The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Patrick Brown, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 17-cv-1647
)
v. ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
)
Tarry Williams, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patrick Brown brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tarry Williams, in his
individual capacity and in his official capacity as the warden of Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”). Brown alleges that Williams was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs relating
to the treatment of his seizures while he was incarcerated at Stateville, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Before the Court today is William’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
explained below, Defendant’s motion [298] is denied with respect to the claims brought against
Williams in his individual capacity and granted with respect to the claims brought against Williams in
his official capacity as warden of Stateville.
Background
On February 28, 2020, Brown filed his Second Amended Complaint alleging that Williams,
Alma Martija, M.D. (“Dr. Martija”), and Wexford Health Sources Inc., were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. On November 2,
2022, on receipt of a joint stipulation from the parties, the court dismissed the suit as to Wexford
Health Sources and Dr. Martija, leaving Williams as the sole remaining defendant. Williams is
named in both his individual and official capacity.
For the purposes of evaluating this motion, the following facts are accepted as true. Plaintiff’s
claims arise from the treatment of his seizures at Stateville, where he was incarcerated from 2004
through December 17, 2015, at which point he was moved to Pontiac Correctional Center. Williams
served Stateville’s warden from April 2014 through July 15, 2015. (Dkt. 302, ¶ 3). On April 22,
2014, Brown was prescribed a medication, Keppra, to treat he had suffered from for over a decade.
(Id. at ¶ 2.) In early 2015, Brown reported to Dr. Martija, his doctor at Stateville, that he was
experiencing seizures again. Medical records indicate that Brown was only receiving doses of
Keppra, which is a daily medication, once or twice per week. (Dkt. 302-15, at 784). Brown told Dr.
Martija on February 3, 2015 that his seizures were getting worse, but Dr. Martija still recorded his
seizures as “Good” and noted “No Reported Seizures Past (1) Year.” (Id. at 783). On August 11,
2015, Brown saw Dr. Martija again and Dr. Martija took him off Keppra. (Dkt. 302, ¶ 5). Brown
suffered numerous seizures after that.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, this Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). However, “[m]erely alleging a factual dispute cannot defeat the summary
judgment motion.” Samuels v. Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1989). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Analysis
Williams raises two scant arguments in support of his motion for summary judgment. First,
he argues that Brown failed to establish the requisite personal involvement by Williams required for
liability under § 1983 because he was not Stateville’s warden during the period in question. Second,
Williams argues that claims against him in his official capacity are moot.
Turning first to Williams’ personal involvement, his sole argument is that Williams was no
longer the warden of Stateville when Brown was taken off Keppra on August 11, 2015. Because
Williams was no longer at Stateville when Brown was taken off his medication, he argues it is
impossible for Brown to show that Williams was personally involved in that decision.
It is undoubtably true that defendants must play an individual role in some constitutional
injury to warrant liability under § 1983. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). And if
the sole constitutional violation alleged here was that Brown was taken off his medication on August
11, 2015, then Williams would be correct. But facts surfaced during discovery and discussed by
Brown in his opposition to the present motion suggest that the injury in question may have begun as
soon as early 2015, when Brown was not given adequate doses of his seizure medication and when
Williams was still warden. Of course, questions remain as to whether that failure amounts to an
Eighth Amendment violation and as to whether Williams himself was personally involved.1 But the
Court can only evaluate the arguments presented to it, and Williams’ departure from Stateville in July
2015, on its own, is insufficient to defeat Brown’s deliberate indifference claim.
Turning to the claim against Williams in his official capacity as warden of Stateville, he
argues the claim is moot because Brown is no longer incarcerated at Stateville. This is correct. First,
1 Brown presents a several theories supporting Williams’ personal involvement in his injury, including Williams’ role in
staffing shortages and recordkeeping issues among the medical staff at Stateville, as well as a 2014 Order from another
Court in this district placing him on notice of Brown’s need for medical care; the Order specifically instructs the warden
of Stateville to “ensure that Plaintiff receives medical and mental health attention for his medical and psychological
needs.” (Dkt. 32-22, at 2). The Court takes no stance today on whether Plaintiff has raised a triable question of fact as
to Williams’ individual role in his alleged injury nor on whether all the elements of a deliberate indifference claim are
met. It finds only that the dates of Williams’ service at Stateville alone cannot defeat Brown’s claim.
a plaintiff is only able to seek injunctive relief, not damages, against a state employee in his official
capacity, because a damages suit 1s prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Sweeney v. Madigan,
359 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (N.D. IIL 2019) (Coleman, J.) (“The Eleventh Amendment generally bars
actions in federal court against .. . state officials acting in their official capacities.”). Second, Brown
is unable to seek an injunction against the warden of Stateville because he is no longer incarcerated
there. “Ifa prisoner is transferred to another prison, his request for injunctive relief against officials
of the first prison is moot unless ‘he can demonstrate that he 1s likely to be retransferred.”” Higeason
v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Brown has not attempted to make a showing that he ts likely to be retransferred to Stateville.
Brown’s claim against Wilhams in his official capacity as warden is thus moot and dismissed from
the suit.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Willam’s motion for summary judgment 1s denied in part and
granted in part. ‘The motion is denied with respect to Wiliams in his individual capacity and granted
with respect to his capacity as warden of Stateville Correctional Center.
TIT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/28/2023
Entered:
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Court Judge