Ysrael v. State of Illinois

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

YAHKESKYAH YSRAEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 22 C 4729

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

STATE OF ILLINOIS, )

JUDGE JAMES CARROLL, )

LOUIS J. PHILLIPS, and BALIN LAW P.C. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

The Court grants Defendants the State of Illinois’ and Judge James Carroll’s motion to

dismiss [27]. The Court grants Defendants Balin Law P.C.’s and Louis J. Phillips’ motion for

leave to file a motion to dismiss [34] as well as their motion to dismiss [39]. Further, as Plaintiff

has stipulated to the dismissal of Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, see Doc. 33, the Court denies

Wells Fargo Bank’s motion to dismiss [24] as moot. Additionally, the Court denies Ysrael’s

demand for default [40] as moot. Because the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction

under the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court dismisses this case without prejudice. Civil

case terminated. See statement.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Yahkeskyah Ysrael, proceeding pro se, brought this federal lawsuit challenging

the outcome of a state court foreclosure action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois

(2020-COTD-2186).1 While Ysrael’s complaint is not a model of clarity, all of his claims

against the remaining Defendants appear to challenge the state court’s approval of the

foreclosure and sale of his property. 2 Defendants the State of Illinois and Judge James Carroll

have moved to dismiss Ysrael’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6), arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the electronic case docket for Case No. 2020-COTD-2186 pending in

the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. See In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) (taking

judicial notice of state court dockets and opinions); see also Container Direct International Furniture,

Inc. v. Fisher & Broyles LLP, No. 22 C 1086, 2022 WL 2257129, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2022) (“On

a motion to dismiss, the court can take judicial notice of matters of public record such as case dockets and

state court opinions and case dockets.” (citations omitted)).

2 On May 3, 2023, Ysrael filed a “Demand for Default Pursuant [to] Rule 56(C) (2) (3) (4)” asking the

Court to enter a default judgment against Defendants. See Doc. 40. But because all Defendants have

appeared and filed motions to dismiss, the Court denies Ysrael’s demand for default as moot.

(1971), and that even if the Court had jurisdiction, Judge Carroll and the State of Illinois are

immune from suit. Because the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the

Younger abstention doctrine, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.3

The State of Illinois and Judge Carroll argue that the Court must abstain from exercising

jurisdiction in light of Younger because the underlying mortgage foreclosure action is pending.4

“Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal

constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” FreeEats.com

v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (“[T]he normal

thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to

issue such injunctions.”). Younger “require[s] federal courts to abstain from enjoining ongoing

state proceedings that are (1) judicial in nature, (2) implicate important state interests, and

(3) offer an adequate opportunity for review of constitutional claims, (4) so long as no

extraordinary circumstances—like bias or harassment—exist which auger against abstention.”

Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1998).

Ysrael responds to Defendants’ Younger abstention argument with one sentence, stating

“[t]he Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of the federal courts’ role in exercising the

jurisdiction granted them to protect and enforce individual rights under the Younger doctrine,”

Doc. 32 at 3 (cleaned up), and citing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). But New Orleans recognizes that “there are some classes of cases

in which the withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with state

proceedings is ‘the normal thing to do,’” and the Court finds that this is such a case. Id. at 359

(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). Here, the underlying action is judicial in nature, implicates

important state interests, namely Illinois’ interest in the legitimacy of its judicial system and

enforcement of its orders, and affords Ysrael an adequate opportunity to raise his challenges to

the foreclosure and any alleged constitutional violations. See Streight v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 11

C 50240, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95961, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011) (abstention under

Younger appropriate where state foreclosure action pending). Ysrael has not identified any

extraordinary circumstances that would weigh against the Court’s abstention, nor does the Court

see any. Thus, the Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over Ysrael’s claims and

dismisses the complaint without prejudice. Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d

811, 815 (“The [Younger] doctrine reflects a concern that federal interference with certain types

of important state proceedings is unwise and unnecessary in a system of dual sovereigns, and it

3 Although Balin Law P.C.’s and Phillips’ motion to dismiss is not fully briefed and does not specifically

raise Younger abstention, because Younger abstention applies with equal force to Ysrael’s claims against

Balin Law and Phillips, the Court grants their motion to dismiss. Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948,

955 (7th Cir. 1996) (court may raise Younger abstention sua sponte); see also Malak v. Associated

Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 1986) (court may sua sponte enter judgment in favor of

additional non-moving defendants if motion by one defendant is equally effective in barring claim against

other defendnats and plaintiff had adequate opportunity to respond to the motion).

4 Ysrael does not contest that the foreclosure action is ongoing, but the status of the state court case is not

perfectly clear to the Court. According to the state court electronic docket, a motion to vacate was filed

on May 3, 2023 (presumably by Ysrael) and the court entered an order, the contents of which the Court is

unaware, on May 17, 2023. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (2020-COTD-2186).

requires that federal courts dismiss such cases rather than intervene in state affairs.” (citation

omitted)).

Even if the Court had jurisdiction, the Court would still dismiss Ysrael’s complaint as to

Judge Carroll and the State of Illinois because they are both immune from suit. “The doctrine of

judicial immunity has been embraced ‘for centuries,’” and “confers complete immunity from

suit, not just a mere defense to liability.” Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). Judicial immunity applies to acts performed by judges in their judicial

capacity. Id. at 661. Here, Judge Carroll, a judge in the County Division of the Circuit Court of

Cook County, entered orders in a state foreclosure action. Although Ysrael disagrees with Judge

Carroll’s orders, he is entitled to judicial immunity. Faulkner v. Loftus, No. 16 CV 02432, 2018

WL 11181980, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2018) (“When a judge does something that qualifies as

a judicial act . . . absolute immunity applies—even if the conduct was baseless, malicious,

corrupt, or violates the Constitution.”). As to the State of Illinois, it is immune from suit under

the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its

agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Ysrael argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought by a citizen against

their own state and that “[u]nder the spending clause the state gives up there [sic] immunity for

violating the citizens[’] rights.” Doc. 32 at 4. Neither of these arguments are availing. First, the

Eleventh Amendment applies to suits brought by citizens against their own state. See Kelly v.

Mun. Courts of Marion Cnty., 97 F.3d 902, 907 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The United States Supreme

Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits against a state by its own citizens.”

(citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890))). Second, while a state may waive its immunity in

some instances, Ysrael does not provide any support for his contention that Illinois has done so

here. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“The mere fact that a State participates

in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the

State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be

sued in the federal courts.”).

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants the State of Illinois’ and Judge James Carroll’s

motion to dismiss [27]. For the same reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Balin Law P.C. and Louis J. Phillips, thus the Court also grants their motion to dismiss [39].

Date: July 5, 2023 /s/_Sara L. Ellis ___________