Rankin v. Chicago Park District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Stanley Rankin,

Plaintiff,

No. 20 CV 794

v.

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

Chicago Park District, J.D. Ostergaard,

and Sidney Lewis,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Stanley Rankin (“Rankin”) brings suit against his former employer the Chicago

Park District (“Park District”) and Park District employees J.D. Ostergaard

(“Ostergaard”) and Sidney Lewis (“Lewis”) for employment discrimination and

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42

U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”). Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

[Dkt. 90]. The motion is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and

against Rankin on all remaining counts of Rankin’s amended complaint.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and

attached exhibits. [See Dkts. 92, 93, 94, 95, 106.] These facts are undisputed except

where a dispute is noted.

Rankin began working for the Park District in 2014 as a Seasonal Attendant.

Rankin is Black and was 58 years old at the time of incidents giving rise to this

lawsuit. During his employment, Rankin was a member of Service Employees

International Union Local 73 (“Union”). His employment was subject to the Union’s

January 1, 2019 Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Park District (“CBA”).

Rankin is classified as a “career service employee.” [Dkt. 92, ¶ 20.]

The Park District is a local public entity that maintains and operates over 600

parks, sports fields, beaches, museums and other facilities. The Park District’s

governing body is its Board of Commissioners (“Board”), which is made up of seven

members. The Park District also has a Personnel Board that oversees personnel and

disciplinary policy and renders final decisions in employee discipline appeals. The

Personnel Board consists of two members of the Board of Commissioners, along with

the Director of Human Resources (“HR”). The Park District’s HR Department and HR

Director are responsible for overseeing and carrying out the employment policies of

the Personnel Board. They are also responsible for enforcing the provisions of the

Park District’s Code of Conduct and instituting discipline. HR Managers have

“frontline responsibility” for resolving employee conflicts, enforcing the Park

District’s Code of Conduct, and initiating discipline for infractions. At all times

relevant to this lawsuit, Michael Simpkins (“Simpkins”) (who is Black and was born

in 1961) was the Park District’s HR Director. Janet Ortiz (“Ortiz”) (who is Hispanic

and was born in 1989) was the HR Manager responsible for employee discipline in

the North Region, which includes the park where Plaintiff worked.

The employee discipline process is controlled by the Park District’s Code of

Conduct, Disciplinary Guidelines, and any applicable CBA. The Disciplinary

Guidelines group employee misconduct into three categories, Groups “A”, “B”, or “C”,

with Group A being the most serious. Pursuant to the Disciplinary Guidelines, Group

A misconduct includes “committing, attempting, or threatening physical violence

other than in self-defense on Park District property or while on duty”. Group B

misconduct includes “direct disobedience to lawful orders from a supervisor”. Group

C misconduct includes any “misconduct other than misconduct identified as Group A

or Group B misconduct”. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 14.] The CBA provides a table of penalties

applicable to the groups of misconduct in the Disciplinary Guidelines:

Group A: Termination for the first offense, absent mitigating

circumstances justifying a less serious penalty.

Group B: 1st offense: 3–5 day suspension; termination may be called

in for appropriate cases.

2nd offense: 5-day suspension or termination.

Group C: 1st offense: oral, written, or 1-3 day suspension.

2nd offense: 1-5 day suspension.

3rd offense: 5-day suspension or termination.

[Dkt. 92, ¶ 15.] Pursuant to the CBA, while the Park District generally follows

progressive discipline, it may depart from this principle if “an act is sufficiently

severe.” [Id., ¶ 16.]

If a suspension or discharge may be warranted, a Corrective Action Meeting

(“CAM”) is scheduled. The CAM is facilitated by the HR Manager. During the CAM,

the HR Manager gathers facts and the employee is afforded a chance to respond to

allegations of misconduct and present evidence in his defense. The purpose of the

CAM is to allow the HR Manager to gather information from the employee and his

chosen representative regarding the specific charges and to afford the employee an

opportunity to present his side. Following the CAM, the HR Manager may conduct a

follow-up investigation based on information provided by the employee. After the

CAM, the HR Manager, in consultation with the HR Director and the Park District’s

Law Department, generates a CAM Notice of Disposition announcing if the charges

were sustained, and if so, the discipline that will be imposed. The discipline can range

from a written reprimand to termination, depending on the severity of the offense.

Before a career service employee like Rankin can be terminated, he has the

right to a hearing before a hearing officer appointed by the Personnel Board. The

hearing officer conducts a hearing pursuant to the rules of evidence and issues a

recommended decision. A dissatisfied employee can file written exceptions to the

recommended decision with the Personnel Board. The Personnel Board rules on the

hearing officer’s recommended decision and any timely filed exceptions by accepting,

rejecting, or modifying the recommended decision. Personnel Board decisions are

subject to administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

About three years after Rankin began his employment with the Park District,

he was transferred to Berger Park. (The summary judgment record is largely silent

as to Rankin’s earlier work history or why he was transferred, although Rankin’s

brief hints at “personal issues” between himself and his supervisors.) At Berger Park,

Plaintiff’s supervisor was Ostergaard, a white male born in 1984. On January 28,

2019, Rankin filed an Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) Charge against

the Park District alleging race and age harassment by Ostergaard. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 26.]

The parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements provide no details on the factual basis for

this charge. The charge attached to the amended complaint indicates that Plaintiff

felt that Ostergaard was micro-managing him and being overly critical, which

Plaintiff attributed to his race and age. [See Dkt. 27 at 4-5.]

Rankin was on sick leave from his position at Berger Park from April 8 to April

18, 2019. On the afternoon of April 9, 2019, Rankin visited Mandrake Park, which is

also managed by the Park District. Rankin had worked at Mandrake Park prior to

being reassigned to Berger Park. There is an office building adjacent to Mandrake

Park, in which the Park District leases space for its staff offices and indoor

programming. The office building is owned by the Chicago Housing Authority

(“CHA”). The CHA building has a patron entrance where patrons are required to sign

in to enter the facility. The CHA building also has a secure, employee-only entrance

in the back of the building. CHA employs security from Skytech Security at the CHA

Building. Skytech Security has authority to restrict access to the CHA building.

Mandrake Park’s supervisor was Lewis, who is Black and was born in 1979.

Lewis began working for the Park District in October 2014 and has been Mandrake

Park supervisor since October 2016. As the Mandrake Park Supervisor, Lewis had

the authority to restrict access to the CHA Building. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 23.] According to

Lewis, he was in his office on the afternoon of April 9, 2019 and heard a “loud” banging

sound coming from the employee entrance. [Id., ¶ 28.] Lewis went to the employee

entrance and observed Rankin attempting to enter the CHA Building through the

employee entrance. Lewis informed Rankin that he was not permitted to enter

because he was not a Mandrake Park employee and he had no Park District business

to conduct at the building. Rankin refused to leave the employee entrance doorway

and insisted that he be permitted to enter. He positioned himself in a way that

impeded the closure of the employee entrance door. A verbal and physical

confrontation between Lewis and Rankin ensued. During the approximately ten-

minute confrontation, Lewis made multiple requests for Rankin to move himself from

the employee entrance, which Rankin refused. During the incident, Lewis did not

make any comments about Rankin’s race or age. Lewis recorded a portion of the

confrontation on his cell phone. [Dkt. 93.]

Three other individuals were present during the confrontation: Program and

Event Coordinator Thomas Hayes (“Hayes”), who is Black and was born in 1993;

Mandrake Park Physical Instructor Charles George (“George”), who is Black and was

born in 1994; and Etaria Lyles (“Lyles”), a Skytech Security Officer whose race is not

identified in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 materials. During the altercation, Park

District staff called the police. The police arrived and ordered Rankin to leave, which

he did. [See Dkt. 92, ¶ 30.] A police report was generated.

Following the incident, Lewis drafted an incident report and Lewis, Hayes,

George, and Lyles drafted witness statements describing the occurrence with Rankin.

According to Lewis’ witness statement, after he told Rankin that he needed to leave,

Rankin “pushed, bumped, and shoved” Lewis in “an attempt to bulldoze his way into

the building.” [Dkt. 92, ¶ 32.] According to Hayes’ witness statement, he “observed

[Lewis] and [Lyles] having words with [Rankin],” and overheard Lyles and Lewis

inform Rankin that he was not permitted to enter the CHA Building. [Id.] Hayes’

witness statement further reported that the interaction went back and forth for “7 to

10 minutes,” until the police arrived. [Id.] According to George’s witness statement,

Rankin “attempt[ed] to use force to muster his way through [Lewis] as he stood at the

door”. [Id.] According to Lyles’ witness statement, upon noticing Rankin at the

facility, Lyles advised Rankin that he could not enter the facility. Lyles’ witness

statement further indicates that Rankin attempted to “push pas[t] Mr. Lewis so [she]

stood in between the both of them with hope that Mr. Rankin would leave and allow

[her] to close the entry door, but he did not leave.” [Id.]

Lewis submitted the incident report and witness statements to HR. The matter

was assigned to Ortiz. On April 27, 2019, Ortiz prepared a CAM notice based on the

incident report, narratives, and police report. Rankin received a copy. The CAM

notice advised Rankin that it had been alleged that he “failed to be respectful and

polite on Chicago Park District property when he attempted to use aggressive force

towards a Park Supervisor on April 9, 2019 which is a violation of the Chicago Park

District’s Violence in the Workplace Policy.” [Dkt. 92 at 9-10.] The CAM Notice cited

the following Code of Conduct and Violence in the Workplace policy provisions, which

Rankin’s conduct allegedly violated:

Section I (H): An employee shall comply with the policies and procedures

of the Chicago Park District and the written policies of his/her

department or unit. Policies and procedures of the Chicago Park District

include, but are not limited to, any Park District ordinance, any

directive of the Board of Commissioners, any Personnel Board Rule, and

any directive bulletin or memorandum issued by the General

Superintendent.

Section I(E): An employee shall refrain from committing, attempting or

threatening physical violence against another employee or a member of

the public while on the work site or while on duty, except in self-defense.

Violence in the Workplace Policy: Aggressive or hostile behavior

including but not limited to, threatening remarks, hazing or any activity

or gesture that creates a reasonable fear of injury to another person or

subjects another person to individual distress.

On July 25, 2019, Ortiz held a CAM, which Rankin attended with his attorney.

This was the first time that Rankin had ever spoken to Ortiz. [See Dkt. 92, ¶ 35.]

During the CAM, Rankin denied that he bumped, pushed, or shoved Lewis during

the April 9, 2019 incident. According to Rankin, he had gone to Mandrake Park to

drop off tax papers for the daughter of Mandrake Park Program Facilitator Sandra

Young (“Young”). Young denied having knowledge of Rankin ever providing tax

documents to her daughter. Rankin further informed Ortiz that he had filed a police

report against Lewis concerning the April 9, 2019 incident. Following the CAM, Ortiz

contacted Young, obtained the police report generated by Rankin, and obtained

documents relating to Rankin’s use of sick leave during the period.

On August 13, 2019, Ortiz—with the approval of Simpkins—issued a CAM

Disposition terminating Rankin for cause. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 37.] Ortiz took into account the

incident report, witness statements, police reports, doctor’s note, Rankin’s timesheet

for the period at issue, and the information obtained during the CAM. Ortiz

determined that the weight of the evidence supported Lewis’ narrative and

contradicted Rankin’s description of the April 9, 2019 incident. Ortiz further

determined that Rankin’s conduct included “Group A” misconduct. In particular, her

CAM Disposition identified the following instances of misconduct as the basis for

Rankin’s termination:

On April 9th, you failed to be respectful and polite on Chicago Park

District property when you attempted to use aggressive force towards a

Park Supervisor.

You provided the Chicago Park District a doctor’s note stating you were

unable to work from 4/8-4/18 due to illness. During the CAM, you

indicated [sic] going to Mandrake Park on April 9th to complete your

taxes which is an abus[e] of sick leave.

[Dkt. 92, ¶ 37.] The CAM Disposition explained further that Rankin’s conduct

violated certain provisions of the Code, Code of Conduct, and Violence in the

Workplace Policy, including:

Code of Conduct Section I(E): An employee shall be respectful and polite

in conduct while on duty or on park property.

Code of Conduct Section I(G): An employee shall refrain from

committing, attempting or threatening physical violence against

another employee or a member of the public while on the work site or

while on duty, except in self-defense.

Code of Conduct Section I (H): An employee shall comply with the

policies and procedures of the Chicago Park District and the written

policies of his/her department or unit. Policies and procedures of the

Chicago Park District include, but are not limited to, any Park District

ordinance, any directive of the Board of Commissioners, any Personnel

Board Rule, and any directive bulletin or memorandum issued by the

General Superintendent.

Violence in the Workplace Policy: Aggressive or hostile behavior

including but not limited to, threatening remarks, hazing or any activity

or gesture that creates a reasonable fear of injury to another person or

subjects another person to individual distress.

Park District Code, Ch. 5.B.2.c. Abuse of sick leave, including the

furnishing of false information in connection with a sick leave request,

failing to submit the appropriate documentation, failing to submit to a

physical examination, failing to return to work when such leave has

been terminated, or using sick leave for a reason other than those

outlined in 2.b.1 of this Code will result in disciplinary action up to and

including discharge.

[Dkt. 92, ¶ 37.]

On August 14, 2019, Rankin filed a timely appeal of his termination with the

Personnel Board. Five days later, on August 19, 2019, Rankin filed a charge of

discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation. Rankin’s appeal to the

Personnel Board and his EEOC charge proceeded concurrently on separate tracks,

with the EEOC’s proceedings concluding first. In particular, the EEOC issued Rankin

a Right to Sue letter on November 20, 2020, which was before the Personnel Board

ultimately decided his appeal.

In connection with his appeal to the Personnel Board, a hearing was held on

December 2 and December 9, 2019. Rankin was represented by an attorney. At some

point following the hearing, the hearing officer issued the following recommendation:

I find that the Chicago Park District has established by a preponderance

of the evidence that Stanley Rankin violated Section I(E), I(H), and I(G)

of the Chicago Park District’s Code of Conduct. Rankin also violated the

Violence in the Workplace Policy and the Sick Leave Policy. I

recommend that the termination be affirmed.

[Dkt. 92, ¶ 38.]1 On November 12, 2021, Rankin filed written exceptions to the

hearing officer’s findings and recommendation. On December 27, 2022, the Personnel

Board voted to adopt the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer and

upheld Rankin’s termination.

1 The Hearing Officer’s findings and recommendations are not dated [see Dkt. 92-1 at

6- 76] and the parties’ submissions do not indicate when the Hearing Officer made his

decision or communicated it to Plaintiff. [See Dkt. 92-1 at 5, ¶ 11 (Hrysikos declaration).]

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent

Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 2022). The Court “must construe all facts and

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The

Court “‘may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which

inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.’” Johnson v. Rimmer,

936 F.3d 695, 705 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th

Cir. 2003)).

Summary judgment “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit, when a

party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its

version of events.” Wade v. Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Schacht

v. Wis. Dept’ of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999)). A party opposing summary

judgment must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment

is proper if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 646

(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). The non-moving party “must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986). The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s]

position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. Analysis

A. Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 governs summary judgment practice in this district. See

generally Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). Defendants

filed a Local Rule 56.1 statement along with their summary judgment motion, as

required by Local Rule 56.1. [See Dkt. 92.] Local Rule 56.1 requires a party opposing

a summary judgment motion (here, Rankin) to file a concise response to the movant’s

Local Rule 56.1 statement. See L.R. 56.1(b)(2), (e). “To dispute an asserted fact, a

party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must

concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. Asserted facts

may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary

material.” L.R. 56.1(e)(3). The party opposing summary judgment may also file his

own statement of additional material facts, if he wishes to assert facts not set forth

in the movant’s statement. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). Rankin also received the Local Rule 56.2

notice that is provided to all unrepresented litigants. [See Dkt. 95.]

In his Local Rule 56.1 response, Rankin largely does not dispute the facts set

out in Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statement. In particular, he “agrees” with

paragraphs 1 through 27 of Defendant’s statement, as well as paragraph 38. [Dkt.

106 at 1.] Rankin “can neither agree nor disagree” with paragraphs 33 through 37,

which concern the Park District’s human resources investigation and his termination.

[See id. at 2.] Because Rankin cites nothing in the record to explain his lack of

information, and thus his inability to confirm or deny the facts alleged in those

paragraphs, those facts are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by the

record materials cited by Defendants. Rodriguez. v. City of Berwyn, 2018 WL

5994984, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2018). Rankin disputes only paragraphs 28 through

32, which concern the incident at Mandrake Park that precipitated his termination.

[Dkt. 106 at 2.] But Rankin does not cite any evidentiary material to controvert

Defendants’ facts or explain the basis for his disagreement. All he says is that he

“disagrees with the statements alleged” in those paragraphs. [Id.] Rankin also chose

not to file a statement of additional material facts.

The Seventh Circuit “has repeatedly recognized that district courts may

require exact compliance with their local rules,” including the “local rules governing

summary judgment.” Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 969 F.3d 343, 349 (7th

Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). Consistent with the purpose of Local Rule 56.1, however,

the Court has “broad discretion” to relax or enforce strictly local rules governing

summary judgment practice. Edgewood Manor Apt. Homes, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co.,

733 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1168, 1169

(7th Cir. 2013)); see also Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632. Because the Court prefers to decide

cases on the merits, not on technicalities, it considers the arguments Rankin raises

to the greatest extent possible. As the analysis below indicates, however, Rankin’s

agreement with most of Defendants’ asserted facts, along with his decision not to file

a statement of additional material facts, means that the record is devoid of evidence

tying the Park District’s decision to terminate him to his race, age, or any protected

activity in which he engaged, which is fatal to his claims.

B. Race Discrimination

Rankin brings race discrimination claims against the Park District based on

Title VII and against the individual Defendants based on § 1983 and § 1981. In

general, the same standards govern intentional discrimination claims under all of

these statutes. Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2020); Nagle v.

Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1114 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Title VII, an

employer may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An

employer violates Title VII if it “intentionally relies in part” on an individual

employee’s membership in a protected class when the employee makes an adverse

employment decision. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741, 590

U.S. -- (2020). Put differently, “if changing the employee’s” race or other protected

characteristic “would have yielded a different choice by the employer,” then “a

statutory violation has occurred.” Id. Under § 1981 and § 1983, “individual liability

is possible if [a] subordinate employee, motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent,

caused the nominal actors to take the adverse action,” which “can happen, for

example, if the evidence shows that the nominal decisionmakers played no real role

in the action, but instead simply rubber-stamped the action of the subordinate.”

Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2020).

The summary judgment record shows that Rankin is a member of a protected

class based on his race (Black) and that he suffered an adverse employment action—

termination. Causation is the only element for the Court to resolve. At summary

judgment, the question is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder

to conclude that the Rankin’s race “‛caused the discharge or other adverse

employment action.’” Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)); see also

Nigro v. Indiana Univ. Health Care Assocs., Inc., 40 F.4th 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2022);

Purtue v. Wisc. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2020). Rankin can establish

causation using the burden-shifting method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973), or in a holistic manner under Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760. See Riley, 829

F.3d at 891-92. In their opening brief, Defendants analyze the case under both

McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz. In his response to summary judgment, Rankin does

not address either method—or even mention race or age—instead focusing on a few

discrete factual disputes surrounding his termination. The Court agrees with

Defendants that Rankin fails to meet his burden under McDonnell Douglas or Ortiz.

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, the plaintiff has the

“initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination” by showing that 1)

he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate job

expectations; 3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) similarly situated

employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably. Wince, 66 F.4th

at 1040. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the “burden shifts to the defendant to

provide a legitimate justification, before finally shifting back to the plaintiff to

establish that such justification was pretextual.’” Wince, 66 F.4th at 1040 (quoting

Dunlevy v. Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022)).

Under this framework, Rankin’s race discrimination claims are a non-starter

due to his inability to identify any similarly situated employee outside his protect

class who was treated more favorably than him. Rankin questions why he was fired

and Lewis was not, even though “both adults chose to engage in childish behavior and

the identity of the initiating aggressor remains in dispute.” [Dkt. 105 at 2.] But Lewis

is in the same protected class as Rankin; both are Black. Ostergaard cannot be used

as a comparator, either. Though he is white, the summary judgment record contains

essentially no evidence concerning Ostergaard—and certainly no evidence that

Ostergaard was ever involved in a physical and verbal altercation with another

employee but was allowed to keep his job.

Even if Rankin could establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, he

fails to rebut the Park District’s showing that it had a valid reason to terminate him

and fails to come forward with sufficient evidence that the Park District’s decision

was a pretext for discrimination. “Pretext is a lie, specifically a phony reason for some

action.” Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 591 F.3d 393, 403-404 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “to show pretext, a plaintiff must show

that (1) the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason was dishonest, and (2) the

employer’s true reason was based on a discriminatory intent.” Id. “Pretext does not

exist if the decisionmaker honestly believed the nondiscriminatory reason given by

an employer for an adverse employment action.” Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 48

F.4th 793, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“So, in evaluating pretext, the focus is on what the decisionmakers knew, and their

perceptions are ‘controlling.’” Id. (quoting Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895,

902 (7th Cir. 2010)). “[T]he pretext inquiry turns on honesty, not correctness, and

even if we assume a less severe punishment might have been more appropriate, that

fact does not, without more, provide evidence of pretext.” Liu v. Cook County, 817

F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2016).

In this case, the decisionmakers were Ortiz, the HR Manager who made the

August 13, 2019 decision to terminate Rankin’s employment, and Simpkins, the HR

Director who approved Ortiz’s decision. In his response to summary judgment,

Rankin does not mention Ortiz and Simpkins or offer any information on whether

they honestly believed that he engaged in a terminable offense. He simply argues

that, “given the circumstances a reasonable jury would conclude and agree that

Defendants actually did not have a proper justification for termination outside of

suspected personal issues and past issues between Rankin and Ostergaard and

similarly between Rankin and Lewis.” [Dkt. 105 at 1.] Rankin questions whether the

story Lewis told HR—portraying Rankin as the aggressor—was entirely accurate.

But this is not sufficient to show that the reasons Ortiz and Simpkins provided for

the termination were dishonest or that Ortiz and Simpkins harbored any

discriminatory bias. See Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784,

795 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[t]he question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was

inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the reasons it has

offered to explain its decision” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted));

Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[i]t was up to

Adams to produce evidence showing that Wal-Mart did not genuinely believe that she

had” stolen the money—not simply that the “investigators might have made a

mistake in their conclusion”).

The Court recognizes that a plaintiff “may prevail—even without showing that

the ultimate decisionmaker harbored discriminatory bias—by invoking the cat’s paw

theory of liability.” Sinha v. Bradley University, 995 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2021); see

also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011); Brewer v. Board of Trustees of

University of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2007). Under this theory, “where an

employee without formal authority to materially alter the terms and conditions of a

plaintiff’s employment” (like Lewis) “nonetheless uses h[is] ‘singular influence’ over

an employee who does have such power to harm the plaintiff for racial reasons, the

actions of the employee without formal authority are imputed to the employer and

the employer is in violation of Title VII.” Brewer, 479 F.3d at 917. However, “[a]n

employer may avoid cat’s-paw liability if ‘the decisionmaker is not wholly dependent

on a single source of information and conducts her own investigation into the facts

relevant to the decision.’” Sinha, 995 F.3d at 574 (quoting McDaniel v. Progress Rail

Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 370 (7th Cir. 2019)). “So long as ‘the employer’s

investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the [other

employee’s] original biased action ... the employer will not be liable.’” Id. (quoting

Staub, 562 U.S. at 421).

In this case, Rankin has not developed a cat’s paw theory of liability and the

undisputed evidence in the record would not support one. There is no evidence that

Lewis (who would be the “cat,” in this analogy) harbored any discriminatory animus

toward Rankin because of his race, got into the altercation with Rankin because of

his race, or exercised any influence over the HR process to have Rankin terminated

due to his race. Rankin’s response brief hints at “suspected personal issues and past

issues between Rankin and Ostergaard and similarly between Rankin and Lewis.”

[Dkt. 105 at 1.] But Rankin has not introduced any evidence into the summary

judgment record about any past “personal issues” between him and either Lewis or

Ostergaard. Rankin provides no hint that any of those issues involved his race.

Rankin simply disputes how, exactly, the altercation at Mandrake Park unfolded. For

instance, Rankin disputes paragraph 28 of Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement,

which says that Lewis heard “banging,” which prompted him to go to the employee

entrance. Rankin points to (1) a memo prepared by security on the same day of the

incident, which said that Lewis “was alerted by building security that Stanly Rankin

was trying to access the building through the locked door” and (2) Young’s testimony

that she did not hear banging. [Dkt. 105 at 3-4.] Assuming this is an inconsistency,

Rankin does not explain how it is material or how it shows that the reasons given for

Rankin’s termination were a lie. It is undisputed that Lewis, as the Mandrake Park

Supervisor, had the authority to restrict access to the CHA Building. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 23.]

There is no dispute that Rankin went to the Mandrake Park CHA building and sought

to enter the secured employee entrance, that Lewis said he could not enter, and that

an altercation with Lewis ensued.

Further, there is no evidence that Ortiz or Simpkins (the “paws”) harbored any

racial bias themselves, or depended solely on Lewis’ side of events in deciding that

terminating Rankin was appropriate. Sinha, 995 F.3d at 574. Instead, the record

shows that they “conduct[ed] [their] own investigation into the facts relevant to the

decision.” Id. Rankin admits that the discipline he received complied with the Park

District’s Disciplinary Guidelines and the CBA applicable to his employment. [See

Dkt. 106 at 1 (admitting to paragraphs 13-20 of Defendants’ L.R. 56.1 statement).]

The evidence demonstrates that Ortiz and Simpkins made good faith findings that

Rankin committed Group A misconduct during his confrontation with Lewis, which

warranted termination for the first offense. Ortiz determined that Rankin’s conduct

violated the Park District’s Code, Code of Conduct, and Violence in the Workplace

Policy. [See id. at 1-2 (agreeing with paragraphs 12, 32 and 38 and offering no

objection to paragraph 37 of Defendants’ L.R. 56.1 statement).]

The Park District’s decision to terminate Rankin was based on documentary

evidence that included not only Lewis’ statement, but also eyewitness statements

from Hayes, George, and Lyles, as well as a police report. The evidence indicated that,

while Rankin was off work and on paid sick leave from his Berger Park position, he

ignored directives from Lewis and building security and attempted to enter the

restricted employee entrance at the CHA Building. [Id.] Following Rankin’s

termination and a two-day appeal hearing, an independent hearing officer

recommended that Rankin’s termination be upheld. This recommendation was

adopted by the Park District’s Personnel Board. [Id. at 2 (admitting to paragraph 38

of Defendants’ L.R. 56.1 statement).]

Finally, Rankin questions whether his purported “abuse of sick leave” provided

another valid basis for the Park District’s decision to terminate him. Rankin argues

that this is an “innocuous infraction,” and that he did not violate the policy’s “sub-

conditions”—failure to submit appropriate documentation, submit to a physical

examination, or return to work when leave was terminated. [Dkt. 105 at 4-5.] But

Rankin ignores that Park District Code, Ch. 5.B.2.c., also considers it an abuse of sick

leave to “us[e] sick leave for a reason other than those outlined in 2.b.1.” [Dkt. 92, ¶

37.]. Section 2.b.1 provides that sick leave may only be used for illness, disability

(including disability due to pregnancy) or injury of the employee, their spouse or

dependent child, or appointments with doctors, dentists, or other professional medical

practitioners. [Id. at 12, n.1.] Rankin was at Mandrake Park while on sick leave in

connection with his taxes, which is not one of the uses provided for in section 2.b.1.

Even if the Park District made a mistake by concluding that he abused his sick leave,

there is no evidence that Ortiz and Simpkins did not honestly believe that Plaintiff

violated the policy or that their decision was a pretext for racial discrimination.

In sum, the Park District has shown that it had a legitimate, non-

discriminatory basis for terminating Rankin’s employment. Rankin has not identified

any evidence that calls into doubt that Ortiz and Simpkins honestly believed that his

termination was warranted and therefore cannot prove his case under the McDonnell

Douglas framework. See Dickerson v. Walgreen Co., 345 F. App’x 178, 180 (7th Cir.

2009) (violation of company policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

termination); Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1998)

(violation of company’s sexual harassment policy was legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for terminating Rankins).

As an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “may prove

discrimination in a holistic fashion, by proffering ‘direct or circumstantial evidence of

intentional racial discrimination.’” Wince, 66 F.4th at 1040 (quoting Bagwe v.

Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2016)). The Seventh

Circuit has “identified three broad types of circumstantial evidence that will support

an inference of intentional discrimination: ambiguous or suggestive comments or

conduct; better treatment of people similarly situated but for the protected

characteristic; and dishonest employer justifications for disparate treatment.” Joll v.

Valparaiso Community Schools, 953 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2020). Under Ortiz, the

Court looks at all of the evidence together and asks simply “whether the evidence

would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the Rankin’s [membership in a

protected class] ... caused the discharge or other adverse employment action” at issue.

834 F.3d at 765.

Viewing the summary judgment record through a holistic lens does not save

Rankin’s race discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, or § 1983. He offers no

direct or circumstantial evidence suggesting that he was fired because of his race: no

direct statements tying the termination decision to his race; no ambiguous or

suggestive comments concerning race; no similarly situated, non-Black employees

who engaged in similar misconduct but were not terminated; and no evidence that he

was fired as a pretext for race discrimination, rather than because the

decisionmakers honestly thought that he engaged in a terminable offense. Assessing

the evidence as a whole, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Park

District terminated Rankin because of his race. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 race

discrimination claims.

C. Age Discrimination

In addition to his race discrimination claims, Rankin brings an ADEA age

discrimination claim against the Park District. Similar to Title VII, the ADEA

protects employees over the age of 40 from employment discrimination. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a)(1). However, “in the ADEA context, it’s not enough to show that age was a

motivating factor. The plaintiff must prove that, but for his age, the adverse action

would not have occurred.” Martino v. MCI Commc'ns Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 455

(7th Cir. 2009). “In this respect, the ADEA is narrower than Title VII ... as Title VII

also protects against mixed-motive discrimination.” Carson, 865 F.3d at 532; see also

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., U.S. 167, 174 (2009); Marnocha v. St. Vincent

Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2021); Skiba v.

Illinois Central Railroad Co., 884 F.3d 708, 719 (7th Cir. 2018). Causation for an

ADEA claim may be established holistically or using the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting method. See Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2020).

Rankin’s age discrimination claim is deficient for essentially the same reasons

as his race discrimination claims. Rankin’s claim fails under McDonnell Douglas

because he does not rebut the Park District’s showing that it had a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason to terminate him. His claim fares no better under Ortiz,

because he makes no attempt to identify any direct or circumstantial evidence tying

the Park District’s decision to terminate him to his age. Therefore, the Park District

is entitled to summary judgment on the ADEA claim, too.

D. Retaliation

Finally, Rankin brings a retaliation claim against the Park District under Title

VII. To succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must “present evidence of

(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the

employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic

Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595

F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). Like a Title VII discrimination claim, a Title VII

retaliation claim may be proven using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

method or the Ortiz holistic method. See Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874,

885 (7th Cir. 2018). “The key question is whether a reasonable juror could conclude

that there was a causal link between the protected activity or status and the adverse

action.” Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Associates, Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir.

2019).

The summary judgment record shows that on January 28, 2019—

approximately seven months before he was terminated—Rankin engaged in

protected activity when he filed an IDHR Charge against the Park District alleging

race and age harassment by Ostergaard. [Dkt. 92, ¶ 26.] But like with his race

discrimination claims, Rankin has no evidence of causation. Rankin does not argue,

let alone provide any evidence suggesting, that Ortiz or Simpkins knew about or took

into account his IDHR Charge when they decided to terminate him, or that they did

not honestly believe that he engaged in a terminable offense. The only evidence

Rankin has is timing.

“[F]or a suspicious-timing argument alone to give rise to an inference of

causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘an adverse employment action follows

close on the heels of protected expression’”—typically “no more than a few days—and

the plaintiff [must] show that the person who decided to impose the adverse action

knew of the protected conduct.” Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir.

2012) (quoting Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also

Kotaska v. Federal Express Corp., 966 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2020) (cautioning that

“close timing alone is rarely enough to raise a triable claim of retaliation”; “[t]here

must be other circumstantial evidence of retaliation”); cf. Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA,

Inc., 202 F.3d 9138, 918 (7th Cir. 2000) (‘The mere fact that one event preceded

another does nothing to prove that the first event caused the second... Rather, other

circumstances must also be present which reasonably suggest that the two events are

somehow related to one another.”). Under Seventh Circuit precedent, it would be far

too speculative to infer a retaliatory motive solely from the fact that Rankin was fired

approximately seven months after filing an EEOC Charge. And that is the only

evidence of retaliation that Rankin has, entitling the Park District to summary

judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 90] is granted. Judgment is

entered in favor of Defendants and against Rankin on all remaining counts of

Rankin’s amended complaint.

Enter: 20-cv-794

Date: September 18, 20238 2S OO

Lindsay C. Jenkins

United States District Judge

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