Bass v. Sgt. A. Dakuras

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Jeanette Bass,

Plaintiff,

No. 19 CV 7557

v.

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

Sgt. A. Dakuras, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On June 23, 2019, Janette Bass1 requested a police supervisor come to her

home to address concerns about a police report she had previously filed. Andrew

Dakuras, then a Chicago police sergeant, responded to the call. While at Bass’s home,

Dakuras concluded that Bass needed immediate mental-health treatment and

detained her so she could be taken to the hospital. Bass brought this lawsuit against

Dakuras and the City of Chicago (collectively, “Defendants”). [Dkt. 1.] Now before the

Court are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 115] and Bass’s cross-

motion for partial summary judgment [Dkt. 112]. For the reasons discussed below,

Defendants’ motion is granted, and Bass’s motion is denied.

I. Background

On June 20, 2019, Bass filed a police report against her condominium

association’s management “for allegedly entering her unit without permission and

videotaping Bass in her unit when she was undressed from the waist down.” [Dkt.

1 Bass’s first name is misspelled “Jeanette” in the case caption. [See Dkt. 114 at 1 n.1.]

130 ¶ 5.] The police report characterized her complaint as noncriminal trespass, but

Bass believed management had committed criminal trespass. On June 23, 2019, she

called the police station and spoke to Sergeant Erick Seng; later that day, she called

911 and requested a supervisor come to her home to amend the classification from

noncriminal to criminal. [Dkt. 133 ¶ 6.] Dakuras responded to the call. [Dkt. 130 ¶ 8.]

Footage from Dakuras’s body-worn camera captures the entirety of his

encounter with Bass. After Dakuras arrives at Bass’s condo unit on the thirty-first

floor, he introduces himself. [Dakuras Body-Worn Camera (“BWC”) at 3:30–5:30.]

Bass begins describing her conflicts with her condo association:

I had to, obviously, change my locks, for the tune of $200. As you see,

the main water line’s broke. They banned me from the office because I

asked them to fix it, and I’ve called the police several times to help me

because they’ve called the police on me for no reason, so I have a history

now, and I have them all recorded, how many times I’ve called you all to

help me. On Thursday [June 20], they crossed the line. I was not notified

that they were coming into my unit, so a bunch of men first come, and I

was naked, and they came in and they wouldn’t leave, for five minutes.

[Id. at 5:30–6:10.] While Bass is talking, Dakuras makes simple statements like “OK”

[id.], and then he asks what the men did. Bass replies, “Nothing, except stare at me,”

and says they committed criminal trespass. [Id. at 6:10–:25.] Dakuras disagrees that

the incident was criminal trespass and suggests that the entry would have been

permissible in an emergency; Bass insists there was no emergency. [Id. at 6:25–:53.]

Bass describes the messages she sent to the condo association regarding the

incident, then begins to play a recording she says captures “the second criminal

entry.” [Id. at 6:53–8:10.] As the recording plays, Bass states, “It’s criminal entry

when they don’t have permission and there’s no emergency.” [Id. at 8:50–:58.]

Dakuras starts to say, “Ma’am, the report—” but Bass says, “No, the report does not

say that.” [Id. at 8:58–9:04.] She holds up a piece of paper she says is a copy of the

report; tells Dakuras, “It does not say that”; and says she had spoken with the

detective who filed the report. [Id. at 9:04–:15.]

The conversation then becomes more adversarial. Dakuras indicates that Bass

can contact the detective so he can amend the report. [Id. at 9:15–:19.] Bass disagrees,

and they begin talking over each other, disputing what Sergeant Seng told Bass. [Id.

at 9:19–:45.] Then, Bass begins playing a recording of her earlier interaction with

Seng, while Dakuras simultaneously calls Seng on the phone. [Id. at 9:45–10:21.]

While Dakuras talks to Seng, Bass tries to speak to Dakuras, but he raises his voice

and says, “Ma’am, I’m talking on the phone! Do not interrupt me!” [Id. at 10:22–:32.]

Bass again tries to say something about the recording, and Dakuras says, “I’m talking

to the sergeant on the phone right now.” [Id. at 10:32–:36.] Bass says, “Don’t scream

at me, sir, I’m the victim.” Dakuras responds that he is “trying to get to the bottom of

this,” and Bass says, “I’m the victim,” twice more. [Id. at 10:37–10:46.] Seemingly out

of patience, Dakuras ends the call with Seng and tries to terminate the interaction.

[Id. at 10:47–:53.] Speaking over Bass, Dakuras says he has received a report, wishes

her a good day, and moves toward the door. [Id. at 10:54–11:30.]

Bass continues to speak to Dakuras, which causes him to turn around. Bass

says, “They can come into my unit and take me naked, and you’re not going to put

that down on the report?” [Id. at 11:30–:42.] Dakuras initially tells Bass not to yell at

him, then asks, “Ma’am are you in crisis?” and repeats, “Are you in crisis?” when Bass

does not immediately answer. [Id. at 11:35–:45.] Bass says, “If you’d been broken in

when you were naked, and you people”; points at Dakuras and adds, “Because of you”;

she then sits down. [Id. 11:43–:49.] Dakuras asks, “You’re in crisis because of me?” to

which Bass responds, “Yeah, because of you, lying.” [Id. at 11:49–:52.] Dakuras asks

Bass if she is under the treatment of any doctor, and Bass says no. [Id. at 11:52–:55.]

Next, Bass tells Dakuras to leave her unit, and he refuses. [Id. at 12:04–:11.]

Bass repeats the demand, and Dakuras again refuses. [Id. at 12:16–:18.] Dakuras

then radios to ask for an ambulance and a “wagon” for a “mental-health transport.”

[Id. at 12:19–:27.] Bass stands and repeatedly insists Dakuras leave her unit. [Id. at

12:27–:42.] Dakuras asks what hospital he can take Bass to, and Bass says, “I have

post-traumatic syndrome from the police.” [Id. at 12:42–13:08.] Dakuras says her only

two options are to go to the hospital voluntarily or involuntarily. [Id. at 13:10–:19.]

Bass makes a call to “Michael,” whom she tells to come as quickly as possible because

“they’re arresting me”; Dakuras explains he is not arresting her. [Id. at 13:20–:55.]

Bass approaches Dakuras, and Dakuras says, “don’t put your hands on me,” although

the video does not definitively show whether she touches him. [Id. at 13:55–14:08.]

Bass calls 911 and reports Dakuras for refusing to leave, and she continues to speak

to the 911 operator for over two minutes. [Id. at 14:08–16:45.]

Bass then walks out of her open front door, and Dakuras follows. [Id. at 16:45–

17:00.] Dakuras tells Bass to stay where she is, but Bass enters the stairwell. [Id. at

17:00–:10.] Dakuras follows her down (and later up) several flights of stairs and

through hallways. [Id. at 17:10–18:15.] He catches up with her on the twenty-seventh

floor, and Bass walks toward Dakuras, then tries to flee past him. [Id. at 18:15–:25.]

Dakuras stops her by grabbing her arm and shirt, handcuffs her left hand as she

drops to the floor, tries to handcuff her hands behind her back, and finally handcuffs

her hands in front of her body. [Id. at 18:25–:48.] Bass’ cell phone remained in her

hand. Dakuras keeps one or two hands on Bass until paramedics and other police

officers arrive, during which time Bass repeatedly says Dakuras is hurting her and

asks for help while speaking on her phone to 911 and Michael. [Id. at 18:48–22:00.]

The paramedics and other officers take Bass away in an elevator. [Id. at 22:00–24:30.]

The camera footage ends shortly after.

Bass filed a five-count complaint against Dakuras and the City of Chicago.

[Dkt. 1.] Counts I and II raise 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Dakuras for unlawful

seizure2 and excessive force, respectively. Count III raises an intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) claim against Dakuras under Illinois law. Count IV is a

Monell claim against the City, and Count V seeks indemnification from the City. The

Court previously granted the City’s motion to dismiss Count IV. [Dkt. 26.] Defendants

now move for summary judgment on Bass’s remaining claims [Dkt. 115], and Bass

moves for summary judgment on Count I [Dkt. 112].

2 Bass’s complaint frames this as a false arrest claim [Dkt. 1 at 1], but the parties agree

that Dakuras did not arrest Bass; he seized her for purposes of effectuating a mental health

evaluation [see Dkt. 114 at 2; Dkt. 117 at 6–7].

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Frazier-Hill v. Chi. Transit Auth., 75 F.4th 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2023).

When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in

the light most favorable to party against whom the motion under consideration is

made. Frazier-Hill, 75 F.4th at 802. A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Skiba v. Ill.

Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). Often, differing accounts of the

events at issue preclude resolution at summary judgment, but video evidence can

make factual disputes not “genuine” for summary judgment purposes. Kailin v.

Village of Gurnee, —F.4th—, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2023). “When

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

The Seventh Circuit has made clear that it is a “rare case where video evidence

leaves no room for interpretation by a fact finder,” id. (citation omitted), but this is

such a case. Dakuras turned his body-worn camera on before his encounter with Bass

began, and it ran continuously until after paramedics took Bass to the hospital. The

video footage is sharp, and—save for a few seconds here and there—Bass remains on

camera during the entire roughly 20-minute encounter. The sound quality is good,

and nearly every word spoken is audible. The recording is nothing like the grainy,

soundless video in Kailin, where “the entire video of the critical event last[ed] a mere

six seconds” and “a reasonable juror might see different things in that inkblot of a

blur.” Id. at *5. The Court can therefore rely on the footage to resolve many factual

disputes that ordinarily would be for a jury to decide.

The footage does not, however, resolve every possible dispute. One issue is

perspective. Because the camera was mounted on Dakuras’s body, it is not always

possible to tell precisely where Dakuras’s arms and legs are, or whether Dakuras is

being touched. And although the words Bass and Dakuras utter are almost always

clear, reasonable people could interpret their words or tone of voice differently. If

these disputes were material, a jury would have to resolve them, see id. at *4 (“Video

evidence … can eviscerate a factual dispute only when the video is so definitive that

there could be no reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts.” (citation

omitted)), but as explained below, the only genuine disputes are about facts

immaterial to the summary judgment decision.

III. Constitutional Claims

Dakuras moves for summary judgment on Bass’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for

unlawful seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (applied

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), and Bass moves for summary

judgment on her unlawful seizure claim. Dakuras has qualified immunity, which

“protects government officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation omitted). To survive Dakuras’s motion for summary judgment,

Bass has the burden to show that the evidence, construed in her favor, supports

finding (1) that Dakuras violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was

clearly established. See Prude v. Meli, —F.4th—, 2023 WL 5010780, at *6 (7th Cir.

Aug. 7, 2023); McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2022). Courts may

consider the two analytical steps in either order. See McGee, 55 F.4th at 572.

The Court decides the summary judgment motions at issue here at step two.

Even construed in Bass’s favor, the record shows that Dakuras did not violate any

principle of clearly established law. He is therefore entitled to summary judgment on

the § 1983 claims.

A. Count I: Unlawful Seizure

Both parties move for summary judgment on Bass’s unlawful seizure claim. It

is undisputed that Dakuras seized Bass when he refused to leave Bass’s home and

told her she would be taken to the hospital. [Dkt. 114 at 2–3; Dkt. 117 at 6–7.] The

question is whether this seizure violated clearly established law.

The Fourth Amendment governs mental-health seizures. Bruce v. Guernsey,

777 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2015). “Like ordinary seizures, mental-health seizures

comply with the Fourth Amendment if officers have probable cause, which exists only

if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to

seizure under the governing legal standard.” Id. at 875–76 (cleaned up). Probable

cause is an objective standard judged by the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g.,

United States v. Alexander, —F.4th—, 2023 WL 5163946, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 11,

2023). Under Illinois law,

[a] peace officer may take a person into custody and transport [her] to a

mental health facility when the peace officer has reasonable grounds to

believe that the person is subject to involuntary admission on an

inpatient basis and in need of immediate hospitalization to protect such

person or others from physical harm.

405 ILCS 5/3-606. This standard tracks the general rule that “a mental-health seizure

is lawful if there is probable cause to believe that the person seized is a danger to

herself or others.” Bruce, 777 F.3d at 876 (citation omitted).

In the probable cause context, an officer does not violate clearly established

law if he has “arguable probable cause,” which means “a reasonable officer in the

same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question

could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established

law.” Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

omitted). The Court has doubts that Dakuras actually had probable cause for the

mental-health seizure,3 but he at least had arguable probable cause, so he did not

violate clearly established law.

The usual way to demonstrate a legal rule is clearly established is to show that

it has “a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be

settled law, which means it is dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus

3 Illinois law permits such seizures only when there is a danger of physical harm, and

the cases Dakuras cites in support of probable cause all contain clear evidence that the

plaintiff was a danger to himself or others. Sherman v. Four Cnty. Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d

397, 401–02 (7th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. May, 1993 WL 322664, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 1993)

(nonprecedential); Knope v. McElroy, 2019 WL 4393075, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2019).

Bass—although frustrated and arguably behaving erratically—made no threats and had no

known history of self-harm or violence. Further, while Bass’s statements may have been

consistent with someone who might harm herself, they could also have been an angry

outburst.

of cases of persuasive authority,” not merely “suggested by” precedent. District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (cleaned up). Particularly in the Fourth

Amendment context, the clearly established rule must be articulated with “a high

degree of specificity.” Id. (cleaned up). This level of specificity “does not require a case

directly on point,” but “existing precedent must have placed the … question beyond

debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (internal quotation omitted).

Bass fails to satisfy this standard.4 She primarily cites cases where courts

found probable cause because a “person ha[d] expressed threats to harm himself or

others” or was “displaying threatening or dangerous behavior.” [Dkt. 131 at 8–9

(citing cases).] Bass contends that “deductive reasoning dictates that officers do not

have probable cause” to seize a person who “has neither made threatening comments

nor displayed dangerous, violent, or aggressive behavior.” [Dkt. 139 at 8.] This

argument does not follow as a matter of logic or law: cases holding that probable cause

existed based on different fact patterns do not help Bass show, to a high degree of

4 Bass seems not to understand that she bears the burden of showing that Dakuras

violated clearly established law. See Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806. After citing caselaw, she argues

that “an officer does not have arguable probable cause to detain a person for a mental health

seizure under established law where that individual has not engaged in conduct that is

analogous to conduct as described in the above-cited cases.” [Dkt. 131 at 9–10.] This

argument suggests that Dakuras is not entitled to qualified immunity unless established law

supports his probable cause determination, but this framing gets qualified immunity doctrine

backwards. See Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806.

specificity, that Dakuras did not have arguable probable cause to arrest her. See

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63.5

The only case Bass cites where a court did not find probable cause for a mental-

health seizure is Dobrzeniecki v. Vela-Sailsbery, 2014 WL 4979185 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6,

2014). The court concluded that granting summary judgment was inappropriate

because it was disputed whether the plaintiff, while crying, said, “If [my son] dies, I

want to die,” or “I just want to die, I do, I just want to die.” Id. at *5. The court

reasoned that if the plaintiff made the former statement, then detaining her would

have violated clearly established law; her son had not died, so she did not convey “an

immediate threat to herself.” Id. at *5–6.

Dobrzeniecki is not “controlling authority,” nor has Bass placed it within “a

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (cleaned

up). If anything, Dobrzeniecki supports finding that Dakuras is entitled to qualified

immunity. A reasonable officer who read that case could extract the legal rule that

imminence is the key factor for a mental-health seizure. If that officer witnessed

Bass’s unusual, agitated behavior; heard her say she suffers from post-traumatic

5 Bass also argues that Dakuras lacked arguable probable cause because when other

officers went to her home on an earlier occasion (June 20, 2019), she behaved similarly, yet

they did not conduct a mental-health seizure. [Dkt. 139 at 9.] But Bass cites no evidence

showing that Dakuras knew about Bass’s behavior during the earlier police visit, so an

argument against finding arguable probable cause because Bass’s conduct on June 23 was

consistent with her usual behavior fails. See Alexander, 2023 WL 5163946, at *2 (explaining

that probable cause is based on what an officer knew at the time). Further, even assuming

both situations were materially identical, the fact that officers did not conduct a mental-

health seizure on June 20 does not negate Dakuras’s arguable probable cause, which depends

on what “a reasonable officer in the same circumstances … could have reasonably believed,”

not what specific officers actually did believe. Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 825 (cleaned up).

stress disorder; and received an affirmative answer when he asked if she was

currently “in crisis” [see BWC at 11:35–:52], the officer might conclude—perhaps

wrongly—that Bass posed “an immediate threat to herself” and there was probable

cause to seize her, Dobrzeniecki, 2014 WL 4979185, at *6. To be sure, Dakuras never

clarified what he meant by “crisis,” and Bass argues she did not mean she was

suffering from a mental-health crisis that required hospitalization [Dkt. 131 at 6],

but it is undisputed that she agreed when Dakuras asked if she was in crisis. The

Court cannot say that “every reasonable official would interpret” the caselaw Bass

cites “to establish the particular rule” that an officer cannot seize someone who agrees

she is in crisis without clarifying further what “crisis” means. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at

590 (citation omitted); cf. Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 548–49 (7th Cir.

2006) (holding it was at most arguable whether joking about making a bomb threat

was a crime, so there could be no violation of clearly established law).

Bass also suggests that Dakuras’s conduct could violate clearly established law

based on a “[g]eneral statement[ ] of the law.” [Dkt. 114 at 9.] Bass is correct that an

analogous case is not always needed, but only when a violation is obvious. Taylor v.

Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (per curiam). This rare method of overcoming

qualified immunity applies to egregious conduct such as an Eighth Amendment

violation for purposefully allowing a detainee to hit his head on a concrete floor,

Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 621 (7th Cir. 2022), or due process

violations as blatant as rigging disciplinary proceedings, Prude, 2023 WL 5010780,

at *6, or deliberately manufacturing false evidence, Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682

F.3d 567, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court’s above discussion of caselaw shows that

Dakuras had arguable probable cause to seize Bass. If Dakuras did violate Bass’s

Fourth Amendment rights, the violation was not so obvious to overcome qualified

immunity in the absence of a case on point. See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S.

Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam) (rejecting an obviousness argument and reiterating the

importance of specificity).

Whether or not Dakuras had probable cause to seize her, Bass has failed to

overcome qualified immunity by showing that Dakuras could not “have reasonably

believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” Mwangangi, 48

F.4th at 825 (cleaned up). The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Count I. Since Dakuras is entitled to qualified immunity when the

record is construed in Bass’s favor, it follows that when viewing the record in

Dakuras’s favor on Bass’s cross-motion for summary judgment, she is not entitled to

summary judgment. See Frazier-Hill, 75 F.4th at 802. The Court therefore denies

Bass’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I.

B. Count II: Excessive Force

The Court now turns to Bass’s excessive force claim, on which only Dakuras

seeks summary judgment. “A claim for excessive force under § 1983 invokes the

Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures. The reasonableness

standard is objective, ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Turner v. City of Champaign, 979

F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

Although police cannot use “significant force” to subdue someone who is merely

passively resisting police commands, it is reasonable to use “minimal force.” See id.

at 569 (citations omitted).

Dakuras is protected by qualified immunity unless he violated clearly

established law. Taylor, 10 F.4th at 806. Clearly establishing a legal rule in excessive

force cases requires an especially strong showing by a plaintiff. “Use of excessive force

is an area of the law in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,

and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent

squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (cleaned up).

It is often inappropriate to resolve excessive force cases at summary judgment

when parties give different accounts of events, see Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624

F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir.

2009), but the video evidence here is definitive enough to dispel factual disputes that

would otherwise preclude summary judgment. Disregarding facts blatantly

contradicted by the video, see Kailin, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4, no reasonable jury

could conclude that Dakuras’s use of force violated clearly established law.

1. The Video Evidence

The Court begins by analyzing the extent to which Bass’s version of events is

consistent with the video evidence. See id. According to Bass, after grabbing her “by

her arm and her shirt,” Dakuras “pull[ed] her towards himself,” then “pushe[d] [her]

onto the ground and utilize[d] his body weight to pin her down.” [Dkt. 113 ¶¶ 53–54;

see Dkt. 116-3 at 109 (“[H]e threw me down to the floor using excessive force.”), 112

(“He took his arms and threw me to the floor.”).] Dakuras then “handcuff[ed]” Bass

“as she [was] on the ground” and “use[d] his left hand to shove [her] head down.” [Dkt.

113 ¶¶ 55–56.] While Bass was on the ground, Dakuras “placed his knee in her back

while pushing down with his body weight.” [Dkt. 132 ¶ 17; see Dkt. 116-3 at 114 (“He

had his knee on me. I couldn’t breathe. I couldn’t move.”).] Dakuras kept Bass pinned

to the floor with his knee in her back while she “begged him to stop and told him that

he was hurting her.” [Dkt. 132 ¶ 18; see Dkt. 116-3 at 114 (“I remember begging him

to stop hurting me ….”), 115 (Dakuras kept his knee on her for “many minutes.”).]

Much of Bass’s account is “blatantly contradicted by” the video evidence, and

“no reasonable jury could believe it.” Kailin, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4 (quoting Scott,

550 U.S. at 380). The video shows that Dakuras first grabs Bass’s arm and shirt as

she is attempting to run away from him; he “pull[ed] her towards himself” [Dkt. 113

¶ 53] only in the sense that Dakuras used force to stop Bass from fleeing [BWC at

18:20–:30].6 The video completely contradicts Bass’s contention that Dakuras pushed

her to the floor. [Dkt. 113 ¶ 54.] The video shows Bass’s head dip toward the camera,

then shows Bass smoothly dropping down to a seated position on the floor. [BWC at

18:30–:35.] Dakuras’s hands are not fully visible during this sequence, but Bass

remains largely in view, and Dakuras does not touch her torso or upper body. [Id. at

18:31–32.] When Bass goes to the floor, Dakuras’s hands become visible, and the video

shows him using both hands to fasten a handcuff around Bass’s left wrist. [Id. at

18:33–:35.] The video shows no sudden movement by Dakuras or Bass that could be

6 In fact, the video appears to show Dakuras moving toward Bass’s position, rather than

pulling her toward himself, but brief shakiness in the footage prevents the Court from

making a precise determination about Bass’s and Dakuras’s relative locations in that

moment. [BWC at 18:25–:30.] This fact is not material for summary judgment purposes.

consistent with a shove or the reaction to a shove, and the handcuff can be heard

tightening while Bass goes to the floor. [Id. at 18:30–:35.] In other words, the video

makes clear that Bass sat or slumped down as Dakuras placed a cuff on her. No

reasonable jury could find he pushed or threw her to the floor. See Kailin, 2023 WL

5028149, at *4.

The video footage also blatantly contradicts much of what Bass says occurred

once she was on the floor. To the extent she claims she was already fully handcuffed

before Dakuras placed his hand on her neck [see Dkt. 113 ¶¶ 55–56], the video

unambiguously shows that only her left hand was cuffed at this time [BWC at 18:35–

:40]. The footage shows that Dakuras places his hand on Bass’s neck for about three

seconds, during which time he exerts pressure that moves her head downward, but

Dakuras releases her neck as she leans her right side toward the floor. [Id.] The Court

cannot say as a matter of law that Dakuras did not “shove” Bass’s head down, because

a jury could interpret Dakuras’ contact with Bass’s neck as a shove, see Kailin, 2023

WL 5028149, at *4, but this contact occurred for only three or four seconds while one

of Bass’s hands remained uncuffed as she held her phone.

Bass contends that Dakuras pinned her to the floor with his knee and she could

not breathe. [Dkt. 132 ¶¶ 17–18.] Here, too, the video contradicts Bass’s version of

events in significant part. After removing his hand from Bass’s neck, Dakuras leans

down, a cuff is heard tightening, and he straightens up. [BWC at 18:40–:46.] Dakuras

then bends down to tighten the cuffs, leaves his right hand on Bass’s shoulder, and

straightens up again. [Id. at 18:46–:56.] Bass’s body stays in the video frame, but

most of Dakuras’s body is off camera. Even so, Dakuras remains standing with both

feet on the floor and one or two hands on Bass’s arm or shoulder. [Id. at 18:56–19:28.]

Dakuras continues to stand with one or both hands on Bass as she begins complaining

that he is hurting her. [Id. at 19:28–20:15.] The camera angle changes slightly as

Bass shifts on the floor, and Dakuras appears to shift his body downward. [Id. at

20:15–:23.] Bass’s objections continue in the same vein, and several seconds later the

camera angle rises slightly, suggesting that Dakuras shifted his weight back upward.

[Id. at 20:23–:25.] Bass and Dakuras remain in the same basic positions for about

half a minute [id. at 20:25–20:58], then Dakuras takes one of his hands off Bass and

remains in that position [id. at 20:58–21:44]. Dakuras stands, placing one hand on

Bass’s hip to help steady himself, and removing the hand once he is upright. [Id. at

21:45–22:00.] Other officers arrive, and after helping the others lift Bass to her feet,

Dakuras stops touching her. [Id. at 22:00–22:30.] During this time, Bass speaks

almost constantly; she does not mention Dakuras’s knee, anything specific he is doing

that is hurting her, or that she is having difficulty breathing. [Id. at 20:25–22:30.]

In light of this segment of the video footage, no reasonable jury could find that

Dakuras pinned Bass to the floor with his knee or kept his body weight on her for any

significant length of time. See Kailin, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4. The video makes clear

that for most of the time she was on the floor, Dakuras was standing beside Bass, not

putting his weight on her, and even when Dakuras’s legs are not visible, there is no

significant change in the camera angle or reaction by Bass that could be consistent

with Dakuras placing his knee or his full weight on her. At most, a jury could find

that Dakuras put some weight on Bass as he stood up or that his knee contacted her

body as he crouched beside her. But no reasonable jury could find that Dakuras

prevented Bass from breathing. Except when he touched her neck for a few seconds,

Dakuras never touched Bass anywhere other than her arm and shoulder, and Bass

spoke frequently and loudly throughout her time on the ground without giving any

indication that she had difficulty breathing.

2. Application

The Court now considers whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable

to Bass after accounting for the video footage, could permit a reasonable jury to find

that Dakuras’s uses of force violated clearly established law. Dakuras’s force can be

broken down into three discrete uses: (1) grabbing Bass to stop her flight, (2) shoving

Bass’s head down while trying to handcuff her, and (3) keeping her on the floor after

cuffing her. The Court analyzes the three uses of force independently, “asking

whether each … was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Turner, 979

F.3d at 567 (citation omitted). All three uses of force were reasonable.

As to the first, an officer may use force to detain a fleeing individual if he has

probable cause for the detention. Id. at 568. As explained above, Dakuras had

arguable probable cause to conduct a mental-health seizure, meaning he could have

reasonably believed he had probable cause. Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 825. Thus, his

decision to stop Bass could not have violated clearly established law. See Wesby, 583

U.S. at 63 (“‘Clearly established’ means that … every reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” (cleaned up)).

The amount of force Dakuras employed was also reasonable. The first use of

force closely tracks Turner, where the Seventh Circuit held that grabbing a fleeing

suspect’s shoulder to stop his flight constituted the “use of reasonable force to

accomplish the detention.” 979 F.3d at 569 (citations omitted). Like the suspect there,

Bass was actively resisting detention by running from Dakuras, and grabbing her

arm and shirt is a comparable amount of force to a shoulder grab. See id. And because

the video evidence establishes that Bass went to the floor herself [BWC at 18:30–:35],

the Court need not consider whether Dakuras would have been justified in taking

Bass to the ground, cf. Turner, 979 F.3d at 569–71 (conducting such an analysis).

The Court now turns to the second use of force, when Dakuras pushed on Bass’s

neck while trying to handcuff her right hand. The first issue to consider is whether

Bass was actively or passively resisting. If she was still actively resisting, Dakuras

would have been justified in using significant force to subdue her, see id. at 569, and

his use of force would clearly have been reasonable. If Bass was passively resisting,

however, then Dakuras could only use minimal force, id., or more specifically, through

the lens of qualified immunity, the amount of force a reasonable officer could have

believed was minimal force, Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (“An officer cannot be said to

have violated a clearly established right unless … any reasonable official in the

defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” (cleaned up)).

Because the Court construes the record in Bass’s favor, it will assume that Bass’s

resistance had switched from active to passive when Dakuras placed his hand on her

neck,7 but even so, it is relevant that the passive resistance followed seconds after

active flight, see id. at 1152 (noting that whether the suspect is “attempting to evade

arrest by flight” and whether “circumstances … are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving” impact the reasonableness of a use of force (cleaned up)).

The Seventh Circuit has not fleshed out the boundary between significant and

minimal force. More commonly, it has said what minimal force is not. See, e.g., Miller

v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2014) (bringing knee down on suspect’s jaw

“with enough force to break it” was significant force); Abbott v. Sangamon County,

705 F.3d 706, 732 (7th Cir. 2013) (tasing suspect was significant force). The only case

the Court has found where the Seventh Circuit described specific uses of force as

“minimal” is Smith v. Ball State University, 295 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh

Circuit expressly described an attempted “knee strike” as a minimal use of force, id.

at 771, and a later opinion suggested that the “straight arm bar” technique discussed

in Smith was also a use of minimal force, Abbott, 705 F.3d at 732 (citing Smith, 295

F.3d at 770).

The Court does not, however, interpret Smith as establishing a rule that all

such uses of force are minimal. Smith stressed that the permissible amount of force

7 Even construing the record in Bass’s favor, it is possible that she was still actively

resisting at this point. The Seventh Circuit has characterized “not respond[ing] to the first

physical contact by complying with the officers’ commands” but instead shoving and grabbing

at officers as active resistance. Turner, 979 F.3d at 569; see also Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d

822, 829 (7th Cir. 2014) (“lying motionless and spread-eagled on the ground” was passive

resistance); Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (“not comply[ing]

with [an] order to turn over onto [the plaintiff’s] stomach” was passive resistance). Since the

Court holds that Dakuras’s force would be reasonable in response to passive resistance, it

declines to take a firm position on this issue.

varies with the circumstances. 295 F.3d at 770. The two officers who used the arm

bar needed to remove a nonresponsive suspect from a running car—a dangerous

situation—and the officer who attempted a knee strike could have reasonably thought

the suspect was resisting. Id. at 770–71. Still, Smith makes clear that minimal force

can, in some circumstances, include as much force as a knee strike.

With these principles in mind, the Court considers Dakuras’s use of force. The

video shows that Dakuras keeps his hand on Bass’s neck for only three or four

seconds, but the video does not resolve how much force he exerted, so the Court

assumes Dakuras used his full strength. See Kailin, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4. Even

so, this use of force would not have violated clearly established law. Police can place

detainees in handcuffs, see, e.g., Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 665–66 (7th

Cir. 2006) (rejecting excessive force claim based on overly tight handcuffs), including

mental-health detainees, see Turner, 979 F.3d at 569; Est. of Phillips v. City of

Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1997). Police can therefore use appropriate

force to do so, minimal force in the case of a passive resistor. Turner, 979 F.3d at 569.

Given Bass’s active resistance seconds earlier and Smith recognizing arm bars and

knee strikes can sometimes be considered minimal force, not every “reasonable

official in [Dakuras’s] shoes would have understood that he was violating” the Fourth

Amendment by pushing down on Bass’s neck for three or four seconds. See Kisela,

138 S. Ct. at 1153 (cleaned up); see also Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 602 (7th

Cir. 2011) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” (cleaned up)). Because

a reasonable officer could have thought it was a use of minimal force, Dakuras’s

second use of force did not violate clearly established law.

Finally, the Court considers Dakuras’s third use of force, keeping one or two

hands on Bass while she was on the floor. Here, too, the video dispels some of Bass’s

version of the facts, such as that Dakuras placed his knee on her. There remains a

genuine dispute as to how much pressure Dakuras placed on Bass, so the Court

assumes he used substantial pressure, even though the video evidence is inconsistent

with him keeping his full body weight on her. See Kailin, 2023 WL 5028149, at *4.

Seventh Circuit precedent recognizes that officers can keep a detainee on the ground

after resistance is subdued. See Est. of Phillips, 123 F.3d at 591–94; cf. Miller, 761

F.3d at 829 (using more than minimal force on detainee spread-eagled on the ground

would violate the Fourth Amendment). A reasonable officer could have believed that

using one or two hands to keep Bass on the ground was a reasonable use of minimal

force in light of her attempts to flee, so Dakuras is entitled to qualified immunity. See

Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153.

Bass complained that Dakuras was hurting her, but the fact that a detainee

complains of pain does not itself create a triable issue of fact in an excessive force

case. See Tibbs, 469 F.3d at 665–66 (affirming the grant of summary judgment where

the plaintiff alleged that he complained once that his handcuffs were too tight, but

police did not loosen them); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir.

2005) (“[T]he mere fact that an injury occurred while an individual was in police

custody is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment ….”); see also Nolin v. Isbell, 207

F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] minimal amount of force and injury … will not

defeat an officer’s qualified immunity in an excessive force case.”). True, Bass

complained repeatedly that Dakuras was hurting her, but she never “elaborat[ed] on

any injury … or degree of pain,” which undermines the argument that any reasonable

officer would have known he might be using excessive force. See Tibbs, 469 F.3d at

666.

Further, Bass points to no caselaw that could have given Dakuras “notice that

[his] specific use of force [was] unlawful.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (citation omitted).

She cites Boothe v. Sherman, where the court denied qualified immunity when the

most favorable version of the facts to the nonmovant showed that “after body

slamming and falling on top of [a student], [the officer] held her neck and dug his

knee into her back for about one minute—even though, once on the ground, she did

not attempt to pull away or to move her arms or legs in any way until he instructed

her to do so.” 190 F. Supp. 3d 788, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2016). But as discussed above, the

most favorable version of the facts to Bass in light of the video evidence is nowhere

close to that in Boothe: Dakuras kept her on the floor with one or two hands; he did

not drive his knee into her or place his full body weight on her. Boothe is too factually

dissimilar to permit the finding that Dakuras’s conduct violated clearly established

law. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153. [Contra Dkt. 131 at 13–14.]

Because Dakuras did not violate clearly established law, he is entitled to

qualified immunity on Bass’s excessive force claim. The Court therefore grants

Dakuras’s motion for summary judgment on Count II.

IV. State Law Claims

A. Count III: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Dakuras also moves for summary judgment on Count III, Bass’s IIED claim.

Under Illinois law, an IIED claim fails unless the defendant engaged in conduct that

was “truly extreme and outrageous,” “so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds

of decency and to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.” Feltmeier v.

Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80–81 (Ill. 2003) (cleaned up). Bass’s complaint alleges that

detaining her, placing her in handcuffs, and forcing her to undergo a mental-health

examination despite knowing she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder was

extreme and outrageous. [Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 16–18.] Dakuras contends that his conduct could

not have been extreme and outrageous because it was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. [Dkt. 117 at 13–14.] Bass does not respond to this argument [see Dkt.

131], so she has waived any counterargument she might have made, Bonte v. U.S.

Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010).

The Court agrees that Dakuras is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Strictly speaking, the Court did not determine that Dakuras’s conduct complied with

the Fourth Amendment because it resolved Counts I and II on qualified immunity

grounds. But given the high bar for extreme and outrageous conduct under Illinois

law, Bass’s inability to defeat qualified immunity by showing that Dakuras’s conduct

constituted an obvious constitutional violation, see Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53–54, and

her failure to cite any authority finding similar conduct to be extreme and outrageous,

the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that Dakuras’s conduct

transgressed all possible bounds of decency in a civilized society, see Feltmeier, 798

N.E.2d at 80-81. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on Count ITI.

B. Count V: Indemnification

All that remains is Count V, Bass’s indemnification claim against the City of

Chicago. Indemnification is a derivative liability claim that requires Bass to prevail

against another defendant. Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th 483, 500 (7th Cir. 2022).

Given that Dakuras is entitled to summary judgment on all claims against him, it

follows that the City is entitled to summary judgment on Count V. Id.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment [Dkt. 115] and denies Bass’s cross-motion for partial summary

judgment [Dkt. 112]. A final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will

enter in favor of Defendants and against Bass. Civil case terminated.

Enter: 19-cv-7557

Date: August 29, 2023

Lindsay C.Jenkins □ s—t—S

United States District Judge

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