Brown v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MILDRED B.,

Plaintiff,

No. 19 CV 3532

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING Magistrate Judge McShain

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mildred B. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial

review of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision denying her application

for benefits. For the following reasons, the Court reverses the SSA’s decision, denies

the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s (Acting Commissioner) motion for

summary judgment [22],2 and remands this case to the agency for further

administrative proceedings.

Background

In June 2015, plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security

income, alleging an onset date of September 25, 2013. [9-3] 19. The claim was denied

initially and on reconsideration. [9-5] 120-24. Plaintiff then requested a hearing,

which was held by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on January 3, 2018. [9-3] 43-

84. In a decision dated March 29, 2018, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled

and denied her application. [Id.] 19-37. The Appeals Council denied review on

February 25, 2019 [id.] 6-8, making the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955, 404.981. After obtaining an extension of time to file a civil action

[id.] 1-2, plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. [1]. The Court has subject-matter

jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security, is substituted as the defendant in this case in place of the former Commissioner of

Social Security, Andrew Saul.

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, with the exception of citations

to the administrative record [9], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner

of each page.

Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step

inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a

severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s

impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can

perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to perform

any other available work in light of her age, education, and work experience. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a). “An affirmative answer leads either to the next

step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer

at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a

claimant is not disabled.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially to determine if it is

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “not a

high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019)). But the standard

“is not entirely uncritical. Where the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be

remanded.” Brett D. v. Saul, No. 19 C 8352, 2021 WL 2660753, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June

29, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Discussion

At step one of her written decision rejecting plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ found

that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 19, 2015, the

date of her application. [9-3] 21. At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff

suffered from the following severe impairments: obesity, degenerative joint disease of

the knees and shoulders, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, depressive disorder,

and anxiety disorder. [Id.] 21-22.

At step three, the ALJ ruled that plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. [9-3]

22-23. In so concluding, the ALJ found that plaintiff had a “moderate limitation” in

interacting with others and limited her to “no interaction with the public, superficial

interaction with coworkers and occasional interaction with supervisors.” [Id.] 23. The

ALJ also determined that plaintiff had a “moderate limitation” in “concentrating,

persisting, or maintaining pace[.]” [Id.]. Although “the record fail[ed] to disclose any

allegation or finding of difficulty in pace or concentration,” the ALJ found that

plaintiff had “some deficit in persistence” given “her remarkable failure to attend her

consultative exams.” [Id.]. For that reason, the ALJ limited plaintiff to “simple,

routine, repetitive tasks in a low stress job . . . defined as a job requiring few if any

changes in the work environment and few if any simple, routine decisions.” [Id.].

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, except that plaintiff can

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently climb stairs and ramps; can

frequently balance and stoop but only occasionally crouch and crawl; and requires the

use of knee braces. [9-3] 23-24. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff has the ability

to understand, remember, concentrate, and persist to perform simple, routine,

repetitive tasks in a low stress job defined as having few, if any, changes in the work

environment and few, if any, routine decisions. [Id.] 24. Finally, the ALJ found that

plaintiff can have brief superficial interaction with coworkers, occasional interaction

with supervisors, and no interaction with the public. [Id.].

At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff has no past relevant work. [9-3] 36.

At step five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, such as production

assembler, bottle line assembler, and linen grader. [Id.] 36-37. The ALJ accordingly

found that plaintiff was not disabled. [Id.] 37.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence. More specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to

explain why she did not adopt all of the mental and social limitations identified by

Dr. Joseph Cools, the state agency reviewing consultant, despite giving his opinion

“considerable weight.” [16] 5-7. For the following reasons, the Court agrees with

plaintiff that the ALJ’s mishandling of Dr. Cools’s opinion was reversible error and

that the case must be remanded for further proceedings.3

I. The ALJ Failed To Explain Why She Did Not Include A 1-2 Step Task

Limitation In Plaintiff’s RFC.

“A disability claimant’s RFC describes the maximum she can do in a work

setting despite her mental and physical limitations.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802,

807 (7th Cir. 2014). “An ALJ must evaluate all relevant evidence when determining

an applicant’s RFC[.]” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). “Although

an ALJ need not mention every snippet of evidence in the record, the ALJ must

connect the evidence to the conclusion; in so doing, he may not ignore entire lines of

contrary evidence.” Id. at 592.

3 Given this ruling, the Court does not address plaintiff’s other grounds for reversal.

A. The ALJ Did Not Address Dr. Cools’s Opinion That Plaintiff

Was Limited to Performing 1-2 Step Tasks.

State agency reviewing consultant Dr. Cools found that plaintiff was

“moderately limited” in her “ability to understand and remember detailed

instructions.” [9-4] 115. In the narrative portion of the mental RFC assessment that

he prepared, Dr. Cools opined that plaintiff “is able to understand, learn and

remember very simple instructions,” that she “would be able to learn 1-2 step tasks,”

but would “have difficulty in retaining material over 3 steps.” [Id.]. The ALJ stated

that she gave “considerable weight to the opinions of the State agency non-examining

consultants,” including Dr. Cools. [9-3] 35. Nevertheless, the ALJ did not discuss

Cools’s opinion respecting 1-2 step tasks or explain why her RFC determination did

not include this task limitation. See [id.] 23-36. Nor did the ALJ include the 1-2 step

limitation in any of the hypothetical questions she posed to the vocational expert

(VE), Dennis Gustafson. [Id.] 79-83. Instead, the ALJ accounted for plaintiff’s mental

impairments by limiting her to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” in low-stress jobs

that involved “few if any changes in the work environment and few if any simple

routine decisions.” [Id.] 24.

The Court concludes that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why she did not

adopt Dr. Cools’s 1-2 step task limitation. An ALJ “must explain [her] analysis of the

evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.”

Moira L. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 C 2687, 2022 WL 846469, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ “is not required to credit every part of a

medical opinion just because he credits one part.” Stephens v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-3117,

2016 WL 1271050, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016), aff’d, 671 F. App’x 390 (7th Cir.

2016). But the ALJ was “required to–and did not–explain why [s]he adopted some of

[Dr. Cools’s] findings and rejected others.” Diaz v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 11149, 2017

WL 4163959, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017) (remanding for new RFC determination

where ALJ gave “some weight” to state agency psychologists’ opinions but did not

explain why RFC omitted include their recommendation that plaintiff was limited to

1-2 step tasks); accord Ghada G. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 C 6306, 2022 WL 580782, at *7

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2022) (“[I]t is generally alright when an ALJ draws her

hypothetical/residual functional capacity finding directly from the opinions of the

state agency reviewing doctors. But the ALJ didn’t do that here. She rejected the

limitation to ‘simple 1-2 step tasks’ and didn’t explain why. That has to be addressed

on remand as well.”) (internal citations omitted); Martinez v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 9240,

2018 WL 2984829, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 14, 2018) (remanding where ALJ gave great

weight to agency consultants’ opinions that plaintiff was limited to 1-2 step tasks, but

“did not include a one- to two-step task limitation in his ultimate RFC determination

or in his hypothetical questions posed to the VE” and instead “limited Plaintiff to

simple, routine tasks”).

The Acting Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the task

limitation was not error because Dr. Cools supposedly “confirmed that simple, routine

tasks would accommodate the limitation to 1-2 step tasks.” [23] 4. Here the Acting

Commissioner cites Cools’s statement at the conclusion of the mental RFC

assessment that “the claimant retains the capacity to perform simple routine tasks

with adequate pace, persistence and concentration given the above noted limitations.”

[9-4] 117 (emphasis added). In the Acting Commissioner’s view, this statement

indicates that plaintiff was capable of performing simple, routine work despite “the

above noted limitations” in Dr. Cools’s RFC assessment, including the 1-2 step task

limitation. [23] 3-4. The Court rejects this argument for two reasons. First, there is

nothing in the ALJ’s decision to indicate that the ALJ evaluated Dr. Cools’s opinion

and concluded that, notwithstanding the 1-2 step task limitation, plaintiff could

perform simple, routine work. But “[r]eview of social security decisions is limited to

the ALJ’s rationales, and a decision cannot be upheld by giving it new ground to stand

on.” Crystal M. on behalf of D.R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 CV 2240, 2022 WL 1567061, at

*5 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2022). Because the ALJ did not say that she believed Cools’s 1-

2 step task limitation was equivalent to, or synonymous with, a limitation to simple,

routine tasks, the Court cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision on that basis. Second, when

Dr. Cools’s RFC assessment is considered as a whole, it is apparent that Cools meant

that “the above noted limitations” modified plaintiff’s ability to perform simple,

routine tasks–not that plaintiff could perform simple, routine tasks in spite of those

limitations. Importantly, two of the “above noted limitations” were either more

restrictive than Cools’s statement respecting simple, routine work or not

encompassed at all by that statement. In the earlier section of his RFC assessment,

Dr. Cools opined that plaintiff could remember, not “simple” instructions, but “very

simple instructions.” [9-4] 115. Cools also opined that plaintiff could “behave in a

socially appropriate manner with only brief superficial contact with others” [id.] 117,

but that limitation is not captured by Cools’s statement that plaintiff could perform

simple, routine tasks because that statement does not mention any social restrictions.

Thus, Dr. Cools’s conclusion that plaintiff could perform simple, routine tasks “given

the above noted limitations” means that these limitations modified the kinds of

simple, routine tasks that plaintiff could perform–and not that a limitation to simple,

routine tasks captured all of the limitations that were identified in his mental RFC

assessment.

The Acting Commissioner also argues that “case law supports that simple,

routine, repetitive works accommodates limits to 1-2 step tasks.” [23] 4. The

Commissioner relies on Collins v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 3589, 2018 WL 3361847 (N.D.

Ill. Jul. 10, 2018); Pinkston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-CV-1708, 2019 WL

5102743, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 2019); and Nicholas B. v. Saul, Case No. 18-2217,

2019 WL 7500242 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2019). According to the Acting Commissioner,

these cases held or recognized that “a limitation to simple, routine work can

accommodate a limitation to 1-2 step tasks.” [23] 5. However, the Court finds that

these cases are all distinguishable for the same reason. In each case, a state agency

reviewing consultant or other medical source opined that the claimant could perform

up to 3-step tasks; the ALJ accepted these opinions and gave them varying degrees

of weight, but did not include an express task limitation in the RFC determination.

See Collins, 2018 WL 3361847, at *2 (great weight to agency reviewer’s opinion that

claimant could “carry out and sustain performance of 1-3 step tasks”); Pinkston, 2019

WL 5102743, at *2 (accepting opinions that claimant “retained the capacity to

understand, remember, carry out and sustain performance of one to three step

tasks”); Nicholas B., 2019 WL 7500242, at *4 (reviewing consultant found that

claimant could “carry out and sustain performance of 1-3 step tasks”). The court in

each case concluded that the ALJ’s RFC determination adequately accounted for

plaintiff’s mental limitations, despite not adopting the exact language, including the

3-step task limitation, used by the medical source at issue. Unlike Collins, Pinkston,

and Nicholas B., however, there is no opinion evidence in this case that plaintiff was

capable of performing 3-step tasks. Therefore, the holdings in those cases that a

restriction to simple, routine work can accommodate a 3-step task limitation are

irrelevant here because Dr. Cools opined that plaintiff could perform only 1-2 step

tasks.

Finally, even if Collins, Pinkston, and Nicholas B. had some bearing here, the

Court would decline to follow them. Instead, the Court is more persuaded by decisions

from the Northern District of Illinois holding that “there is a significant difference

between one- to two-step tasks and simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” Schlattman v.

Colvin, Case No. 12 C 10422, 2014 WL 185009, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2014). “One-

to two-step tasks function as a term of art in the Social Security context: the

Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles . . . defines a Reasoning

Development Level of 1 as the ability to apply commonsense understanding to carry

out simple one- or two-step instructions.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted). “By contrast, Reasoning Development Level 2 requires the ability to apply

commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral

instructions.” Id. (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). “Accordingly, a

limitation to one or two step work restricts the person to a Level 1 Reasoning job

under the DOT, whereas simple work may also include Reasoning Level 2 or higher.”

Deborah B. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-7729, 2022 WL 1292249, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29,

2022). Thus, “a limitation to one-to-two step tasks is more restrictive than just the

limitation to simple work[.]” Id.; accord Wyatt v. Colvin, Case No. 14-cv-3252, 2015

WL 3919058, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 24, 2015) (remand warranted where ALJ’s “fail[ure]

to use the psychologist’s terminology” that plaintiff was limited to “one and two-step

tasks” in hypothetical question to VE, and instead asking whether plaintiff could

perform “simple work,” may have “caused the expert to overstate the occupations for

which Plaintiff was qualified”). Despite plaintiff’s citation to Schlattman in her

opening brief, and despite it addressed the exact question presented in plaintiff’s

appeal, the Acting Commissioner’s brief does not discuss its holding that a limitation

to 1-2 step tasks is more restrictive than a limitation to simple work.

In sum, the ALJ erred by failing to explain why she did not incorporate Dr.

Cools’s 1-2 step task limitation into plaintiff’s RFC because that limitation was more

restrictive than the limitation to simple, routine work. See Deborah B., 2022 WL

1292249, at *2; Ghada G., 2022 WL 580782, at *7; Martinez, 2018 WL 2984829, at

*3; Schlattman, 2014 WL 185009, at *7

B. The ALJ’s Error Was Not Harmless.

Finally, the Acting Commissioner argues that any failure to discuss or adopt

the 1-2 step task limitation was harmless. [23] 5. This is so, the Acting Commissioner

contends, because even if the ALJ had adopted that task limitation, one of the jobs

that the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform–bottling-line attendant–involved only

1-2 step tasks.

In this case, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of performing three jobs

that existed in substantial numbers in the national economy. However, two of these

jobs–linen grader and production assembler–are Reasoning Level 2 jobs. See

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Codes 361.687-022 (linen grader) & 706.687-010

(production assembler). These jobs would have been precluded had the ALJ adopted

the limitation to 1-2 step tasks that Dr. Cools identified. See Deborah B., 2022 WL

1292249, at *2 (“all jobs cited by the VE have a Reasoning Level of at least 2 and,

therefore, would be precluded by the limitation to one-to-two step work”).

The third job identified by the ALJ–bottling-line attendant–is a Reasoning

Level 1 job. See DOT Code 920.687-042, 1991 WL 687971. However, the Court agrees

with plaintiff that the Acting Commissioner has not “produce[d] reliable evidence”

that “a significant number” of bottling-line attendant jobs exist in the national

economy, which is necessary to support the ALJ’s finding at step five. Deborah B.,

2022 WL 1292249, at *3. At step five, the ALJ based her determination that there

were 250,000 bottling-line attendant positions in the national economy on VE

Gustafson’s testimony. [9-3] 38. But VE Gustafson never testified that 250,000

bottling-line attendant positions existed in the national economy. Rather, Gustafson

testified that there were 250,000 jobs that “would fall under hand packaging work,”

and that the bottling-line attendant was “an example in that category.” [Id.] 80. And

as the following excerpt from Gustafson’s testimony shows, the VE never identified

how many bottling-line attendant positions existed in the national economy:

Yes. What we’re looking at are going to be non machine related

manufacturing activities. I have approximate US numbers. Looking in

the area of a job classified as production workers–essentially non

machine related production jobs in manufacturing and the approximate

US numbers at light are going to be 220,000. There is multiple DOT

classifications of similar characteristics. An example in that category is

going to be an assembler, production. And that’s 706.687-010. Jobs that

would fall under hand packaging work, that’s going to be–that will be in

the vicinity of 250,000. And again, there is multiple DOT classifications

with similar characteristics. An example in that category would be a

bottling line attendant. And that is 920.687-042. Another area would be

production related inspection activity. The approximate numbers there

would be around 90,000. And again, multiple classifications. An example

would be a linen [grader].

[9-3] 80 (emphasis added).

Because Gustafson did not testify how many bottling-line attendant jobs

existed in the national economy, there is no substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

finding that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff

could perform. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed. See Garza v.

Berryhill, No. 17 cv 4189, 2018 WL 2765921, at *3 (“At step five, the ALJ must provide

substantial evidence that a person with Plaintiff’s limitations could perform work

that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy.”).

II. The ALJ Did Not Adequately Explain The Social Limitations She

Included In Plaintiff’s RFC.

Although the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Cools’s 1-2 step task limitation alone

warrants remand, the ALJ’s failure to explain why she did not incorporate the social

limitations that Dr. Cools identified into plaintiff’s RFC is also grounds for a remand.

Dr. Cools opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to

maintain socially appropriate behavior. [9-4] 116. Elaborating on that opinion, Cools

stated that plaintiff “is able to relate adaptively to others only on a casual basis. She

would be unable to sustain close, frequent, confrontational contact with others. She

would behave in a socially appropriate manner with only brief superficial contact for

others.” [Id.]. The ALJ agreed that plaintiff “has a moderate limitation” in

“interacting with others.” [9-3] 23. But the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Cools’s opinion

even though she gave “considerable weight” to the opinions of the state agency

reviewing consultants–and despite finding that evidence submitted after those

opinions were issued “serve[d] to reinforce the opinions rather than to refute them.”

[9-3] 35. Instead, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could have “brief superficial

interaction with coworkers, occasional interaction with supervisors but no interaction

with the public.” [Id.] 24.

The Court concludes that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why the social

limitations she incorporated into plaintiff’s RFC were less restrictive than those

identified by Dr. Cools. In reaching her conclusion that plaintiff could have occasional

interactions with supervisors, the ALJ did not address Dr. Cools’s opinion that

plaintiff’s interactions with others need to be brief and superficial. Nor did the ALJ

identify other substantial evidence that might have supported her conclusion that

plaintiff was capable of occasional interactions with supervisors. This was a critical

error because the VE’s testimony confirmed that, if plaintiff had been limited to only

brief superficial contacts with supervisors, plaintiff would be precluded from working:

Q: Hypothetical number four is going to be the same as three but

interaction with supervisors would be only infrequent and

superficial. Any work for such an individual in the national

economy?

A: Most likely not because supervisor interaction depends on job

performance but it would normally exceed infrequent–

Q: Okay.

A: –or superficial.

[9-3] 81.

The Acting Commissioner’s efforts to salvage the ALJ’s decision lack merit.

The Acting Commissioner reiterates that the ALJ was not obligated to adopt all of

the limitations identified by Dr. Cools simply because she gave “considerable, but not

penultimate, weight” to his opinion. [23] 6. That is true as a general proposition, but

here–given the inconsistency between the limitation that Dr. Cools proposed and the

limitation included in the RFC–the ALJ had to explain why she adopted some of Dr.

Cools’s findings, but rejected the limitation to brief, superficial interactions with

others, which would include supervisors. See Diaz, 2017 WL 4163959, at *2. The

Acting Commissioner also observes, see [23] 5-6, that the ALJ reviewed the record

and found that plaintiff “is consistently described as pleasant, appropriate and

cooperative,” that her anger and irritability are “for the most part . . . well controlled,”

and that plaintiff’s social limitations only infrequently “exacerbate[ ] to moderate”

and only when she interacts with family. [9-3] 23. It is unclear to the Court how any

of this evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff was capable of more than

brief, superficial interactions with supervisors in a work setting. Rather, it appears

that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence that she believed supported her conclusion

respecting plaintiff’s social limitations. Cf. Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and

cannot simply cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring

evidence that points to a disability finding.”). Indeed, there was ample evidence in

the record–some of which the ALJ even mentioned–that was inconsistent with the

evidence highlighted by the ALJ and appeared to support Dr. Cools’s findings. For

example, plaintiff’s son testified at the hearing that his mother “has anger issues and

did not trust anyone,” “gets angry over the littlest thing,” and “tries to get physical.”

[9-3] 25. In another part of her decision, the ALJ observed that plaintiff “had been

arrested ... for throwing a man down the stairs” and “reported feelings of anger and

wanting to hurt others.” [Jd.] 27. Finally, plaintiff testified at the hearing to the

difficulties she had managing conflicts with other people while riding the bus to her

therapy appointments. [/d.] 67-68. By citing this evidence, the Court does not mean

to imply that the ALJ had to find that plaintiffs social limitations were as severe as

Dr. Cools concluded. The Court cites this evidence only to underscore the importance

of the ALJ’s responsibility to consider all evidence in the record and to directly

address the limitations identified by Dr. Cools, whose opinion, again, was given

“considerable weight.” The ALJ’s oblique discussion of cherry-picked evidence of

plaintiffs supposedly minor limitations in social interactions does not constitute

substantial evidentiary support for holding that plaintiff could have occasional

interactions with supervisors, particularly when the ALJ failed to mention Dr. Cools’s

contrary opinion.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's request to reverse the SSA’s decision

and remand this case to the agency [16] is granted, and the Acting Commissioner’s

motion for summary judgment [22] is denied. The decision of the SSA is reversed,

and, in accordance with the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and

Order.

Wath AC Nun

HEATHER K. McSHAIN

United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: May 31, 2022

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