The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT A. AUSTIN,
Plaintiff, No. 18 C 07268
v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert A. Austin filed suit against the City of Chicago and various individuals
asserting a variety of claims, including false arrest and civil conspiracy. Throughout
the litigation, Mr. Austin has demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate in the
discovery process. His conduct has ranged from frustrating to outright abusive.
Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly overlooked these issues and given him leeway
to advance his case. That leeway has run out, and Mr. Austin’s refusal to cooperate
has become untenable. Accordingly, the Court now exercises its own inherent
authority and dismisses Mr. Austin’s case with prejudice.
District courts possess inherent authority to impose sanctions, including
dismissal of a case, for discovery violations or bad faith conduct in litigation.
Greviskes v. Univ. Research Ass’n, Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2005). Because
dismissal for failure to cooperate in discovery is a severe sanction, it is appropriate
only when the record demonstrates “willfulness, bad faith, or fault” on the part of the
plaintiff. Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2011). “Factors
relevant to determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction include ‘the
plaintiff’s pattern of and personal responsibility for [his misconduct], the prejudice to
others from that noncompliance, the possible efficacy of lesser sanctions, and any
demonstrated merit to the suit.’” Mojapelo v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2018 WL
10809373, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2018) (quoting Pendell v. City of Peoria, 799 F.3d
916, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2015)). A court should ordinarily warn a plaintiff of the
possibility of dismissal before imposing such a sanction. See Brown, 664 F.3d at 192.
Mr. Austin’s history of non-cooperation in discovery is outlined in the Court’s
previous orders. See, e.g., R. 200. This has included the assertion of unfounded
objections to routine discovery requests, the failure to provide complete answers to
such requests, and the inclusion of vulgar and harassing language in his responses.
His demands have necessitated rescheduling of his deposition and long delays in
completing discovery. Because Mr. Austin is proceeding pro se, he is solely responsible
for this behavior.
The willfulness of Mr. Austin’s conduct is evident from its repetition, even in
the face of court orders. Notably, after being warned that repeated inclusion of
vulgarity in his discovery responses would result in dismissal of his case, he
nonetheless copied the exact same offending language into his supplemental
responses. Additionally, despite being warned that failure to provide basic
information, or that citation to unrelated information filed on the docket, would result
in dismissal of his case, Mr. Austin continued to do so in his supplemental responses.
The result has been serious prejudice to Defendants’ efforts to investigate and defend
against Mr. Austin’s claims. They have incurred substantial unnecessary costs in
bringing multiple discovery motions, nearly all of which have been granted. Defense
counsel have also endured baseless attacks on their professional character, both in
Mr. Austin’s written submissions and during his appearances before this Court.
Despite this obstruction, the Court has given Mr. Austin every opportunity to
pursue his claims. This extended up to the Court’s status hearing on March 2, 2022,
in which the Court denied Defendants’ most recent motion to compel, effectively
excusing Mr. Austin’s failure to complete written discovery notwithstanding the
prejudice to Defendants. The Court instructed the parties to proceed with his
deposition. However, Mr. Austin refused to engage in a good faith effort to schedule
that deposition, insisting that he would not accept phone calls, texts, or emails from
defense counsel for scheduling purposes, and that all communication occur by mail.
This would be an unreasonable demand in any scenario. Here, when the Court
had already granted Mr. Austin’s request that the deposition take place in the
courthouse building, rather than at defense counsel’s office, because of his concern
over the “antics” of Defendants and their attorneys,1 it would be a logistical
impossibility. Mr. Austin’s flat refusal to accommodate basic discovery practices
offers no indication that lesser sanctions would be effective.
Given the multiple warnings over the course of several months that he faced
dismissal of his case, Mr. Austin’s continual refusal to cooperate cannot be considered
1 As the Court has previously stated, defense counsel’s conduct in this case has been
entirely appropriate.
anything other than bad faith. Dismissal is appropriate in such a scenario. The Court
recognizes the severity of this sanction but cannot tolerate this behavior any longer.
For these reasons, Mr. Austin’s case is dismissed with prejudice. All other
outstanding motions in this case are denied as moot.
Notice of Appeal Rights
Plaintiff is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If
he wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days
of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Plaintiff need not bring a motion
to reconsider this Court’s ruling to preserve his appellate rights. However, if Plaintiff
wishes the Court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days
of the entry of this judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion
pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule
59(e) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e) motion is
ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be filed
within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must
be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the
Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed within 28 days of the entry
of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
ENTERED:
Arnis 0 Lucho
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: March 2, 2022