Watkins v. City of Chicago

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

VICTOR WATKINS,

Plaintiff, No. 19-cv-06615

v. Judge John F. Kness

CITY OF CHICAGO and STATE OF

ILLINOIS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Victor Watkins sued the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois under

federal civil rights law for alleged violations of “his unfettered right to petition the

court for redress of grievances.” According to Plaintiff, after he announced his intent

to file a petition for habeas corpus, “unknown” officers surveilled Plaintiff at several

temporary residences, berated him in retaliation, and hacked his social media profiles

in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. In response, the City of Chicago has moved to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Monell doctrine bars vicarious liability

claims against a municipal entity under § 1983 and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff

fails to state an underlying constitutional violation.

As explained more fully below, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against a

municipal entity under either a theory of respondeat superior or Monell. Accordingly,

the City’s motion to dismiss is granted. Because Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to state

a claim against the State of Illinois (which has not appeared in this matter), the Court

must also dismiss all claims against the State in accordance with its 28 U.S.C. § 1915

screening obligation.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Victor Watkins brings this action against the City of Chicago and the

State of Illinois based on alleged civil rights violations. (See First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”), Dkt. 40.) Plaintiff alleges that Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) officers

and Illinois State Police (“ISP”) officers acted together to “deprive[] Plaintiff of his

unfettered right to petition” the Northern District of Illinois for “redress of

grievances.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17, 21.)

Plaintiff was convicted of burglary in October 2013 and sentenced to 12 years

in prison. (Id. ¶ 7.) After Plaintiff was paroled on April 3, 2019, Plaintiff initiated a

grievance against the CPD officers involved in his 2013 arrest with the City’s civilian

police oversight board, and he informed “them that he intended to file a petition for

habeas corpus” challenging the validity of his state burglary conviction. (Id. ¶ 7.) On

April 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; that petition is

currently pending before another judge in this District. (Id. ¶ 8); see Watkins v.

Baldwin, No. 19-cv-02878 (N.D. Ill filed on Apr. 30, 2019).

According to Plaintiff’s complaint in the present suit, “[s]ince Plaintiff

announced his intent to file a petition for habeas corpus,” he was subjected to a

variety of civil rights violations at the hands of “unknown” CPD and ISP officers

between April 2019 and July 2020:

 On April 12, 2019, “unknown CPD officers surveilled Plaintiff [] and conducted

a warrantless search” of his hotel room in Chicago.

 On April 30, 2019, “unknown CPD officers followed Plaintiff to [church]” and

requested that Church employees cease providing work-related transportation

aid to Plaintiff. After this visit, the services “immediately ended.”

 On November 2, 2019, “unknown CPD officers surveilled Plaintiff” and

“conducted a warrantless search” of another hotel room in Chicago where

Plaintiff was temporarily residing.

 In December 2019 and July 2020, and potentially on additional occasions,

Plaintiff’s Facebook account was hacked. “Plaintiff believes that the hacking

was done by unknown CPD officers.”

 In December 2019 and March 2020, CPD plainclothes officers “berated”

Plaintiff for successfully filing his habeas petition and “warned him that he

would be returned to prison[.]”

 Between April 29 and May 2, 2020, ISP officers surveilled the “home of the

biological mother of Plaintiff’s child” in Rockford, Illinois, as well as hotel room

at which Plaintiff was residing at the time.

 Finally, Plaintiff “is advised and believes that in May 2020, CPD officers told

known gang members in [] Chicago, Illinois, that Plaintiff was a ‘snitch.’ ”

(Id. ¶ 9.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff sued the City and the State1 for violating “his

unfettered right to petition the court for redress of grievances” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count I); conspiring to deprive Plaintiff of the same right under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

(Count II); and “fail[ing] to take action to prevent or expose said conspiracy” under

42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count III). (Id. ¶¶ 12-23). Plaintiff claims that Defendants are

“responsible for the actions of [their] employees while acting within the scope of their

employment, including officers employed at [CPD and ISP].” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) But

1 Plaintiff named the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois as Defendants. (See FAC.)

To date, only the City has appeared, and the City alone filed the present motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff does not name any individual ISP or CPD officers as defendants in this case,

nor any “unknown ISP/CPD officers” as placeholders in the caption. (See id. ¶¶ 4-6.)

Instead, Plaintiff seeks to hold only the governmental entities liable for the actions

of their employees. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18, 22.)

On Plaintiff’s application, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. (Dkt. 8.) The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for

failing to state a claim. (Dkt. 45.) For the reasons that follow, the City’s motion is

granted and Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint

generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal punctuation

omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice

pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather

than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578

F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514

(2002)).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). These allegations “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put another

way, the complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that

conveys a story that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774,

777 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even though factual allegations are

entitled to the assumption of truth, mere legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678-79.

III. DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the State and

the City. In performing the screening obligations inherent in any in forma pauperis

case, the Court must dismiss the claims against the State because § 1983 does not

alter the sovereign immunities of the State, and the State has not otherwise

consented to suit. The Court also dismisses the complaint against the City because,

even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint fails to state

sufficiently a Monell claim under any identifiable theory of liability.

A. Plaintiff cannot proceed against the State of Illinois

Courts must screen complaints where plaintiffs proceed in forma pauperis and

must dismiss those they determine are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against defendants who are

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). To determine if a

complaint passes muster under § 1915, the Court applies the same standard as it

would to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). Cf. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718

(7th Cir. 2011) (addressing similar screening obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

Plaintiff names both the State and the City as Defendants. Although the City has not

appeared in this case, the Court must review the claims against the State in

accordance with its § 1915 screening obligation.

Sovereign immunity is “the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without

its consent and is secured to the states by the Eleventh Amendment.” Driftless Area

Land Conservancy v. Valcq, 16 F.4th 508, 520 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations

omitted). State sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar to suit. Id. As such, to

maintain an action against a state, Plaintiff must establish that “Congress has

abrogated the state’s immunity from suit through an unequivocal expression of its

intent to do so” or that the state “has properly waived its sovereign immunity and

consented to suit in federal court.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Com. Comm’n, 183

F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff filed his complaint against the State under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986

of Title 42, but none of those statutes waives a state’s sovereign immunity. Indeed,

the Supreme Court has explained that § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for

litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties”

and does not otherwise alter a state’s sovereign immunities. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 67 n.7 (1989). Congress likewise has not waived

sovereign immunity for states under §§ 1985 and 1986. Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue

Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 641 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Hill v.

Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the State has not waived its

sovereign immunity for such claims. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co.,

222 F.3d 323, 338 (7th Cir. 2000) (There must be an “unequivocal indication that the

State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the

Eleventh Amendment” and courts “indulge every reasonable presumption against a

state’s waiver of its immunity.” (cleaned up)). Because Plaintiff fails to cite to

authority showing that the State of Illinois has waived its sovereign immunity and

consented to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from

proceeding against the State of Illinois in this case. See Valcq., 16 F.4th at 520. All

claims asserted against the State in this action are dismissed.

B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City of Chicago

Plaintiff alleges that the City is liable for the actions of the “unknown” CPD

officers because the City is “responsible for the actions of its employees while acting

within the scope of their employment . . . .” (FAC ¶ 5.) The City argues that Plaintiff’s

attempt to hold it liable under a theory of respondeat superior liability runs afoul of

Monell. (Dkt. 45 at 3.) In his response, Plaintiff broadens the basis for his suit by

arguing that the City is also liable under Monell for “the failure of command staff []

to take action to put an end to the scheme [of alleged harassment, which] constitutes

the sort of ‘deliberate indifference’ upon which liability might be found.” (Dkt. 47 ¶ 3.)

But, as the City argues, to state a claim under Monell, Plaintiff must sufficiently

“link” his alleged constitutional injuries to an action of a City official or widespread

practice of the City. (Dkt. 48 at 3.) Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim against the City under either a theory of vicarious liability or

Monell.

1. Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim of vicarious liability

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to hold the City liable for the alleged

constitutional violations of its employees under a theory of vicarious liability, such

attempts fail as a matter of law. In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New

York, the Supreme Court held that “municipalities and other local government units

[are] included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

At the same time, however, “Monell rejected the common-law theory of respondeat

superior liability for an employee’s actions.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021). It is thus well-established that “a municipality

cannot be held liable for the constitutional torts of its employees and agents.” First

Midwest Bank ex rel. LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).

Plaintiff alleges that the City is liable for the misconduct of unknown CPD

officers because “the unknown CPD [] officers were at all relevant times acting within

the scope of their employment.” (FAC ¶¶ 14, 18, 22). But that allegation simply

restates the elements of a vicarious liability claim against the City for the

constitutional torts committed by its employees, which Monell expressly prohibits.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasor.”). Because the City cannot be held vicariously liable for

constitutional torts committed by its employees, Plaintiff’s claims against the City

under a theory of respondeat superior fails as a matter of law.2

2. Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under Monell

In his response brief, Plaintiff raises for the first time a more capacious legal

theory of liability against the City: Plaintiff argues that the City is liable because his

alleged constitutional violations were part of “an ongoing scheme of harassment.”

(Dkt. 47 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff invites the Court to “infer that, at a minimum, knowledge of

the scheme goes fairly high up the chain of command” at the CPD. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff

also “submits that the failure of command staff at [the CPD], with knowledge of the

scheme, to take action to put an end to the scheme constitutes . . . ‘deliberate

indifference.’ ” (Id.) It appears Plaintiff seeks to construct a claim under Monell,

despite not specifically citing that case or any of its progeny. Although courts need

only look to matters within the four corners of the complaint in deciding a motion to

dismiss, see Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2013),

the Court will nonetheless address Plaintiff’s Monell theory of liability.

Under Monell, a local government can be a proper § 1983 defendant only “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

2 Because vicarious liability against a municipality is unavailable to a § 1983 plaintiff,

such a plaintiff must attempt to identify the individuals responsible. See Prate v. Vill. of

Downers Grove, No. 11-cv-3656, 2011 WL 5374100, at *6 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2011) (“Plaintiff

must specifically name each individual officer as a party Defendant against whom he alleges

his § 1983 claims . . . .”).

injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. As such, the Court must “distinguish between the

isolated wrongdoing of one or a few rogue employees and other, more widespread

practices” attributable to the municipality itself. Howell, 987 F.3d at 654. To state a

valid Monell claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the violation of his

constitutional rights was caused by: (1) an express government policy; (2) a

widespread and persistent practice that amounted to a custom approaching the force

of law; or (3) a policy or decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrs., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). A plaintiff may also take an “alternative path to Monell

liability” by plausibly alleging that the need for more or different training is “so

obvious” that the municipality’s failure to act reflects deliberate indifference and

permits an inference of institutional culpability. J.K.J. v. Polk-County., 960 F.3d 367,

380 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).

That said, the Supreme Court has made clear that “federal courts must not

apply a heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases alleging § 1983 municipal

liability.” McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2000). As the

Seventh Circuit has explained, a “conclusory” Monell claim will survive a motion to

dismiss when it is “sufficient to put the [local governing body] on notice of [the

plaintiff’s] claim against it” and if the plaintiff gives the defendant “notice of the crux

of the plaintiff’s charges” and does not “[leave] out facts necessary to give the

defendants a complete understanding of the claims made against them.” Id. at

325; see Howard v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 15 C 9384, 2016 WL 4366598, at *3 (N.D.

Ill. Aug. 16, 2016). To withstand a motion to dismiss on a Monell claim, Plaintiff must

“plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

local governing body maintained a policy, custom, or practice, or a lack thereof that

caused the constitutional violations alleged.” Howard, 2016 WL 4366598, at *3

(cleaned up).

Plaintiff does not allege his constitutional rights were violated by an express

government policy or a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

(Dkt. 47 ¶¶ 2-3; see generally FAC.) Instead, Plaintiff highlights the “repeated” and

“ongoing” harassment at the hands of unknown officers from both CPD and ISP—the

“breadth” of which, Plaintiff argues, leads to the reasonable inference that City

officials knew of the “scheme” and failed to stop it. (Dkt. 47 ¶¶ 2-3.) Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor and taking the complaint’s allegations as

true, Plaintiff appears to be relying on a theory of liability, if any, based on the City’s

widespread practice or failure to train. (See Dkt. 40). The Court addresses each theory

in turn.

a. “Widespread Practice”

To prevail under the “widespread practice” theory of Monell liability, Plaintiff

must allege that there is a true municipal practice at issue, not a series of disparate

events. Howell, 987 F.3d at 654 (internal citations omitted). Although a plaintiff need

not provide examples of “every other or even one other individual” who similarly

suffered as a result of the alleged municipal practice, see White v. City of Chicago, 829

F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016), he must “plausibly allege that such examples exist” to

sufficiently plead a widespread practice. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344

(7th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff must also allege causation between the alleged practice

and his injuries, meaning that the policy or custom was the “moving force” behind the

constitutional violation. Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509,

514 (7th Cir. 2007). Alleged misbehavior by one or a group of officials is relevant only

where “it can be tied to the policy, customs, or practices of the institution as a whole.”

Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015).

Despite the low pleading standard for § 1983 municipal liability claims, see

McCormick, 230 F.3d at 323, Plaintiff fails sufficiently to allege the existence of a

widespread municipal practice. Plaintiff neither attempts outright to define any

parameters of a widespread City practice nor provides any allegations of similar

harassment faced by others to support an inference that such a practice exists (or

existed). (Dkt. 47 ¶¶ 2-3; see generally FAC.)

Other judges in this District have rejected widespread practice claims under

Monell even when the plaintiff provides far greater evidence than Plaintiff does here.

See, e.g., Starks v. City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780, 793 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“five

[similar cases] over a period of more than twenty years are insufficient to create

municipal liability for a ‘widespread practice’ ”); Carmona v. City of Chicago, No. 15-

CV-462, 2018 WL 306664, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2018) (submission of U.S.

Department of Justice report on use-of-force cases cannot establish widespread

practice of the precise handcuffing alleged); Henderson v. McCarthy, No. 14-cv-09905,

2016 WL 6135706, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2016) (allegations that police officers were

previously reprimanded for similar conduct do not establish a widespread practice).

Indeed, the only allegations of harassment are Plaintiff’s varied personal

experiences. Plaintiff claims that the harassment began after he “announced his

intent” to file his habeas petition (FAC ¶ 9), and the harassment was “retaliat[ion]”

for the same (Dkt. 47 ¶ 5). To that end, Plaintiff alleges that the CPD officers

“surveilled,” “accosted,” and “berated” him “for filing his habeas corpus petition. . . .”

(FAC ¶ 9.) But Plaintiff alleges that such conduct happened only to him. Plaintiff’s

isolated experiences—as troubling as they may be—cannot establish a widespread

practice. See Petropoulos v. City of Chicago, 448 F. Supp. 3d 835, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2020)

(finding no widespread practice when only the plaintiffs’ experiences were alleged);

Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 5190, 2016 WL 3227310, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. 2016) (same).

Even under the Seventh Circuit’s generous pleading standard at the motion to

dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s strained allegations of a widespread practice fail “to put the

[City] on notice of [Plaintiff’s] claim against it.” McCormick, 230 F.3d at 325.

b. “Deliberate Indifference”

In his response, Plaintiff proposes—again, for the first time—another variety

of municipal liability, namely, that “failure of command staff [within CPD and ISP],

with knowledge of the scheme, to take action to put an end to the scheme constitutes

the sort of ‘deliberate indifference’ upon which liability might be found.” (Dkt. 47 ¶ 3.)

But this “deliberate indifference” avenue under Monell is likewise unsuccessful.

It is true that municipal inaction, if properly pleaded, can establish a Monell

claim. In some instances, a city’s sustained “policy of inaction, in light of notice that

its [practices] will cause constitutional violations[,] is the functional equivalent of a

decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 61-62 (2011) (cleaned up). Unlike an affirmative practice, however, a failure to

intervene “could be inadvertent, and the connection between inaction and a resulting

injury is more tenuous.” J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 378. As a result, “rigorous standards of

culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held

liable solely for the actions of its employee.” Id. (quoting Bryan Cty v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 405 (1997)).

The Supreme Court has “made plain” that a failure to act “amounts to

municipal action for Monell purposes only if the [municipality] has notice that its

program will cause constitutional violations.” Id. at 379 (citing Connick, 563 U.S. at

61-62 (2011)). And “notice requires proof of a prior pattern of similar constitutional

violations.” Id. at 380. Although “there is no clear consensus as to how frequently

such conduct must occur to impose Monell liability,” there “must be more than one

instance. . . .” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 302 (7th Cir. 2010)

(citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s attempt to hold the City liable for its failure to take action to put an

end to the scheme allegedly perpetrated by “unknown CPD officers” is unsuccessful

for the same reasons Plaintiff’s complaint fails under the more lenient pleading

standards for its alleged widespread practices. Plaintiff does not allege that the City

has an express policy or widespread practice of ignoring or disregarding harassment

by its officers. (See generally FAC.) Nor does Plaintiff cite any examples of other

similarly situated individuals that experienced a comparable pattern of tortious

behavior to allege such a practice indirectly. (Id.) Having alleged facts pertaining only

to his own experiences, Plaintiff cannot plausibly state a claim against the City for

maintaining a policy of “deliberate indifference.”3 See Jones v. Feinerman, 2011 WL

4501405, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Plaintiff fails, therefore, to allege a viable deliberate

indifference claim under Monell.

* * *

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in

his favor, no viable Monell claim can be discerned from the complaint as it now

stands. Because Plaintiff cannot establish a § 1983 claim against the City, the Court

need not address the alleged constitutional violations by “unknown” CPD officers.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 45) is granted,

and the claims against the State are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for

seeking relief against a defendant that is immune from such relief. These dismissals

are without prejudice. If Plaintiff believes he can remedy the deficiencies identified

in this order, he may, on or before April 27, 2022, file a second amended complaint. If

3 Although it is possible to allege deliberate indifference under a failure-to-train theory,

see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-92 (1989), such a theory of liability is improper

when a plaintiff does not allege that “the defendants improperly hired, trained, or supervised”

their employees—as is the case here, Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003).

no amended pleading is filed by that date, the dismissals outlined in this order will

automatically convert to dismissals with prejudice.

SO ORDERED in No. 19-cv-06615.

Date: April 7, 2022 Spas] Ursa

JOHN F. KNESS

United States District Judge

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