatory accusations

against Hall in retaliation for his exercising his LMRDA rights. Compl. ¶¶ 58–59. In their

motions to dismiss, defendants quote from Wende’s letters dated July 20 and November 6, 2020.

See Local 63 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 6 & n.3; International’s Mot. to Dismiss 11.

Defendants argue in effect that the court should accept the letters’ factual claims about Hall’s

alleged misconduct, Wende’s motivations for the disciplinary action he took against Hall, and

Wende’s contested claims about who was responsible for the July 2020 union hall brawl. Based

on these letters, defendants ask the court to conclude that Hall “was terminated as a result of non-

speech conduct, [because] not one item of his advocacy was cited as motivation for his

termination.” Local 63 Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 6–7; see also International’s Mot. to

Dismiss 11. Defendants’ request to credit the letters’ allegations must be denied because the

complaint alleges that the letters contain false and defamatory allegations against Hall and that

the union hall brawl was orchestrated by IW Local 63 leadership to create a pretext to discipline

Hall. See Compl. ¶¶ 56–60. The complaint’s factual allegations prevail over the letters’ contrary

statements at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Were the court to consider these letters and credit Wende’s

version of the facts, the incorporation doctrine “would become a backdoor to a one-sided

summary judgment procedure—the very thing Rule 12(d) seeks to prevent.” Ware v. Lake Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 2017 WL 914755, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2017) (citing Facebook, Inc. v.

Teachbook.com LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). The letters attached to

defendants’ motions to dismiss will not be considered.

IV. Analysis of Motions to Dismiss

“Congress passed the LMRDA out of ‘concern with widespread abuses of power by

union leadership,’ ” and the LMRDA’s provisions have the “overarching objective of “ensuring

that unions w[ill] be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships.’ ”

Vought v. Wis. Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, 558 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2009) (alteration in

original) (quoting Finnegan, supra, 456 U.S. at 435). Defendants make several arguments for

dismissing Hall’s LMRDA claims, but the court reaches only their argument that Hall did not

exhaust internal union dispute resolution procedures before filing suit. See Local 63 Defs.’ Mem.

Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 3–10; International’s Mot. to Dismiss 3–11.

Title I of the LMRDA provides that a union “member may be required to exhaust

reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such

organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or

any officer thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). This provision “normally” requires a plaintiff to

exhaust internal remedies before filing suit. Vought, 558 F.3d at 620 (citing Stevens v. Nw. Ind.

Dist. Council, 20 F.3d 720, 733 (7th Cir. 1994)); see Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Automobile,

Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981); Wood, 489 F.2d

at 856. In his complaint, Hall pleads in conclusory fashion that he “exercised all internal

remedies available to him to resolve his claims asserted herein.” Compl. ¶ 63. By themselves,

“merely conclusionary” allegations of this sort in a complaint do not suffice to plead exhaustion.

Wood, 489 F.2d at 856; see also Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678‒79. But Hall also pleads that he

unsuccessfully appealed to the International’s executive board. Compl. ¶ 63(c).

Defendants maintain that Hall had additional remedies. They point to Article XIII § 6 of

the International’s constitution:

The General Executive Council shall decide all appeals coming before it from the

General Executive Board and decide all other matters properly coming before it. It

shall maintain a record of all cases and make a report to the regular Convention,

and all decisions of the General Executive Council shall be final unless reversed by

the regular Convention.

2016 Int’l Const. art. XIII, § 6, International’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 45‒46, ECF No. 25-2.

According to defendants, Hall should have appealed, but did not, the general executive

board’s decision to the general executive council and, if dissatisfied with the result, taken his

grievances to the regular convention. See International’s Mot. to Dismiss 5‒6; Local 63 Defs.’

Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 4. Hall does not dispute that he did not take these steps.

To show that he should not be required to take further steps, Hall cites a 90-year-old case

stating that the language of Article XIII § 6 “confers no right of appeal upon anybody. It gives

the council ‘power to hear appeals from the General Executive Board’ and to decide other

matters properly coming before it.” Walsche v. Sherlock, 159 A. 661, 665 (N.J. Ch. 1932)

(quoting prior version of the constitution at issue here). The Walsche court made this point to

emphasize that the phrase “other matters” was not defined in Article XIII, which is not the issue

here, where defendants contend that Hall should appeal to the council. See id. Moreover,

Walsche’s construction of Article XIII supports the conclusion that the Council has the power to

hear and decide an appeal from Hall without a time limit. See id. In other words, the remedies

provided by Article XIII § 6 remain available to Hall today, as far as the record shows.

Hall also argues that he should not be required to follow the procedure in Article XIII § 6

because it merely makes an appeal available; he implicitly argues that he is not obligated to

appeal. See Resp. Opp’n Mot. to Dismiss 5–8. Contrary to Hall’s argument, the Seventh Circuit

has required exhaustion under a union constitution that “provide[d] for” an appeal without

explicitly requiring one. See Harris v. Plasterers & Cement Masons Loc. No. 406, 619 F.2d

1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Harris v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Loc. No. 1291,

321 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1963).

Using language similar to § 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, a separate provision of the

International’s constitution requires Hall to exhaust “all rights, remedies and reasonable

provisions for hearing, trial, and appeal within [the International]” before filing suit.3 See 2016

Int’l Const., art. XIX, § 4, International’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 57‒58. This language by its

terms requires exhaustion of not only “rights” to appeal but also “provisions for hearing, trial,

and appeal.” Id. Thus, members must resort to the remedies in Article XIII § 6 before filing suit,

even though that section does not explicitly require an appeal. Because Hall did not comply with

this requirement, he has not exhausted his internal union remedies.

When analyzing whether to excuse the failure to exhaust internal union remedies, the

court considers the following factors:

First, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope

to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals

procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to

award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of

internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain

a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim.

Stevens, 20 F.3d at 731 (alteration omitted) (quoting Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689) (non-exhaustive

list of factors).

Hall contends that the appeals process in Article XIII, even if available on paper, must be

“reasonable . . ., which has more to do with their execution then how they read on paper.” Resp.

————————————————————

3 This provision reads in full:

No suit or other action at law or equity shall be brought in any court and no

proceeding shall be initiated before any administrative agency by any officer or

member of The International Association or any Local Unions affiliated with The

International Association until and unless all rights, remedies and reasonable

provisions for hearing, trial, and appeal within The International Association shall

have been properly followed and exhausted by the officer, member or Local Union.

This provision shall require that they resort to internal remedies for a period not

exceeding four (4) months. The provisions of this Section shall be enforced to the

extent permitted by law.

Int’l 2016 Const., art. XIX, § 4, International’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 57‒58.

Opp’n Mots. to Dismiss 7. Hall does not explain what specifically about the appeals process, as

practiced, is unreasonable. See id. He points to the complaint’s allegations that he was banned

from IW Local 63 property and removed from office in violation of IW Local 63’s constitution

and bylaws, which require formal charges to be filed against him. See id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 56,

58, 59). From these allegations, Hall asserts that it is reasonable to infer that, despite his having

filed an appeal, no meaningful appellate review is possible, most likely because there is no

record of a trial to review (assuming that is how an appeal before the council and convention

works). See id. Hall cites no authority in support of this argument. See id.

In order to excuse failure to exhaust internal remedies based on these grounds, Hall “must

establish that ‘union officials [were] so hostile to [him] that [he] could not hope to obtain a fair

hearing on [his] claim.’ ” Vought, 558 F.3d at 620 (alterations in original) (quoting Stevens,

20 F.3d at 733); see also Clayton, 451 U.S. at 688–89. In Harris v. Plasterers & Cement Masons

Local No. 406, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that their failure to exhaust

internal union appellate procedures should be excused because the formal charges against them

did not comply with union bylaws and constitutional requirements. See Harris v. Plasterers &

Cement Masons Local No. 406, 619 F.2d 1164, 1168‒69 (7th Cir. 1980). “A challenge to a local

union’s disciplinary procedures,” held the court, “should properly be made in the first instance

within the union since there is [a] possibility that corrective action may render the particular

issues moot, thus conserving judicial resources.” Id. (citing Buzzard v. Loc. Lodge 1040,

480 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973) and McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Loc. 107 of Int’l

Broth. of Teamsters, 223 F. Supp. 341 (Del. 1963)). Hall suggests no reason why he could not

argue before the council that the relevant union constitutions and bylaws were violated because

charges were not brought against him and a trial was not held. See Resp. Opp’n Mots. to

Dismiss 7‒8. Thus, as in Harris v. Plasterers & Cement Masons Local No. 406, there is no

reason to think the internal union process is unavailable or inadequate to hear and resolve Hall’s

procedural arguments and take corrective action if such action is warranted. See Harris,

619 F.2d at 1168–69. Nor does Hall allege in his complaint or briefing that anyone associated

with the International’s executive committee, which would hear his appeal, was involved in the

July 2020 decision to ban him from the union hall and remove him from office. See Compl.

¶¶ 56–59; cf. Howard v. Loc. 152 of Int’l Constr. & Gen. Laborers’ Union of Am., 999 F. Supp.

1213, 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1998). For these reasons, neither the complaint nor the representations in

Hall’s briefing plausibly allege grounds to excuse Hall’s failure to exhaust his internal remedies

under Article XIII of the International’s constitution. See Vought, 558 F.3d at 620; Stevens,

20 F.3d at 733.

The Seventh Circuit prescribed the remedy for failure to exhaust in Stevens: “Normally,

failure to properly exhaust should lead a federal court to stay its hand until exhaustion can be

completed (or the dispute resolved in the process).” Stevens, 20 F.3d at 733. But dismissal is

proper where “exhaustion can never be completed because of the nature of the default.” Id. In

Stevens, the plaintiff missed a 30-day deadline to appeal in the union’s constitution, making

exhaustion impossible and therefore requiring dismissal. See id. The parties here have not

briefed the proper remedy. The court has located nothing in the union’s constitution imposing a

deadline for appealing to the council or the convention under Article XIII § 6. This case will

therefore be stayed for a period not to exceed four months to allow Hall to exhaust his internal

remedies.4

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the International’s motion to transfer venue is denied, and

defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. In

accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), this case is stayed for a period not to exceed four months

————————————————————

4 If defendants believe that dismissal is the appropriate remedy based on the language of the

International’s constitution, they may file an appropriate motion citing the specific provision they

believe entitles them to relief.

to permit plaintiff to exhaust his internal union remedies. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the

complaint are denied without prejudice to refiling if and when the stay is lifted.

Dated: September 27, 2023 /s/ Joan B. Gottschall

United States District Judge