Hayes v. Board of Education for the City of Chicago

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KATHLEEN HAYES,

Plaintiff, No. 21-cv-01198

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE Judge John F. Kness

CITY OF CHICAGO, MATTHEW

LYONS, and JANE DOES 1−3,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Until her termination from Northwestern University, Plaintiff Kathleen Hayes

oversaw the placement of student teachers at Chicago Public Schools (CPS). During

her employment, Plaintiff was publicly critical of CPS and its leadership. Among

other things, she posted complaints against CPS on social media and promoted

petitions critical of CPS’s leadership. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Matthew

Lyons, the Chief Talent Officer for CPS and the Board of Education of the City of

Chicago (the “Board”), along with the unknown principals at several CPS schools

(Jane Does 1−3), compiled instances of Plaintiff’s criticism, and Defendant Lyons

emailed Plaintiff’s supervisor at Northwestern University to express “concerns” about

Plaintiff’s social media activity. That email, according to Plaintiff, led to her

termination.

Plaintiff brought the present suit against Lyons, the Board, and Jane Does 1−3

for violating and conspiring to violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. She alleges

that Lyons and Jane Does 1−3’s collection of her social media activity and Lyons’

email to Plaintiff’s supervisor were unlawful retaliation for her constitutionally

protected speech and association activities. Plaintiff also alleges, under state law,

that Defendants tortiously interfered with the prospective economic gains of her

continued employment.

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege

her constitutional claims and that Defendants are entitled to immunity under federal

and state law. But Defendants’ arguments are premature. Plaintiff plausibly alleges

each of her claims, including those against Lyons and the Board, with sufficient

particularity to put Defendants on notice about the substance of those claims.

Likewise, resolution of Defendants’ immunity arguments would require the Court to

find facts not properly before the Court at this stage of the litigation. As the Seventh

Circuit has repeatedly explained, dismissal at the pleading stage on immunity

grounds is generally “inappropriate.” Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.

2001). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13) is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Hayes worked at Northwestern University as the Senior Coordinator

for School Partnerships from September 20161 until she was terminated in March

1 Although Plaintiff alleges that she was hired in September 2020 (Dkt. 1 ¶ 13), one of

Plaintiff’s exhibits confirms that her employment began in September 2016. (Dkt. 1-5). For

2020. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 13.) In that role, Plaintiff “oversaw the placement of student teachers,”

a responsibility that required her to work with CPS to place Northwestern University

student teachers on school campuses. (Id. ¶¶ 13−14.) During her employment,

Plaintiff received two performance reviews, both of which rated her as “Excelling.”

(Id. ¶ 15.)

In the years preceding Plaintiff’s termination, she alleges that she “engaged in

speech and association critical of CPS.” (Id. ¶ 17.) According to her, that speech

included

things such as calling for the expansion of the authority of the CPS

Inspector General to “investigate and report on racial inequities in

CPS,” calling into question CPS’s well-documented shortcomings

regarding the policing of sexual misconduct at its schools, questioning

public statements of CPS CEO Janice Jackson, and questioning CPS’s

commitment to fully staffing schools with librarians and social workers.

(Id. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff posted criticism on social media and promoted petitions critical of

CPS. For example, on October 30, 2019, Plaintiff wrote in a social media post that

CPS’s (and the State of Illinois’s) “lack of resources and systemic inequities have

become an acceptable status quo” for many educators. (Dkt. 1-4 at 8.) Plaintiff also

commented on another social media user’s post that “Janice Jackson and CPS should

stop the inaccurate rhetoric about the longer day and year because they spout it All.

The. Time.” (Id. at 7.) On February 11, 2020, Plaintiff shared a petition sponsored by

purposes of resolving the present motion, the Court assumes Plaintiff was employed by

Northwestern University starting in September 2016.

Raise Your Hand and Chicago United for Equity demanding CPS “build

accountability measures around equity in schools.” (Id. at 4.)

On February 22, 2020, Defendant Lyons, CPS’s Chief Talent Officer, sent an

email to Timothy Dohrer, the Director and Assistant Professor in the Master of

Science in Education Program at Northwestern University and Plaintiff’s direct

supervisor, and to David Figlio, Northwestern’s Dean of the School of Education and

Social Policy. In his email, Lyons expressed his and “several CPS principals[’]” (Jane

Does 1−3’s) “concerns” about Plaintiff’s “social media usage” and noted the posts

Plaintiff made “over at least the past several months” which “disparage CPS and

question the motives and competence of [CPS’s] leadership.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 1.) Lyons

also referenced Plaintiff’s social media posts critical of specific campuses and CPS

policies described above. (Id.)

Five days later, on February 27, Dohrer requested that Northwestern

University terminate Plaintiff. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 33; see Dkt. 1-5.) On the Request for

Termination form, Dohrer cited three instances of alleged “prior corrective action

steps” in 2017 and 2018, and he referenced Defendant Lyons’s email and Plaintiff’s

social media activity critical of CPS. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 34; Dkt. 1-5 at 1.) On March 6, 2020,

Plaintiff was terminated from Northwestern University. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 46.)

On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff brought the present suit, alleging four claims

against Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lyons and the

Board retaliated against Plaintiff for activity protected by the First Amendment by

contacting and complaining to her employer about her social media activity. (Id.

¶¶ 47−53.) In Count II, she alleges that Defendants, including the Jane Doe “CPS

principals” referenced in Lyons’s email, conspired to violate her constitutional rights.

(Id. ¶¶ 54–58.) In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff alleges under state law that Defendants

tortiously interfered with her prospective economic gain when Lyons “sent an email

that purposefully and intentionally sought to terminate or at least limit [Plaintiff’s]

ongoing employment at Northwestern.” (Id. ¶¶ 59−70.)

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, contending that Plaintiff does

not allege sufficient facts to assert a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim,

(Dkt. 13 at 5–6); that Plaintiff fails to allege any plausible Monell theory of liability

to hold the Board liable (id. at 8); and that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a

meeting of the minds between Defendants Lyons and Jane Does 1–3 to support a

conspiracy claim (id. at 10). Defendants also argue that Defendant Lyons is entitled

to qualified immunity and that both Defendants Lyons and the Board are immune

under state law. (Id. at 4–5.) Finally, Defendants argue that Defendants Lyons and

the Board are immune from punitive damages under state law. (Id. at 11–12.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). These allegations “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put another

way, the complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that

conveys ‘a story that holds together.’ ” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774,

777 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826–27 (7th

Cir. 2014)). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the

complaint’s factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s

favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even though factual allegations are entitled to the

assumption of truth, mere legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678−79.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count I)

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lyons and the Board violated

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to free speech and association by emailing her

supervisors to complain about her criticism of CPS. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 47−53.) According to

Plaintiff, Defendant Board is liable for the First Amendment violation because

Defendant Lyons was a person with final policymaking authority on behalf of the

Board. (Id. ¶¶ 53; 11.) In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

does not plausibly allege (1) that Defendant Lyons violated Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights; and (2) a Monell theory of liability is sufficient to hold the

Defendant Board liable. (Dkt. 13 at 5−8.)

1. Defendant Lyons

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for “deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To bring

a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [s]he engaged

in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) [s]he suffered a deprivation that

would likely to deter First Amendment activity in the future,; and (3) the First

Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendant’s decision to

take the retaliatory action.” Thompson v. Brown, 2021 WL 2254970, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

June 3, 2021) (quoting 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2021)

(cleaned up)).2

Defendants challenge the adequacy of Plaintiff’s claim against Lyons. Among

other contentions, Defendants argue that, even assuming Plaintiff’s social media

activity was constitutionally-protected speech, a public official’s (such as Defendant

Lyons’s) speech is only actionable when it contains “a threat, coercion, or intimidation

intimating that punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will imminently

follow.” (Dkt. 13 at 6 (citing Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d 947, 956 (7th Cir. 2011))).

According to Defendants, Lyons’s email only suggested that Dohrer and Figlio should

address Plaintiff’s behavior as they “believed appropriate.” (Id.) Defendants also

argue that Plaintiff “cannot allege protected speech was a motivating factor” for the

alleged deprivation of her First Amendment rights. (Id. at 7.)

2 Although the Seventh Circuit has not specified the standard to be applied for § 1983 First

Amendment retaliation claims where no employment relationship exists between the parties,

the Court agrees with another judge in this District that there is “no meaningful distinction

in the applicable standards for § 1983 claims brought either by employees or non-employees.”

Villagrana v. Vill. of Oswego, 2005 WL 2322808 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2005) (citing Chicago

Reader v. Sheahan, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).

Defendants’ arguments may carry the day at a later stage of litigation. But

those arguments are premature in a motion to dismiss. As the Seventh Circuit has

explained,

pleadings in federal court need not allege facts corresponding to each

‘element’ of a statute. It is enough to state a claim for relief—and [Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] departs from the old code-

pleading practice by enabling plaintiffs to dispense with the need to

identify, and plead specifically to, each ingredient of a sound legal

theory . . . . Plaintiffs need not plead facts; they need not plead law; they

plead claims for relief. Usually they need do no more than narrate a

grievance simply and directly, so that the defendant knows what he has

been accused of . . . . Any district judge (for that matter, any defendant)

tempted to write ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not

contain . . .’ should stop and think: What rule of law requires a

complaint to contain that allegation? . . . Complaints initiate the

litigation but need not cover everything necessary for the plaintiff to

win; factual details and legal arguments come later. A complaint suffices

if any facts consistent with its allegations, and showing entitlement to

prevail, could be established by affidavit or testimony at a trial.

Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Plaintiff adequately

alleges her First Amendment retaliation claim. According to her, Defendant Lyons’s

email was retaliation for Plaintiff’s constitutionallyprotected speech and that email

led to her termination. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 47.) Such allegations are sufficient to state a claim

for relief.

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary would require factfinding not proper at

this stage of the case. For example, Defendants’ argument that Lyons’s email was “so

trivial a person of ordinary firmness would not be deterred” in exercising her right to

freedom of speech or association (Dkt. 13 at 7 (quoting Hoffman v. DeWitt Cnty., 2018

WL 3758566, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2018)) would require the Court to make findings

about the content of Lyons’s email in Defendants’ favor. Beyond the principle that

questions of fact “are more properly considered” on a motion for summary judgment,

Anderson Designer Homes Co. v. Amwood Homes, Inc., 1992 WL 168799, at *1 (N.D.

Ill. July 13, 1992), the Court is required to draw factual inferences in Plaintiff’s (not

Defendants’) favor at this stage, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. So drawn, the inferences from

and allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are enough to survive the present motion.

2. Defendant Board

Plaintiff’s allegations are likewise sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim against

the Board. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, local government entities

such as the Board can be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations

caused by their official policies or customs. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). More specifically,

a local government entity can be liable where there is “(1) an express policy that

causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is

so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final

policymaking authority.” Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted).

As the Supreme Court has made clear, “federal courts must not apply a

heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases alleging § 1983 municipal

liability,” and “[t]he Seventh Circuit has interpreted this mandate to allow

‘conclusory’ Monell complaints to survive motions to dismiss when they are ‘sufficient

to put the [local governing body] on notice of [the plaintiff’s] claim against it.’ ”

Howard v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2016 WL 4366598, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2016)

(alterations in original) (quoting McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th

Cir. 2000)); see also Horton v. Guzman, 2017 WL 1233028, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4,

2017).

Plaintiff pleads her Monell claim with sufficient specificity to put the Board on

“notice of the crux of [Plaintiffs’] charges.” McCormick, 230 F.3d at 325. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Lyons, as the Board’s Chief Talent Officer, is a person with

final policymaking authority and that Lyons caused Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation injury by emailing her supervisors. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 11; 26–27.) Taken as true,

those allegations are enough to apprise the Board of the nature of Plaintiff’s claims

against it and thus to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Conspiracy Claim (Count II)

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lyons conspired with Jane Does

1–3 “in preparing the case and making the complaint to Northwestern regarding

Hayes’[s] protected activity.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 58.) To state claim under § 1983 for

civil conspiracy, Plaintiff “must allege facts from which the Court may reasonably

infer there was ‘(1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive

plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights

in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.’ ” Wheeler v. Piazza, 364 F.

Supp. 3d 870, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (quoting Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441 (7th

Cir. 1988)).

Although a conspiracy claim “bereft of any suggestion, beyond a bare

conclusion” would be insufficient, Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir.

2009), there is “no heightened pleading standard for conspiracy claims: ‘it is enough

in pleading a conspiracy merely to indicate the parties, general purpose, and

approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with,’ ”

Sanchez v. Vill. of Wheeling, 447 F. Supp. 3d 693, 705 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting Walker

v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff plausibly alleges her First Amendment

retaliation claim (Count I), she fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the

Defendants had a “meeting of the minds” to support her conspiracy claim (Count II).

(Dkt. 13 at 9–10 (citing Goldschmidt v. Patchett, 686 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1982))).3

But construing the complaint liberally in Plaintiff’s favor, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,

Count II plausibly alleges a conspiracy claim. Defendant Lyons states in his email to

Plaintiff’s supervisors that “several CPS principals” brought concerns regarding

Plaintiff’s “online activity” to Defendant Lyons’s attention. (Dkt. 1-1 at 2.)4 Those

Jane Does purportedly told Lyons that they would be unwilling to host Northwestern

student teachers on their campuses because they “believe [Plaintiff’s] presence would

expose their school[s] to potential reputational risk online.” (Id.) Based on such

statements, Plaintiff alleges that Lyons “does not appear to have acted alone in

building the complaint” and, in fact, that “others [Jane Does 1−3] worked in concert

3 Defendants also argue that, because Plaintiff failed to plead a First Amendment

violation, there can be no § 1983 conspiracy claim. (Dkt. 20 at 11.) Having found that Plaintiff

plausibly alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim (see above), that argument fails.

4 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court takes as true the factual allegations in the

complaint as well as in any exhibits attached to the complaint. See Green v. Ill. State Bd. of

Educ., 849 F. App’x 593, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Squires-Cannon v. Forest Preserve Cook

Cnty., 897 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2018)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

with Lyons in preparing the case and making the complaint to Northwestern

regarding [Plaintiff’s] protected activity.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 54−58.) Such allegations are

sufficient to support Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails under the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. According to Defendants, “a conspiracy cannot

exist between an employer’s own officers and employees.” (Dkt. 20 at 11 (citing

Simonsen v. Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 230777, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002)). In

Simonsen, a teacher alleged that his employers and supervisors conspired to deprive

him of a property right in continued employment. Simonsen, 2002 WL 230777, at *1.

Rejecting the teacher’s claim, the court held that “neither a corporation nor its

managers may be held liable for conspiracy . . . for actions taken within the scope of

the corporation’s business.” Id. at *7. Based on Simonsen, Defendants argue that

“Lyons[’] communications with CPS principals, [who are] also employed by the Board,

cannot comprise a conspiracy.” (Dkt. 20 at 12 (citation omitted).)

But the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the applicability of the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to § 1983 claims. See Liggins v. City of Chicago,

2021 WL 2894167, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2021) (citations omitted). Moreover, even

assuming that doctrine applies, it only shields “routine, collaborative business

decisions that are later alleged to be discriminatory.” Newsome v. James, 2000 WL

528475, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2000). At this stage, it is at best unclear whether

Defendants’ collection of Plaintiff’s social media posts, documentation of her Facebook

group affiliations, and notification to Plaintiff’s supervisors of such posts and

affiliations constitute the type of “routine . . . business decisions” covered by the

doctrine. In other words, drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot

dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.

C. Defendants’ Immunity

Defendants also advance three theories of immunity: that Defendant Lyons is

immune from Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims (Counts I and II) under

the federal doctrine of qualified immunity; that Lyons and the Board are immune

from Plaintiff’s state law claims (Counts III and IV) under the Illinois Tort Immunity

Act (TIA); and that the Board and Lyons are immune from punitive damage under a

different provision of the TIA. (Dkt. 13 at 4–5, 11−12.) These arguments are

premature.

1. Federal and State Law Immunities

Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability “unless a plaintiff

pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,

and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In turn, under the TIA, “a public employee serving in a

position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable

for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in

the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2-201. In

other words, to be afforded TIA protection, the public employee must (1) be

empowered with either discretion or policy making authority; and (2) commit an act

or omission that is both “a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion.”

Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P’ship, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341 (1998).

Defendants argue that Lyons is immune from Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation under the doctrine of qualified immunity and that Lyons and the Board

are immune from Plaintiff’s state law claims under the TIA. (Dkt. 13 at 4–5, 11.) But

dismissal under either source of immunity is premature. The Seventh Circuit has

repeatedly cautioned that, because “immunity defense[s] usually depend[] on the

facts of the case, dismissal at the pleading stage is inappropriate.” Alvarado, 267 F.3d

at 651; see Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000). As

explained by another judge in this District,

on [] one hand, qualified immunity is a defense to suit rather than just

liability, and should be addressed as early as possible. On the other

hand, [Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] does not require

plaintiffs to anticipate a qualified immunity defense and allege every

fact needed to defeat it in the complaint. Thus, a court must determine

whether the facts actually alleged clearly establish a qualified immunity

defense. If not, courts have a variety of ways to protect defendants from

unnecessary litigation, such as requiring a more definite statement of

the claim, a reply to an answer, or summary judgment briefing.

Rusinowski v. Vill. of Hillside, 835 F. Supp. 2d 641, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (cleaned up).

The same reasoning applies with equal effect to the TIA. Wilson v. City of Chicago,

758 F.3d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 2014) (construing statutory immunity, such as that

available under the TIA, as an “affirmative defense[]”); Smith v. City of Chicago, 143

F. Supp. 3d 741, 759 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (recognizing that “the Tort Immunity Act

provides affirmative defenses”).

The mere presence of Defendants’ potential immunity defenses “does not

render [Plaintiff’s] claim for relief invalid.” Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy

Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). On the contrary, “a plaintiff may state a

claim even though there is a defense to that claim.” Id. Reading the complaint in her

favor, Plaintiff has not clearly alleged facts that support Defendants’ qualified

immunity or immunity under the TIA. Accordingly, Defendants’ appeals to either

source of immunity are not proper at this stage.

2. Immunity from Punitive Damages

Defendants also argue that the Board and Lyons are immune from punitive

damages. (Dkt. 13 at 11−12.) A separate provision of the TIA provides circumstances

under which local public entities and public officials may be immune from such

damages. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2–102. Because the principal consideration at this

stage is whether the claims present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative

that conveys a story that holds together,” Kaminski, 23 F.4th at 777 (internal

quotation marks omitted), the Court will reserve its evaluation of what remedies may

be available to Plaintiff for a later time. It is “simply too early” to determine the facts

necessary to any immunity from punitive damages. Lifton v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 290

F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Defendants’ immunity arguments are denied

without prejudice to Defendants raising those arguments anew at a later time.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13) is denied.

SO ORDERED in No. 21-ev-01198.

Date: September 19, 2022 _ Oh Kame

JO F. ESS

United States District Judge

16