Smith v. Godinez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID A. SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 14 C 6744

)

SALVADOR GODINEZ et al., Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff David Smith is an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center. He filed two claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, alleging

that his conditions of confinement are unconstitutionally inhumane and that his incarcerators

failed to mitigate known hazards inherent in his work as a prison groundskeeper. After

Mr. Smith’s pro se complaint was narrowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and following a

lengthy stay pending developments in a related class action, Mr. Smith acquired counsel and the

defendants—various high-level officers within Illinois’ prison system—moved for summary

judgment. The defendants argue they were not deliberately indifferent to the risks of harm

associated with each of Mr. Smith’s claims, nor are those harms objectively serious. The

defendants also claim qualified immunity. But when the disputed facts are viewed in the light

most favorable to Mr. Smith, a reasonable jury could conclude that both his failure to protect

claim and the inadequate sanitation component of his conditions of confinement claim have

merit. The defendants are also not entitled to qualified immunity. Their motion for summary

judgment is therefore denied in part. It is granted, however, with respect to all components of

Mr. Smith’s conditions of confinement claim that do not implicate unsanitary conditions.

BACKGROUND1

Stateville Correctional Center is a maximum-security facility located about an hour

outside of Chicago in Crest Hill, Illinois. The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) first

opened Stateville in 1925, and revelations offered in the past decade regarding the facility’s

upkeep suggest it has seen better days. In 2011 and 2013, the John Howard Association—an

independent correctional oversight organization—issued monitoring reports warning of “dire

consequences” from Stateville’s “harsh, dehumanizing conditions,” which, in its summation,

included “substandard heating, cooling and air ventilation; infestations of cockroaches and other

pests; poor sanitation due to malfunctioning toilets, plumbing, and showers that are peeling and

decaying; broken and non-functioning windows; and a physical plant that is overall dilapidated

and falling apart.” John Howard Ass’n, Monitoring Visit to Stateville Correctional Center 2011

at 2–3.2 Although the reports centered on two of Stateville’s six cell houses (Unit F and Unit X),

see id. at 5, the organization noted “deterioration and lack of upkeep in many parts of the max

facility.” John Howard Ass’n, Monitoring Visit to Stateville Correctional Center 2013 at 12.3

“Inmate reports of bird, rodent, cockroach, and spider infestations,” it added, “were common and

credible.” Id.

1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. All disputed facts are sourced from

Mr. Smith’s deposition, his letters to the defendants, his administrative grievance, and two

affidavits from fellow inmates. See Pl.’s Statement of Additional Material Facts, ECF No. 163

(“PSOF”).

2 See Archive of Reports on Stateville Correctional Center, John Howard Ass’n,

http://www.thejha.org/facilities/stateville-correctional-center (last visited Jan. 5, 2023).

3 Stateville’s notorious Unit F has since been officially closed by order the Governor of

Illinois. Tina Sfondeles, State Closes Door on Stateville Prison “Roundhouse”, Chi. Sun Times

(Nov. 30, 2016, 10:18 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/state-closes-door-on-stateville-

prison-roundhouse.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mr. Smith was not the first, or only, inmate to sue over

Stateville’s living conditions. Among other cases, a class action was filed in early 2013, and by

January 2014, a class was certified covering “all individuals incarcerated at the Stateville

Correctional Center at any time since January 1, 2011, and all individuals who will be housed at

the Stateville Correctional Center in the future.” Order Granting Class Certification ¶ 2, Dobbey

v. Weilding, No. 13 C 1068 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014), ECF No. 37. Mr. Smith is a member of this

class and his conditions of confinement claim concerns many of the same issues involved in the

class claim. Order 1–2, ECF No. 99. (As of this opinion, class settlement negotiations are

ongoing.) Nonetheless, because the class—certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(2)—seeks only injunctive relief, the class action does not preclude individual class

member claims for damages. Id. Mr. Smith accordingly filed a section 1983 suit in August 2014

after exhausting his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ill. Adm. Code tit. 20,

§§ 504.800–504.870. At Mr. Smith’s request, this case was stayed in 2016 pending resolution of

the Dobbey class action. See Stay Order, ECF No. 104. In 2018, however, the Court granted

Mr. Smith’s request for recruitment of settlement counsel. Although ensuing settlement

discussions did not resolve the case, Mr. Smith’s settlement counsel subsequently volunteered to

take on full representation of Mr. Smith. Mot. to Vacate Stay, ECF No. 120.

The complaint asserts two claims: one based on conditions within Stateville’s walls and

one for failure to protect against hazards on Stateville grounds. The following defendants are

named in their individual capacities: Marcus Hardy, Stateville’s Warden (c. 2009 to 2013);

Darryl Coleman, Stateville’s Assistant Warden of Operations (c. 2011 to 2013); John

Luchsinger, Stateville’s Chief Engineer (c. 2003 to 2010); and Salvador Godinez, the Director of

IDOC (c. 2011 to 2014).

A. Conditions of Confinement

Mr. Smith has been an inmate at Stateville since 2003. Throughout that time, he has

resided in all six of Stateville’s cell houses. His conditions of confinement claim is not expressly

focused on a particular cell, although it may be reasonably inferred that his asserted injuries stem

from his time within two Unit C cells. In any event, the defendants take no issue with this

potential lack of specificity.

The defendants dispute the following facts on various grounds.

According to Mr. Smith, his six-by-ten-foot cell is “horrendously unsanitary.” Resp. 3,

ECF No. 161. He and a cellmate share a toilet, sink, and bunk bed, and the only cleaning

supplies they receive is one scoop per week of “extremely diluted” disinfectant. PSOF ¶ 5.

Mr. Smith and his cellmate are required to use the disinfectant the same day they receive it. They

are also required to purchase their own washcloths from the Stateville commissary (the only

cleaning supplies available for purchase). The combination of confined quarters and inadequate

cleaning supplies, Mr. Smith says, turns his cell into a “Petri dish” of bodily fluids and

excrement. PSOF ¶ 3.

Mr. Smith alleges that his cell is also inadequately ventilated. It does not have air

conditioning or a window. Its air vent is sealed, and the main cell house ventilation system is

inoperable. To compensate, the cell house, which has five cell floors, runs a single exhaust fan

on the first floor. No exhaust fans run on the upper floors where Mr. Smith resides. Given that

heat rises, this first-floor exhaust fan is not sufficient to mitigate the extreme heat Mr. Smith is

subjected to. Neither are the two nine-inch fans Mr. Smith and his cellmate run inside their cell.

He claims air does not circulate.

Vermin are an additional problem. A throng of birds, rodents, and insects swarm

Stateville and Mr. Smith’s cell. They leave feces, urine, and dander throughout, including inside

his personal property box where he stores his food and clothing. He suffers mosquitos, and he

has once attended sick call to treat an unidentified insect bite. A contract pest exterminator visits

Stateville on a monthly basis, but only routinely attends to common areas (e.g., the kitchen).

At one point, an electrical socket inside Mr. Smith’s cell began popping and emitting

bursts of sparks. (He experienced the same thing in both of his Unit C cells.) The socket sits

eight inches from Mr. Smith’s bed. This, Mr. Smith claims, is a fire hazard. He adds that

Stateville does not conduct fire drills, nor does it have a sprinkler system or fire extinguishers in

the cell houses. Also, in the event of a fire, the cell doors must be opened manually.

When electricians arrived a week or more later to fix Mr. Smith’s socket problem, they

attributed it to the facility’s leaking water pipes. Relatedly, Mr. Smith says that he has seen mold

in his cell and throughout Stateville.

Finally, the gallery lights are on twenty-four hours a day at Stateville. They shine into

Mr. Smith’s cell, and he is prohibited from hanging anything on his bunk or in his cell to block

the light.

Mr. Smith blames his living conditions for the health problems he has endured since at

least 2013. He says his squalid living conditions—his inadequately sanitized quarters, the vermin

infestation, the lack of ventilation, the mold—combine to severely inflame his allergies and have

caused him to suffer rashes and chronic ear and sinus infections. He is also sleep deprived. The

gallery lights which shine into his cell twenty-four hours a day, the excessive heat, noises from

resident birds, and the constant need to fight-off crawling insects all prevent him from sleeping

soundly.

B. Failure to Protect

Inmates are permitted but not required to work various paid jobs at Stateville. In 2011,

Mr. Smith began work as a prison groundskeeper. He mowed grass, removed weeds, and

trimmed trees under the supervision of groundskeeping staff. He also regularly cleaned up

debris—such as broken windows, siding, or roofing—when it fell upon prison grounds from

dilapidated buildings found around Stateville. The only protective gear Mr. Smith was provided

for this work was cloth gardening gloves.4

On August 30, 2012, Mr. Smith’s groundskeeping supervisor instructed him to remove

debris around an industrial building. Glass block windows had fallen from the building and they

needed to be removed before the area could be mowed. While attempting to retrieve one of the

windows, a glass shard pierced Mr. Smith’s glove and sliced his left hand. He was taken to the

hospital where he eventually underwent surgery to repair nerve and tendon damage to his left

thumb.

The defendants dispute the extent to which Mr. Smith and other prison groundskeepers

warned the defendants of relevant groundskeeping hazards prior to Mr. Smith’s injury.

Mr. Smith says he requested protective equipment (safety goggles, reinforced boots, leather

gloves, dust masks) from the groundskeeping supervisor on multiple occasions prior to his

injury. So too did two of Mr. Smith’s fellow groundskeepers. On two separate occasions, the

three men also claim they spoke directly with Mr. Hardy (the Warden) about the need for

protective equipment. Mr. Coleman (the Assistant Warden of Operations) was present for the

4 The defendants do not dispute that Mr. Smith was provided “gardening gloves.” Defs.’

Statement of Material Facts ¶ 25, ECF No. 156 (“DSOF”). In a subsequent filing, however, the

defendants acknowledge only that he was provided gloves and dispute the characterization of

those gloves as “gardening” gloves. Resp. to PSOF ¶ 38, ECF No. 170. The defendants’

inconsistent position makes no difference; Mr. Smith claims they were gardening gloves, and so

for the purpose of opposing of summary judgment, they are.

conversation Mr. Smith claims he had with Mr. Hardy, whereat Mr. Hardy instructed Mr. Smith

to put his concerns in writing. As for the separate conversation Mr. Smith’s fellow

groundskeepers jointly had with Mr. Hardy, they both recall Mr. Hardy stating that “he had been

made aware of [their] concerns by the other guys on the crew and that [they] should just be

careful.” Perez Aff. 2, ECF No. 163-8; Oaks Aff. 2, ECF No. 163-7.

Mr. Smith also expressed his safety concerns during a chance encounter with

Mr. Godinez (the Director of IDOC). In response, Mr. Godinez instructed Mr. Smith to write

Mr. Hardy. Complying with that instruction, Mr. Smith addressed a letter dated April 11, 2012,

to Mr. Hardy and Mr. Coleman detailing the “inherent dangers” groundskeepers face while

“clean[ing] up trash[] [and] debris that has fallen off the condemned buildings and the broken

glass block windows that [are] repeatedly [found] along these same buildings.” Apr. Letter 1,

ECF No. 163-9. The letter reiterated the need for and specifically requested protective

equipment. Mr. Smith never received a response to this letter; however, he did speak with

Mr. Hardy on several subsequent occasions and Mr. Hardy told him he was considering it.

With his safety concerns left unaddressed by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Coleman, Mr. Smith

wrote a second letter—this time addressed to Mr. Godinez and dated July 8, 2012. In the letter,

Mr. Smith detailed all of his prior failed attempts at acquiring protective equipment and again

explained the hazards and pressed his request. No response was received. Mr. Smith lacerated his

thumb approximately two months later.

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on both claims.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Factual disputes

are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the

facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .” Id. at 255. Hence, in order to defeat summary

judgment, a nonmoving plaintiff need only identify specific, admissible evidence from which a

verdict in his favor may reasonably result. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th

Cir. 2017).

Here, most of the specific evidence Mr. Smith relies upon is disputed. The defendants

nevertheless argue that both of Mr. Smith’s deliberate indifference claims fail as a matter of law.

In making this argument, the defendants largely ignore Mr. Smith’s evidence (his deposition, for

instance) and refer instead to their own version of events.5 They also make a sweeping argument

that most of Mr. Smith’s evidence is irrelevant. See Resp. to PSOF 1–15, ECF No. 170. But

“summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants,” Payne v.

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003); and it is inconceivable how the plaintiff’s description

of his experience at Stateville and his interactions with the defendants are irrelevant. Personal

knowledge, especially when detailed and specific, is sufficient to rebut a motion for summary

judgment. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2006). Analysis of Mr. Smith’s Eighth

Amendment claims therefore proceeds under the assumption that his version of events is correct.

5 See, e.g., Resp. to DSOF ¶¶ 16, 19, 21, 27, 28–30, 35, 37, ECF No. 162 (examples

where defendants assert facts in direct contradiction to the deposition of Mr. Smith).

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty

on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, to ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and to take reasonable measures to guarantee

inmates’ safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “This means that a constitutional

violation inheres in a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious

harm to an inmate.” Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511

U.S. at 828). These so-called “deliberate indifference” violations have both an objective and a

subjective component. Id. That is, a violation only occurs if (1) a prisoner has been exposed to a

harm that was objectively serious, and (2) a prison official knew of and disregarded excessive

risk of that harm. Id. Each component will be addressed in turn.

I. Objectively Serious Harm

The Supreme Court has narrowly defined “objectively serious” harms as those which

“deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). These deprivations must be “extreme,” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9 (1992), and do not include “restrictive” or “even harsh” retributive conditions permitted

under contemporary standards of decency, Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

A. Conditions of Confinement

Many of the conditions Mr. Smith supposedly lives with are alike in kind if not severity

to conditions previously deemed unconstitutional. See Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th

Cir. 1987) (“[A] state must provide . . . reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding,

hygienic materials, and utilities (i.e., hot and cold water, light, heat, plumbing).” (quoting Ramos

v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir. 1980))). For example, regarding sanitation, the Seventh

Circuit in Vinning–El v. Long reversed summary judgment dismissal of a conditions of

confinement claim involving “a floor covered with water, a broken toilet, feces and blood

smeared along the wall, and no mattress to sleep on.” 482 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2007). As for

vermin infestations, the Seventh Circuit in Antonelli v. Sheahan reinstated a dismissed complaint

which alleged that “cockroaches . . . were everywhere, crawling on [the prisoner’s] body (along

with mice) and constantly awakening him . . . .” 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotations omitted). And with respect to inadequate ventilation, the Seventh Circuit held in

Board v. Farnham that allegations of an “extremely poor” system involving ducts lined with

fiberglass dust and black mold were “more than sufficient” to withstand summary judgment. 394

F.3d 469, 486 (7th Cir. 2005).

The defendants’ point to these cases and argue that each of Mr. Smith’s alleged

conditions, when viewed in isolation, pale in comparison. Mr. Smith counters that his various

conditions should be considered in combination, not individually. To an extent, both parties are

wrong. “Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in

combination’ when each would not do so alone . . . .” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)

(emphasis in original) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Yet “[t]o say that some prison

conditions may interact” to form a constitutional violation “is a far cry from saying that all prison

conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes.” Id. Only when multiple

conditions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,

identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise” shall courts consider them in

combination. Id.; Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013). Mindful of this, what

follows below is an examination of the individual parts of Mr. Smith’s conditions of confinement

claim ending in an appraisal of their effect in combination.

Before proceeding, however, a note on the relevancy of injury is warranted. “Objectively

serious” harms are not limited to harms which cause physical injury. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d

612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012). This is not to say that physical injuries are irrelevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry. The extent of injuries suffered by inmates is one factor that may suggest the

severity of the conditions about which they complain. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

(2010) (holding same in excessive force context). In addition, while the Prison Litigation Reform

Act denies recovery “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), psychological harms alone may still give rise

to an Eighth Amendment violation and provide a basis for a civil action for nominal and punitive

damages and/or injunctive relief. Thomas, 697 F.3d at 614. And regardless of whether an alleged

injury is physical or psychological, to have a cognizable claim, “plaintiffs alleging deliberate

indifference must, ‘at a minimum, specifically describe not only the injury but also its relation to

the allegedly unconstitutional condition.’” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 229–30 (4th Cir.

2016) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 n.9 (4th Cir. 1993)). “There is no

requirement, however, that a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference present expert testimony to

support his allegations of serious injury or substantial risk of serious injury.” Id. at 230. “[E]xpert

testimony is necessary . . . only when it will ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)). Hence, a lack of medical or

scientific evidence may be dispositive only when the seriousness of harm would not be apparent

to a layperson. Id.; see, e.g., Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2016) (inmate

permissibly relied on common-sense link between asthma and excessive dust and dander);

Holland v. Hanks, 139 F.3d 901, at *3 (7th Cir. 1998) (plaintiffs impermissibly offered no

evidence, other than their own beliefs, that second-hand smoke in cells caused nosebleeds,

dizziness, headaches, and shortness of breath); see also Gray, 826 F.3d at 1007 (claims for future

injuries require “a degree of reasonable medical certainty” that inmate faces an increased risk of

injury).

Turning now to the individual parts of Mr. Smith’s conditions of confinement claim:

Hygiene. Mr. Smith characterizes his cell as filthy. He blames it on the fact that he and

his cellmate are only permitted a small dose of disinfectant once a week to clean their

shared sink and toilet. He does not claim his sink or toilet are broken or that he is forced

to coexist with human waste left by anyone other than himself or his cellmate—he only

claims that he lives in uncomfortable proximity to a bathroom that is soiled by, yet

otherwise adequately services, the weekly hygiene needs of himself and another adult

male. This description of filth falls short of the unconstitutionally unsanitary conditions

in Vinning—El, which included a “sink and toilet [that] did not work,” “walls [that] were

smeared with blood and feces,” and a cell devoid of “toilet paper, towels . . . [and] soap.”

See 482 F.3d at 924. The fact that Mr. Smith or his cellmate were the source of his cell’s

filth also reduces the potency of any corresponding harm. See Isby v. Clark, 100 F.3d

502, 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n inmate who causes filthy conditions to exist may not

have a cruel and unusual leg to stand on.”). In short, although Mr. Smith’s cell might

benefit from additional supply of disinfectant, this deprivation by itself does not rise to a

constitutional violation. “Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services

of a good hotel... .” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988).

" Ventilation. Mr. Smith decries inadequate ventilation; however, he spent little time

describing this condition when asked about it in deposition. In his administrative

grievance, Mr. Smith generally describes stagnant air full of “dust, dirt, mold, pest

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dander, airborne viruses and wool fibers” and rank with odors of animal and human

waste.° The Constitution does not guarantee fragrant air, however. See Sain v. Wood, 512

F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n unpleasant odor ..., along with the absence of any

evidence of serious injury, does not amount to constitutional deprivation.”). That

Mr. Smith and his cellmate were each permitted a personal fan within their small cell also

undermines his claim that the air was stagnant. And to whatever extent Mr. Smith’s

environment is full of airborne contaminants, he offers no medical or scientific evidence

beyond lay observations to substantiate his claim. A similar claim was dismissed in

Dixon v. Godinez, where the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against an

inmate who only offered “conclusory allegations, without backing from medical or

scientific sources, that the rank air exposed him to diseases and caused respiratory

problems which he would not otherwise have suffered.” 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.

1997). Without more, then, Mr. Smith’s inadequate ventilation claim cannot reasonably

impose liability.

Cooling. Because of inadequate ventilation, Mr. Smith says his cell is extremely hot. Yet

the record is devoid of any evidence that might help a jury quantify that claim. Mr. Smith

does not attempt a guess at the temperature within his cell. Nor does he describe anything

that would indicate extreme heat (for example, metal bars too warm to touch or a bunk

bed soaked with perspiration). Mr. Smith also claims no heat-related illnesses; he simply

asserts that the temperature within Stateville affects his sleep. But even temperatures that

occasionally exceed 95°F do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Chandler v. Crosby, 379

6 Mr. Smith also says toxins from lead paint fill the air, but his claim based on lead paint

at Stateville was previously dismissed on initial screening. Order 2, ECF No. 11; accord 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e).

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F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004). And the electric fans provided to Mr. Smith and his

cellmate offer at least some cooling effect. Cf Dixon, 114 F.3d at 645 (inmate’s

possession of electric fan undercut summertime heat claim). Without any specific facts

bearing on Mr. Smith’s extreme heat claim, it is not reasonable to infer the temperature at

Stateville is any more than uncomfortable. Cf Vasquez v. Frank, 290 F. App’x 927, 929

(7th Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of sleep deprivation claim in part

because inmate “presented no evidence regarding the duration of the alleged excessive

heat”).

" Fire Safety. Although the Eighth Amendment guarantees a certain degree of fire safety, it

does not constitutionalize state and municipal fire codes. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d

1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985). In other words, “not every deviation from ideally safe

conditions constitutes a violation of the constitution.” /d. (quoting Santana v. Collazo,

714 F.2d 1172, 1183 (1st Cir. 1983)). Actionable deviations tend to implicate multiple

facets of fire safety, such as fire susceptibility, detection, evasion, and abatement. See

Hadix v. Johnson 367 F.3d 513, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2004) (compiling cases into a

continuum of fire safety violations). Here, Mr. Smith has provided very little evidence to

suggest Stateville is unduly susceptible to fire. He has not, for example, provided

evidence that fires have occurred in the past, that flammable materials are negligently

warehoused, or that the facility itself is particularly combustible (based on its layout or

construction). He does highlight the issue with his cell’s electrical sockets as a danger.

But the issue was rectified within a reasonable period after it was reported, and so it

provides little cause for alarm. Regarding fire detection, Mr. Smith provides no evidence

that Stateville is deficient (such as a lack of smoke alarms). He also only marginally

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indicts Stateville’s fire evasion capability by alleging that Stateville does not conduct fire

drills and that his cell door cannot be automatically opened in the event of a fire. But

while this is not ideal, he does not implicate the more serious issues that can arise with

fire evasion, such as nonexistent evacuation plans, severe overcrowding, or limited or

locked emergency exits. Cf id. (collected cases). Mr. Smith’s concerns regarding the lack

of fire abatement equipment (such as a sprinkler system and fire extinguishers) are

reasonable, but considering Mr. Smith’s fire safety claim in totality, it appears no more

egregious than in Johnson v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, where the Fifth Circuit

considered a substantially similar fire safety claim involving “no fire alarms or fire

detection systems, poor electrical equipment, and inadequate staff in living areas” but

dismissed it because the inmate did “not allege that anyone had been injured by any type

of fire or that [the prison] was built from flammable materials or was particularly

susceptible to fires.” 281 F. App’x 319, 320-22 (Sth Cir. 2008). Mr. Smith has likewise

not presented a triable fire safety issue.

= Pest Infestation. Mr. Smith contends Stateville is “infected with multiple pests[,]

including birds, rats, mice, cockroaches, red ants, spiders, flies, mosquitos, gnats, and

moths.” Ex. A to Smith Dep. 3, ECF No 163-2 (“Grievance”). He describes Stateville as

a “pseudo-aviar[y],” with birds nesting and leaving droppings and feathers everywhere

(including in his cell) and feeding from prisoner food carts. /d. Rats and mice “run[]

rampant throughout” and the cockroaches which infest his cell “frequently crawl on [him]

while [he] sleep[s] at night.” /d. Rats, mice, and insects have invaded his personal

property box, soiling the food, clothing, and personal items within. PSOF § 2. He has

once visited sick call to treat a minor insect bite and has “been bitten numerous times” by

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mosquitos while in the shower. /d. §/ 24; Grievance at 3. All told, the pest problem at

Stateville sounds severe. It is doubtful reasonable citizens would consider living with an

occasional cockroach, spider, fly, or mouse to be inhumane. See Munson v. Kink, No. 21-

2738, 2022 WL 17844068, at *1—-2 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) (dismissing infestation claim

based on a single mouse bite); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008)

(dismissing infestation claim where inmate “often saw ‘several’ cockroaches crawling in

his cell”). But it is hard to imagine when contemporary standards of decency were so

miserable as to find acceptable the level of infestation that Mr. Smith describes. Even

Edmond Danteés in 1821 detested the “many loathsome animals inhabit[ing] [his] prison.”

Alexandre Dumas, The Count of Monte Cristo (1846); see also Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d

1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he repulsive nature of cockroaches and mice is hardly

subject to dispute.”). Thus, if Mr. Smith is to be believed (and, for purposes of this

motion, he must be), a reasonable jury could find his compulsory pest cohabitation cruel

and unusual.

Mold. Hypothetically, certain levels of mold within a prison can by themselves violate

the Eighth Amendment. Thurmond vy. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020).

There is no authority that clearly defines that threshold, however. See id. at 1013

(granting qualified immunity on a mold claim). Nonetheless, a jury is not needed to

determine that Mr. Smith’s mold claim falls short. This is because he offers only sparse,

generalized statements about the mold he has seen in his cell and elsewhere at Stateville.

Much like his inadequate ventilation claim, Mr. Smith does not offer any medical or

scientific evidence to help substantiate the mold he has supposedly witnessed. He does

claim that physicians at Stateville told him he may have a mold allergy and that dust and

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mold at Stateville has caused him severe allergic reactions, as well as ear and sinus

infections. If true, this might be enough to present a jury question. But on this record, the

physicians’ diagnosis is hearsay, see PSOF § 23,’ and so cannot be used to defeat

summary judgment. Some other admissible evidence is therefore needed to reasonably

infer that Mr. Smith’s allergic reactions and infections were caused by mold and not

some other condition at Stateville, such as the grass Mr. Smith mows as a groundskeeper.

" Lighting. “[S]ufficient or ‘adequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of

“adequate shelter” required by the Eighth Amendment.’” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706

F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th

Cir. 1985)). Whether continuous lighting represents a constitutional violation depends on

various factors, “including whether the lights caused sleep deprivation, the brightness and

intensity of the lights, the duration of exposure, whether a legitimate penological

justification existed, and whether prison officials were trying to keep the prisoner

awake.” /d. at 1059 (citations omitted). For instance, the Seventh Circuit has held that

“24-hour lighting involving a single, 9-watt fluorescent bulb does not objectively

constitute an ‘extreme deprivation.’” Vasquez v. Frank, 290 F. App’x 927, 929 (7th Cir.

2008) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Compare that to Keenan v. Hall, where the Ninth

Circuit denied summary judgment on a claim that “large florescent lights directly in front

of and behind [an inmate’s] cell shone into his cell 24 hours a day [for six months], so

that his cell was ‘constantly illuminated, and [he] had no way of telling night or day,’ .. .

caus[ing] him ‘grave sleeping problems’ and other mental and psychological problems.”

83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting record). Critical to Keenan’s holding,

7 Tt does not appear that any expert opinions will be offered at trial, either. No treating

physicians were deposed and no expert opinions have been disclosed.

17

however, was the fact that the lights served no legitimate penological purpose. See

Chappell, 706 F.3d 1057–58 (examining Keenan). That is not an issue here: Mr. Smith

does not contest that the continuous lights at Stateville serve a security purpose. Resp. to

DSOF ¶ 24, ECF No. 162. The constitutional question therefore hinges on the intensity,

duration, and impact of Mr. Smith’s cell lights. That is a fact-specific inquiry, and

unfortunately, Mr. Smith does not supply many facts. He simply asserts that at all times

relevant to this action, his cell house “flood lights” “beam[] on high 24 hours a day”

outside of his cell “mak[ing] it impossible to get a proper, healthy and uninterrupted

night’s sleep.” Grievance at 8. That description is too thin to reasonably connote extreme

sleep deprivation. Mr. Smith does not need to photometrically describe his light situation

in terms of footcandles or lux, but a fuller understanding of how he is sleep deprived is

necessary. Chavarria v. Stacks contains a good example of what might suffice. There, an

inmate averred that “six lights, three of them with fluorescent bulbs, shine into his cell

twenty-four hours per day,” offering him no place to gain respite from the strong

lighting—“even under his bed [was] well lit.” 102 F. App’x 433, 437–38 (5th Cir. 2004)

(King, C.J., dissenting). This, the Chavarria inmate said, induced a chronic cycle of thirty

to thirty-five hours of wakefulness interrupted only when overpowered by insomnious

exhaustion. Id. at 438 n.1. Comparatively, Mr. Smith’s plight is benign. In deposition, he

merely claims that his continual lighting prevents him from sleeping “soundly.” Smith

Dep. 44:15–45:2, ECF No 163-2. But to reiterate, “the Constitution does not mandate

comfortable prisons . . . .” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. And additionally, Mr. Smith’s light

claim is diminished by the fact that Mr. Smith—although he claims he is prevented from

hanging blankets in his cell—does not claim he is prevented from shielding his eyes with

a towel or shirt while he sleeps. Cf. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 518, 522 & n.12 (7th

Cir. 2017) (“[A]ny Eighth Amendment concern implicated by twenty-four hour lighting

. . . was negated by the fact that [the prisoner] can cover his eyes with clothes or

towels.”); Mathews v. Raemisch, 513 F. App’x 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Allowing the

plaintiffs to cover their eyes with towels was a reasonable response to their [light]

complaints.”); Chavarria, 102 F. App’x at 437 (Reavley, J., concurring) (“[W]ith

deference to those who are concerned about Mr. Chavarria’s illuminated cell, I regard

this judicial attention as much ado about nothing. A little cloth over his eyes would solve

the problem, negate deprivation, and escape this exercise in frivolity.”).

With an understanding of the seriousness of the individual parts of Mr. Smith’s

conditions of confinement claim, the analysis now turns to how those parts combine to deprive

identifiable human needs. Mr. Smith’s overall claim involves three basic needs: personal safety,

sanitation, and sleep. Mr. Smith’s fire safety claim stands alone in implicating personal safety,

and as discussed, it is not objectively serious on its own. Mr. Smith’s personal (fire) safety claim

is therefore dismissed.

Sanitation is implicated by Mr. Smith’s hygiene, ventilation, infestation, and mold

claims. Only the harm associated with the infestation claim is objectively serious on its own, but

because the other claims appreciably contribute to this same harm, they too survive summary

judgment. This conclusion comports with Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016). There

the Seventh Circuit addressed a conditions of confinement claim from a Stateville inmate who

asserted that “myriad infestations and [a] lack of access to adequate cleaning supplies, taken

together, deprived him of the basic human need of rudimentary sanitation in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1005. The details of this claim are strikingly similar to the details of

Mr. Smith’s hygiene and infestation claims, see id. at 1004; and without ruling on the individual

parts of the claim, the Gray Court held that “[in] combination, . . . [they were] enough to defeat

summary judgment for [Warden Hardy].” Id. at 1006.

As for the need for sleep, it is implicated by Mr. Smith’s cooling, ventilation, lighting,

and infestation claims. Here, the harm caused by Stateville’s supposed infestation weighs far less

than it did when considering sanitation. Mr. Smith says that noises from resident birds and the

need to fight-off crawling insects interrupts his sleep. This alone does not carry the day. Nor, as

discussed, do his cooling, ventilation, or lighting claims. It is reasonable to infer that excessive

heat, inadequate ventilation, twenty-four hour lighting, and bird and insect activity may in

combination cause sleep deprivation when each alone would not do so. But whatever sleep

deprivation this combination has caused Mr. Smith, his asserted injury indicates it is not extreme.

In deposition, Mr. Smith merely claimed that he cannot sleep “soundly.” PSOF ¶ 25. This injury

does not even surpass that claimed in Vasquez v. Frank, where the Seventh Circuit affirmed

summary judgment dismissal of a sleep deprivation claim based on “constant light, poor

ventilation, and extremely hot temperatures” in part because no medical evidence linked the

inmate’s asserted injuries (insomnia, dizziness, migraines, difficulty breathing, and eye irritation)

with the alleged conditions of confinement. 290 F. App’x 927, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2008). The

description of Mr. Smith’s sleep deprivation contained in his administrative grievance is no more

severe. There he simply claims that his conditions of confinement “make[] it impossible to get a

proper, healthy and uninterrupted nights sleep.” Grievance at 8.8 But one can imagine that many

8 This description and the one-off deposition remark constitute the entirety of Mr. Smith’s

sleep deprivation evidence. See PSOF ¶ 25. Notably, the evidence was gathered before

Mr. Smith retained counsel and the defendants were understandably content with the short shrift

Mr. Smith gave to their sleep deprivation questions in deposition. But if Mr. Smith was

unsatisfied with the summary judgment record by the time counsel was appointed, he could have

adults living outside Stateville struggle with getting a proper, healthy, uninterrupted night’s

sleep. No reasonable jury would consider that inhumane.

To recap, Mr. Smith’s personal safety and sleep deprivation claims fail to withstand

summary judgment. Based on the disputed evidence of Stateville’s hygiene, ventilation,

infestation, and mold conditions, a triable issue exists on whether Mr. Smith’s unsanitary living

conditions are objectively serious. The claim is cognizable given the psychological harm

Mr. Smith has asserted. See Bentz v. Hardy, 638 F. App’x 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“[D]epending upon the extent, duration, and kind of infestation an inmate was made to endure, a

trier of fact still may reasonably find that an Eighth Amendment violation occurred even without

a showing of physical harm.”); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The

potential psychological harm from living in a small cell infested with mice and cockroaches is

pretty obvious.”). But compensatory damages may still be unavailable. The solitary insect bite

Mr. Smith endured left only a “red mark” and required nothing more than anti-itch ointment.

Smith Dep. 36:1-11, ECF No 163-2. It is therefore de minimis, which does not suffice as a

“physical injury” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191,

193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). And as for Mr. Smith’s

other asserted physical injuries (his allergies, ear and sinus infections, and rashes), no admissible

medical evidence has been provided to link them to his unsanitary living conditions. In the

absence of such evidence at trial, then, Mr. Smith may be limited to nominal and punitive

damages. Gray, 826 F.3d at 1008.9

conducted additional discovery. See Order, ECF No. 122 (vacating stay and reopening

discovery).

9 To whatever extent Mr. Smith’s sanitation claim is not subsumed by the class action

claim in Dobbey v. Weilding, he could—had he sued the defendants in their official capacities—

B. Failure to Protect

The harm identified in Mr. Smith’s failure to protect claim is objectively serious.

Mr. Smith required surgery to repair nerve and tendon damage to his left thumb after lacerating it

on a glass shard while performing his groundskeeping duties. The defendants do not adequately

argue that this is not objectively serious harm.

II. Deliberate Indifference to Substantial Risk

“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment” for objectively

serious harms “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Id. This requisite knowledge can be demonstrated in the usual

ways, including through circumstantial evidence. LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.

2020). For instance, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk

from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. “[P]rison officials who

actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety can nevertheless escape liability if

they responded reasonably to the risk, whether or not the harm was ultimately averted.” LaBrec,

948 F.3d at 841 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45).

“[A] prison official’s knowledge of prison conditions learned from an inmate’s

communications can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient knowledge of the

conditions to require the officer to exercise his or her authority and to take the needed action to

investigate and, if necessary, to rectify the offending condition.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987,

993 (7th Cir. 1996). “Indeed, once an official is alerted to an excessive risk to inmate safety or

also be theoretically entitled to injunctive relief. Here, since he has only sued the defendants in

their individual capacities, he is limited to monetary relief.

health through a prisoner’s correspondence, ‘refusal or declination to exercise the authority of his

or her office may reflect deliberate disregard.’” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781–82 (7th

Cir. 2015) (quoting Vance, 97 F.3d at 993). Nonetheless, even if communications are addressed

directly to certain high-level prison officials, those officials are not typically involved in day-to-

day decisions affecting inmates, nor can they realistically be “expected to be personally involved

in resolving a situation pertaining to a particular inmate unless it were of the gravest nature.”

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428–29 (7th Cir. 1996). High-level officials can, however,

“be expected to know of or participate in creating systemic, as opposed to localized, situations.”

Id. at 1429.

Before turning to specific evidence of the defendants’ knowledge, some winnowing at the

outset is feasible. Mr. Smith acknowledges that Mr. Luchsinger (the Chief Engineer at Stateville

from 2003 to 2010) was not employed at Stateville at any time relevant to his hand injury. Resp.

to DSOF ¶ 31, ECF No. 162. He also omits Mr. Luchsinger from his argument imputing

knowledge of his living conditions to the defendants. See Resp. 10–13, ECF No. 161. The Court

reads this as a tacit concession that Mr. Luchsinger was not deliberately indifferent.

Mr. Luchsinger is therefore dismissed.10

A. Conditions of Confinement

The administrative grievance detailing Mr. Smith’s conditions of confinement claim was

addressed to and reviewed in some capacity by Mr. Hardy’s office. (Mr. Smith also asserts he

sent two additional letters regarding his living conditions, but those letters were supposedly lost

10 It also appears that Mr. Luchsinger would have a viable statute of limitations defense

since he left employment at Stateville in 2010 and Mr. Smith filed his complaint in 2014. The

statute of limitations in Illinois for section 1983 claims is two years. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d

645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). No limitations defense was advanced on Mr. Luchsinger’s behalf,

however.

in the mail.) The grievance bears a signature of Mr. Hardy’s name, followed by the initials of an

assistant—indicating, according to Mr. Hardy, that he was not the actual signatory. The parties

dispute whether the initials absolve Mr. Hardy of personal knowledge of Mr. Smith’s living

conditions. But this dispute over Mr. Smith’s communications makes no difference. The

unsanitary conditions Mr. Smith asserts are not personal to him—he claims they exist throughout

Stateville. They are therefore systemic conditions, knowledge of which can be fairly imputed to

high-level Stateville officers. See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1999)

(“[C]laims regarding . . . inadequate hygiene are conceivably systemic conditions that can

support a valid claim against [the Sheriff] and [the Director of a jail] in their personal capacity.”).

Based on practically the same systemic conditions that Mr. Smith describes, the Seventh

Circuit has already held Mr. Hardy’s knowledge of Stateville’s living conditions and his

disregard of the obvious risks they pose to be triable issues. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000,

1008 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Even if [the plaintiff] had never filed the grievance, a jury could infer that

[Mr. Hardy] was aware of the pest infestations in [Stateville].”). Hence, summary judgment for

Mr. Hardy is precluded.

The claim in Gray did not involve the IDOC Director, but it does not require much

extrapolation to impugn Mr. Godinez as well. He admitted in deposition that he visited Stateville

“quite often” and it was his common practice to read monitoring reports from the John Howard

Association. Godinez Dep. 46:4–50:6, ECF No. 163-13. Mr. Hardy also admitted he informed

his supervisors of the problems identified in those reports. Hardy Dep. 5:14–6:11, ECF No.

163-3. The John Howard Association report from 2011 mimics portions of Mr. Smith’s claim

(especially the infestation issue), and the Association’s report from 2013 indicates the infestation

issue had not abated. This would reasonably suggest to any reader, such as Mr. Godinez, that

whatever measures taken since 2011 to address the issue were ineffective. Accordingly,

Mr. Godinez’s knowledge of Mr. Smith’s living conditions and his potential deliberate

indifference to them are suitable jury questions. Cf. Hardy v. Godinez, No. 12 C 6033, 2017 WL

2569605, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2017) (denying summary judgment for Mr. Hardy and

Mr. Godinez on similar Stateville sanitation claim).

That leaves Mr. Coleman, the Assistant Warden of Operations. In that role, Mr. Smith

claims Mr. Coleman was Stateville’s “Safety and Sanitation Coordinator.” PSOF ¶ 21. This fact

is disputed, but whatever his official duties were, Mr. Coleman acknowledges he was in charge

of—among other things—maintenance at Stateville. Coleman Dep. 5:19-20, ECF No. 163-5.

That responsibility included maintenance of Stateville’s ventilation. Id. at 16:3–17:23. It also

positioned him as the direct supervisor for Stateville’s pest extermination coordinator, who

arranged monthly, routine exterminator visits to Stateville’s general facilities and as-needed

visits to individual cells whenever the Warden approved a grievance request for pest control. Id.

at 7:22–16:2. Mr. Smith claims that infrequent exterminator visits to individual cells were

ineffective at combating Stateville’s infestation.11

The incomplete picture these facts paint preclude summary judgment for Mr. Coleman. It

can be reasonably inferred that Mr. Coleman had knowledge of the infestation problem based on

its obvious scope and severity. (To a limited extent, he also admits knowledge of it in

deposition.) But, given that he did oversee at least a limited (albeit ineffective) response to the

issue, one interpretation of Mr. Smith’s version of the facts is that Mr. Coleman was either

11 It is not clear from the evidence how often Stateville’s contract pest exterminators

visited individual cells, and no party asserts a figure. Notably, evidence in Hardy v. Godinez—a

case involving the same exterminator company and a factually similar issue at Stateville—

showed that the company “visited each cell house once a month, [but] it went inside individual

cells only twice between 2010-12.” No. 12 C 6033, 2017 WL 2569605, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 12,

2017). The evidence in Hardy does not inform this case, however.

incompetent or under-resourced but not deliberately indifferent. Cf. Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th

703, 711 (7th Cir. 2022) (“It is always possible to do more or move faster, but the existence of

policies that may have been more effective does not mean an official recklessly disregarded the

risk of harm.”). However, it is not known what (if any) policy or procedural improvements where

within Mr. Coleman’s power to implement. And absent this information, another reasonable

interpretation—especially given the protracted nature of the problem that Mr. Smith describes—

is that Mr. Coleman is liable for deliberately persisting with an inadequate solution. Cf. Gray,

826 F.3d at 1009 (“Knowingly persisting in an approach that does not make a dent in the

problem is evidence from which a jury could infer deliberate indifference.”).

B. Failure to Protect

Although Mr. Smith’s sanitation claim is “potentially systemic,” his failure to protect

claim is “clearly localized” to him and his fellow groundskeepers. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1429.

No credence shall therefore be given to Mr. Smith’s assertion that the episodic removal of debris

around Stateville created hazards that were obvious to high-level Stateville officials, such as the

defendants. Id. Evidence of prisoner communications with the defendants is what remains to

potentially imply their knowledge. See Perez, 792 F.3d at 782 (“[P]risoner requests for relief that

fall on ‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate indifference.” (quoting Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d

640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Mr. Smith claims he spoke directly with Mr. Hardy regarding the groundskeeping crew’s

need for protective equipment, including work gloves. Mr. Hardy told him to put his concerns in

writing. Mr. Smith complied, sending Mr. Hardy a letter in April 2012 which reiterated the

dangers groundskeepers face. Subsequently, Mr. Hardy told Mr. Smith on several occasions he

was considering the issue. Two other groundskeepers also spoke directly with Mr. Hardy

regarding the need for protective equipment and both claim Mr. Hardy told them he was aware

of the problem yet instructed them to just be careful. If all this is to be believed, a reasonable jury

could find that Mr. Hardy was both aware of the risk faced by the groundskeeping crew and

deliberately ignored that risk. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Doing

nothing could be simple negligence, but it does not stretch the imagination to see that it might

also amount to deliberate indifference.” (emphasis in original)).

The same holds true as to Mr. Coleman. According to Mr. Smith, Mr. Coleman was

present for the conversation Mr. Smith had with Mr. Hardy. Mr. Smith’s April 2012 letter was

also addressed to Mr. Coleman, who was the Assistant Warden of Operations at the time, and

responsible for, among other things, maintenance of the facility. Coleman Dep. 5:19-20, 16:3-4,

18:20-23, ECF No. 163-5. Mr. Coleman denied any recollection of the April 2012 letter but

acknowledged it was prison policy to provide necessary safety equipment for groundskeeping

crews at Stateville. Id. at 18:24–19:10. A reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Coleman was

on notice that necessary safety equipment was routinely not being provided, that Mr. Coleman

learned of that problem, that it fell within his area of responsibility, and that Mr. Coleman

nevertheless turned a blind eye to it. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)

(supervisor liability can be predicated upon turning a “blind eye” to serious problem within

supervisor’s area of responsibility).

The affirmative link to Mr. Godinez, however, is weak. Mr. Smith had a chance

conversation with him regarding the need for protective equipment, and Mr. Godinez reasonably

told Mr. Smith to address his concerns with Mr. Hardy. After Mr. Smith’s April 2012 letter to

Mr. Hardy failed to achieve results, he wrote Mr. Godinez a similar letter in June 2012. Again,

no response was received. The letter, then, is all that links Mr. Godinez to Mr. Smith’s failure to

protect claim. But as Director of IDOC, this letter is not enough to hold Mr. Godinez liable for

prisoner equipment decisions at Stateville. See Williams v. Raemisch, 545 F. App’x 525, 529 (7th

Cir. 2013) (“The secretary [of the Department of Corrections] did not supervise the day-to-day

operations of the prison, so his receipt of [a prisoner’s] letter is insufficient to establish liability

for deliberate indifference.”).

III. Qualified Immunity

“In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of constitutional rights, qualified

immunity shields an official from liability for civil damages, provided that the illegality of the

official’s conduct was not clearly established at the time he acted.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843,

858 (7th Cir. 2011). “In determining whether a right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of an

official action, [courts] must look at the right violated in a ‘particularized’ sense, rather than ‘at a

high level of generality.’” Id. (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). When

available, controlling precedent from either the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit guides this

inquiry. Alicea v. Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 291 (7th Cir. 2016). “However, a case holding that the

exact action in question is unlawful is not necessary.” Id. “Even where there are notable factual

distinctions, prior cases may give an officer reasonable warning that his conduct is unlawful.” Id.

The defendants assert qualified immunity for both the conditions of confinement claim

and the failure to protect claim. This opinion has already catalogued numerous Seventh Circuit

opinions which are both akin to Mr. Smith’s sanitation claim and predate it. See part I.A. As for

Mr. Smith’s failure to protect claim, it too is not novel. See Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420

(7th Cir. 2011) (“Failure to provide a prisoner required to work out of doors with minimal

protective clothing, obviously including gloves, can . . . violate the Eighth Amendment, as

countless cases have found.”); see, e.g., Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2004)

(reversing summary judgment for prison officials who failed to provide electrical gloves to

prisoner performing work as electrician). The deliberate indifference violations that Mr. Smith

alleges were therefore clearly established at the times they occurred. Accordingly, qualified

immunity is denied.

x x x

In summary, Plaintiff Smith has presented a triable inadequate sanitation claim against

Defendants Hardy, Coleman, and Godinez, and a triable failure to protect claim against

Defendants Hardy and Coleman. Summary judgment is granted to the defendants on all other

conditions of confinement claims. Because no triable claim remains against Defendant

Luchsinger, he is dismissed from the case.

Date: January 23, 2023 John J. Tharp, Jr.

United States District Judge

29