Hill v. D.J. Taylor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Willie Hill, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 20 C 6723

v. )

) Hon. Virginia M. Kendall

City of Chicago, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this pro se civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Willie Hill alleges

Defendants Chicago Police Officers Taylor and Zeman stopped, searched, and arrested him for

illegal possession of a fire arm on September 3, 2020, in violation of his rights under the Fourth

Amendment. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that their

actions complied with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and that they are entitled to

qualified immunity (Dkt. 60), to which Plaintiff has responded (Dkts. 73-75). For the reasons

stated below, Defendants Motion (Dkt. 60) is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 sets out a procedure for presenting facts pertinent to a party’s request for

summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Rule 56.1 requires the party moving for

summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts and a supporting memorandum of law.

LR 56.1(a)(1), (2) (N.D. Ill.). The statement of material facts “must consist of concise numbered

paragraphs[,]” and “[e]ach asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary

material, including the specific page number, that supports it.” LR 56.1(d)(1), (2).

The party opposing summary judgment must submit a supporting memorandum of law and

a response to the moving party’s statement of facts. LR 56.1(b)(1), (2). To dispute an asserted

fact, the opposing party “must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact” and

explain “how the cited material controverts” the fact. LR 56.1(e)(3). In addition, if the opposing

party wants the Court to consider facts not presented by the moving party, he must submit a

separate “statement of additional material facts” consisting of “concise numbered paragraphs” and

attaching any additional evidentiary material. L.R. 56.1(b)(3), (d)(1).

The district court may limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment “to evidence

that is properly identified and supported in the parties’ statements.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch.

Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,

886–87 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the

benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have repeatedly held that district

judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity of

summary judgment filings.”). Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from

complying with Local Rule 56.1. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e

have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as

to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se.

Wis., Inc., 423 F. App’x. 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“Though courts are solicitous of

pro se litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance with local rules.”).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Defendants served him with a “Notice to Pro Se

Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” as required by Local Rule 56.2. (Dkt. No. 63.)

Plaintiff submitted his own Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. 73) which largely parrots

the statement of facts submitted by Defendants. He also submitted a Response to Defendants’

Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 74) and a Declaration

(Dkt. 75) The Court construes Plaintiff’s materials (Dkt. 74 and 75) as his response to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment.

Defendants treated Plaintiff’s Statement (Dkt. 73), as a statement of additional facts and

responded to it (Dkt. No. 81), and the Court will do the same for the sake of clarity. However,

while the Court liberally construes these submissions, many of the purported factual statements

submitted by Plaintiff are duplicative, irrelevant, argumentative, consist of legal conclusions or

conclusory statements, or are not supported by admissible evidence. The Court will entertain

factual statements only to the extent they are material, supported by the record, or a party could

properly testify about the matters asserted. See Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (N.D.

Ill. 2013).

Defendants argue in their Reply (Dkt. 82) that Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts,

Paragraphs 1, 3, 18-20, and 25-26 mischaracterize the evidence upon which they purport to rely.

The Court has evaluated the cited underlying evidence and has not relied on Plaintiff’s summation

of that evidence. See United States Soccer Fed’n, Inc. v. United States Nat’l Soccer Team Players

Ass’n, No. 14 C 9899, 2015 WL 5730267, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2015).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Statements of Undisputed Facts, Paragraphs 4-17, 21-22, and 24

do not cite to the record. On summary judgment, the opposing party must respond to the movant’s

proposed statements of fact. Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir.

2005). In the case of any disagreement, “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that

controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.

Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary

material.” LR 56.1(e)(3). “[M]ere disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is inadequate if

made without reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th

Cir. 2003).

The Court will therefore accept Defendants’ Statement of Facts, to the extent it is supported

by the record. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006). (district court properly

rejected Rule 56.1 statement that did not comply with the local rule); Milton v. Slota, 697 F. App’x.

462, 464 (7th Cir. 2017) (“the [district] court was entitled to strictly enforce the local rule, even

against a pro se litigant, by deeming uncontroverted statements of material fact admitted for the

purpose of deciding summary judgment”). The Court will also consider Plaintiff’s factual

assertions that are properly supported or about which he could testify, and then decide whether, on

those facts, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. With these guidelines in mind, the

Court turns to the facts of this case.

B. Factual Background

Willie Hill (“Plaintiff”) brings this action alleging claims pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants, Chicago Police Officers David Taylor and Edward Zeman (collectively,

“Officers”), for unlawful seizure, unlawful search, and false arrest. (Dkt. 61, Def. SOF, ¶ 1.)

On September 3, 2020, the Officers were on duty and were assigned to the 11th district.

(Id. at ¶ 4.) At the time, Officer Taylor had been working as a police officer for approximately 5

years and had been working in the 11th district for approximately 3 and a half years. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Officer Zeman had been working as a police officer for approximately 4 and a half years and had

been working in the 11th district for approximately 3 years. (Id.)

During the afternoon of September 3, 2020, the Officers were patrolling in the area of

Hamlin and West End, an area they knew had a high rate of gun violence. (Id. at ¶ 6.) The

Officers were wearing their police uniforms which included a police badge, duty vest with service

belt, and were driving an unmarked municipal vehicle with M plates. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

As the Officers were driving southbound on Hamlin near West End, they saw Plaintiff

walking on the sidewalk toward them with a multi-colored bag strapped across his chest. (Id. at ¶

8.) The Officers saw that the bag appeared to be weighed down by a heavy object inside and was

swinging from side to side with each step Plaintiff took. (Id. at ¶ 9.) As the Officers approached,

Plaintiff quickened his pace, avoided eye contact, and tried to conceal the bag with a shirt that he

was carrying. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

During the Officers’ time working in the 11th district, each of them recovered firearms on

multiple occasions in the area from bags that were similar in size and style to the bag strapped

across Plaintiff’s chest. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendants assert that as the gap in distance between the

officers and Plaintiff closed , the officers saw what appeared to be the imprint of a gun inside the

bag that was strapped across Plaintiff’s chest. (Id. at ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff states, in his

Statement in response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts that there is no way the officers could

have seen the imprint of a gun because the bag was not clear or see-through. (Dkt. 73, Pl.

Statement, ¶ 15.) Based on the Officers’ knowledge of the area, experiences as police officers,

and observations of Plaintiff, they believed that Plaintiff was in unlawful possession of a firearm

and was armed and dangerous. (Dkt. 61, Def. SOF, ¶ 13.)

Officer Zeman stopped the car, and the Officers exited. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Officer Taylor

immediately conducted a protective pat-down of the bag strapped across Plaintiff’s chest and felt

a hard object that he immediately recognized as a handgun. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Officer Taylor then

went around behind Plaintiff to handcuff him for safety purposes and nodded at Officer Zeman to

indicate that Plaintiff was carrying a gun in the bag. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Officer Zeman opened the bag

and immediately saw and then recovered a black Taurus 9mm handgun which was uncased and

fully loaded. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

When Plaintiff was asked if he had a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (“FOID”) card

or concealed carry license, he told the Officers that he did not and that he found the bag while he

was walking. (Id. at ¶ 18.) The Officers arrested Plaintiff, placed him in the back of the squad

car, and transported him to the police station to be processed. (Id. at ¶ 19.) When Plaintiff was

asked if he had any identification whatsoever, he told the Officers that he had an ID card which

was in the bag that had been strapped across his chest. (Id. at ¶ 20.) At the station, the Officers

confirmed that Plaintiff did not have a valid FOID card or concealed carry license. (Id. at ¶ 21.)

Plaintiff was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court does

not weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or determine the truth of the matter, but rather determines

only whether a genuine issue of fact exists. Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.,

528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. Id.

Material facts are determined by the substantive law underlying the claim, and a genuine

issue is one that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.”). Disputes about irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not count. Id.

Summary judgment is warranted where a party fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party bears

the burden of proof at trial. Austin v. Walgreen Co., 885 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (7th Cir. 2018)

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The moving party may discharge its

burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ first argument on summary judgment is that they fully complied with the

Fourth Amendment in their interactions with Plaintiff on September 3, 2020. The Court begins by

analyzing the initial stop. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Plaintiff

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, so an officer may

detain a suspect for an investigatory stop, referred to as a Terry stop, only if the officer has

reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to be or has been committed. See D.Z. v. Buell, 796

F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Reasonable

suspicion “is more than a hunch but less than probable cause and considerably less than

preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Snow, 656 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2011). It “can

therefore be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required

to establish probable cause,” and it “can arise from information that is less reliable than that

required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). In evaluating

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, a court must make “an

objective inquiry into all of the circumstances known to the officer at the time he stopped the

[individual], including information relayed by . . . police dispatchers.” Snow, 65 F.3d at 500.

The record establishes that on September 3, 2020, Defendants, Officers Taylor and Zeman,

were patrolling an area that, based on their years of experience as police officers, they knew to be

an area that they knew had a high rate of gun violence. They observed Plaintiff walking toward

them with a multi-colored bag strapped across his chest. The bag appeared to be weighed down

with a heavy object. As Defendants approached Plaintiff he quickened his pace, avoided eye

contact, and attempted to conceal the bag with a shirt he was carrying.

However, while Defendants contend in their statement of facts that they could see an

imprint of the gun in Plaintiff’s bag, he responds by stating (as he would presumably testify) that

there is no way Defendants could see the imprint of a gun in the bag because it was not clear or

see-through. Thus, a material question of fact exists, and the resolution of that question largely

depends upon a determination of the credibility of the parties’ testimony. The Court cannot resolve

credibility issues or weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment. See Higginson v.

Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 810–11 (7th Cir. 1996) (where record is a “swearing contest”, summary

judgment is inappropriate); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“summary judgment is not a procedure for resolving a swearing contest.”); see also Miller v.

Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014).

Because the Court has found that questions of material fact remain as to whether

Defendants had reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff the Court need not analyze the remaining

Fourth Amendment arguments relating to Defendants’ search of Plaintiff and his resulting arrest.

B. Defendants are not entitled to Qualified Immunity

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in the Fourth Amendment Terry stop context

if a reasonable officer could have believed that “arguable” reasonable suspicion (for a Terry stop)

or probable cause (for an arrest) existed to detain the plaintiff. See Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999,

1007 (7th Cir. 2014); (“Due to qualified immunity's protection, an officer needs only 'arguable'

probable cause.”); Minett v. Overwachter, 433 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 2020 WL 224342, at *5 (W.D.

Wis. 2020) (“[D]efendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have

believed that ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to detain plaintiff.”); Rouei

v. Vill. of Skokie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 765, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[Q]ualified immunity exists in a false

arrest case where there is ‘arguable’ probable cause, ... and thus it likely exists in a false Terry stop

case where there is ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion.”). Arguable reasonable suspicion and

probable cause are established “when a reasonable officer ‘in the same circumstances and ...

possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that

[reasonable suspicion or] probable cause existed in light of well-established law.’” Huff, 744 F.3d

at 1007 (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998)).

Qualified immunity is available to protect the Officers from liability unless it can be shown

by Plaintiff that the Officers violated a clearly established right, based on closely analogous cases

illustrating that the Officers’ conduct was unlawful or that the violation was so obvious that

reasonable officers would have known that their actions were unconstitutional. See, e.g., McGreal

v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 683 (7th Cir. 2004). However, because the Court has found that questions

of fact remain that allow for the possibility of two different inferences (one supporting a finding

of reasonable suspicion and one supporting a finding of no reasonable suspicion) the Court cannot

find that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Nettles-Bey v. Williams, 819 F.3d 959,

961 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that where the admissible evidence would permit two inferences, one

of which would implicate violations of a plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights, the

case must proceed to trial, and the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity).

No one disputes that it was clearly established by September 3, 2020, that a stop by police

without reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional. Because the Court has found that material

questions of fact remain as to whether there was reasonable suspicion for Defendants to stop

Plaintiff, the Court cannot make a finding that qualified immunity applies. Thus, the Court

declines to enter summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [60] is denied. This

matter is set for a status hearing on January 23, at 9:15 a.m. .

DATE: January 3, 2023 Ange: DP oe alae

United States District Judge

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