Dale v. Deutsche Telekom AG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY DALE, BRETT JACKSON,

JOHNNA FOX, BENJAMIN BORROWMAN,

ANN LAMBERT, ROBERT ANDERSON, and No. 22 C 03189

CHAD HOHENBERY, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly Judge Thomas M. Durkin

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs filed this suit under the federal antitrust statutes challenging the

2020 merger between T-Mobile and Sprint. Defendant T-Mobile US, Inc. (the only

defendant that has been served thus far) has moved to transfer the case to the

Southern District of New York (“SDNY”).1 For the reasons stated below, T-Mobile’s

motion is denied.

Background

On April 29, 2018, wireless service providers T-Mobile and Sprint announced

their intention to merge. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia sued to block

the merger. The case proceeded to trial in December 2019 before the Honorable Judge

1 The Court may resolve this motion even though not all parties have been served yet.

See Rivers v. Union Pac. R.R., 2017 WL 379447, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017) (“A

federal court may consider a transfer motion before all of the parties are joined.”).

Victor Marrero of SDNY. During the two-week bench trial, the parties presented

extensive evidence and testimony regarding the potential pro- or anti-competitive

effects of the merger. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179,

187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Together, counsel and experts amass documentary and

testimonial records for trial that can occupy entire storage rooms to capacity.”). Judge

Marrero ultimately ruled against the complaining States, saying he was “not

persuaded” by their prediction that the new company formed by the merger would

pursue anticompetitive behavior. Id. at 189. He also disagreed with the States’

contention “that Sprint, absent the merger, would continue operating as a strong

competitor in the nationwide market for wireless services.” Id. Finally, he rejected

the States’ argument that DISH Network Corp. was unlikely to enter the wireless

services market as a viable competitor post-merger. Id.

After Judge Marrero issued his decision, T-Mobile and Sprint settled with

twelve of the State Attorneys General. The settlement included commitments by the

merged company to provide low-cost plans to residents of those states and nationwide

broadband access for educational purposes to qualifying households. In exchange, the

States agreed to forgo an appeal of Judge Marrero’s decision and to refrain from

publicly opposing the merger. The settlement agreement remains in force through

April of 2025, and all disputes arising out of the agreement are to be heard in the

Southern District of New York.

The merger closed on April 1, 2020. In T-Mobile’s characterization, the results

have been emphatically pro-consumer. T-Mobile points to its roll out of wireless plans

targeted at low-income and prepaid customers and an expanded network that

competes with home internet providers. T-Mobile also lauds DISH as a rising

competitor in the wireless service market, emphasizing DISH’s achievement of FCC-

imposed milestones for building out its own 5G network.

Plaintiffs, naturally, espouse a dimmer view. They claim that post-merger, the

downward trend in wireless service plan prices has reversed, with the big three

wireless carriers (T-Mobile, Verizon, and AT&T) instead raising rates, on top of

customers facing higher taxes, fees, and surcharges. Plaintiffs also allege that T-

Mobile has exploited the post-merger reduction in competition by enrolling its

customers in a program that sells their data to advertisers. And contrary to T-

Mobile’s rosy description of DISH’s place in the market, Plaintiffs bemoan the would-

be competitor’s performance, noting that DISH remains primarily a “virtual” network

that resells access to the networks of other carriers.

Against the backdrop of these competing pictures of the commercial wireless

service environment, Plaintiffs bring antitrust claims under Section 7 of the Clayton

Act (15 U.S.C. § 18) and Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). Purporting to

represent a nationwide class of AT&T and Verizon wireless customers, Plaintiffs

allege that the reduction in competition has caused the class members to pay billions

of dollars more than they otherwise would have absent the merger. In this action,

they seek to unwind the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, create a viable fourth competitor in

the marketplace, and recover damages for the overcharges they sustained.

Delving into the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims is a task for a later date, however.

In the transfer motion presently before the Court, the question is simply where those

issues should be litigated. The named Plaintiffs claim they chose the Northern

District of Illinois (“NDIL”) because it is the most convenient for them, and that the

case should remain here. Of the seven, one resides in this District, three others reside

in Illinois, and the remaining three reside in Indiana. T-Mobile contends the case

belongs back in SDNY because it has the closest connection to the material events

and is more convenient in other relevant regards.

Discussion

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a

district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it

might have been brought.”2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) “‘permits a flexible

and individualized analysis’ and affords district courts the opportunity to look beyond

a narrow or rigid set of considerations in their determinations.” Research Automation,

Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). The party seeking transfer

“has the burden of establishing, by reference to particular circumstances, that the

transferee forum is clearly more convenient” than the transferor. Coffey v. Van Dorn

Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1986). The task of weighing the relevant

factors “is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 219.

2 Plaintiffs do not dispute that jurisdiction and venue would be proper in SDNY.

A district court considering a transfer motion “must evaluate both the

convenience of the parties and various public-interest considerations.” Atl. Marine

Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). Relevant private interest

factors include the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the situs of the material events, the

convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the relative ease of access to evidence.

See Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The

public interest analysis “focuses on the efficient administration of the court system,

rather than the private considerations of the litigants. Id. at 961 (quoting Espino v.

Top Draw Freight Sys., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Considerations

include “the speed at which the case will proceed to trial, the court’s familiarity with

the applicable law, the relation of the community to the occurrence at issue, and the

desirability of resolving controversies in their locale.” Id. at 962.

I. Private Interest Factors

a. Plaintiffs’ choice of forum

A plaintiff’s choice of forum ordinarily is entitled to “substantial deference,”

particularly when the chosen forum is the plaintiff’s home forum. AL & PO Corp. v.

Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., 2015 WL 738694, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015); see also

Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63 (noting that “plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select

whatever forum they consider most advantageous”). Several additional, related

considerations come into play in this case. First, some courts have suggested that a

plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to even greater respect in antitrust cases. See,

e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 497, 500 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Star

Lines, Ltd. v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 442 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

Along this line, Plaintiffs point to Congress’s “intent to liberalize the restrictive venue

provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act by enacting Section 12 of the Clayton Act.”

Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 1977). But

the discussion in Tiger Trash indicates that the jurisdictional expansion of Section 12

was primarily aimed at remedying situations where a defendant corporation could

avoid suit outside the district where its headquarters were located. See id. (“A foreign

corporation no longer could come to a district, perpetrate there the injuries outlawed,

and then by retreating or even without retreating to its headquarters defeat or delay

the retribution due.” (quoting United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795,

808 (1948))). Although Section 12 means plaintiffs are less likely to face the burden

of litigating their claims in distant forums as a matter of necessity, that does not

necessarily equate to a strong Congressional preference in favor of a plaintiff’s choice

of forum. To that end, the Court has not located a case from this district echoing the

notion that an antitrust plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to special deference in a

§ 1404(a) analysis. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has noted that when Congress enacts

a broad venue provision allowing plaintiffs to sue closer to home, “defendants’

legitimate interests are protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal

Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.

2000) (discussing venue under ERISA).

Second, courts typically give less deference to a plaintiff’s choice to sue in its

home forum when a case is brought as a class action, as here. See, e.g., Georgouses v.

NaTex Res., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 728, 730 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Moreover, because plaintiff

alleges a class action, plaintiff’s home forum is irrelevant.”); Jaramillo v. DineEquity,

Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that the weight given to the

plaintiff’s choice of forum is “greatly discounted” in class actions). But see AL & PO

Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *3 (noting widespread adoption of this position but

declining to follow it because “unnamed class members presumably benefit from a

class representative who is able to aggressively litigate their claims without

significant inconvenience due to travel”).

Finally, “a plaintiff's choice of forum is afforded less deference when another

forum has a stronger relationship to the dispute or when the forum of plaintiff's choice

has no connection to the material events.’” Amorose v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

521 F. Supp. 2d 731, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2007). As discussed below, this District’s connection

to the case is tenuous, but SDNY’s connection is not appreciably stronger.

Given all these layered nuances, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ choice of

forum carries the “substantial” weight ordinarily afforded to a plaintiff’s choice to

litigate in its home forum, but is not entitled to any additional deference. Although

only one named Plaintiff resides in this District, the rest live nearby. The nationwide

class they seek to represent is of course scattered throughout the country, but

presumably benefits from any lessened burden imposed on their representatives.

Though the Court does not necessarily agree that antitrust plaintiffs’ forum

selections are entitled to special deference, Congress’s choice to enact a broad venue

statute reflects a willingness to permit suits far from a defendant’s home forum.

Congress certainly knows how to use venue statutes in a contrary fashion. See Leroy

v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) (recognizing that statutory

venue limitations are typically intended to protect defendants “against the risk that

a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial”). Although Plaintiffs’

choice of forum does not carry conclusive weight under the circumstances of this case,

“less deference does not mean no deference.” Qurio Holdings, Inc. v. DISH Network

Corp., 2015 WL 536002, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2015). This factor therefore weighs

against transfer.

b. Situs of the material events

The parties somewhat dispute what “events” are relevant to this factor.

According to Plaintiffs, “T-Mobile’s focus on the negotiation of the merger is yet

another red herring” because the merger cannot be said to have occurred exclusively

in SDNY, and because this case really concerns its effects, which were felt nationwide.

“However, the material events inquiry focuses on the location of actions creating the

injury, not the location of the injury itself.” George & Co. LLC v. Target Corp., 2021

WL 2948910, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2021). “[T]he situs of material events factor

becomes more important when it differs from the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Waters

v. Leidos, Inc., 2022 WL 657055, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2022).

Plaintiffs are no doubt correct that claiming the merger occurred exclusively

or predominantly in SDNY is a fiction. T-Mobile has identified several key events

that took place there, including a substantial portion of the business negotiations,

but Plaintiffs point to other relevant events that occurred far from SDNY.

More importantly, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the focus should not

be on the merger itself, or the prior litigation surrounding it, because this suit really

arises from the alleged anticompetitive conduct that took place afterward.

Determining where that post-merger conduct “occurred” may be a fool’s errand,

because the allegations concern nationwide patterns of conduct. Perhaps an

argument could be made that the conduct occurred in Washington, where T-Mobile’s

headquarters are located. But even that would be a stretch, and would not account

for the other players identified in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Clearly this case is not the

sort of “‘localized controversy’ that would warrant transfer to the local district court.”

Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 3d 114, 118 (D.D.C. 2016)

(quoting Stand Up for Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C.

2013)).

At the same, if Plaintiffs contend that NDIL’s connection to this case derives

from the fact that the alleged negative effects of the merger were felt here, such a

“broad assertion” really demonstrates that this District has “no meaningful

connection to this action.” FTC v. Graco Inc., 2012 WL 3584683, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan.

26, 2012). One of Plaintiffs’ attorneys conceded as much during a status call. R. 62,

at 5:22-24 (“Well, Your Honor, there’s no special connection between the facts of the

case and Chicago.”). Thus, while the Court does not agree that the material events of

this case occurred primarily in New York, they certainly did not occur in Chicago.

This factor is therefore neutral.

c. Convenience of the parties and witnesses

“The convenience of witnesses is often viewed as the most important factor in

the transfer balance.” Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp.

2d 821, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting Rose v. Franchetti, 713 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (N.D.

Ill. 1989)). Within this category, “[t]he convenience of non-party witnesses is afforded

greater weight than the convenience of parties.” Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc., 405 F. Supp.

3d 771, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

T-Mobile lists several non-party witnesses whom it expects will provide

evidence in this case, including several executives from Verizon who work or reside

in SDNY or neighboring districts, and comparable personnel from New York-based

Altice USA, Inc., which was a figure in the original trial before Judge Marrero. In

response, Plaintiffs argue this “small number of witnesses” is inadequate to carry T-

Mobile’s burden. R. 59, at 8. They also point to the many other third-party witnesses

located far from New York who occupy comparable roles at other companies, and thus

would seem equally likely to be called to testify.

Certainly, a party must do more than “allude[ ] to potential third party

witnesses” for concerns about inconvenience to those witnesses to have any weight.

See U.S. ex rel. Heathcote Holdings Corp. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 2011 WL 3511064, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011). But given the magnitude of this case and its early posture,

T-Mobile cannot be expected to identify every witness who might be called to testify.

The identifications and descriptions T-Mobile has provided at least allow the Court

to gauge the likely role of those third parties (and others for whom they are

representative) in the case. Moreover, the Court agrees with T-Mobile that given

Plaintiffs’ claims, which allege that AT&T and Verizon have raised prices on their

customers post-merger, those witnesses are reasonably likely to testify as well.

It appears that few third-party witnesses (if any) are located in the greater

Chicago area, whereas at least some of the witnesses T-Mobile has identified would

be best served by transfer to New York. But evaluating this transfer motion by

reference to those witnesses alone is arbitrary. An equivalent argument might be

made in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Texas, where AT&T is

headquartered, or the District of Colorado, where DISH is headquartered. In truth,

the third-party witnesses are dispersed throughout the country (and indeed, the

world), such that no district can possibly be convenient for all. See Ashley Furniture

Indus., Inc. v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 275 F. Supp. 3d 957, 967 (W.D. Wis. 2017)

(“Moreover, defendants witnesses will be inconvenienced regardless of the forum

because they are located in various parts of the country.”). Plaintiffs contend that

Chicago’s central location best accommodates the dispersed witness pool, but this is

not a particularly weighty consideration. Compare id. (crediting the relative ease of

travel in and out of Chicago by air), with Hirst, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 778-79 (discounting

significance of flight time differences for witnesses). It may be that the trouble of

accounting for dispersed witnesses and evidence is simply not worth the payoff. See

In re Toyota Motor Corp., 747 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The comparison

between the transferor and transferee forums is not altered by the presence of other

witnesses and documents in places outside both forums.”). The Court concludes that

the witness convenience factor slightly favors transfer.

As for the convenience of the parties themselves, T-Mobile cannot claim a great

benefit from moving these proceedings farther from its West Coast headquarters.

Plaintiffs, meanwhile, would undoubtedly prefer to litigate this case close to home.

As a purported nationwide class, this preference carries less weight—replacements

are likely available in any locale should the burdens of representation prove

unbearable for any named Plaintiff. See Simonoff v. Kaplan, Inc., 2010 WL 1195855,

at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2020) (“Should litigating this case in the Southern District of

New York prove too inconvenient for the named Plaintiff, then another named

plaintiff can be substituted for her.”). Nonetheless, because transfer to SDNY would

impose a greater burden on Plaintiffs without conferring any obvious benefit on T-

Mobile, the party convenience factor cuts against transfer.

d. Ease of access to evidence

Modern litigation practices of sophisticated entities, by which the vast majority

of documentary evidence can be produced electronically and transmitted anywhere,

have greatly diminished the importance of this factor. See Elite Erectors, 212 F.3d at

1037; Tavistock Rest. Grp. LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1614519, at *6 (N.D.

Ill. Apr. 26, 2021). Understandably, neither party addressed this factor in detail, and

the Court finds that it is neutral in the transfer calculus.

II. Public Interest Factors

a. Time to resolution

“To evaluate the speed at which a case will proceed, courts look to two

statistics: (1) the median number of months from filing to disposition for civil cases

and (2) the median number of months from filing to trial for civil cases.” Campbell v.

Campbell, 262 F. Supp. 3d 701, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting AL & PO Corp., 2015

WL 738694, at *5). According to the data cited by the parties,3 for the 12-month period

ending June 30, 2022, the median time to disposition of civil cases was 5.7 months in

SDNY and 7.2 months in NDIL. The median time to trial was 44.4 months in SDNY

and 48.9 months in NDIL. By both measures, cases tend to move slightly quicker in

SDNY, so this factor slightly favors transfer.

b. Familiarity with law and facts

This case arises under federal antitrust law, and all district courts are

presumed to be equally capable of interpreting and applying federal law. See Lewis

v. Grote Indus. Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Familiarity

with the law therefore cuts in neither direction. However, courts have also considered

the relative familiarity of transferor/transferee courts with the “facts and

circumstances surrounding the controversy.” Jaramillo, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.

This consideration often arises when a proposed transferee court is currently

presiding over, or has recently handled, a similar case. See id.; Preston v. Am. Honda

3 See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2022_0.pdf

Motor Co., 2017 WL 5001447, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2017); Rosen v. Spirit Airlines,

Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (explaining that although cases arose

under federal law, “it would be inefficient for two Courts to invest the time learning

the facts common to both [cases] and then applying” the law to those facts). That is

not the scenario presented here: the SDNY merger dispute concluded in 2020, and

Plaintiffs correctly note that this case differs from the earlier controversy in material

respects. Nonetheless, a transferee court’s familiarity with a dispute may still be

relevant “even when the transferred case may not be consolidated for trial” with other

pending cases. General Elec. Co. v. R Squared Scan Sys., Inc., 1990 WL 7186, at *3

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1990).

It is certainly plausible that there will be some overlap between this case and

the prior merger dispute—at minimum, familiarity with the complicated

telecommunications industry will be helpful. However, “it is not [SDNY] as a whole

that is familiar with the earlier matter, but rather one particular judge there.”

Oceana v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 962 F. Supp. 2d 70, 78 (D.D.C. 2013). This

Court has no ability to dictate which judge in a transferee court should handle a case,

and the nature of this case does not suggest it would automatically be assigned to

Judge Marrero as a continuation or related case to the merger challenge.

Plaintiffs also characterize T-Mobile’s efficiency argument as a veiled attempt

to transfer the case to a specific judge who has already ruled in their favor once.

Indeed, a request to transfer a case to a particular judge may be “suspect,” see Greater

Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.D.C. 2001), and can

implicate the “systemic integrity” of the federal courts, see Oceana, 962 F. Supp. 2d

at 78 (quoting Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 30). Even a “plausible possibility” that a

defendant is using a § 1404 transfer motion as a means of forum shopping can weigh

against granting the motion. Greater Yellowstone, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 130.

Conversely, T-Mobile accuses Plaintiffs of forum-shopping for a District they

perceive as conferring a legal advantage on a threshold merits issue. The propriety of

such a tactical decision, at least as it factors into a transfer motion, is debatable. On

the one hand, courts typically view “forum shopping” by plaintiffs with less suspicion

than comparable practices by defendants. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63 (noting that

“plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most

advantageous (consistent with jurisdictional and venue limitations)”); see also United

States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (suggesting

that a plaintiff’s ability to “shop for law or location encourages them to use the judicial

system for their disputes”). On the other hand, “[Section] 1404’s transfer provisions

were intended to prevent forum-shopping, and plaintiffs should not be able ‘to select

one district exclusively or primarily to obtain or avoid specific precedents.’” Packman

v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2020 WL 4700642, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2020)

(quoting Schmid Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 654 F. Supp.

734, 737 (D.D.C. 1986)).

Discouraging forum-shopping is undoubtedly a concern when weighing a

transfer motion. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. ESCO Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 (C.D.

Ill. 2012) (“Courts are always concerned about the prevention of pernicious forum-

shopping, and must be cognizant of this issue when dealing with a motion to

transfer.”). It is hard to deny that T-Mobile’s request to transfer this case to SDNY at

least creates the appearance of forum shopping, given that any purported efficiency

gain in that district is speculative and it is not T-Mobile’s home district. The Supreme

Court has explained that § 1404(a) should not be used “to defeat the advantages

accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient,

was a proper venue.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633-34 (1964). Here,

Plaintiffs’ chosen forum is not obviously inconvenient, making the transfer motion

more suspect. Given all these considerations, the Court cannot say that SDNY’s

potential familiarity with the subject matter of this case favors transfer, and this

factor overall counsels against granting T-Mobile’s motion. See Greater Yellowstone,

180 F. Supp. 2d at 130.

c. Relationship to the community and desirability of resolving

controversies in their locale

“[T]he interest of justice is better served when a forum contains a community

that has a strong desire to resolve a particular dispute and that has an invested stake

in the matter such that the venue is ‘closer to the action.’” Craik v. Boeing Co., 37 F.

Supp. 3d 954, 963-64 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting Hanley v. Omarc, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d

770, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1998)). As discussed above, the allegations in this case carry

nationwide implications and defy categorization as a localized controversy. While

Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that Chicago has no special connection to the facts of the

case, SDNY has no stronger interest. This factor is neutral.

III. Balancing the Factors

On balance, the Court finds that T-Mobile has not met its burden of showing

SDNY is clearly a more convenient forum for this case than NDIL. Several factors

are neutral, and no factor strongly favors transfer. On the other side of the scale,

some convenience factors favor keeping the case here, as does the usual preference of

respecting a plaintiffs choice of forum. “[U]nless the balance of the factors is strongly

in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”

In re Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gulf Oil

Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, T-Mobile’s motion to transfer this case to the

Southern District of New York [42] is denied.

ENTERED:

Aeaniee M Budler.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: October 7, 2022

17