The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KAABAR VENSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 18-cv-07055
v. )
) Judge Andrea R. Wood
VAUGHN RUSSELL, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kaabar Venson was a prisoner at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”)
when she fell down the stairs while correctional officers were escorting her and other prisoners to
receive x-ray exams. Venson has filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Lieutenant William Brown, Lieutenant Charles Best, and Correctional Officer Vaughn Russell
(“Defendants”), all Stateville correctional officers, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent
to a substantial risk to her safety when they escorted her down the stairs while chained to other
prisoners, in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 54), in which they argue that Venson failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
I. Administrative Grievance Procedures
The Illinois Department of Corrections’s (“IDOC”) regulations establish grievance
procedures for prisoners. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.800 et seq. Prisoners are first
required to file a written grievance with their institutional counselor within sixty days after the
discovery or occurrence of an issue, unless they can demonstrate good cause for an untimely
filing. Id. § 504.810(a). The grievance must “contain factual details regarding each aspect of the
offender’s complaint, including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who is
the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” Id. § 504.810(c). If the prisoner
does not know the names of the individuals involved, the prisoner “must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id. Grievances are then reviewed by a
grievance officer who reports their findings and recommendations to the correctional facility’s
Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) within two months, when reasonably feasible. Id.
§ 504.830. The CAO reviews the grievance officer’s determination and provides the prisoner with
a written decision. Id.
If they are dissatisfied with the CAO’s decision, prisoners may appeal the decision to the
IDOC’s Director within thirty days. Id. § 504.850(a). The Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”), appointed by the Director, reviews the record and submits a written report of its
findings and recommendations to the Director. Id. § 504.850(d). Finally, the Director reviews the
ARB’s findings and recommendations and makes a final decision within six months, when
reasonably feasible. Id. § 504.850(e).
II. April 2018 Grievance
Around March 22, 2018, Venson fell while being escorted down the stairs at Stateville.
(Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Facts (“PRDSF”) ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 62.) Following the incident,
Defendant Russell completed an incident report and forwarded it to Stateville’s CAO. (Defs.’
Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts (“DRPSAF”) ¶¶ 1, 3, Dkt. No. 63.) The report
describes how a group of prisoners, including Venson, fell while being escorted down the stairs
by a lead chain; they were then treated by medical staff. (Id. ¶ 2.) In response to the incident,
Venson filed a grievance on April 20, 2018, which does not describe or name the Defendants nor
does it allege that she informed Defendants of her inability to travel safely down the stairs.
(PRDSF ¶¶ 7–8, 10.) On the grievance form, Venson did not check the “Staff Conduct” box, but
she checked the “Medical Treatment” box and the “Other” box, handwriting the words “falling
down the stairs.” (PRDSF ¶ 9; DRPSAF ¶ 6.) The grievance details the fall, noting that Venson
fell down the stairs while shackled with leg irons and with her hands locked in a lead chain.
(DRPSAF ¶ 7.) Other prisoners fell on her head, neck, back, and legs during the incident. (Id.)
The grievance also requested medical attention for injuries Venson claims to have suffered from
the fall because she did not believe that she was receiving proper medical treatment. (PRDSF
¶ 11; DRPSAF ¶ 7.)
On May 31, 2018, Venson’s correctional counselor responded to the April 20, 2018
grievance, referencing a medical report from the facility’s nursing supervisor. (PRDSF ¶ 11;
Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”), Ex. 2, Grievance Records 4/20/18, Dkt. No. 55-2.1)
On June 12, 2018, Venson sent IDOC officials a request for copies of every grievance that she
had submitted during her incarceration at Stateville in 2018 because she had not received
responses on some of them. (DRPSAF ¶ 8.) The grievance officer recommended that Venson’s
1 Venson contends that her grievance record for the month of April does not provide any reason to
conclude the correctional counselor’s response was shared with her. The Northern District of Illinois’s
Local Rule 56.1, which governs motions for summary judgment, requires a party’s response to an
opposing party’s statement of facts to “cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact” to
adequately dispute an asserted fact; asserted facts may be deemed admitted without such specific
citations. L.R. 56.1(e)(3). “[M]ere disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is inadequate if made
without reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).
Because Venson failed to cite specific evidence, such as an affidavit stating that she never received the
counselor’s response, the fact will be deemed admitted.
request be denied, explaining that prisoners are provided copies of their grievances when the
grievance receives a response. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Defendants claim that the grievance officer recommended that Venson’s grievance be
denied as moot on December 14, 2018. (PRDSF ¶ 13.) In contrast, Venson contends that the
document was not finalized until sometime in February 2019, as the grievance officer’s report
mentions medical treatment Venson received in January 2019 and February 2019. (PRDSF ¶ 13;
Grievance Records 4/20/18.) In the report, the grievance officer explains that the grievance should
be denied as moot since Venson was receiving continued medical treatment for her medical
problems. (DRPSAF ¶ 13.) The CAO concurred with the grievance officer’s recommendation for
the April 2018 grievance on February 25, 2019, and Venson appealed that decision to the ARB on
March 5, 2019. (DRPSAF ¶¶ 14–15.) On March 14, 2019, the ARB responded to the grievance,
stating that the grievance did not comply with the applicable regulations because it was not
submitted within the required timeframe and no justification was provided for additional
consideration. (See Grievance Records 4/20/18.)
III. September 2018 Grievance
On September 19, 2018, Venson filed a grievance regarding her March 2018 fall, alleging
misconduct by Defendants. (PRDSF ¶¶ 15–16.) Specifically, Venson wrote that she had informed
Defendants that she could not walk down the stairs cuffed and chained to other prisoners because
of her preexisting injuries. (DRPSAF ¶11.) (Venson claims to have suffered injuries to her hip,
face, and back, from an attack by other prisoners prior to this incident. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 8,
Dkt. No. 16.)) Venson submitted the form directly to the ARB, reasoning that it had been several
months since the March incident and she had yet to receive a response to the many grievances she
had filed. (DRPSAF ¶¶ 10–11.) Venson disputes Defendants’ characterization of the September
2018 grievance as a separate grievance from the April 2018 grievance; instead, she asserts that the
September grievance was a continuation of the April grievance. (PRDSF ¶¶ 15–16.) Regardless of
the characterization, the September grievance does not list the date of Venson’s fall down the
stairs. (Id. ¶ 17.)
The ARB returned Venson’s grievance on September 26, 2018. (PRDSF ¶ 18; DSMF, Ex.
3, Grievance Records 9/19/18, Dkt. No. 55-3.2) Defendants assert that the ARB returned the
grievance because of the omitted date. (PRDSF ¶ 18; Grievance Records 9/19/18.) However, the
ARB did not check the box on the Return of Grievance or Correspondence form for Venson to
provide a date; instead, the ARB checked the boxes for “This office previously addressed this
issue” and “No justification provided for additional consideration” under the heading “No further
redress.” (PRDSF ¶ 18; Grievance Records 9/19/18.) Furthermore, in the “Other” section, the
ARB wrote “You provide no dates or month of incident. But our office has reviewed like claims
on the above dates. No review will be given for this submission, further submissions will be
FILED and not responded to.” (Id.) Following its decision, the ARB did not receive any appeals
or grievances from Venson related to the March fall incident between September 26, 2018 and
October 16, 2018. (PRDSF ¶ 19.) Venson also did not file any other grievances concerning the
incident. (Id. ¶ 19.)
In October 2018, Venson brought the present lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (PRDSF
¶ 5.) In her Second Amended Complaint, Venson alleges that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk to her safety when they forced her and other prisoners down the
2 Venson claims that her grievance record for the month of September does not indicate that the ARB’s
response was provided to her. For the reasons discussed noted, the fact will be deemed admitted since she
failed to cite specific evidence, such as an affidavit stating that she never received the ARB’s response.
stairs, despite their knowledge of her preexisting injuries, her statement that she was unable to
descend the stairs while shackled and chained to other prisoners, and the availability of a nearby
elevator. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14–15, 27.)
DISCUSSION
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Venson failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies before filing suit. Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible
evidence considered as a whole shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even after all reasonable inferences are
drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th
Cir. 2011). A genuine dispute exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The PLRA requires that prisoners exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to
filing a federal action regarding prison conditions, including a § 1983 suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Seventh Circuit takes a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). “Unexhausted claims are procedurally barred from consideration.”
Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016). A prisoner fulfills the exhaustion
requirement by complying with the specific procedures established by the prison’s policy.
Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2016). Because failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense, defendants carry the burden of proof. Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 533
(7th Cir. 2018).
Exhaustion is not a requirement where administrative remedies are not “available” to a
prisoner. Hernandez, 814 F.3d at 842. Thus, at the summary judgment stage, “defendants must
show beyond dispute that remedies were available.” Ramirez, 906 F.3d at 534. The Supreme
Court has noted three circumstances in which prisons may have an official administrative
procedure for prisoners to submit grievances, but such procedure nonetheless is not “available”
under the PLRA: (1) the procedure is essentially a dead end through which prisoners consistently
fail to obtain relief; (2) the administrative procedure is so complicated and opaque that a typical
prisoner could not navigate it; or (3) prison officials actively thwart prisoners’ attempts to take
advantage of the procedure. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016). The Seventh Circuit has
advised that “these were only examples, not a closed list.” Ramirez, 906 F.3d at 538. For
example, even if prison officials do not engage in affirmative misconduct, they may make
remedies unavailable by “failing to inform the prisoner of the grievance process.” Hernandez, 814
F.3d at 842. Additionally, a remedy becomes unavailable where “prison employees do not
respond to a properly filed grievance.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (citing Lewis v. Washington, 300
F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002)).
I. April 2018 Grievance
With respect to the April 2018 grievance, Defendants assert that Venson failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies because she did not follow the procedural rule requiring her to name
or describe the individuals involved in the incident.
IDOC regulations require prisoners to include factual details in their grievances, including
the names of the people involved in the incident or, if their identities are unknown, descriptive
information about the individuals. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(b). The absence of any
information indicating who is the target of a grievance constitutes a fatal defect. See Roberts v.
Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 235–36 (7th Cir. 2014). But “[a] procedural shortcoming like failing to
follow the prison’s time deadlines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prison administrators
explicitly relied on that shortcoming.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also Watkins v. Lancor, 558 F. App’x 662, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2014) (determining that a prisoner
exhausted his remedies, despite violating the prison’s “one issue” rule for grievances, because
officials decided his appeal on the merits; specifically, officials reasoned that the prisoner’s
concerns had already been addressed appropriately, and he provided no new information.);3 Lewis
v. Pfister, No. 18-CV-4502, 2019 WL 5577164, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2019) (finding that a
prisoner exhausted his remedies, notwithstanding his failure to name or describe defendants in the
grievance, since officials did not invoke that procedural rule when denying the grievance as
untimely).
Here, it is undisputed that Venson did not name or describe Defendants in the April 2018
grievance. Nonetheless, Defendants cannot rely on this procedural shortcoming as IDOC officials
did not explicitly invoke this rule when denying or returning Venson’s grievance. Rather, the
grievance officer addressed the claim on the merits and recommended that the CAO deny the
grievance as moot because Venson was already receiving medical treatment for her issues. And
the CAO later concurred with this assessment. According to ARB records, the ARB later returned
the grievance because it was untimely submitted to the grievance officer, and no justification was
provided for additional consideration. Since none of these documents reference a failure to
identify responsible individuals as the reason for denying Venson’s claim, that failure provides no
basis to find that Venson did not exhaust her administrative remedies.
However, Venson’s April 2018 grievance suffers from a more fundamental defect. A
claim will not be considered administratively exhausted where the claim filed in federal court is
3 Watkins is an unpublished Seventh Circuit order issued after January 1, 2007. Although not
precedential, the order’s reasoning is persuasive and provides a useful point of comparison here. See Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1(a); 7th Cir. R. 32.1(b).
substantively distinct from the allegation made in the grievance. See Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513,
517–18 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding a prisoner failed to administratively exhaust his claim where his
federal complaint alleged that correctional officers had advance notice of an attack by fellow
prisoners but failed to protect him from harm, while his prison grievance alleged that correctional
officers failed to come to his aid during the attack). A grievance should provide “notice to the
prison of the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990,
995–96 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that a prisoner’s grievance
did not give adequate notice of his failure to protect claim where the grievance alleged that the
prison guards did not sufficiently aid him during an attack but did not reference events preceding
the attack or misconduct by officers mentioned in the federal claim).
Venson’s April 2018 grievance failed to provide adequate notice to the IDOC of Venson’s
claim for deliberate indifference to her safety. Although the grievance describes how Venson fell
down the stairs while shackled and chained to other prisoners, it does not allege any wrongdoing
by Defendants, such as the correctional officers forcing her to go down the stairs. The grievance
also failed to state that Venson informed Defendants of her inability to travel safely down the
stairs. Furthermore, Venson only requested proper medical attention as relief. Thus, the sole
alleged wrongdoing that could be gleaned from the April 2018 grievance is the failure to provide
Venson with proper medical treatment, which would implicate the facility’s medical staff but not
the correctional officers who escorted her down the stairs during her fall. In contrast, Venson’s
§ 1983 claim before this Court alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk to Venson’s safety when they forced her and other prisoners down the stairs,
despite knowing about her preexisting injuries, that she was unable to safely walk down the stairs
while shackled to other prisoners, and the availability of a nearby elevator. For this reason, the
April 2018 grievance, which focused on issues with Venson’s medical treatment, failed to exhaust
Venson’s administrative remedies with respect to her deliberate indifference claim that is the
subject of the present lawsuit.4
II. September 2018 Grievance
The Court next addresses the September 2018 grievance and, specifically, whether
Venson’s failure to include the date of the incident on the grievance form means she failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies.
To begin, unlike the April 2018 grievance, the substance of the September 2018 grievance
relates to the issue of deliberate indifference to safety presently before this Court. For instance,
the September 2018 grievance alleged misconduct by Defendants with respect to causing
Venson’s fall, such as Venson’s claim that she informed Defendants that she would be unable to
walk down the stairs because of her injuries and they told her to do it anyway. The grievance also
sought disciplinary action against Defendants as one form of requested relief. Similarly, Venson’s
§ 1983 claim here asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to
her safety when they forced her and other prisoners down the stairs despite knowing about her
4 The Court notes that Venson and Defendants devote a significant portion of their briefing to addressing
whether the IDOC unreasonably delayed its response to Venson’s April 2018 grievance. But the Court
need not reach the issue since the grievance did not exhaust Venson’s administrative remedies for her
present deliberate indifference claim for other reasons. Nonetheless, the Court observes that there appears
to be a dispute of fact concerning whether Venson received any response to the April 2018 grievance
between the counselor’s response in May 2018 and the grievance officer’s decision in December 2018.
Venson contends that she received no response during that period. In Defendants’ reply brief, however,
they allege several new facts not included in either party’s statement of facts or responses as reasons for
the delay, such as Venson sending her grievance directly to the ARB once she received the counselor’s
response, the ARB returning Venson’s grievance in June 2018 because Venson had not included the
grievance officer’s response, Venson then resubmitting the grievance to the grievance officer, and the
grievance officer not receiving the grievance until late July 2018. See Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J. at 12, Dkt. No. 63. If not for the Court’s independent determination that the April 2018
grievance failed to exhaust Venson’s administrative remedies for her present §1983 claim, this dispute
likely would be significant for assessing whether a delay made administrative remedies unavailable to
Venson.
preexisting injuries and that she was unable to safely walk down the stairs while shackled to other
prisoners. Nonetheless, four procedural deficiencies potentially could render the September 2018
grievance unexhausted: (1) Venson failed to include the date of the incident on the grievance
form; (2) she submitted the grievance after the sixty-day deadline; (3) she sent the grievance
directly to the ARB; and (4) she did not resubmit the grievance with the missing information or
appeal the ARB’s decision to the Director.
Defendants contend that Venson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she
did not include the date of the incident in the grievance form, and she did not file another
grievance or appeal the ARB’s decision. IDOC regulations direct prisoners to include factual
details in their grievances, including the date when the incident occurred. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20,
§ 504.810(b). But exhaustion does not require prisoners to “go beyond the established system and
guess at some other way of attracting the attention of prison authorities.” Williams v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d 828, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2020). Prison officials can so obscure the
administrative process that it becomes unknowable and, thus, unavailable, when they inform
prisoners of errors in their grievances, but send conflicting messages on how to proceed. See Reid
v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 327–30 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding remedies were unavailable to a prisoner
because officials’ communications left the prisoner with no conceivable next steps since the ARB
checked the box for the prisoner to submit missing documents but did not check the box for him
to return the grievance with the additional information requested); Williams, 957 F.3d at 833–34
(concluding that a prisoner exhausted all available remedies when the ARB returned the appeal as
insufficient due to missing documents, but did not check the box to provide the missing
materials).
Here, the ARB’s response to Venson so obscured the administrative process that it made
administrative remedies unavailable to her. As discussed previously, the Court deems admitted
that Venson received the ARB’s response to her September 2018 grievance. In its response, the
ARB noted that Venson failed to provide a date for the incident; however, it did not check the box
for her to return the grievance with the additional information requested. Instead, the ARB
checked the boxes for “This office previously addressed this issue” and “No justification provided
for additional consideration.” Additionally, the ARB stated, “[O]ur office has reviewed like
claims on the above dates. No review will be given for this submission, further submissions will
be FILED and not responded to.”
With this response, the ARB did not leave Venson with any conceivable next steps to take
since it failed to indicate to her that she should resubmit the grievance with the missing date. To
the contrary, the ARB actively discouraged Venson from additional action by informing her that it
would not review that submission further or respond to any new submissions. It also stated it had
addressed like claims on several dates, including April 20, 2018, which is the date of Venson’s
April 2018 grievance. Yet Venson had also not yet received a response from her grievance officer
on her pending April 2018 grievance. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Reid found the ARB’s
response to be confusing when a prisoner submitted an additional grievance because he had not
yet received a response to his prior grievance, but the ARB told him not to file any new
grievances and did not mention his other pending grievance in its response. See Reid, 962 F.3d at
330. It is reasonable to believe that Venson thought she would not receive a response to her April
2018 grievance, nor a response to any subsequent submissions for the September 2018 grievance,
such as a resubmission or appeal. Considering the conflicting messages she received in response
to her September 2018 grievance, the Court finds that administrative remedies were unavailable
to Venson.
Even if Venson did not receive the ARB’s confusing response to her September 2018
grievance, the result would be no different. To the contrary, Venson’s claim that administrative
remedies were unavailable to her would arguably be stronger. As previously noted, officials’
failure to respond to a prisoner’s grievance is grounds for finding a remedy to be unavailable.
Reid, 962 F.3d at 329. If Venson did not receive the ARB’s response, Defendants would not be
able to satisfy their burden to prove administrative remedies were available to her. See Pyles, 829
F.3d at 863–64 (finding that a prisoner had exhausted the remedies available to him where he
testified that he did not receive the grievance officer’s response, having submitted the grievance
in March 2013 and filed his lawsuit in July 2013).
The untimeliness of Venson’s September 2018 grievance also presents no barrier to
Venson’s federal claim. IDOC regulations require prisoners to file their grievance with a
grievance officer within sixty days of the occurrence of an incident. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20,
§ 504.810(a). Venson’s September 2018 grievance clearly was not filed within sixty days of the
March 2018 fall incident. But, as noted previously, officials’ failure to rely explicitly on
untimeliness or other procedural shortcomings when responding to a grievance precludes them
from relying on that argument for purposes of arguing a failure to exhaust. In their briefing,
Defendants briefly note that Venson’s September 2018 grievance was untimely although they do
not further develop this point. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6, Dkt.
No. 56. Regardless, the ARB’s response failed to indicate that the September grievance was
untimely or that the ARB was rejecting the grievance for that reason, which bars Defendants from
now advancing that argument as a grounds for dismissal of this lawsuit. The ARB’s response also
did not state that Venson should have first submitted the grievance to the correctional counselor
and grievance officer, as mandated by IDOC regulations. Therefore, Defendants are precluded
from raising these errors as procedural hurdles to Venson’s federal claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on their
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Dkt. No. 54) is denied.
ENTERED:
Dated: October 14, 2022 asthe.
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge