Salley v. Sgt. Parker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DONTANEOUS SALLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 18-cv-5700

)

v. ) Hon. Steven C. Seeger

)

YRHYNEST PARKER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dontaneous Salley was an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections for about

three weeks in 2018. Salley took issue with the location and the condition of his cell. The IDOC

assigned him to a cell on the second floor, even though he used a cane and received a low gallery

permit. Salley also encountered a number of unpleasantries in his cell, including rat feces, dirty

linens, and lights that wouldn’t turn off.

Salley ultimately filed suit, bringing claims under the ADA and under the Cruel and

Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. He alleged that Defendants showed

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and subjected him to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. He also filed claims about a failure to accommodate his religion and

his disability.

Defendants moved for summary judgment for lack of exhaustion, which the Court

granted in part. Salley then filed an amended complaint, and Defendants filed a second motion

for summary judgment on the merits. The latter motion is now before the Court.

For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby

granted.

Background

In June 2018, Plaintiff Dontaneous Salley was an inmate with the Illinois Department of

Corrections. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Facts, at ¶ 1 (Dckt. No. 125). He was housed

at the Northern Reception and Classification Center at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville

NRC”) for around three weeks. Id. He was there from June 6 to 15, 2018, and from June 25 to

July 3, 2018. Id. at ¶ 12.

Before entering Stateville NRC, Salley had some health issues. He suffered from wrist

pain, spondylosis (degenerative arthritis of the spine), and left leg pain and weakness from prior

gunshot wounds. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 1 (Dckt. No. 127). He needed

a cane to get around. Id.

When Salley arrived at Stateville NRC, he told correctional officers about his physical

ailments and his difficulties moving. Id. at ¶ 4. The prison has a practice of accommodating

inmates with disabilities. Id. at ¶ 8. So, prison officials allowed Salley to use a cane and issued

him a low gallery permit. Id. at ¶ 2; see Low Gallery Permit (Dckt. No. 6, at 29 of 31).

At Stateville NRC, a “gallery” is just another word for a floor. So the “first gallery”

means the first floor, the “second gallery” means the second floor, and so on. See Farley Dep., at

14:24 – 15:3 (Dckt. No. 124-1, at 36–37 of 210). Each unit has three galleries, meaning three

floors. Id. at 14:21 – 15:12.

Salley’s low gallery permit didn’t give a lot of details. It wasn’t exactly chock-full of

explanatory content for the interested reader. It didn’t include specific directions about where,

exactly, he was supposed to go, or what he was entitled to.

Basically, the low gallery permit was a one-page form, and it included a few headings.

The relevant one read as follows: “Absolute Criteria for Low Gallery Permit.” See Low Gallery

Permit (Dckt. No. 6, at 29 of 31). It included three boxes, and one of them was checked. That

box read: “Crutches (Permanent/Temporary).” Id. In handwriting, the word “cane” appears. Id.

Salley had a cane, but not for long. Salley’s cane was confiscated and replaced with a

wooden crutch. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 3 (Dckt. No. 127).

The parties disagree about the meaning of the low gallery permit, including whether

Stateville NRC complied with the permit. Salley believes that a low gallery permit entitled him

to a cell on the first floor. According to Salley, the IDOC “failed to honor” his permit by placing

him on the second floor, where he was the only inmate using an assistive device. See Pl.’s

Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 126). As he tells it, a first-floor cell was available at the

time of his cell assignment, but he didn’t get it. Id. at ¶ 9. Salley complained, and explained that

he had a medical permit, but the IDOC didn’t budge. Id. at ¶¶ 5–6.

Defendants have a different take on the meaning of the low gallery permit, and on

whether they complied. According to them, the second floor “is considered a low gallery,” and

an inmate who receives a low gallery permit “is authorized to be on either the first or second

gallery.” See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 6–7 (Dckt. No. 127). Stateville

NRC’s policy was to place inmates with low gallery permits in cells on the first floor, when

possible. But if a cell on the first floor was unavailable, the inmate would be placed on the

second floor. Id. at ¶ 8. As they tell it, there were no available cells on the first floor when

Salley entered the prison. Id. at ¶ 9. So, based on Stateville NRC protocol, Salley was placed in

a second-floor cell. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.

The parties also offer conflicting evidence about the conditions of Salley’s cell on the

second floor. Salley testified that it contained rat feces, bloodied sheets, and blankets that

smelled of urine. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 126). But Defendants offered

evidence that Stateville NRC cleans the cells on a regular basis, and that Salley’s cell was

cleaned before he entered his housing. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6 (Dckt.

No. 127). New inmates receive clean bedding, their initial clothing, a mattress, soap, a

toothbrush, and toothpaste. Id.

In sum, the parties agree that Salley was housed on the second floor when he entered

Stateville NRC. And they agree that he had a low gallery permit. But they disagree about

whether the permit entitled Salley to reside on the first floor, and whether a first-floor cell was

available when he entered the facility. And they disagree about the conditions of his second-

floor cell.

Things took a turn for the worse a week after his arrival. On June 12, 2018, Defendant

Cecil Whitfield, an IDOC correctional officer, arrived at Salley’s cell to escort him to the

showers. Id. at ¶ 11. Salley reminded Whitfield that he was not to be placed on the second-floor

gallery. Id.

Salley then attempted to go down the stairs to the showers. Id. at ¶ 13. As Salley puts it,

he “was then made” to walk down the stairs to the first-floor showers, despite the availability of

showers on the second floor.1 See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 12 (Dckt. No. 126).

The stairs leading from the second floor to the first floor had a railing. See Pl.’s Resp. to

Defs.’ Statement of Facts, at ¶ 16 (Dckt. No. 125). According to Salley, he had his crutch in one

arm and his shower gear in the other, so his hands were full. Id. As he tells it, it was

“impossible” for him to hold the railing while walking down the steps, and he needed help. Id.

1 Defendants dispute that there were showers on the second floor. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of

Facts, at ¶ 12 (Dckt. No. 127). But Salley testified that there were showers on the second floor, so that

testimony suffices to create an issue of fact. See Salley Dep., at 80:4-22 (Dckt. No. 122-1).

At deposition, counsel squarely asked Salley whether he ever told Whitfield that he

needed help walking down the stairs. Salley could not remember ever asking for help. He

testified: “I don’t remember. I don’t remember telling him that. I don’t know. I probably did. I

probably did. But if he was – I mean, me personally – I am walking with a crutch. I got my

shower gear. I am walking down 15 steps. He seen my permit that I am not supposed to be up

there. He should have known that common sense [sic] I needed to use the elevator. They had an

elevator, too. Put that for the record. They got elevators at NRC that he could have put me in.

There is an elevator that I could use. He didn’t put me in an elevator. So I can’t remember

asking him for help or not. If I did, I probably put it in my complaint. I am not sure. I don’t

remember right now at this moment.” See Salley Dep., at 77:19 – 78:9 (Dckt. No. 122-1).

Salley could not recall, one way or the other, whether he asked for help going down the

stairs. He testified that he couldn’t remember, so any testimony that he “probably” asked for

help is simply a guess. And speculation is not evidence. See Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870

F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[The non-movant] is only entitled to the benefit of inferences

supported by admissible evidence, not those supported by only speculation or conjecture.”)

(cleaned up). If he doesn’t remember, then he doesn’t remember. And if he doesn’t remember,

then he can’t testify about it.

Salley then walked down the stairs. It is undisputed that Whitfield did not help Salley

walk down the stairs. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 13 (Dckt. No. 127). And

it is undisputed that Salley did not use the railing. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Facts, at

¶ 16 (Dckt. No. 125).

Salley took a tumble. The record doesn’t reveal how far Salley walked down the stairs

before he fell. And the record does not shed light on how far he fell. But the bottom line is that

Salley fell, injuring his hand, wrist, and back. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at

¶¶ 13, 17 (Dckt. No. 127).

After the fall, Salley received medical attention and pain medication. Id. at ¶ 14. And

the prison re-assigned him to a new cell on the first floor. Id.

Three days later, on June 15, 2018, Salley submitted a written emergency grievance. Id.

at ¶ 15. He argued that Stateville NRC had failed to accommodate his disability, and he detailed

the events leading to his fall and injury. Id. Salley checked the box for “ADA Disability

Accommodation” and wrote “Violation of Eighth Amendment / Deliberate Indifference” next to

the “Other (specify)” box. Id. at ¶ 16; see also 6/15/18 Grievance, at 1 (Dckt. No. 124-1, at 9 of

210). He also complained about the conditions of his cell. He pointed to rat feces, lights that

would not turn off, and a lack of cleaning supplies. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts,

at ¶ 17 (Dckt. No. 127); 6/15/18 Grievance, at 2.

Salley ultimately filed a pro se complaint under section 1983 against seven individual

defendants who worked at Stateville NRC. See Cplt. (Dckt. No. 6). He sued six IDOC officers

and one IDOC mental health professional. Id. at ¶¶ 4–8, 11–12.

His original complaint included four claims: (1) deliberate indifference to a serious

medical condition; (2) failure to accommodate his religion; (3) failure to accommodate a

disability; and (4) inhumane living conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 69–72, 74–76. The Court later

appointed him counsel. See 3/26/19 Order (Dckt. No. 41).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the limited issue of whether Salley had

exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit. See Defs.’ Mtn. for Summ. J. (Dckt.

No. 67). This Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. See 8/14/20 Mem. Opin. and Order (Dckt. No. 93). The Court concluded that Salley

had not exhausted his administrative remedies for his claim about inadequate mental health care

or his request for religious accommodation, but he had exhausted his claims for his disability

accommodation and his living conditions. Id. at 26.

The Court dismissed one Defendant (Officer Hernandez), and granted summary judgment

in favor of another Defendant (Exner, a mental health professional). See 11/12/19 Order (Dckt.

No. 59); 8/14/20 Mem. Opin. and Order, at 26 (Dckt. No. 93). At that point, five individual

Defendants remained: Officers Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, and Farley.

In June 2021, Salley filed an amended complaint. See Am. Cplt. (Dckt. No. 100). The

amended complaint included claims against seven defendants. He included the same five IDOC

correctional officers: Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, and Farley. But the amended complaint

added Rob Jeffreys (the acting director of the IDOC), and the IDOC itself.

The amended complaint includes three counts. Count I is a claim under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Jeffreys and the IDOC (only). Id. at ¶¶ 41–51. Count II

is an inadequate medical care claim against the five IDOC correctional officers. Id. at ¶¶ 51–60.

And Count III is an unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against the five IDOC

correctional officers. Id. at ¶¶ 61–68.

After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. See Defs.’ Mtn. for Summ.

J. (Dckt. No. 119).

Legal Standard

A district court “shall grant” summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of

establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To survive summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond

the pleadings and identify specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

The Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving

him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Chaib v. Geo Grp., Inc., 819 F.3d 337, 341 (7th

Cir. 2016). The Court does not weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or determine the truth of

the matter, but rather determines only whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. See Nat’l

Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary

judgment is appropriate if, on the evidence provided, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in

favor of the non-movant. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc.,

674 F.3d 769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012).

Analysis

Salley brings three claims. Again, the first claim is an ADA claim against the IDOC and

Jeffreys (the acting director) for failing to accommodate his disability. The second claim is an

inadequate medical care claim against five IDOC officers for failing to place him in a first-floor

cell. The third claim is an unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against those five

IDOC officers based on the conditions of his second-floor cell.

The Court will address each claim in turn.

I. Americans with Disabilities Act (Count I)

Count I is an ADA claim against the IDOC, and against Jeffreys in his official capacity.

Salley alleges that they failed to meet his physical accessibility needs and failed to make

reasonable accommodations for his disability. See Am. Cplt., at ¶¶ 45–46 (Dckt. No. 100). He

contends that Defendants discriminated against him based on his disability. Id. at ¶ 47.

Defendants do not contest the merits of Salley’s ADA claim. Instead, they argue that

Salley brought his claim too late. The Court agrees.

“The ADA, like many federal civil rights statutes, does not contain a specific statute of

limitations. Thus, the most appropriate state limitations period applies.” Norfleet v. Gaetz, 820

F. App’x 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547,

550 (7th Cir. 1996)). Salley’s claim most closely resembles a personal injury claim, so the two-

year statute of limitations for personal injuries under Illinois law applies. See Scherr v. Marriott

Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013).

Salley’s last day at Stateville NRC was July 3, 2018. At that point, the IDOC couldn’t

accommodate his disability, because he wasn’t there. He needed to sue no later than two years

after he left the building. So he had until July 3, 2020 – meaning two years later – to bring his

ADA claim.

Salley brought a timely failure to accommodate claim in his original complaint, which he

filed in August 2018. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 69–71 (Dckt. No. 6). But that claim was not against

Jeffreys (again, the acting director) or the IDOC itself. Instead, it was against six individual

IDOC officers, five of which remain in this case (Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, and Farley).

Id. at ¶¶ 4–7, 11–12.

Then, when he filed his amended complaint in June 2021, Salley dropped the failure to

accommodate claim against the original Defendants. Instead, he brought a failure to

accommodate claim against Jeffreys and the IDOC (only). See Am. Cplt., at ¶ 45 (Dckt. No.

100).

So, in the amended complaint, he switched the defendants on his failure to accommodate

claim under the ADA. The original complaint named Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, Farley,

and Hernandez, but the amended complaint named Jeffreys and the IDOC (only) and dropped the

others.

Jeffreys and the IDOC argue that Salley missed the statute of limitations on his ADA

claim by almost one year. In other words, the IDOC and Jeffreys argue that he needed to add

them as defendants by July 2020. But Salley named them as defendants in June 2021.

Salley responds that the ADA claim relates back to the date of his original complaint. He

filed that complaint in August 2018, only two months after the alleged violation in June 2018. In

his view, the claims against the new Defendants relate back to that original filing.

An untimely claim can pass muster under the statute of limitations by latching onto a

timely claim. But not always. Rule 15(c)(1) governs when an amended complaint that adds a

new defendant relates back to the filing of an earlier complaint. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

The Rule sets up three hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome.

The first is a shared subject matter. “An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date

of the original pleading when: . . . (C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the

party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied. . . .” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(C). Rule 15(c)(1)(B), in turn, provides that the amendment must assert a claim arising

out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the

original pleading.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

If an amended complaint passes that first hurdle, a plaintiff must overcome two more.

An amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if the new defendant “(i) received

such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew

or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).

Here, Salley has not satisfied the last requirement.

An amended complaint does not relate back to an earlier complaint simply because a

plaintiff believes that it was a mistake not to include someone as a defendant. Only certain

mistakes count. Mere oversights don’t count. Neither do tactical mistakes.

“The text of the Rule expressly requires a case of mistaken identity.” See McMurtry v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2021 WL 1165102, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Relation back applies

only if the new defendant knew or should have known that it would have been sued “but for a

mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (emphasis

added).

There is nothing in Salley’s original complaint, or amended complaint, suggesting the

presence of a mistake. Salley originally chose to sue six individual defendants who worked at

Stateville NRC. That complaint involved defendants’ alleged failure to accommodate his

disability. The record does not suggest that he sued those individuals mistakenly when he meant

to sue Jeffreys and the IDOC. It is not as if he mixed up the defendants, or got their names

wrong, or otherwise confused one person for another.

The amended complaint reads like Salley simply changed his mind about who to sue. He

didn’t swap defendants because he mistakenly believed, in the original complaint, that one of the

original defendants was the director of the IDOC. It is not as if the original complaint alleged

that Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, Farley, or Hernandez was the IDOC director. The amended

complaint reflects a change of heart and change of mind: instead of suing individual officers

(Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, Farley, and Hernandez), he sued the director of the IDOC

(Jeffreys) and the IDOC itself.

But “[c]hanging one’s mind about who to sue – or making a tactical decision to expand

the boundaries of the lawsuit to add new defendants – does not qualify as mistaken identity.”

See McMurty, 2021 WL 1165102, at *12; see also Webb v. Fillipitch, 2022 WL 267907, at *5

(N.D. Ill. 2022) (“This is not a case of mistaken identity; Plaintiff simply changed his mind about

who he wanted to sue.”) (citing McMurty, 2021 WL 1165102, at *12).

Tellingly, Salley never argues that he made a mistake. His only reference to a mistake in

his brief denies that he needs a mistake for relation back. See Pl.’s Resp., at 8–9 (Dckt. No. 124)

(citing Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). That’s

not what the text of the rule says.

There is no basis for a finding that Salley failed to name certain defendants because of

mistaken identity. So the claims against Jeffreys and the IDOC in the amended complaint do not

relate back to the filing of the original complaint. And without relation back, Salley’s ADA

claims against them are untimely.

The Court grants summary judgment to Jeffreys and the IDOC on Salley’s ADA claim.

And again, there are no other defendants on Count I.

II. Official Capacity Claims and Damages

Before getting into the merits of the next two claims, the Court needs to take a bit of a

detour. The punchline is that Salley can’t recover damages from the state employees in their

official capacities.

In Counts II and III, Salley sues a number of IDOC correctional officers in their official

capacities, and he seeks damages under section 1983. See Am. Cplt., at ¶¶ 5–9, 60, 68 (Dckt.

No. 100). There are five remaining Defendants for those claims – Officers Whitfield, Parker,

Leiby, Clark, and Farley – all of whom are state employees. Id. at ¶¶ 5–9, 60, 68.

Salley brought claims against those Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 5–9

(suing each Defendant “in his official capacity”). The amended complaint does not include

claims against them in their individual capacities. At least not expressly. But in their briefs on

the motion for summary judgment, the parties appear to operate under the assumption that the

amended complaint named them in their individual capacities.

If Salley intended to bring official capacity claims against the Defendants, those claims

would fail right out the gate. Section 1983 authorizes suits against a “person” who acts under

color of state law and deprives another person of his or her rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A

State is not a “person,” so the statute does not allow suits against the State. See Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). And an official capacity claim against a state

officer is, really, “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Id. at 71. As a result, a

plaintiff cannot bring an official capacity claim for damages under section 1983 against a state

official. See Fritz v. Evers, 907 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2018); Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532,

535–36 (7th Cir. 2017).

Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, and Farley are employees of an Illinois state agency, so

section 1983 does not authorize a suit for damages against them in their official capacities. See

Fritz, 907 F.3d at 533. The Court therefore grants judgment to Defendants Whitfield, Parker,

Leiby, Clark, and Farley to the extent that the amended complaint alleged official capacity

claims for monetary damages.

Going forward, the Court treats Count II (inadequate medical care) and Count III

(unconstitutional conditions of confinement) as claims against the officers in their individual

capacities. The Court addresses those claims in turn.

III. Inadequate Medical Care (Count II)

Count II alleges that the five IDOC Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Salley brings an inadequate medical care

claim based on the officers’ refusal to place him in a low gallery cell. The claim involves his

first six days at the facility – recall that he went to the first floor after his fall.

Before diving into the claim, it is important to bear in mind what Salley is claiming, and

what he is not claiming. Salley claims that Defendants provided inadequate medical care

because he was housed on the second floor. The claim is about his placement on the second

floor, meaning the location of his cell.

Salley is not claiming that Whitfield or anyone else is liable for refusing to help him walk

down the stairs during the incident in question. The complaint does not contain a claim that the

guards did not help Salley walk down the stairs. In a similar vein, Salley did not argue in his

summary judgment briefs that Defendants are liable because they refused a request for help on

the day in question. And the claim is not about his medical care after he took a spill, either.

In sum, the claim is about the decision to place Salley on the second floor, instead of the

first floor. The claim is not about whether any of the guards refused a request for help walking

down the stairs before Salley took a tumble. The claim is not about a refusal to help him and

thus prevent a slip and fall. And it is not about his post-fall medical care.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” See Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “Prison officials violate the Eighth

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they display deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir.

2008).

“To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must offer evidence of ‘1)

an objectively serious medical condition; and 2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that

condition.’” LaRue v. Obaisi, 2021 WL 3290919, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (quoting Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011)). Courts refer to these two prongs as the “objective”

and “subjective” elements. See Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 766 (7th

Cir. 2021).

The objective component means that a prisoner was “exposed to a harm that was

objectively serious.” See Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 654. A medical condition is objectively serious

“if a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be

obvious to a layperson.” See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Bell v.

Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2021 WL 4267503, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (“[T]he standard for

conditions to be objectively ‘serious’ does not create a high bar.”) (citation omitted).

The subjective component requires that the prison official “actually knew of and

disregarded a substantial risk of harm” to an inmate. See Richter v. Mitchell, 2022 WL 1988986,

at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th

Cir. 2018)). This subjective standard “requires more than negligence or even gross negligence; a

plaintiff must show that the defendant was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored a

known risk.” See Huber v. Anderson, 909 F.3d 201, 208 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Figgs v.

Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016)).

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assume that Salley suffered from an

objectively serious medical condition.2 See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Their Mtn. for Summ. J., at

6 (Dckt. No. 120). District courts frequently assume that a plaintiff satisfies the first element – a

serious medical condition – when assessing inadequate medical care claims based on a prisoner’s

low gallery permit. See, e.g., Perez v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2019 WL 5788073, at *7

(N.D. Ill. 2019); Young v. Obaisi, 2019 WL 1239876, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Sharif v. Carter,

2017 WL 3421554, at *11 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Gonzalez v. Hardy, 2015 WL 6528112, at *7 (N.D.

Ill. 2015); Harrison v. Wexford Health Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 3897526, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2015).

Here, Salley suffered from several physical ailments that inhibited his ability to walk

without a cane or crutch. For purposes of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court

assumes that Salley had an objectively serious medical condition.

That leaves the subjective element: whether Defendants knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of harm to Salley’s health. Salley argues that all five IDOC Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need when they failed to honor his low gallery

permit and failed to assign him to a first-floor cell. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6 (Dckt.

No. 126). All parties agree that assignment to a low gallery qualifies as medical treatment. See,

e.g., Perez, 2019 WL 5788073 at *7; Sharif, 2017 WL 3421554 at *11.

According to Salley, he told the officers about his low gallery permit. He showed them

his permit, and repeatedly insisted that the permit prevented him from getting placed on the

second floor. Id. at ¶ 17.3 He also says that he communicated that he had difficulty walking, and

2 Defendants say that they challenge the objective element, but their argument only discusses the

subjective element. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Their Mtn. for Summ. J., at 6 (Dckt. No. 120).

3 Salley relies on his grievance to support the notion that he told all five Defendant officers about the low

gallery permit. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 17 (Dckt. No. 126). Defendants contend that this

grievance is inadmissible hearsay. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 17 (Dckt. No. 127).

At summary judgment, evidence does not need to be admissible in form; it only needs to be admissible in

that the “limitations in his ability to ambulate” were “visible and apparent.” Id. at ¶ 4. But

despite his protests, the officers refused to assign him a first-floor cell, allegedly ignoring a

substantial risk of harm by forcing him to stay on the second floor.

Viewing the record in Salley’s favor, he fails to put forward evidence that Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference. See Huber, 909 F.3d at 208.

First, Salley relies on the existence of his low gallery permit to establish the officers’

deliberate indifference to his medical need to be in a first gallery cell. See Pl.’s Statement of

Facts, at ¶¶ 5–6, 10 (Dckt. No. 126). Yet Salley’s permit says nothing about his medical

condition, or about the reasons for his placement on the first or second floor. See Low Gallery

Permit (Dckt. No. 6, at 29 of 31). The permit simply states, “Low Gallery Permit,” and that

Salley may use a cane. Id.

The parties dispute the meaning of “low gallery.” But even if Salley’s permit expressly

said, “first floor only,” the permit remains insufficient to show that the officers acted with

deliberate indifference by keeping him on the second floor.

An inmate’s medical permit does not dictate a court’s analysis of inadequate medical care

claims. Salley must establish both the objective and subjective elements of his Eighth

Amendment claims. A medical permit “does not supplant that framework.” See Est. of Miller by

Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2017).

content. See Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016). The

statements in Salley’s grievance are within his personal knowledge, and he can testify about them at trial.

See Rankin v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2019 WL 3554543, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2019). So, “even if the

grievance[] would not be admissible at trial . . . [Salley’s] testimony concerning the statements therein . . .

would be admissible.” Id.; see also Williams v. Schwarz, 2018 WL 1961143, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2018)

(considering statements in a prisoner’s grievances at summary judgment because the prisoner would be

allowed to testify about the statements at trial “independently of the grievance documents”).

An officer’s refusal to comply with an inmate’s medical permit does not automatically

establish the subjective element of Eighth Amendment claims. As other courts have noted, a

medical permit “might call for treatment that is beyond what is required by the Eighth

Amendment.” See Everett v. Baldwin, 2016 WL 8711476, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (emphasis

in original).

The Constitution sets a floor on the state’s minimally acceptable treatment of inmates. A

medical permit could entitle an inmate to better treatment above that floor, but it doesn’t raise

the floor.4 That is, the Constitution does not necessarily require compliance with a permit.

Even if Salley’s permit had said, “first floor only,” that directive wouldn’t be enough to

satisfy the subjective prong of an inadequate medical care claim. The permit revealed nothing

about why Salley was issued a cane, or what medical conditions he had, or how serious they

were. The permit did not say why he had difficulty walking, or how much difficulty he had, or

whether he had trouble with stairs. It didn’t contain medical information. And there is no

evidence that the officers knew of his degenerative arthritis or gunshot wounds.

In other words, showing a permit to the officers did not, on its own, give Defendants

knowledge of a serious medical condition or a substantial risk to his health. See Marberry, 847

F.3d at 428 (“[Plaintiff] does not contend that the very existence of a lower-bunk assignment

would convey to any conscientious prison employee the existence of a serious medical condition

. . . . For all this record shows, medical personnel issue lower-bunk directives for reasons that do

not imply the existence of a ‘serious’ health problem.”).

4 For instance, imagine a prison that gives medical permits for daily ice baths to inmates with broken

ankles. If, one day, a guard refuses to provide an inmate with his bath, that refusal does not mean the

guard inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. Not having a daily ice bath for a broken ankle is not cruel

and unusual, independent of what any medical permit says. In simple terms, a permit granting an inmate

special care does not mean that the prison must now abide by that permit, or else violate the Eighth

Amendment.

Second, even if Salley’s reliance on a crutch was clear to the officers, that fact is not

enough to establish that the officers acted with something akin to criminal recklessness.

Salley must present evidence that the officers actually knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of harm. See Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 498. “Even objective recklessness – failing to

act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk that is so obvious that it should be known – is

insufficient to make out a claim.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis

in original).

Deliberate indifference requires a reckless disregard of a known and substantial risk of

danger, not the mere absence of ordinary care. See Hardin v. Baldwin, 770 F. App’x 289, 290

(7th Cir. 2019). That said, “[i]f a risk from a particular course of medical treatment (or lack

thereof) is obvious enough, a factfinder can infer that a prison official knew about it and

disregarded it.” See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729.

Reviewing the record, Salley’s use of a cane plus the failure to place him in a first-floor

cell did not present a sufficiently obvious risk of harm to Salley.

Start with the stairs. The Seventh Circuit considers both an inmate’s ability to walk and

the quality of the stairs he must walk on. Compare Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 683

(7th Cir. 2016) (“Forcing someone to walk handcuffed and unaided down stairs needlessly

strewn with easily removable milk, food, and garbage, as Anderson alleges, poses an

unreasonable peril.”), with Pyles, 771 F.3d at 410 (holding that a wet stairway is not a hazardous

condition of confinement); see also Perkins v. Pfister, 711 F. App’x 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2017)

(holding that a prison’s policy of handcuffing inmates before moving them through “dry,

uncluttered stairwells” did not violate the Eighth Amendment).5

5 These cases concern unconstitutional conditions of confinement. But inadequate medical care claims

and unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims both involve the same deliberate indifference

Salley submits no evidence that the stairs at Stateville NRC were particularly hazardous,

slippery, lacked railings, or functioned as obstacle courses. See Vinegar v. Braggs, 2019 WL

277747, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (granting summary judgment on defendant’s inadequate medical

need claim be he “has presented this Court with no evidence to show that the stairs [he] walked

on were covered with debris or posed any sort of safety risk”). And the stairs were not

excessively long, either. Salley needed to walk 15 steps to get down to the first level. See Salley

Dep., at 16:9-13 (Dckt. No. 122-1, at 5 of 18). Without any evidence on the conditions of the

stairs, he is left only with the fact that he had a crutch and resided on the second floor.

But using a crutch while walking up or down 15 steps to a cell did not give Defendants

actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. A crutch is not the same as a wheelchair, or even

two crutches. With one crutch, a person’s other hand is free to balance himself. He can, for

instance, hold onto a railing for extra support. He isn’t left helpless on the stairs or subjected to

an uncompromising danger.

While Salley relied on a crutch, he submits no evidence that his crutch prevented his

ability to go up or down steps. Vertical movement on stairs may be more difficult with a crutch,

but it isn’t an excessively risky maneuver. Many people rely on a cane or crutch to walk, and

those same people can use stairs without putting their health and safety on the line. See HCP of

Illinois, Inc. v. Farbman Grp. I, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“[J]udges in

summary judgment proceedings . . . are not to ignore common sense and human experience.”).

standard, so the same considerations apply to both. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994);

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Indeed, the two claims are closely related, as “medical care

is simply one of the many conditions of confinement to which an imprisoned person is subjected.” See

Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303

(1991)).

In fact, Salley’s deposition makes it clear that he can take steps without causing injury or

facing a risk of harm. When asked if he ever takes stairs outside of prison, Salley responded: “I

really don’t recall taking stairs that much, to be honest with you. If I do, I take my time.” See

Salley Dep., at 75:3-5 (Dckt. No. 122-1, at 2 of 18). He then added: “So I have taken stairs, but

not flights, not no like 30 steps at a time. Probably like two or three steps, five steps here and

there. But for the most part I am taking elevators.” Id. at 75:10-13. Given Salley’s self-

professed ability to use stairs, albeit at a slower pace, there simply was not an obvious risk to his

health in keeping him on the second floor.

So, left only with the low gallery permit and Salley’s use of a single crutch, no reasonable

jury could conclude that Defendants’ refusal to move Salley off the second floor constituted

cruel and unusual punishment.

True, the incident in question involved Salley walking down the stairs with both hands

full, on his way to the shower. But there is no evidence in the record that could support a finding

of deliberate indifference when it came to the fall. Four of the five individual Defendants

weren’t even there. And Salley couldn’t remember if he asked the fifth Defendant (Whitfield)

for help.

In any event, the claim is about the assignment to a cell on the second floor, not the fall

down the stairs. After considering the record as a whole, and viewing it in a light most favorable

to Salley, there is no evidence that could support a finding by a reasonable jury against the five

IDOC Defendants. There is no evidence that they showed a reckless disregard of a known and

substantial risk of danger when Salley was assigned to a cell on the second floor.

Third, even if Salley could show that the officers acted with deliberate indifference in

refusing to assign him to a first-floor cell, qualified immunity would apply.

“Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit when the official is

performing a discretionary function and his conduct does not violate clearly established rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542,

572 (7th Cir. 2014). To proceed against the officers, Salley “must (1) adequately allege the

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) show the right was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation, such that a reasonable public official would have known that his conduct was

unlawful.” See Atterberry v. Sherman, 453 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 2006).

As already discussed, Salley has not submitted evidence of a violation of his

constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment. But even if he did, Salley still bears

the burden of establishing the existence of a clearly established constitutional right. See Green v.

Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). He has failed to satisfy his burden.

Salley relies on the general proposition that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical

need is a clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment, precluding an application of

qualified immunity. See Pl.’s Resp., at 14 (Dckt. No. 124) (citing Bond v. Aguinaldo, 265 F.

Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2003)); see also Barrows v. Larry, 2020 WL 1182658, at *10 (N.D.

Ill. 2020) (“It is well-established that ‘government officials violate inmates’ constitutional rights

when they deliberately disregard an inmate’s serious medical condition, and only a trial can

resolve the facts that are in dispute.’”) (quoting Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 528 (7th Cir.

2008)).

But Salley defines the principle at a level of generality that is simply too high. A general

legal standard is insufficient. Salley must show that the right was “established not as a broad

general proposition but in a particularized sense so that the contours of the right are clear to a

reasonable official.” See Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 548 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted); see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot defeat

qualified immunity by defining clearly established law “at a high level of generality”).

In the context of Eighth Amendment claims, a plaintiff cannot overcome qualified

immunity by simply referring to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Baisi v.

Burke, 359 F. Supp. 3d 592, 597 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see also Shaw v. Williams, 2018 WL 3740665,

at *13 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“That general legal proposition holds true in the abstract, but it lacks any

connection to the facts of this case and thus does not help Plaintiff.”).

Salley offers no authority to suggest that placing an inmate with a crutch and low gallery

permit on the second floor violates clearly established law. None of his cited authorities are

sufficiently particularized to the facts here. He cites no case involving an inmate with an

assistive device and a cell above the first floor. And the Court could not find any, either.

Accordingly, the Defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court grants summary judgment on Salley’s Eighth Amendment claims against the

five IDOC officers for failing to assign him to a first-floor cell.

IV. Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement (Count III)

Finally, Salley brings an unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against the

same five IDOC correctional officers (Whitfield, Parker, Leiby, Clark, and Farley). He argues

that his second-floor cell had rat feces on the floor, bloodied sheets, and blankets that smelled of

urine. He also alleges that the cell light would not turn off, and that Defendants denied his

requests for cleaning supplies. See Pl.’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 126); Pl.’s Resp.,

at 11–12 (Dckt. No. 124). Salley arrived at Stateville NRC on June 6, and he was reassigned to a

first-floor cell on June 12. So he spent six days in the second-floor cell.

A prisoner’s claim about his conditions of confinement falls under the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994). To establish a constitutional violation about his living conditions, Salley must

demonstrate that: (1) the conditions were objectively so adverse that they deprived him “of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities;” and (2) Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to the conditions. See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

Life’s necessities include shelter, heat, clothing, and adequate sanitation. See Budd v.

Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

2006). A deprivation must be sufficiently serious, meaning the condition must create “a serious

risk to an inmate’s health or safety or be sufficiently prolonged so as to cause significant pain or

discomfort.” See Hall v. Nicholson, 2022 WL 407649, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2022); see also Thomas v.

Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2021). And individual deprivations can work together,

creating a “mutually enforcing effect which produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable

human need, such as food or warmth.” See Murithi v. Hardy, 2016 WL 890695, at *9 (N.D. Ill.

2016) (quoting Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493); see also Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir.

2016) (“[S]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in

combination when each alone would not do so.”) (cleaned up).

Salley’s conditions of confinement claim fails on the first element – he has not shown

that his cell’s conditions were so adverse that they denied him of life’s necessities. Salley does

not describe the light in his cell, the extent of rat feces on the floor, or the degree of blood and

urine stains on his bedding. Regardless, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to him,

those alleged conditions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

In short, Salley’s cell conditions were not sufficiently serious to qualify as a

constitutional violation on their own, and he did not spend enough time in the cell to transform

them into a violation. The conditions do not have a mutually enforcing effect, either. See Allen

v. Engelson, 2016 WL 4245514, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2016) (finding a six-day exposure

was not sufficiently serious when it involved droppings from mice and birds); see also Walker v.

Dart, 2010 WL 669448, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Being denied clean clothes for two weeks,

though unpleasant, is not a deprivation serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment

claim.”); Moss v. DeTella, 1997 WL 24745, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that lack of clean

clothes and bedding for 111 days did “not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); Martin

v. Lane, 766 F. Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that deprivation of laundry services for

between three and eighteen days is not sufficiently serious injury).

The conditions that Salley experienced are undoubtedly uncomfortable. But “[p]rison

conditions ‘may be uncomfortable, even harsh, without being inhumane.’” See Buchanan v.

Pfister, 2020 WL 902829, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting Est. of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d

740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)); see also Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008).

Indeed, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement

claim.” Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001). Conditions that survive

summary judgment involve far harsher surroundings than what Salley has put forward. See, e.g.,

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Thomas’s assertions of feces-covered

walls, a lack of hot water, hundreds of dead flies in his bed, and a mattress covered in human

waste no doubt establish a material dispute on the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment

claim.”); Gray, 826 F.3d at 1003 (reversing summary judgment where prisoner spent 15 years in

a cell infested with “vermin, insects, and birds,” without cleaning supplies); Vinning–El v. Long,

482 F.3d 923, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing summary judgment where “floor of the cell was

covered with water, the sink and toilet did not work, and the walls were smeared with blood and

feces,” and the prisoner “was forced to remain in the cell without a mattress, sheets, toilet paper,

towels, shoes, soap, toothpaste, or any personal property”); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21,

22 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment where prisoner “was forced to live with ‘filth,

leaking and inadequate plumbing, roaches, rodents, the constant smell of human waste, poor

lighting, inadequate heating, unfit water to drink, dirty and unclean bedding, without toilet paper,

rusted out toilets, broken windows, and drinking water containing small black worms which

would eventually turn into small black flies,’” which appeared “strikingly reminiscent of the

Black Hole of Calcutta”) (cleaned up); Hall, 2022 WL 407649 at *4 (“[Plaintiff’s] undisputed

account of rampant pest activity throughout the prison, coupled with his exposure to toxins and

moldy and filthy showers, walls, dining tables, and trays – which all resulted in him developing

persistent respiratory and skin conditions – is sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to

whether his living conditions were constitutionally deficient.”).

And while Salley also alleges the lack of cleaning supplies, the Seventh Circuit has

recognized Eighth Amendment violations for deprivations of cleaning supplies “only in extreme

circumstances.” See Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005 (collecting cases). Salley has not presented

evidence of extreme circumstances, so the lack of cleaning supplies does not move the needle.

Finally, Salley does not present any evidence that he suffered from some type of

cognizable harm on account of the conditions. See Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006 (“Gray must do more

than demonstrate a triable issue of fact with respect to the conditions he faces; he must also show

that he suffered some cognizable harm from the overall lack of a sanitary environment . . . .”);

see also Towns v. Dart, 2017 WL 4572209, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The plaintiff must show that

he suffered some type of cognizable harm from the conditions.”) (citing Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005);

Allen, 2016 WL 4245514, at *4.

A plaintiff can rely on physical, psychological, or future injury as a cognizable harm. See

Craddock v. Pfister, 2022 WL 1499808, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2022). But here, Salley offered no such

evidence. His complaint alleges that he suffered headaches and extreme emotional distress

because of his cell’s conditions. See Am. Cplt., at ¶ 65 (Dckt. No. 100). But Salley offered no

evidence of any such harm. At the summary judgment stage, facts and evidence matter, but

allegations do not. And this Court will not dig through the record to find evidence for Salley’s

own position. See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003).

So Salley does not mention any harm arising out of his cell conditions, and he submits no

evidence that supports the existence of any such harm. Without any cognizable harm, Salley’s

claim cannot survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Schomig, 863 F. Supp. 789, 795

(N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Although a closer call, plaintiff’s claim with regard to the urine and feces

stained mattress also falls short of the objective standard of seriousness. Indeed, while not a

pleasant condition of confinement, there is no allegation that Wilson suffered any physical harm

from the stains on his mattress.”); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1234 (7th Cir. 1988)

(holding that a “filthy, roach-infested cell” without toilet paper for five days, and no soap,

toothbrush, or toothpaste for ten days, was not a constitutional violation because the “conditions

were temporary” and “[a]lthough Harris experienced considerable unpleasantness, he suffered no

physical harm”).

The Court grants summary judgment to the five individual Defendants on Salley’s claim

of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Date: July 26, 2022 1 7

Steven C. Seeger

United States District Judge

28