Martinez v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

THERESA M.,

Plaintiff,

No. 20 CV 481

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Magistrate Judge McShain

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Theresa M. brings this action for judicial review of the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA) decision denying her application for benefits. For the

following reasons, plaintiff’s request to reverse and remand the SSA’s decision [17]2

is granted, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary

judgment [19] is denied, and this case is remanded to the agency for further

administrative proceedings.

Procedural Background

In January 2017, plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability

and disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of June 1, 2016. [13-1] 32.

The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. [Id.]. Plaintiff requested a

hearing, which was held by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on September 17, 2018.

[Id.] 51-93. In a decision dated January 7, 2019, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not

disabled and denied her application. [Id.] 32-42. The Appeals Council denied review

on November 18, 2019 [id.] 1-6, making the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955 & 404.981. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court [1], and the

1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security, is substituted as the defendant in this case in place of the former Commissioner of

Social Security, Andrew Saul.

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except for citations to the

administrative record [13-1], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner of

each page.

Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Acting Commissioner’s decision

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3

Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a sequential

five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is unemployed; (2) whether the claimant

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s

impairment meets or equals any listed impairments; (4) whether the claimant is

unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to

perform any other available work in light of her age, education, and work experience.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a). “An affirmative answer leads either to

the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A

negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a

determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868

(7th Cir. 2000).

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially to determine if it is

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “not a

high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019)). But the standard

“is not entirely uncritical. Where the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be

remanded.” Brett D. v. Saul, No. 19 C 8352, 2021 WL 2660753, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun.

29, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Discussion

At step one of his decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful employment since her alleged onset date. [13-1] 34. At step two,

the ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from five severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine; history of

anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion; osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees; diabetes

mellitus; and obesity. [Id.] 35. At step three, the ALJ ruled that plaintiff does not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed

3 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case by a United States

Magistrate Judge. [6, 9].

impairment. [Id.] 36-37. Before turning to step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff has

the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except that plaintiff can (1)

stand/walk four hours in an eight-hour workday; (2) occasionally use right foot

controls and frequently use left foot controls; (3) occasionally climb ramps and stairs

but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, and crawl; and (5) never work at unprotected heights or with moving

mechanical parts. [Id.] 37-41. At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform

her past relevant work as an assembler, insurance clerk, medical clerk, billing clerk,

referral coordinator, and receptionist. [Id.]. Because that ruling meant that plaintiff

was not disabled, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f), the ALJ did not proceed to step five.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s physical RFC determination is not supported

by substantial evidence. More specifically, plaintiff contends that (1) after the ALJ

gave little weight to the opinions of the non-examining State agency medical

consultants that plaintiff could perform medium work, the ALJ faced an “evidentiary

deficit” that he could not “fill with his lay understanding of how a claimant’s

impairments restricts her ability to perform work tasks”; (2) the ALJ failed to

adequately explain how plaintiff’s obesity affected her ability to sit; (3) the ALJ did

not account for plaintiff’s need to lie down throughout the day; and (4) improperly

rejected plaintiff’s allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of her symptoms. See [17] 5-9, 12-15.

The Court agrees that multiple errors in the ALJ’s physical RFC determination

warrant remand.4

A. The Physical RFC Determination Is So Poorly Articulated That

Meaningful Appellate Review Is Impossible.

“A disability claimant’s RFC describes the maximum she can do in a work

setting despite her mental and physical limitations.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802,

807 (7th Cir. 2014). “The relevant regulation, SSR 96-8p, lists seven strength

functions that an ALJ must consider when assessing a claimant’s RFC to work:

lifting, carrying, sitting, standing, walking, pushing, and pulling.” Jarnutowski v.

Kijakazi, No. 21-2130, --- F.4th ----, 2022 WL 4126293, at *4 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 2022).

“The regulation also requires an ALJ to describe how the evidence supports each

conclusion about a strength function, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory

findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Id. (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted). “An ALJ must evaluate all relevant evidence

when determining an applicant’s RFC[.]” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir.

2012). In crafting the RFC, the ALJ “must explain his analysis of the evidence with

enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Moira L. v.

4 Consequently, the Court need not reach plaintiff’s additional argument that the ALJ’s

mental RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

Kijakazi, No. 19 C 2687, 2022 WL 846469, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

After recounting plaintiff’s allegations and testimony about the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ acknowledged that

plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms[.]” [13-1] 38. But the ALJ found that plaintiff’s

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence

in the record[.]” According to the ALJ:

As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of his or her own symptoms, they are inconsistent

because the alleged severity is generally not consistent with the medical

evidence of record. Although the claimant has described daily activities

which are fairly limited, two factors weigh against considering these

allegations to be strong evidence in favor of finding the claimant

disabled. First, allegedly limited daily activities cannot be objectively

verified with any reasonable degree of certainty. Secondly, even if the

claimant’s daily activities are truly as limited as alleged, it is difficult to

attribute that degree of limitation to the claimant’s medical condition,

as opposed to other reasons, in view of the relatively weak medical

evidence and other factors discussed in this decision. Overall, the

claimant’s reported limited daily activities are considered to be

outweighed by the other factors discussed in this decision.

[Id.] 38.

The ALJ then summarized the “relatively weak” medical evidence relating to

plaintiff’s spinal and knee impairments. See [13-1] 36-39. According to the ALJ’s own

summary, this evidence showed that:

• At a February 2017 consultative exam, plaintiff had no difficulty standing,

bending, or sitting; no difficulty with gait; and minimal difficulty

lifting/carrying.

• At a June 2017 consultative exam for bilateral knee pain, plaintiff walked with

a limp, both knees had slight varus malalignment, and an X-ray showed medial

joint space narrowing, but not quite bone-on-bone. The examiner “provides

injections.”

• At a July 2017 examination, plaintiff reported that her upper and lower back

pain was “bothering her a lot,” and a physical exam documented tenderness,

limited range of motion, and bony deformity.

• A January 2018 MRI of plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed mild space loss at L5-

S1 but no significant spondylolisthesis. Plaintiff complained to an orthopedic

specialist that same day of pain in her neck and thoracic and lumbar spines,

which was worse when standing more than 15 minutes at a time. A physical

exam noted only slight pain with hyperextension and bilateral genu varum

deformity, but 5/5 strength and normal straight leg raise.

• At a March 3, 2018 physical therapy appointment, plaintiff reported feeling

discomfort after climbing nine steps.

• In April 2018, plaintiff was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis of the spine,

and x-rays showed some wedging of the L3 vertebrae but “no degenerative

changes above her prior surgery.” Plaintiff’s medication was helpful in

reducing her pain, and a posture bra helped improve her thoracic pain.

• Notes from a physical therapy session in July 2018 reflect that “relief from

shots in [plaintiff’s] knees a month prior only lasted two days,” but plaintiff’s

mobility increased, her back pain decreased, and her gait improved “after

correcting her pelvis.”

• At an August 2018 appointment with an orthopedic surgeon, plaintiff reported

intermittent knee pain, minimal relief from injections, and no progress in

physical therapy. Plaintiff received an injection in the pes bursa, and the

surgeon opined that plaintiff “may be a candidate for staged bilateral UKAs if

all non-operative measures fail.”

• An MRI of plaintiff’s lumbar spine taken on September 7, 2018 showed

“spondylosis with mild to moderate central, R lateral recess, and foraminal

stenosis at L4-5[.]”

• An examination on September 21, 2018 revealed a prolapsed lumbar disc, and

plaintiff reported being unable to sit/stand too long, push/pull, or overhead

reach. Plaintiff was referred to pain management.

[13-1] 39-41.

The ALJ concluded his analysis by stating that “the above [RFC] is supported

by the objective medical findings, the claimant’s treatment history, and the

assessments of the State agency consultants.”5 [13-1] 41.

5 This was a reference to the State agency consultants’ assessments of plaintiff’s psychological

limitations, to which the ALJ gave great weight. [13-1] 40. In contrast, and as discussed

below, the ALJ gave only limited weight to the consultants’ assessments of plaintiff’s physical

limitations because medical records post-dating their assessments showed that plaintiff’s

condition had worsened. See [id.].

The ALJ’s decision is so poorly articulated that the Court is unable to

meaningfully review the ALJ’s ruling that plaintiff is capable of a limited range of

light work. Rather than explain why the medical evidence he had just discussed

supported the limitations in the RFC, the ALJ merely summarized the evidence

without meaningfully evaluating it or describing how it supported the RFC

determination. The Court is therefore unable to determine whether substantial

evidence supports the RFC determination. See Channell v. Kijakazi, 21 C 3094, 2022

WL 4386589, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2022) (remanding where, “[a]lthough the ALJ’s

opinion recites the medical evidence from the record, it does not describe how the

evidence supports the positional limitation” included in RFC); Peter H. v. Kijakazi,

No. 20 C 1906, 2022 WL 2105915, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 10, 2022) (“the ALJ provided

no explanation for how the RFC accounts for any of plaintiff’s mental impairments or

limitations; instead, the ALJ simply recited pages of evidence from the medical record

and identified an RFC without any meaningful analysis establishing how or why the

limitations identified in the RFC connect with the record.”) (emphasis in original);

Patricia C. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-3951, 2021 WL 131420, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2021)

(“While the ALJ summarized the medical evidence, he did not specifically identify

which evidence supports each of these limitations. Absent this information, the Court

cannot determine whether the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.”) (internal

citation omitted).

To be sure, the ALJ found that the medical evidence was “relatively weak,” but

weak in relation to what? The ALJ offered no explanation for that conclusion, nor did

he explain how the RFC determination accounted for plaintiff’s impairments.

Furthermore, much of the evidence in the ALJ’s summary appears consistent with

plaintiff’s allegations and testimony: she consistently reported back pain, including

pain that was worse when standing; two MRIs in 2018 documented degenerative

changes in her lumbar spine, including mild to moderate stenosis; an orthopedic

surgeon identified her as a likely candidate for bilateral knee surgery; plaintiff

received multiple injections in her knees, some of which were only minimally effective

at controlling her pain; and plaintiff was referred to pain management after reporting

that she was unable to sit/stand for too long. In citing this evidence, the Court is not

suggesting that the ALJ had to credit it or find that it showed that plaintiff was

disabled. Rather, the Court highlights this evidence because it appears inconsistent

with the ALJ’s unexplained conclusion that the medical evidence was “relatively

weak” and, in the absence of any description of how the evidence supports the RFC

determination, the Court is unable to meaningfully review the ALJ’s decision.

See Channell, 2022 WL 4386589, at *4; Peter H., 2022 WL 2105915, at *3; Patricia

C., 2021 WL 131420, at *3; Brett D., 2021 WL 2660753, at *1.

Finally–and apart from the error just discussed–the Court observes that once

the ALJ rejected the opinions of the State agency medical consultants that plaintiff

could perform medium work, there was no opinion evidence suggesting that plaintiff

could perform a restricted range of light work. Dr. Richard Bilansky opined in April

2017 that plaintiff was capable of medium work, see [13-2] 103, and Dr. Ranga Reddy

reached the same conclusion in August 2017, see [id.] 116. The ALJ gave these

opinions little weight, however, because medical records “received after their review

show that the claimant’s condition progressed in 2018,” such that additional work-

related limitations were warranted. [13-1] 40. Despite that conclusion, the ALJ did

not explain how he determined that restricting plaintiff to a limited range of light

work properly accounted for what the more recent records showed. And given the

ALJ’s unexplained and opaque conclusion that this evidence was “relatively weak,”

the Court is simply unable to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning. Remand is

therefore required, as this is a case where “[n]o physician testified–no medical records

[re]vealed–that [plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity ascribed to h[er] by the

administrative law judge.” Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013); see

also Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2014) (ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff could perform light work not supported by substantial evidence where

“[t]here is no medical evidence in the record to contradict Murphy’s claim” that she

could not perform such work, and primary doctor’s treating notes neither

“contradict[ed] Murphy’s testimony” about her limitations nor “address[ed] the legal

requirements one must be able to perform before the ALJ can determine that the

individual is able to do light work”)

Relying on Burmester v. Berryhill, defendant argues that the RFC was

adequately explained because “the ALJ’s RFC finding” was “‘more limiting than that

of any state agency doctor[.]’” [20] 3 (quoting 920 F.3d 507, 510) (7th Cir. 2019)). This

argument lacks merit because Burmester “addressed an ALJ’s use of boilerplate, not

an ALJ’s compliance [with] SSR 96-8p,” and nothing in Burmester “suggest[s] that an

ALJ is excused from SSR 96-8p’s narrative discussion requirement if her RFC finding

was more limiting than that of the state agency doctors.” Channell, 2022 WL 4386589,

at *5. Because the ALJ did not describe why the evidence supported his

determination that plaintiff could perform a limited range of light work, remand is

warranted. See Amy F. v. Saul, No. 19 C 7733, 2020 WL 6509339, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.

5, 2020) (remanding where ALJ, after assigning some weight to state agency

reviewer’s outdated opinion, “amended” the reviewer’s RFC determination “by adding

postural restrictions and a limitation to no more than frequent bilateral, overhead

reaching” but failed to “identify the medical evidence that supports the changes she

made” to reviewer’s original RFC determination).

B. The ALJ Did Not Adequately Explain Whether Plaintiff’s

Obesity Affected Her Ability To Sit.

“[O]besity is no longer a standalone disabling impairment,” but “the ALJ must

still consider its impact when evaluating the severity of other impairments.” Stephens

v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 2018). “This is because the combined effects

of obesity with other impairments may be greater than might be expected without

obesity.” Tanitria C. v. Saul, No. 19 CV 1884, 2021 WL 1577795, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr.

22, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s obesity was a severe impairment and recognized

that plaintiff’s body mass index (BMI) was greater than 40 kg/m2, which is

“considered Level III obesity” or morbid obesity. [13-1] 40; see also Louise W. v.

Kijakazi, No. 19 cv 7734, 2022 WL 4109716, at *6 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2022)

(“Persons with a BMI of over 40 are considered to be morbidly obese.”). According to

the ALJ, however, while “[i]t is reasonable to infer that the claimant’s pain or other

symptomologies may be exacerbated by her weight,” there was “no indication that it

would preclude her from performing the modified light exertional residual functional

capacity assessed herein.” [13-1] 40. This conclusion, like the ALJ’s broader physical

RFC determination, is so poorly articulated that the Court is unable to trace the path

of the ALJ’s reasoning: “If the ALJ thought that [plaintiff’s] obesity has not resulted

in limitations on her ability to work, he should have explained how he reached that

conclusion.” Arnett, 676 F.3d at 593. The ALJ’s conclusory assertion that there was

“no indication” that plaintiff’s obesity would preclude her from performing light work

is in obvious tension with the fact of plaintiff’s morbid obesity itself, her severe knee

and spinal impairments, and evidence that plaintiff had difficulty sitting for

prolonged periods of time.6 See Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2011)

(“It is one thing to have a bad knee; it is another thing to have a bad knee supporting

a body mass index in excess of 40.”).

Defendant’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Defendant first argues that

there was substantial evidence that, notwithstanding her obesity, plaintiff could

perform light work because a consultative examiner opined in February 2017 that

plaintiff had no difficulty sitting, and because the State agency reviewers both opined

plaintiff could perform medium work. [20] 4. However, the ALJ gave little weight to

the State agency physicians’ opinions because more recent evidence showed that

plaintiff’s condition had progressed after they had completed their reviews, so it is

not clear why–or whether–the ALJ credited their opinions on plaintiff’s ability to sit.

Cf. Mildred B. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 CV 3532, 2022 WL 1746849, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May

31, 2022) (ALJ must explain why he adopts some parts of medical opinion but rejects

others). And while the February 2017 consultative exam may not support plaintiff’s

allegations, other evidence in the record–such as plaintiff’s report in September 2018

that she cannot sit too long and her hearing testimony–did. Yet nothing in the ALJ’s

decision indicates that he considered–let alone tried to resolve–this conflict in the

evidence. See Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1124 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The error here is

the failure to address all of the evidence and explain the reasoning behind the

6 See [13-7] 599 (plaintiff’s report at September 2018 evaluation that she “cannot sit or stand

for too long”); [13-1] 57, 71 (plaintiff’s testimony that “[s]itting over 20 minutes I start getting

back pain” and that she needs to change positions after sitting for 15 to 20 minutes); [13-3]

285 (statement in February 2017 function report that “sitting to [sic] long back hurts”).

decision to credit some evidence over the contrary evidence, such that we could

understand the ALJ’s logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusion.”).

Second, and relying on Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 2010),

defendant argues that the ALJ said enough about plaintiff’s obesity to satisfy his

burden to minimally articulate the reasons for his decision. [20] 5. In Brown, “the

ALJ repeatedly asserted that he had considered [the claimant’s] obesity,” making at

least three explicit references to obesity; referenced a doctor’s “treatment notes that

discussed Brown’s weight, his encouragement that she lose weight, the increasing

pain she endured as a result of her weight-loss attempts[;]” and rejected “the opinions

of several government-affiliated doctors on the ground that the longitudinal record

demonstrates that [Brown]’s back impairment together with her morbid obesity

would prevent her from working above the sedentary exertional level[.]” 845 F.3d at

251-52. Despite all this, the Seventh Circuit still acknowledged that “the issue was

close,” but the court was unable to say that the ALJ “failed to articulate at some

minimal level his analysis of the evidence or that we simply don’t know what he

thought[.]” Id. at 252 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, in

contrast, the ALJ’s decision lacks repeated references to plaintiff’s obesity or a

meaningful consideration of the evidence of obesity, and the Court cannot determine

what the ALJ thought about the effects of plaintiff’s obesity on her impairments

generally or on her ability to sit specifically.

C. The ALJ’s Subjective Symptom Analysis Was Patently Wrong.

“The Court will overturn an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective

symptom allegations only if it is patently wrong.” Charles B. v. Saul, Case No. 19 C

1980, 2020 WL 6134986, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “When assessing a claimant’s subjective symptom allegations, an ALJ must

consider several factors, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily

activities, his level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, course of

treatment, and functional limitations.” Id. “Ultimately, the ALJ must explain her

subjective symptom evaluation in such a way that allows the Court to determine

whether she reached her decision in a rational manner, logically based on her specific

findings and the evidence in the record.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks

omitted).

First, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with the

objective medical evidence. [13-1] 37-38. As discussed above, however, the ALJ failed

to provide any analysis of the medical evidence or explain why he believed that the

evidence was “relatively weak” or how it was inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations.

See Moore, 743 F.3d at 1125 (ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s testimony

attributing her limitations to migraines was not credible “in light of the relatively

weak medical evidence” warranted remand because “this conclusion rests upon a

skewed portrayal of the evidence”).

Second, the ALJ gave only little weight to the statements in a third-party

function report completed by plaintiff’s daughter because the daughter was “not

medically trained to make exacting observations as to dates, frequencies, types and

degrees of medical signs and symptoms, or of the frequency or intensity of unusual

moods or mannerisms” and thus “the accuracy of her observations is questionable.”

[13-1] 40-41. Plaintiff’s daughter spent between two and two-and-a-half hours with

her mother every other day and described, inter alia, her mother’s knee and back

pain, her inability to walk more than 10 to 15 minutes due to shortness of breath, and

her difficulties lifting, mopping around the house, and driving long distances. [13-3]

264-65, 269. “Although an ALJ may question the reliability of third-party statements,

rejecting a statement because of a family member’s lack of medical training is

improper. Indeed, SSR 16-3p expressly contemplates that an ALJ consider opinions

of non-medical sources.” Cynthia H. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-1962, 2019 WL 6893004, *3

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2019). It was therefore “illogical” for plaintiff’s daughter’s “lack of

medical training to bar consideration of [her] third-party statement.” Id.; see also

Dorian W. v. Berryhill, No. 17 CV 50327, 2019 WL 1572560, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11,

2019) (ALJ erred by refusing to give any weight to third-party statement from

plaintiff’s supervisor on ground that supervisor was not “an acceptable medical

source”). While the ALJ also found that plaintiff’s daughter’s statement was “not

entirely consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and observations by

medical doctors in this case” [13-1] 41, the Court reiterates its previous finding that

the ALJ never explained why he viewed the medical evidence as “relatively weak”

and inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations, and the Court observes that the ALJ

again failed to identify the medical evidence that contradicted the daughter’s

statement.

Third, the Court observes that the ALJ dismissed plaintiff’s allegations

regarding her limited activities of daily life (ADL) because “allegedly limited daily

activities cannot be objectively verified with any reasonable degree of certainty” and

“in view of the relatively weak medical evidence and other factors discussed in this

decision,” it was “difficult to attribute that degree of limitation [alleged] by plaintiff

to her “medical condition.” [13-1] 38. Both of these rationales were improper. To begin,

“the fact that a claimant’s responses to the ALJ’s ADL questions are not accompanied

by objective evidence is not automatically a ground for rejecting them–‘otherwise,

why ask in the first place?’” Frazier v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 8484, 2019 WL 157911, at

*6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019) (quoting Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir.

2014)). Moreover, “the ALJ never explained what the alternative reasons for

[plaintiff’s] restricted activities might be.” Id.

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s subjective symptom

analysis was patently erroneous, and remand is required.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's request to reverse and remand the

decision of the SSA [17] is granted, and the Acting Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment [19] is denied. The decision of the SSA is reversed, and, in

accordance with the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Watt Neuen

HEATHER K. McSHAIN

United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: September 29, 2022

11