Williams v. Hart

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RASHAD HAKEEM WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 19 C 581

)

BETH A. HART, ASHWIN ) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

JAYACHANDRAN, M.D., and DAVID )

MANSFIELD, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff Rashad Williams sued Defendants Beth Hart, David Mansfield, and Dr. Ashwin

Jayachandran under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his due-process rights by administering

psychotropic medication against his will while incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center.

(Dkt. 12). Defendants Hart and Mansfield (together, the “IDOC defendants”) moved for

summary judgment, (dkt. 74), and Defendant Dr. Jayachandran individually moved for summary

judgment. (Dkt. 77). For the following reasons, the Court grants both motions.

Background

Plaintiff Rashad Williams was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center

(“Stateville”) from December 8, 2016 until April 3, 2017. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 1; Dkt. 83 ¶ 1; Dkt. 83 ¶

64). Plaintiff is currently being housed in the Cook County Jail on charges of first-degree

murder, attempted murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm. (See Dkt. 76-5 at 7:23-24, 8:1-

24, 9:1-20). Soon after Williams’s arrival at Stateville, treating psychiatrist Dr. Hosain Manesh

conducted a mental-health evaluation. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 17; Dkt. 86-1 at 21–30). Dr. Manesh diagnosed

Williams with an unspecified psychotic disorder and noted recent history of suicide, “vague”

current suicidal ideations, and thoughts of harming others. (Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 18–20; Dkt. 86-1 at 21).

Dr. Manesh placed Williams on 15-minute close supervision for several weeks. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 20;

Dkt. 86-1 at 21). Williams was again placed on close watch for several days in January after

threatening to swallow twenty pills. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 21). He was on close watch for the last few days

in February due to suicidal ideations. (Id. ¶ 22). Williams remained on close watch from March

3–March 16 due to delusional thoughts, as well as paranoid and suicidal ideations. (Id. ¶ 23).

Plaintiff has been treated for severe mental health issues during this entire time in custody

due to threats and acts of harm towards himself and others, auditory and visual hallucinations,

and noncompliance with psychotropic medications. (Id. ¶¶ 6–27). Plaintiff believes he hears

voices; that these voices are real, and not a result of any mental health issues. (Id. ¶¶ 6–9).

Plaintiff has told several mental health professionals at Stateville that Lucifer, the devil, talks to

him; and that he can read other people’s minds. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14). Plaintiff further reported that he

believes “death is freedom” to his treating mental health professionals. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10).

On January 7, 2016, while on crisis watch, Plaintiff made the following statement to a

treator:

I don’t know what to do, when I tell people I have special powers, they don’t

believe me. You know I have the cure to cancer. I know where the atomic

bombs is. And time is of the essence. I can see the future. I see what others

don’t see. Everything is in 3s, even the last three numbers of my Social

Security Number, 666, the sign of Lucifer. . . Or I could kill myself, but I want

to live for my daughter. (Id. ¶ 11).

At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted to misleading his treating mental health professionals

by agreeing to their recommended treatment plans when he never had any intention to do so. (Id.

¶¶ 15–16). Plaintiff also admitted he was noncompliant with his psychotropic medication by

disposing of it instead of taking it. (Id.) Plaintiff underwent several mental health evaluations

with his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Husain Manesh. (Id. ¶¶ 17–27). Dr. Manesh noted several

significant findings, including reported past suicide attempts, suicidal ideations, thoughts of

harming others, and non-compliance with medications. (Id.) Based upon his mental health issues,

Mr. Williams was placed on “close watch” during the majority of his time at Stateville. (Id. ¶¶

21–26).

On March 13, Dr. Manesh re-evaluated Williams’s mental health and repeated the

psychotic disorder diagnosis. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 12; Dkt. 83 ¶ 24; Dkt. 86-1 at 31). Dr. Manesh’s

evaluation alluded to a history of noncompliance with taking prescribed medications Zyprex and

Remeron. (Dkt. 86-1 at 31). Dr. Manesh noted Williams

does not present as an acute risk to others, but there is clearly some

self harm/safety risk as he expresses thoughts of wishing he were

dead without plan or intent. With that said, he will remain on

[close watch]. Because he is not a clear or acute danger to

self/others and he appears to be caring for himself . . . he does not

meet criteria for acute short-term forced medications. With that

said, the longer he is unmedicated and his . . . mental health issues

worsen, he could become a danger to others as he noted [history]

of acting out on himself and others. (Id.)

Dr. Manesh then referred Williams to the Treatment Review Committee (“TRC”) for a hearing

to evaluate the forcible administration of medication because “the processes take time to be

completed.” (Id.; Dkt. 81 ¶ 27). He noted that “should [Williams] comply with treatment AND

improve, then those can be cancelled.” (Dkt. 86-1 at 31).

At Stateville, there is no standing TRC; it is formed ad hoc when an individual is

identified who may benefit from enforced medication. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 27). The TRC comprises two

members: a mental health professional and a psychiatrist; a correctional counselor designated as

the “staff assistant” assists the incarcerated patient. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 28). Defendant Beth Hart, a

Licensed Social Worker, and Defendant Dr. Ashwin Jayachandran, a psychiatrist, served on

Williams’ TRC, and Defendant David Mansfield, a correctional counselor, served as Williams’s

designated staff assistant. (Dkt. 81 ¶¶ 2–8; Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 2–4).

The two TRC members and the staff assistant took on specific roles and responsibilities

to fulfill the procedural requirements of Illinois’s Administrative Code governing the

administration of psychotropic medication against an incarcerated patient’s will. See Ill. Admin.

Code tit. 20, § 415.70 (2005). Here, Hart as Chairperson was responsible for ensuring Williams

received notice of his TRC hearing at least 24 hours in advance, ensuring the member

psychiatrist had the necessary medical history to advise the TRC, reading the initial statement to

Williams at the hearing’s start, and documenting the proceedings. (Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 29–30). She was

also responsible for providing Williams with the TRC’s findings and notice of his right to appeal

their decision to the facility’s Medical Director. (Id. ¶ 31). Dr. Jayachandran’s role as the

member psychiatrist was to provide medical advice after reviewing pertinent mental-health

history and medical records. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 57). He believed he had no additional procedural

responsibilities for the hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33–35). Mansfield, as staff assistant, was responsible

for meeting with Williams before the hearing to discuss the procedural and mental-health issues

involved, identifying whether any witnesses would be called on Williams’s behalf, and serving

as Williams’s advocate during the hearing to ensure the TRC considered his rights. (Id. ¶¶ 36–

37, 39). Defendants all received training on the procedural requirements and mental-health issues

involved in conducting a TRC hearing. (Dkt. 87 ¶ 2; Dkt. 87 ¶ 2).

A mental-health progress note for Williams dated 3-15-17 with a 10:00 a.m. time

notation stated, “[Inmate] seen for daily crisis assessment and served with treatment review

committee paperwork. MHP1 read review paperwork to him. [Inmate] stated ‘I don’t want to talk

to you[.]’ MHP attempted to reengage offender several times and have [inmate] sign

1 MHP stands for “mental health professional.”

paperwork.” (Dkt. 86-1 at 32–33). A TRC Hearing Notice Form identifies Nicole Ramel as the

Notice’s Serving Employee, with 3/15/17 at 9:38 a.m. as the time and date served. (Id. at 34–35).

This form indicated “Committed Person Refused to Sign.” (Id. at 35). Williams does not

remember any mental-health professional coming with paperwork or giving him notice of the

TRC hearing. (Dkt. 76-5 at 66:15–18). Besides the Notice Form’s statements, none of the

defendants had personal knowledge of whether Williams received notice of the hearing. (Dkt. 87

¶¶ 4, 8; Dkt. 88 ¶ 12).

The TRC Hearing Notice Form included a blank space to identify witnesses Williams

wanted to attend the hearing on his behalf. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 15; Dkt. 83 ¶ 22). It is standard procedure

for the designated staff assistant—here, Mansfield—to meet with the incarcerated patient before

a TRC hearing. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 26; Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 39, 50). Mansfield does not remember meeting with

Williams before the TRC hearing. (Dkt. 78-5 at 22:15–23:14; Dkt. 87 ¶ 9; Dkt. 88 ¶ 9). Williams

said Mansfield never met with him before the TRC hearing or asked him about witnesses. (Dkt.

76-5 at 68:11–18). Had he been asked, Williams said he would have called his former cellmate

as a witness. (Dkt. 76-5 at 68:22–69:20).

On March 16, 2017, Hart and Dr. Jayachandran conducted the TRC hearing with

Williams and Mansfield present. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 19; Dkt. 83 ¶ 51). Hart, as Chairperson, later wrote

up the hearing’s proceedings in a TRC Hearing Summary based on notes she took during the

hearing. (Dkt. 81 ¶ 25; Dkt. 83 ¶ 53; Dkt. 86-1 at 19–20). When given the opportunity to make

an opening statement, Williams “indicated that he did not understand the purpose of the

meeting.” (Dkt. 86-1 at 19). Hart clarified the reasons why the TRC was considering enforced

medication status for Williams, including “hoarding medication, refusing crushed medication,

difficulty caring for personal needs, and ongoing delusional thought processes.” (Id.) Williams,

in turn, blamed Hart for these issues because she purportedly had 10 pills and a damaged

mattress removed from Williams’s crisis cell during a daily assessment the week before. (Id.)

The TRC Hearing Summary reported Williams expressed violent thoughts, including a desire to

kill Hart with a pitchfork, and had no insight into his mental illness or the need for ongoing

medical treatment. (Id.)

Williams does not remember what happened at the hearing, including whether he had the

opportunity to present witnesses. (Dkt. 81-1 at 66:23–67:19, 70:3–71:8). Hart did not recall

whether Williams was specifically asked at the hearing if he wanted to call witnesses, (dkt. 78-4

at 31:25–32:8), though Mansfield recalled Hart had asked Williams if he wanted to call any

witnesses. (Dkt. 78-5 at 31:3–22). Mansfield did not recall whether he asked Williams if he

wanted to call witnesses, nor what Williams’s response was to Hart asking. (Dkt. 78-5 at 32:2–

15). Dr. Jayachandran did not recall whether Williams was asked if he wanted to call witnesses.

(Dkt. 78-3 at 30:1–11). The TRC Hearing Summary indicates that no witnesses were

interviewed, with the notation “none requested.” (Dkt. 86-1 at 19).

The TRC Hearing Summary reported the committee’s conclusion: that Williams suffered

from “a serious mental illness, and there is a substantial risk that, if untreated, his condition may

result in serious physical harm to himself and/or others.” (Id. at 20). The TRC also found it was

in Williams’s best interest to take psychotropic medications and concurred with Dr. Manesh’s

recommendation to medicate Williams against his will. (Id.; see also id. at 18).

The day after the hearing, a nurse gave Williams an injection of Haldol2 over his

objection. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 63; Dkt. 81-1 at 78:3–16). After this injection, Williams reported

2 Haldol is a psychotropic medication used to treat schizophrenia and other psychotic mental disorders by altering

the brain’s chemical balance; if effective, it aids the patient to “organiz[e] his or her thought processes and regain[ ]

a rational state of mind.” Sullivan v. Flannigan, 8 F.3d 591, 592 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Washington v. Harper,

494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990)). It can also produce side effects such as “insomnia, restlessness, anxiety, drowsiness,

experiencing dizziness, black outs, memory loss, paralysis, and erectile dysfunction, (dkt. 87 ¶ 1;

dkt. 88 ¶ 1), though Defendants dispute these symptoms as Haldol side effects. (Dkt. 87 ¶ 1; Dkt.

88 ¶ 1; Dkt. 78-3 at 58:3–24).

The TRC Hearing Summary notes Hart served Williams with the TRC’s report on April 3

at 9:00am. (Dkt. 86-1 at 18). This included a notice of Williams’s right to appeal the decision to

the Medical Director. (Id.) But Williams was transferred to Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) that same

day. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 64). Hart believed Williams could have appealed this decision from CCJ. (Dkt.

78-4 at 79:21–80:19). Williams testified that he wanted to file a grievance after the hearing while

he was still at Stateville, but he was not allowed to have pen or paper in the crisis cell, where he

remained on close watch after the Haldol injection. (Dkt. 81-1 at 92:8–21; 93:7–94:14). When he

arrived at CCJ, he was told he could not grieve an issue from what happened at another facility.

(Id. at 98:22–93:1).

Williams sued the three defendants in early 2019, (dkt. 1), and amended his complaint in

June 2019 after retaining appointed counsel. (Dkt. 12). Defendants moved to dismiss based on

Williams’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, (dkt. 58), which this Court

denied after a Pavey hearing. (Dkt. 64). Defendants Hart and Mansfield together and Defendant

Dr. Jayachandran individually moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. 74; Dkt. 77).

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary

judgment “requires a non-moving party to respond to the moving party’s properly-supported

depression, lethargy, confusion, vertigo, seizures, hallucinations, catatonic-like behavior, and ‘tardive dyskinesia’

(spasms of the neck and face muscles).” Id. (citing Physicians’ Desk Reference at 1422–24 (1993)).

motion by identifying specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of

material fact for trial.” Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation

omitted). The parties genuinely dispute a material fact when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-moving party receives “the benefit of reasonable inferences

from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in his favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d

837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). See also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,

134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald

assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific

concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.” (internal citations

omitted)).

Discussion

A. Due-Process Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects incarcerated patients’

“significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). The State balances this interest against the

prison environment’s need for safety and order, and the State may medicate an incarcerated

patient against his will if he has a serious mental illness, is dangerous to himself or others, and

treatment would be in his medical interest. Id. at 222–23, 227. But the State cannot decide these

issues arbitrarily; rather, the State must afford the incarcerated patient procedural due-process

protections of his right to avoid forcible medication. Id. at 228.

Illinois adopted rules governing the involuntary medication of incarcerated patients

through administrative procedures that closely parallel those Harper first approved. Sullivan v.

Flannigan, 8 F.3d 591, 597, 599 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1007 (1994); see Ill.

Admin. Code tit. 20, § 415.70 (2005). Illinois prison officials satisfy federal due process by

following these procedures. Sullivan, 8 F.3d at 599. Incarcerated patients in Illinois only receive

non-emergency administration of psychotropic medication against their will after an independent

Treatment Review Committee (“TRC”) approves this action following a hearing to review the

treating physician’s initial recommendation. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 415.70(a)(1)(B).

The TRC procedures mandate two committee members—both mental-health

professionals, one of whom is a physician—plus a designated staff assistant to assist the

incarcerated patient in representing his interests. § 415.70(b). The procedures state,

The offender and staff assistant shall receive written notification of

the time and place of the hearing at least 24 hours prior to the

hearing. The notification shall include the tentative diagnosis and

the reasons why the medical staff believes the medication is

necessary. The staff assistant shall meet with the offender prior to

the hearing to discuss the procedural and mental health issues

involved.

§ 415.70(b)(2). The procedures also provide that before the hearing, “witnesses identified by the

offender and the staff assistant may be interviewed by the staff assistant,” “the offender and staff

assistant may request in writing that witnesses be interviewed,” and that “the offender and the

staff assistant may request in writing that witnesses appear at the hearing.” § 415.70(b)(5–7).

Here, Williams does not challenge the medical basis for the decision to administer

Haldol. (See dkt. 82 at 11 (challenging only Defendants’ alleged procedural violations, not

whether he was severely mentally ill or treatment was in his best medical interest)). He alleges

Defendants violated his due-process rights by failing to afford him the “minimum procedural

requirements” spelled out in Section 415.70(b)(2), (5), (6), and (7), before the TRC reached its

decision. (Dkt. 12 ¶¶ 29–33, ¶ 41). Due process requires an incarcerated patient has notice of the

hearing and its purpose, and a meaningful opportunity to advocate for himself at his hearing.

Harper, 494 U.S. at 235 (“Absent evidence of resulting bias, or evidence that the actual decision

is made before the hearing, allowing respondent to contest the staff’s position at the hearing

satisfies the requirement that the opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time

and in a meaningful manner.’” (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); cf. Vitek

v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494–96 (1980) (“[N]otice is essential to afford the prisoner an

opportunity to challenge the contemplated action [to transfer prisoner involuntarily to a mental

hospital] and to understand the nature of what is happening to him.”). Williams therefore had the

right to notice of the TRC hearing and the opportunity “to be able to argue capably before [the

TRC] that he does not need forced medication.” Sullivan, 8 F.3d at 598. “If the state failed to

meet [Harper’s] requirements in a particular case, the prisoner could argue that he was denied

Harper’s protections.” Id.

B. IDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants Hart and Mansfield (collectively, the “IDOC defendants”) claim Williams

cannot show he received insufficient procedural protections that violated his due-process rights.

(Dkt. 75). Even if they failed to provide Illinois’s full procedural protections, the IDOC

defendants claim qualified immunity shields them from liability for acts or omissions that did not

violate clearly established federal constitutional rights. (Id.) The Court considers the relevant

procedural rights in turn and whether qualified immunity applies.

1. Notice

Williams cannot overcome the IDOC defendants’ documentary evidence that he received

at least minimal verbal notice—and an attempt to serve written notice—of the TRC hearing 24

hours in advance. Neither Hart nor Mansfield personally served Williams with the TRC Hearing

Notice nor had personal knowledge that it had been served. (Dkt. 87 ¶¶ 4, 8). But they

reasonably relied on statements made by another IDOC mental-health professional, Nicole

Ramel, on the TRC Hearing Notice form indicating the time and date she tried to serve Williams

with written notice. (Dkt. 86-1 at 34–35); see Burks v. Raemish, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.

2009) (“Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do

another’s job.”). The form indicates Williams refused to sign it. (Dkt. 86-1 at 34–35).

Ramel documented her encounter with Williams in a mental-health progress note—

annotated at about the same time as the TRC Hearing Notice—explaining Williams had refused

to talk with her about the paperwork, but that she read it aloud to him and attempted to reengage

him several times to talk about it. (Dkt. 86-1 at 32–33). Williams does not contend any IDOC

employee is lying about these documents’ contents. He just does not remember any mental-

health professional bringing paperwork to him or telling him about the hearing. (Dkt. 76-5 at

66:15–18). Faced with IDOC defendants’ documentary evidence,3 Williams’s lack of memory is

insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he received no notice of the TRC hearing. See, e.g.,

Baines v. Washington, No. 92-cv-20069, 1995 WL 330634, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 1995)

(finding prison officials’ documentary evidence that inmate had been given notice of TRC

hearing overcame inmate’s denial). Williams cannot complain he received no notice of the TRC

hearing pursuant to § 415.70(b)(2) if he refused to engage with the mental-health professional

who came to tell him about it and give him the paperwork.

3 Williams objected to Defendants’ documents’ admissibility as evidence in support of their respective Local Rule

56.1(a)(3) Statements of Fact because they had not been duly authenticated and thus inadmissible as business

records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) hearsay exception for business records. (See Dkt. 80 at 9; Dkt. 81;

Dkt. 82 at 7–9; Dkt. 83). Defendants have cured this issue by authenticating the documents with an affidavit

testifying under oath that the records were kept in the regular course of IDOC business by persons with knowledge

of the act, event, or condition recorded therein and made at or near the time that the recorded act, event, or condition

occurred, or reasonably soon thereafter. (Dkt. 86-1 at 2–3, Declaration of Ava I. Meier). The affidavit reincorporated

the documents referenced in Defendants’ briefs and statements of fact. The Court finds this satisfies the documents’

admissibility as business records and admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).

2. Opportunity to Argue Capably before TRC

Williams personally argued his interests before the TRC decided to medicate him against

his will. (Dkt. 86-1 at 19–20). The parties’ dispute comes down to whether he had the

opportunity to do so “capably,” as Sullivan requires, when Williams claims that he had no

opportunity to call witnesses and that Mansfield, as staff assistant, did not meet with him before

the TRC hearing. See 8 F.3d at 598.

Illinois’s Administrative Code requires the designated staff assistant to meet with the

incarcerated patient before the hearing to discuss its purpose and the issues at stake. See Ill.

Admin. Code tit. 20, § 415.70(b)(2). In consultation with the staff assistant, the patient can

generally call witnesses if he wants. See § 415.70(b)(5–7). But even if the Court accepts

Williams’s version of the facts—that Mansfield never met with him before the hearing, and the

TRC never affirmatively informed him either before or during the hearing of the opportunity to

call witnesses—prison officials’ failure to fulfill Illinois’s procedural requirements does not in

itself establish a federal due-process violation. The federal due-process rights in this context are

not clearly established. The IDOC defendants thus have qualified immunity from such claims.

Qualified immunity shields state officials from personal liability when their actions do

not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights that they reasonably

should have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For official action to

violate a clearly established constitutional right, “[t]he right must have been concrete enough to

notify potential defendants that their conduct was probably unlawful.” Sullivan, 8 F.3d at 595.

The “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear” for reasonable officials to know their

actions were probably unlawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 482 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Courts may

determine whether federal constitutional rights were clearly established before determining

whether an unreasonable violation of that right occurred. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009).

State administrative code does not define the contours of federal constitutional rights.

Owens v. Funk, 760 F. App’x 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A violation of prison rules does not,

without more, offend the Constitution.”); Fuller v. Dillon, 236 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001)

(“[F]ailure of the prison officials to follow state administrative rules is not a denial, in and of

itself, of one’s due process rights.”); Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (“As we

tirelessly but unavailingly remind counsel in this court, a violation of state law [or state code] is

not a denial of due process, even if the state law confers a procedural right.”). Therefore,

Williams’s due-process rights do not “turn[ ] on Defendants’ compliance with the requirements

of Section 415.70,” as he claims. (Dkt. 80 at 4). They turn on whether he received the minimum

federal due-process protections, established under Harper, Sullivan, and their progeny.

Harper generally approved a state policy that included, among other things, the right to

present and cross-examine witnesses at a hearing, but Harper said nothing of whether this was a

minimal procedural right in itself. Harper, 494 U.S. at 235. Under Harper, “allowing respondent

to contest the staff’s position at the hearing satisfies the requirement that the opportunity to be

heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id. (citing Armstrong

v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Sullivan further explains that to fulfill Harper’s procedural

protections, the incarcerated patient “must be able to argue capably” before the TRC that he does

not need forced medication. Sullivan, 8 F.3d at 598.

The precise contours of this right are far from clear. See Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 512

(7th Cir. 2021) (“[O]ur prior cases have not elaborated in detail what it means for a prisoner to

‘argue capably’ as required by Harper . . . .”). But the Seventh Circuit has never held that the

lack of opportunity to present witnesses—much less the lack of affirmatively provided

information about such an opportunity—at a TRC hearing violated an incarcerated patient’s due-

process right to argue his own interests capably before the TRC, particularly when he appeared

and argued his case. See Perry, 990 F.3d at 512 (rejecting prisoner’s claim of procedural-rights

violation when he “had no chance at the hearing to present and cross-examine witnesses” without

showing TRC had denied any affirmative request); see also Fuller, 236 F.3d at 882 (holding

prisoner received due process when he presented his own case before TRC). Without higher

authority holding that federal due process affords the incarcerated patient both the right to

present witnesses at his TRC hearing and to be affirmatively informed of such a right, this right

is not clearly established under federal law. Thus, the IDOC defendants cannot be held liable for

failing to ensure Williams knew he had the opportunity to present witnesses. They are qualifiedly

immune from this claim.

Likewise, there is no clearly established federal right for the incarcerated patient to meet

in advance of the TRC hearing with a prison official—here, the designated staff assistant under

Section 415.70(b)(2)—to help him prepare for it. Harper held “the provision of an independent

lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection” for the

incarcerated patient’s due-process rights. See 494 U.S. at 236. The parties do not dispute that

Mansfield served as Williams’s staff assistant to represent his interests during the TRC hearing.

(Dkt. 81 ¶ 8). Williams alleges only that Mansfield failed to meet with Williams beforehand. No

Seventh Circuit case addresses the staff assistant’s role in the context of the incarcerated

patient’s right to argue capably his own case before the TRC. To the extent the staff assistant’s

meeting with the incarcerated patient would give him notice of the hearing, Williams had notice,

as explained above. With no clearly established federal procedural right to an advance meeting

with a lay adviser, the IDOC defendants are also qualifiedly immune from this claim.

Williams may have had a viable claim that one or both of the IDOC defendants violated

his procedural due-process rights under Illinois law, but he has forfeited any such state-law claim

in this action because his complaint does not address it.

Therefore, the Court grants the IDOC defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.

74). Defendants provided sufficient evidence that no reasonable jury could conclude Williams

received no notice of the TRC hearing as § 415.70(b)(2) required. Further, the IDOC defendants

succeed on their qualified-immunity defense that Williams had no clearly established federal

due-process right to the opportunity to present witnesses on his behalf at the hearing, nor to meet

with a prison official beforehand to discuss the hearing or calling witnesses.

C. Defendant Dr. Jayachandran’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Dr. Jayachandran moves for summary judgment, arguing both that Williams

cannot show sufficient evidence that a constitutional violation occurred, and that even if he can,

Dr. Jayachandran personally violated no procedural due-process rights because they were others’

responsibility. (Dkt. 77). Dr. Jayachandran, a private employee of Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

can be held liable in his individual capacity under Section 1983 for violating an incarcerated

patient’s constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law in the same manner as

public employees. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). Dr.

Jayachandran, however, cannot raise the qualified-immunity defense. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d

722, 734 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Shields, 746 F.3d at 794). Williams makes the same claims

against Dr. Jayachandran as those against the IDOC defendants: that he had no notice, no

opportunity to present witnesses, and no meeting with his designated staff assistant before the

TRC hearing.

As to Williams’s notice of the hearing, Dr. Jayachandran relies on the same evidence as

the IDOC defendants, (see dkt. 77 at 9), and with the same result. Though he neither served

written notice on Williams nor had personal knowledge that notice was served, (dkt. 88 ¶ 12),

Dr. Jayachandran relied on the TRC Hearing Notice signed by Ramel attesting to her attempt to

serve written notice and Williams’s refusal to sign. (Dkt. 86-1 at 34–35). The mental-health

progress note further corroborates Defendants’ evidence that Williams received notice, (dkt. 86-1

at 32–33), even if he refused to acknowledge it at the time or did not later recall it happening.

(Dkt. 76-5 at 66:15–18). Williams cannot overcome this documentary evidence that he received

notice of the TRC hearing, nor does he present any evidence to dispute it.

Regarding Williams’s allegations that he was not informed of the opportunity to present

witnesses and that he received no visit from the designated staff assistant before the hearing, no

reasonable jury could hold Dr. Jayachandran liable for any such procedural failures even if they

happened. Williams cannot show that Dr. Jayachandran was personally involved in any of these

alleged constitutional violations, as required for Section 1983 liability to attach to him.

The Illinois Code mandates the TRC “shall be comprised of two members . . . both of

whom shall be mental health professionals and one of whom shall be a physician.” § 415.70(b).

Separate from the TRC, and not a member of it, “The Chief Administrative Officer shall

designate a member of the program staff not involved in the current decision to order medication

to assist the offender. The staff assistant shall have completed a training program in the

procedural and mental health issues involved . . . .” § 415.70(b)(1). The Code further requires:

that “[t]he staff assistant shall meet with the offender prior to the hearing to discuss the

procedural and mental health issues involved,” § 415.70(b)(2); that “[p]rior to the hearing,

witnesses identified by the offender and the staff assistant may be interviewed by the staff

assistant after consultation with the offender . . . ,” § 415.70(b)(5); that “[p]rior to the hearing,

the offender and the staff assistant may request in writing that witnesses be interviewed by the

Committee . . . ,” § 415.70(b)(6); and that “[p]rior to the hearing, the offender and the staff

assistant may request in writing that witnesses appear at the hearing.” § 415.70(b)(7).

The Code clearly implicates only the staff assistant as responsible for meeting before the

hearing with the incarcerated patient and discussing the presentation of witnesses. Should

witnesses be identified, the members of the TRC shall interview them. See § 415.70(b)(6), (7),

(9). But the Code assigns no responsibility to the two TRC members for carrying out or

overseeing the staff assistant’s procedural responsibilities. Here, TRC member psychiatrist Dr.

Jayachandran’s role was to provide independent medical advice on the case, including reviewing

pertinent mental-health and medical records before the hearing. (Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 32, 57). Mansfield

testified it was his (Mansfield’s) responsibility as designated staff assistant to meet with

Williams before the TRC hearing and determine whether witnesses would be called. (Dkt. 83 ¶¶

36–37, 39). Mansfield testified Dr. Jayachandran had no responsibility to meet Williams before

the hearing, nor to determine whether any witnesses would be called. (Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 38, 40).

Williams argues that as a member of the TRC, Dr. Jayachandran bears joint liability for

ensuring that the procedural requirements were carried out by all its members. (Dkt. 82 at 9–11).

He claims the text of Section 415.70 suggests a collective responsibility on the part of all TRC

members for each other’s acts or omissions. (Id.) But the staff assistant is not a TRC member.

The Code clearly delineates an important but separate procedural role for the staff assistant as the

lay adviser to assist the incarcerated patient in protecting his interests. § 415.70(b)(1). The only

members of the two-person TRC are the Chairperson and the physician, who together review the

medical recommendation of the treating physician, conduct the TRC hearing, and—at the staff

assistant or the incarcerated patient’s request—interview previously identified witnesses. §

415.70(b). The two TRC members then consider all information presented and reach a

conclusion. § 415.70(b)(9–11). There is no basis in the Code’s text to hold a TRC member liable

for procedural failures for which the staff assistant and not a TRC member was solely

responsible.

Nor can Williams claim that Dr. Jayachandran was somehow either jointly and severally

liable or vicariously liable for any failure on Defendant Mansfield’s part to carry out the staff

assistant’s procedural responsibilities. Defendants can only be held liable under Section 1983 for

the constitutional violations they caused, demonstrably acquiesced to, or were personally

involved in. Gonzalez v. McHenry County, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Palmer v.

Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

can only be based on a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation at issue.” (internal

citations omitted)). To be held jointly and severally liable with co-Defendant(s) for a “common

plan or design to commit a tortious act,” Williams would still have to show Dr. Jayachandran

personally deprived Williams of a constitutional right in some way. Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d

1052, 1062 (7th Cir. 2005). Williams provided no evidence Dr. Jayachandran acted in concert

with Mansfield to prevent him from meeting in advance with Williams and discussing the

hearing or presentation of witnesses. No evidence shows Dr. Jayachandran acted during the TRC

hearing to prevent any witnesses from being called.

To invoke Dr. Jayachandran’s vicarious liability, Williams would have to show Dr.

Jayachandran both knew about Mansfield’s failure to meet with Williams and the failure to

discuss presentation of witnesses, and that Dr. Jayachandran “facilitate[d], approve[d],

condone[d], or turn[ed] a blind eye toward it.” Gonzalez, 40 F.4th at 828. Liability would not

attach if Dr. Jayachandran were merely negligent in overseeing another prison official’s

responsibilities, assuming he had any supervisory authority. Id. Again, no evidence shows Dr.

Jayachandran had any personal knowledge Mansfield may have failed to meet with Williams or

identify witnesses—he assumed the others involved in the hearing were performing their

responsibilities. (Dkt. 83 ¶ 46). Because the TRC Hearing Summary stated, “Mr. Williams did

not request any witnesses,” (dkt. 86-1 at 19), Dr. Jayachandran had no reason to question

whether Mansfield had actually consulted with Williams about presenting witnesses. Even if he

knew Mansfield never met with Williams, Williams has no evidence showing Dr. Jayachandran

“facilitate[d], approve[d], condone[d], or turn[ed] a blind eye toward it.” Gonzalez, 40 F.4th at

828.

Therefore, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Jayachandran personally violated

Williams’s due-process rights for failing to carry out Section 415.70 procedures. The

documentary evidence shows Williams received notice, and Williams cannot hold Dr.

Jayachandran responsible for any procedural rights violations that the staff assistant may have

caused. The Court grants Defendant Dr. Jayachandran’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.

77).

Conclusion

Williams cannot survive summary judgment on his claims against all Defendants that he

received no written notice of his TRC hearing when Defendants’ corroborated documentary

evidence shows an IDOC employee tried to serve him with the paperwork, but he refused to

acknowledge it and later could not remember if it happened. The IDOC defendants are

qualifiedly immune from claims they violated Williams’s procedural due-process right to an

advance meeting with a staff assistant because this right is not clearly established under federal

law. Similarly, they are qualifiedly immune from claims Williams had no opportunity to present

witnesses, as this right is not clearly established under federal law. Defendant Dr. Jayachandran

cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for any alleged deprivation of constitutional rights that

he neither caused nor was personally involved in.

The Court grants Defendants Hart and Mansfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendant Dr. Jayachandran’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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(fre{nia M. Kendall

Unifed States District Judge

Date: September 29, 2022

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