The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JERONNA HANSBERRY, )
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Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
v. ) No. 22 C 3388
)
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY )
OF CHICAGO, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Jeronna Hansberry sought employment with two
Chicago Charter Schools, North Lawndale and ASPIRA, in 2020 and
2021, respectively. According to her complaint, these schools
contract with the Board of Education of the City of Chicago to
conduct background checks on prospective employees. In
conjunction with her job application, and after receiving
conditional offers of employment, Ms. Hansberry was required to
sign a three-page form captioned, “Release and Consent to
Conduct and Disclose Background Investigation and Personnel
Information” (“Authorization Form”).1 Ms. Hansberry completed and
1 The two signed forms are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4 to the
Board of Education’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff does not
contest the authenticity of these documents, and they are
central to her claims, so I may consider them without converting
signed Authorization Forms on 06/29/2020 and 07/30/2021. Id.
Thereafter, the Board of Education investigated Ms. Hansberry’s
background and sent reports of its findings to North Lawndale
and ASPIRA. After receiving the Board’s report, North Lawndale
terminated plaintiff’s employment.2 This action followed.
In her complaint, Ms. Hansberry claims that the Charter
School defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), by failing to provide a “stand-alone
disclosure” informing her that a consumer report may be obtained
for employment purposes. The complaint also claims that the
Board violated § 1681b(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to obtain
certifications from the Charter Schools certifying that they
provided the required disclosures and would comply with the
additional requirements of § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (concerning the use
of consumer reports for adverse actions).
Defendants seek dismissal of these claims on the ground
that plaintiff lacks Article III standing. They are correct for
the reasons I explain below. Additionally, to the extent Ms.
Hansberry argues that Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d
690 (7th Cir. 2018), supports standing, I agree with defendants
defendants’ motions to summary judgment motions. See Tierney v.
Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002).
2 Although it does not alter my analysis, I note that although
plaintiff alleges that she was “terminated,” it does not appear
from the complaint that she was ever employed by either of the
Charter Schools, only that she received from them a conditional
offer of employment.
that her complaint does not plead—nor do her allegations
support—the only claim as to which the Robertson court concluded
that the requirements for standing were satisfied.
The Authorization Forms Ms. Hansberry signed open with the
following text:
This form gives the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago (“Board”) authorization to conduct a
Background Investigation which may include, but is not
limited to, a Fingerprint-based Criminal History
Records Check and an Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services State Automated Child Welfare
Information System check (collectively “Background
Investigation”). This form also gives the Board
authorization to release all information or
documentation regarding any disciplinary or dismissal
actions taken against you during your employment by
the Board and your current eligibility for rehire by
the Board and, if ineligible for rehire, the reasons
therefor (collectively “Personnel Information”).
Board’s Mot., Exhs. 3, 4, ECF 19-3, 19-4. The remainder of
the page contains two text boxes with fillable fields: the first
identifies the charter school requesting the background check
and is signed by a school official; the second identifies the
applicant by name, address, date of birth, and other personal
information and is signed by the applicant. Id.
The second and third pages of the Authorization Forms
contain additional questions about the applicant’s background
and further disclosures. The final section of the form is
captioned, “AUTHORIZATION TO DISCLOSE RESULTS OF BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION AND PERSONNEL INFORMATION TO THE CHARTER SCHOOL.”
It states:
I, the undersigned hereby authorize the release of any
criminal history record information that may exist
regarding me from any agency, organization,
institution, or entity having such information on
file.... I further understand that I have the right to
challenge any information disseminated from these
criminal justice agencies regarding me that may be
inaccurate or incomplete pursuant to Title 28 Code of
Federal Regulation 16.34 and or Chapter 20 ILCS 2630/7
of the Criminal Identification Act.
I, the undersigned, provide this authorization to the
Board, in connection with my application to work or my
continuing to work with the Charter School. I also
authorize the Board to release and disclose the
results of the Background Investigation and Personnel
Information to the Charter School. I understand that
the purpose of this authorization is to enable the
Charter School to make a complete assessment of my
fitness to work with the Charter School.
I, the undersigned...authorize and enable the Board to
perform a background investigation, which may include
but is not limited to a Fingerprint-based Criminal
History Records Check; ... [I] understand and agree
that the information obtained through the Background
Investigation and Personnel Information check will be
used to determine whether employment by the Charter
School will be offered or continued or whether
volunteer or compensated service will be approved[.]
Id.
Ms. Hansberry does not dispute that she signed the
Authorization Forms attached to the Board’s motion to dismiss.
Nor does she claim that the Charter Schools failed to inform her
that a background check would be conducted in conjunction with
her application for employment, or that she did not understand
their disclosures in that connection. Instead, she claims to
have been injured by the Charter Schools’ failure to disclose
the information “in a document that consists solely of the
disclosure,” as the statute requires. This claim—a “notice”
claim in Seventh Circuit parlance—is foreclosed by Groshek v.
Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, (7th Cir. 2017). See
Robertson, 902 F.3d at 693-694.
In Groshek, the Seventh Circuit considered a notice claim
like the one Ms. Hansberry alleges and concluded that the injury
the plaintiff asserted was not sufficiently concrete to support
Article III jurisdiction. Id. at 889. As the court explained,
the FCRA’s stand-alone disclosure requirement is “designed to
decrease the risk of a job applicant unknowingly providing
consent to the dissemination of his or her private information,”
while its related “authorization requirement further protects
consumer privacy by providing the job applicant the ability to
prevent a prospective employer from procuring a consumer report,
i.e., by withholding consent,” id. at 887. Reviewing the
complaint before it, the court observed:
Groshek did not allege that Appellees failed to
provide him with a disclosure that informed him that a
consumer report may be obtained for employment
purposes. His complaint contained no allegation that
any of the additional information caused him to not
understand the consent he was giving; no allegation
that he would not have provided consent but for the
extraneous information on the form; no allegation that
additional information caused him to be confused; and,
no allegation that he was unaware that a consumer
report would be procured. Instead, he simply alleged
that Appellees’ disclosure form contained extraneous
information. We conclude that Groshek has alleged a
statutory violation completely removed from any
concrete harm or appreciable risk of harm.
Id. at 889. The same result obtains on the materially identical
allegations of the complaint here.
That Ms. Hansberry characterizes the harms she suffered as
“informational” and “privacy” injuries does not change the
analysis. The Groshek plaintiff characterized his claims
similarly. With respect to the “informational injury,” the court
noted that the plaintiff (like Ms. Hansberry) did not claim to
have been denied any information; he merely objected to the form
in which it was provided. Id. at 888. The court went on to
observe that the FCRA was enacted not to protect consumers from
non-compliant disclosures but “to decrease the risk that a job
applicant would unknowingly consent to allowing a prospective
employer to procure a consumer report.” Id. at 888. Because the
plaintiff did not suggest that the disclosure at issue caused
him unknowingly to consent to a background check, the court
concluded that the informational injury he asserted was
insufficient to support Article III jurisdiction. As for the
plaintiff’s alleged privacy injury, the court acknowledged that
the FCRA’s authorization requirement implicates a privacy
interest but held that the bare procedural violation the
plaintiff alleged did not articulate a concrete privacy injury.
Id. at 889 (“[b]ecause Groshek admits that he signed the
disclosure and authorization form, he cannot maintain that he
suffered a concrete privacy injury.”). The facts here lead
inexorably to the same conclusions. Ms. Hansberry’s claim
against the Board of Education—that it failed to obtain
certifications from the Charter Schools concerning their
compliance with the FCRA’s disclosure requirements—is even more
removed from any concrete injury with which the statute is
concerned.
Nor does Ms. Hansberry’s citation to Robertson v. Allied
Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2018), salvage her claims.
To begin, the Robertson court noted that the plaintiff’s notice
claim was “functionally indistinguishable” from the one it
concluded in Groshek did not support standing, and, indeed, the
plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of that claim. The only
claim as to which Robertson concluded the plaintiff had standing
was an “adverse-action” claim pursuant to § 1681b(b)(3)(A). Ms.
Hansberry’s complaint does not assert such a claim. Moreover,
her allegation that defendant Lawndale terminated her “without
giving her a notice of an adverse action and a summary of her
rights,” Compl., ECF 1, at ¶ 30, does not suffice to confer
standing on the facts alleged here. Robertson held that an
“informational injury is concrete if the plaintiff establishes
that concealing information impaired her ability to use it for a
substantive purpose that the statute envisioned.” 902 F.3d 694.
The “substantive interest” at issue with respect to Lawndale’s
disclosure obligation is to “allow the consumer to review the
reason for any adverse decision and to respond.” Id. at 696. But
Ms. Hansberry does not complain that she was injured because she
was deprived of the ability to review Lawndale’s reason for its
adverse action. She claims to have been injured because Lawndale
failed to provide a stand-alone disclosure of her statutory
rights. See Resp., ECF 33 at 6. That is not the type of harm the
FCRA was designed to prevent.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss
are granted.
ENTER ORDER:
Le Budd
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 26, 2023