Henderson v. Rangel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SEAN HENDERSON,

Plaintiff, No. 19 C 06380

v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin

Chicago Police Officer ALBERT RANGEL,

Star No. 5339; Chicago Police Officer

ADRIAN ROSILES, Star No. 19462; and

the CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Sean Henderson alleges that several officers of the Chicago Police Department

(“CPD”) violated his constitutional rights when they arrested and detained him

without probable cause and in reliance on fabricated evidence. Defendants have now

moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants

Defendants’ motion.

Background

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise indicated. Around

10:00 p.m. on March 10, 2017, CPD Officers Albert Rangel and Adrian Rosiles

conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle because the front passenger was not wearing a

seatbelt. R. 80 ¶ 13. The stopped car was being driven by Henderson. R. 80 ¶¶ 10, 12.

The car belonged to Henderson’s friend Deonte Johnson, who was riding in the front

passenger seat. R. 80 ¶¶ 10, 17. The traffic stop was captured on the body-worn

cameras (“BWC”) of both officers. R. 80 ¶ 14.

After exiting their patrol car, Rangel approached the driver-side door of the

stopped vehicle, while Rosiles walked to the passenger-side door. R. 80 ¶ 15. Officer

Rangel spoke to Henderson through his partially rolled-down window and asked why

Johnson was not wearing a seatbelt. R. 80 ¶ 16. Both officers also smelled burnt

cannabis and observed a partially burnt cigar on Johnson’s lap. R. 80 ¶ 19.

Rangel asked Henderson to exit the vehicle, but Henderson instead rolled up

the tinted window of the car. R. 80 ¶ 20. Rangel claims that he then observed

Henderson lean forward in his seat and reach toward the floor. R. 80 ¶ 21. Henderson

denies that he reached to the floor and testified that any forward lean was to turn off

his car or hang up his phone. R. 80 ¶¶ 21, 22; R. 73-2 108:18-110:9. Rangel then drew

his weapon and shouted at Henderson, “don’t be reaching” and “get your hands up.”

R. 80 ¶ 23. Rangel ordered Henderson to open the driver-side door, but Henderson

refused and requested that Rangel call for a police sergeant to come to the scene. R.

80 ¶¶ 24-25. Once the sergeant arrived, he approached the driver-side window,

remarked that it “reeks of weed,” and told Henderson to exit the car. R. 80 ¶ 26.

Henderson continued to protest but eventually he and Johnson got out. R. 80 ¶ 27.

After Henderson exited the car, Rangel approached the driver’s seat area with

the door still open. R. 80 ¶ 28. A flashlight is visible in Rangel’s right hand from the

8:13 mark of his BWC video to the 8:18 mark. R. 80 ¶ 29. At about the 8:20 mark in

the video, Rangel leans into the driver’s seat area. R. 80 ¶ 28. From 8:20 to 8:21, the

video shows Rangel’s left hand grabbing a badge hanging from a chain around his

neck. R. 80 ¶ 29.

According to Rangel, he observed a handgun under the driver’s seat when he

leaned into the car—Henderson disputes that any gun was present before Rangel

leaned into the car. R. 80 ¶ 28. The video’s audio records Rangel announcing a code

to indicate he found a firearm within a few seconds of leaning into the car. R. 80 ¶ 30.

The video then shows Rangel pulling a silver handgun from the area under the seat,

removing a loaded magazine and a live round from the chamber, and placing the gun

on the driver’s seat. R. 80 ¶¶ 33-34. The serial number of the handgun had been

scratched off. R. 80 ¶ 42. At the time he retrieved the gun, Rangel was wearing winter

gloves. R. 84 ¶ 4. As he stepped away from the stopped car, the video partially

captured him placing the gun in his cargo pants. R. 84 ¶ 5. Meanwhile, Rosiles

recovered the cannabis cigar from Johnson’s lap and conducted a protective pat down

on him. R. 80 ¶ 36. The officers arrested Henderson and Johnson and transported

them to the 6th District police station for processing. R. 80 ¶ 37. Rangel recalled that

he kept his gloves on during the stop and while he was transporting the arrestees

and the gun to the police station. R. 80 ¶ 7. The handgun and ammunition were

eventually placed in sealed envelopes with unique inventory numbers and sent to the

CPD crime laboratory for testing and analysis. R. 80 ¶ 41.

At the station, Johnson was interviewed first and told the officers the gun was

not his and that he knew nothing about it. R. 80 ¶ 39. Henderson declined to answer

questions when interviewed. R. 80 ¶ 40. Rangel confirmed that Henderson did not

have a firearm owner’s identification car or a concealed carry license. R. 80 ¶ 43.

Rangel also confirmed that Henderson had at least two prior felony convictions. R. 80

¶ 44. Rangel then prepared a case incident report that summarized the events of the

traffic stop and arrests. R. 80 ¶ 45. The report identified Henderson as the possessor

of the recovered firearm. Id.

Rangel contacted the felony review unit of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s

Office to assess whether felony charges were appropriate. R. 80 ¶ 46. Assistant State’s

Attorney Conniff was assigned to the case and prepared a “fact sheet” memorializing

the information provided by Rangel. R. 80 ¶ 48. Conniff approved charging Henderson

with being an armed habitual criminal, and a grand jury returned a multi-count

indictment against him, including various weapons charges. R. 80 ¶ 51.

Henderson remained in Cook County jail throughout the pendency of his

criminal case. R. 80 ¶ 54. Rangel says that at some point during the trial, an assistant

state’s attorney told him that his fingerprints had been found on the handgun. R. 84

¶ 16. During Henderson’s trial, Rangel testified that he handled the gun at the station

without his gloves on. R. 80 ¶ 9. On cross-examination, he admitted that he did not

actually remember doing so, but said that he “must have.” R. 80 ¶ 10. Rangel’s case

incident report did not mention anything about him removing his gloves or handling

the gun at the police station, and he did not write a supplemental report to document

having done so. R. 84 ¶¶ 11-12. A jury ultimately acquitted Henderson. R. 80 ¶ 55.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than

a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d

887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and

must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th

Cir. 2018). The Court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests,

determine credibility, or ponder which party’s version of the facts is most likely to be

true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2021 WL 4486445, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct.

1, 2021). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could

not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

Analysis

The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable seizures, such as those “based

solely on false evidence, rather than supported by probable cause.” Manuel v. City of

Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917 (2017). Claims such as the one Henderson raises here, for

deprivation of liberty via an arrest and detention supported by fabricated evidence,

are cognizable under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.; see also

Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022) (recognizing a claim under the

Fourth Amendment for illegal seizure without probable cause).

“Probable cause does not require certainty.” Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578,

587 (7th Cir. 2015). “It is a fluid concept that relies on the common-sense judgment

of the officers based on the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Reed, 443

F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006). “Probable cause exists where the police officer is aware

of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the

petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.’” Coleman v. City of Peoria,

925 F.3d 336, 350 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

When challenged in a civil case, an officer’s probable cause determination is

entitled to an additional layer of deference via qualified immunity. To be entitled to

qualified immunity, “an officer needs only ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Huff v. Reichert,

744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725

(7th Cir. 1998)); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (explaining that

qualified immunity protects officers who make reasonable errors in judgment about

whether probable cause exists). In this manner, qualified immunity protects “all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Tebbens v. Mushol,

692 F.3d 807, 821 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The crux of the case is the allegation that Defendants fabricated evidence,

which would of course defeat a finding of probable cause. See Patrick v. City of

Chicago, 974 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2020). At the motion to dismiss stage, Henderson

accused Rangel and Rosiles of lying about observing a “furtive gesture” by Henderson

toward the vehicle’s floor. In Henderson’s briefing on the instant motion, the focus

has largely shifted to his allegation that Rangel planted the gun he retrieved from

the floor of the car. Although Henderson testified that he did not see Rangel stash

the gun under the driver’s seat, he argues that the BWC video shows Henderson had

the “opportunity” to do so, and that Rangel’s fingerprints could only have wound up

on the gun if he had handled it before the stop. Neither accusation holds up against

the undisputed evidence in this case.

As noted above, the Court ordinarily views disputed facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, in this case Henderson. However, when an event

in question is captured in video footage of unquestioned authenticity, the court “may

consider that video footage without favoring the nonmovant.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883

F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007)). The

Court therefore credits the BWC videos that captured Henderson’s arrest as

undisputed evidence, and to the extent Henderson’s (or another party’s) account of

events differs from what the video depicts, the video controls. See Williams v. Brooks,

809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016) (crediting police dashboard camera video on appeal

of summary judgment grant and rejecting argument that ambiguity in video created

a factual dispute for the jury to resolve).

Addressing first the question of Henderson’s supposed “furtive movement,” the

BWC video supports Defendants’ position. Setting aside whether it conclusively

depicts Henderson reaching to the floor, the video confirms that Henderson was

shifting in his chair and reaching around the area of his seat. Indeed, he admitted as

much, and the video shows tension on his seatbelt consistent with leaning forward.

It is irrelevant that the video never captures an image of Henderson holding a gun—

as discussed below, the officers did not need to see the gun in Henderson’s hand to

have probable cause to believe he illegally possessed it.

The video likewise undercuts Henderson’s claim that Rangel planted a gun

beneath his seat. By Henderson’s own characterization, the video depicts Rangel

leaning into the car for only a few seconds before he pulls the gun out from beneath

the driver’s seat. For most of that time, Rangel’s hands are otherwise occupied,

holding a flashlight or grabbing the badge hanging from his neck. True, for two

seconds, from 8:22 to 8:23 in the video, Rangel’s left hand is out of frame, allegedly

leaving him free to plant a gun. However, unless Rangel boasts the prestidigitation

(a.k.a. sleight-of-hand) skill of a trained stage magician, Henderson’s theory is simply

beyond reasonable belief. It supposes that Rangel had concealed on his person a

second gun bearing an obliterated serial number before approaching the car at all.

He then had to retrieve the second gun and stash it under Henderson’s seat without

being caught on his or his partner’s BWCs or seen by any of the other people on the

scene of the arrest, including Henderson himself (who was still standing near the car

at the time). And he had a window of no more than two seconds to do this.

Furthermore, Henderson’s theory calls for conjecture about what is not shown in the

video. But “no evidence is no evidence,” King v. Hendricks Cty. Comm’rs, 954 F.3d

981, 986 (7th Cir. 2020), and any conclusion derived from the video would not be a

reasonable inference—it would be pure speculation. See McCoy, 341 F.3d at 604.

The evidence that Rangel’s fingerprints were found on the gun is insufficient

to create a genuine issue of material fact. Rangel’s testimony on cross-examination

during Henderson’s criminal trial adequately explains the presence of his

fingerprints on the gun despite not touching it with his bare hands during the traffic

stop. The alternative theory, that Rangel secretly handled the gun before planting it,

again relies on speculation from an absence of evidence. See King, 954 F.3d at 986;

McCoy, 341 F.3d at 604. And as discussed, the video makes it unreasonable to

conclude that Rangel planted the gun. He simply didn’t have the time or opportunity

to do it.

With the fabrication question resolved, the Court finds Defendants had at least

arguable probable cause to arrest and detain Henderson on suspicion of unlawful

possession of a firearm. The possession element can be satisfied by actual or

constructive possession. See United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir.

1990); People v. Rangel, 516 N.E.2d 936, 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Constructive

possession can be shown through evidence of a “defendant’s knowledge of the

presence of the prohibited weapon and his immediate and exclusive control over the

area where it was found.” Rangel, 516 N.E.2d at 942; accord Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1110

(“Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but

instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise

dominion and control over an object.” (quoting United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 864,

868 (7th Cir. 1984))).

In Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, the court had no difficulty finding

probable cause on similar facts. As the court explained,

Describing this case decides the outcome, to wit: Chicago police officers

lawfully stopped Young while he was driving. A gun was found next to

Young in the car. And Young is a convicted felon. That's textbook

probable cause. It does not matter that Young said the gun wasn't his—

protesting innocence is not a get-out-of-pretrial-detention-free card.

Id. at 642. Likewise, in Jackson, the court concluded that officers had probable cause

to arrest a suspect after observing “furtive movements” and discovering a firearm in

the area where he had been seated. People v. Jackson, 2017 WL 4274082, at *4 (Ill.

App. Ct. Sept. 22, 2017). Outside the probable cause context, other courts have also

found constructive possession in cases where a gun was found in a car near the place

where a person was sitting. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 670 (7th

Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence that defendant constructively possessed

firearm found in door storage compartment of car he was driving).

Here, Rangel found the loaded handgun with an obliterated serial number

underneath the seat where Henderson was sitting. He had seen Henderson reaching

around in the area of his seat before exiting the vehicle. And there is no dispute that

Henderson had a criminal history that ostensibly made it unlawful for him to possess

a firearm. If this scenario differs from what the Young court called “textbook probable

cause,” the difference is only slight. Even if the officers knew Henderson was not the

owner of the car (and nothing in the record suggests they were aware of this fact at

the time of the arrest), that does not preclude a finding of probable cause that he was

in possession of the gun under his seat. See Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1112 n.8

(“[O]wnership of the property in which contraband is found is not essential to a

finding of possession of the contraband.”). And while the Seventh Circuit has held

that mere proximity to a gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession, see

United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1994), in this case the gun was

easily within Henderson’s “dominion and control.” Had the gun been found in the

back seat outside Henderson’s reach, or the trunk of the car, the calculus may be

different, but those are not the facts of this case.

The facts available to Rangel and Rosiles at the time were likely sufficient to

establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. But even short of that, their

determination was undoubtedly reasonable, such that both are entitled to qualified

immunity. Indeed, courts have granted qualified immunity on weaker facts than

these. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419, 432-34 (7th Cir. 2022) (granting

qualified immunity to officers who arrested individual after finding a gun in an open

safe in another room in the house where he was living).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to all claims. Civil case terminated.

ENTERED:

Ahnias MW Butler.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: August 26, 2022

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