Mansoori v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MANSOORI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 17-cv-08846

v. )

) Judge Andrea R. Wood

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER PATEL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher Mansoori was an inmate at Cook County Jail (“Jail”) from 2015 until

February or March 2018. He has brought the present civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against thirteen Defendants who worked at the Jail while he was there, alleging that they violated

his constitutional rights in numerous ways. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss

improperly joined Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and all claims for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 35.) For

the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges seventeen violations of Mansoori’s

rights as a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

• Count I: on February 21, 2016, C.O. Patel allegedly placed Mansoori in isolation without

justification and allowed him to be subjected to degrading treatment by other inmates;

• Count II: on December 24, 2016, C.O. Larkin allegedly destroyed Mansoori’s contact

lenses, causing him to lose clear eyesight for several months;

• Count III: from June 30, 2017 until Mansoori’s release in February or March 2018, Jail

dentist Dr. Montgomery allegedly did not provide Mansoori with proper teeth cleaning or

dental floss;

• Count IV: from September 21, 2016 until Mansoori’s release, Dr. Chris Stinaki, a health

care specialist charged with providing food to prisoners, allegedly provided a diet so

lacking in nutrition that Mansoori’s bones became weak and one of his fingers broke;

• Count V: on March 30, 2016, C.O. McCullough (male) allegedly forced Mansoori to stay

in a newly painted cell and inhale dangerous fumes, and refused to get him medical

attention for his inhalation of those fumes;

• Count VI: on April 21, 2016, Sergeant McCullough (female) allegedly placed Mansoori in

a cell with a prisoner with bipolar disorder over Mansoori’s objections, and that prisoner

later attacked him;

• Count VII: from July 2, 2017 to November 3, 2017, Superintendent Brown allegedly only

permitted Mansoori to wash his clothes on two occasions, giving him skin and foot

infections;

• Count VIII: from August 29, 2016 until Mansoori’s release, Commander Garcia allegedly

failed to remove black mold from showers near Mansoori’s cell, forcing him to inhale

toxic fumes;

• Count IX: from November 1, 2016 through August 30, 2017, Superintendent Brown

allegedly failed to control an infestation of mice in the Jail;

• Count X: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration,1 Commander Garcia and C.O.

McCullough (male) allegedly failed to provide him with razors prior to his court

appearances, so that he appeared unkempt, hurting his criminal defense;

• Count XI: from February 21, 2016 to April 21, 2016, Sheriff Dart allegedly failed to

maintain Mansoori’s housing division to a habitable standard;

• Count XII: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, C.O. Larkin and Superintendent Brown

allegedly failed to provide Mansoori with nail clippers regularly, causing his nails to grow

so long they interfered with his functioning;

• Count XIII: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Superintendent Brown allegedly failed

to oversee barbers cutting Mansoori’s hair and allowed the barbers to cut Mansoori’s skin;

• Count XIV: from March 1, 2017 through September 1, 2017, C.O. McGiveny allegedly

failed to provide Mansoori with sufficient exercise time;

1 Mansoori’s SAC does not provide the earliest date or exact length of his incarceration. Defendants,

however, have represented that “the alleged occurrences range from June 30, 2015 to roughly March

2018.” (Mot. to Dismiss at 3, Dkt. No. 35). The Court will therefore assume that Mansoori was in custody

at the Jail at least as early as June 30, 2015.

• Count XV: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Sheriff Dart allegedly gave him

genetically modified soy, increasing his risk of Alzheimer’s disease and cancer;

• Count XVI: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Sheriff Dart allegedly provided him

drinking water containing large black specks; and

• Count XVII: during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, librarians Ms. Pickens and Ms.

Vanco allegedly failed to provide him with reasonable access to the Jail library to do legal

research.

(SAC, Dkt. No. 32.) Because Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss these claims for failure to

state a claim, the Court accepts Mansoori’s factual allegations as true and grants him the benefit

of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those allegations. Williamson v. Curran, 714

F.3d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Defendants cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as the basis for their motion to

dismiss. But because Defendants also seek to dismiss improperly joined parties and claims, the

Court applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 as well. With a Rule 21 motion, if the Court

finds that certain parties have been misjoined, it may, on just terms, add or drop parties or sever

any claim against a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Generally, plaintiffs must file separate claims

against separate parties in different suits. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

However, Rule 20(a)(2) permits joining multiple defendants in the same action when the

plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences and the action

presents a question of law or fact common to all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The Seventh

Circuit has held that the proper remedy for misjoinder is “severance or dismissal without

prejudice, not dismissal with prejudice.” UWM Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 864 (7th

Cir. 2018). Even dismissal without prejudice is an improper remedy if it would result in

gratuitous injury to the plaintiff. See Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000).

In dismissing Mansoori’s initial pro se complaint the outset of this case, the Court

cautioned him not to “bring all of his claims—many of which are unrelated and involve different

defendants—in one suit.” (See May 4, 2018 Order at 2, Dkt. No. 6.) His subsequent complaints,

including the SAC, do nothing to remedy that problem. In fact, he appears to have brought the

same seventeen violations from the original complaint in the SAC. His claims are asserted against

multiple individuals, arise out of disparate aspects of his experience at the Jail, and span his entire

years-long incarceration. Clearly, a number of the claims belong in separate suits.

Mansoori urges the Court to sever rather than dismiss any misjoined claims. He argues

that the Court must avoid the gratuitous injury that would result to him if his case were dismissed,

see Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1012, because several of his claims are now beyond the two-year statute

of limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims in Illinois. See Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. &

Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768–89 (7th Cir. 2007). It is disappointing that after being warned

about the need to separate his claims into distinct suits and receiving multiple extensions of his

time to file the present amended complaint, Mansoori has recycled the same allegations of his

initial complaint. Nonetheless, the Court will first review each of Mansoori’s seventeen counts

and decide which state viable claims for relief and then turn to the issue of misjoinder. To the

extent any of the surviving claims belong in separate suits, the Court will sever those claims.

I. Whether Mansoori’s Allegations State Valid Claims

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to survive a motion at this stage. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “The complaint’s factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Cornielsen v. Infinium Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d 589, 598

(7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “The statement of the claim

must sufficiently give fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests to the

defendants.” Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Since Mansoori was held in the Jail as a pretrial detainee,2 he has brought his claims under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–01 (2015) (“The language of the two Clauses differs,

and the nature of the claims often differs.”). Prisoners’ “rights are rooted in the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Pretrial detainees are in a different

position, because their detention is unrelated to punishment.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816,

821 (7th Cir. 2019). In considering prisoners’ claims under the Eighth Amendment, courts must

apply both a subjective and an objective standard. Id. at 822. The Eighth Amendment requires a

court to ask “whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to adverse conditions that deny

2 The SAC does not specifically allege that Mansoori was a pretrial detainee during the events giving rise

to this case. It is possible that for at least some of the relevant events, Mansoori was serving a short

criminal sentence. However, the Court must draw all reasonable inference in Mansoori’s favor at this

stage, and pretrial detainees are entitled to greater protections than convicted prisoners. Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Because Mansoori has alleged that he was an inmate of the Jail (rather

than a state prison) and he has brought claims pursuant to the Fourteenth, rather than Eighth, Amendment

it is reasonable for the Court to infer that he was a pretrial detainee. See Johnson v. Watson, No. 17-cv-

061-JPG, 2017 WL 2493132, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 8, 2017) (assuming that the plaintiff was a pretrial

detainee where he had brought claims against St. Clair County Jail officials under the Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments).

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By

contrast, pretrial detainees’ claims “are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Pretrial detainees therefore may prevail more easily than

prisoners, by showing that the defendants’ “actions are not rationally related to a legitimate non-

punitive governmental purpose or that the actions appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, “[a] showing of negligence or

even gross negligence will not suffice.” McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.

2018). A pretrial detainee must show “something akin to reckless disregard.” Miranda v. County

of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh

Circuit has held that “Kingsley’s objective inquiry applies to all Fourteenth Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823.

Thus, the Court’s task at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is to decide whether, “taking as true the

conditions described in the complaint, with the plausible inferences we may draw from them, we

find conditions of confinement that were objectively unreasonable and excessive in relation to any

legitimate non-punitive purpose.” Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that all Mansoori’s claims fail because he does not

allege specific injuries. But while a prisoner’s allegation that he was injured is certainly relevant,

he need not allege that he suffered a specific physical injury to state a valid civil rights claim. See

Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court’s dismissal when

the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a needless strip search in front of female prison

guards, finding the plaintiff’s allegations that “prison guards purposefully demeaned and sexually

harassed him” sufficient to state a claim). At this stage, Mansoori only must allege that

Defendants violated one of his federally protected rights.

A. Isolation and Degrading Treatment (Count I)

In Count I, Mansoori alleges that on February 21, 2016, in the course of disciplining

Mansoori, C.O. Patel confined him “in ‘segregation’ or ‘isolation’ without justification[,] causing

him injury” and allowed Mansoori “to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by other

inmates.” (SAC at 3.)

Count I does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a valid claim against Patel.

First, while harsh conditions of segregation may rise to the level of a constitutional violation, see

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2001), a short, unwarranted stay in

segregation, without more, is not unconstitutional. Bogan v. Wexford Health Sources, No. 15 C

7631, 2017 WL 782996, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2017). Mansoori alleges conclusorily that he was

subjected to “inhuman and degrading treatment” in segregation (see SAC at 3), but he has not

pleaded any specific facts that would allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that his

treatment was actually inhuman and degrading. See Bogan, 2017 WL 782996, at *3 (dismissing

Eighth Amendment claim where the plaintiff had “allege[d] no facts to suggest his stay in

segregation deprived him of basic human needs”). For example, Mansoori does not allege how

long he was confined in segregation, in what way his treatment by other innates was inhuman and

degrading, or the nature of the injury he allegedly suffered. Mansoori has also failed to include

any facts suggesting that Patel knew about other inmates’ treatment of Mansoori (whatever that

was) or could have prevented it, such that the Court can reasonably infer that Patel acted with

“reckless disregard.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353; see also Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff’s “conclusory” claim that

defendants “knew [the plaintiff] would suffer personal injuries” as a result of their conduct). As

currently pleaded, Count I does not contain enough facts to give Patel fair notice of the claims

against him. See Bonnstetter, 811 F.3d at 973. Count I of the SAC is therefore dismissed.

B. Contact Lenses (Count II)

Count II alleges that on December 24, 2016, C.O. Larkin destroyed all of Mansoori’s

belongings, “including his contact lenses, causing [him] to lose clear eye sight for a number of

months and causing injury to his person.” (SAC at 4.)

Depriving prisoners of their prescription eyeglasses or contact lenses can amount to a

constitutional violation, depending on how bad their vision is without correction. See Koehl v.

Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing dismissal of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim where he alleged that prison officials confiscated his eyeglasses, without which he suffered

from double vision and lost his depth perception). But the need for glasses “is not per se a serious

medical need.” McIntosh v. Malueg, No. 09-C-1106, 2011 WL 3684777, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Aug.

23, 2011). In evaluating these sorts of prisoner claims, courts consider the severity of the

plaintiff’s vision problems, the length of the deprivation, and its impact on the plaintiff’s daily

activities. Compare Dobbey v. Randle, No. 11-CV-0146, 2013 WL 4821027, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 10, 2013) (finding that the lack of eyeglasses did not constitute an objectively serious

medical condition where the plaintiff showed no severe impairment in his “ability to read, write,

or see objects when walking”); Lavin v. Hulick, No. 09-cv-477-MJR, 2010 WL 2137250, *6 (S.D.

Ill. May 27, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim where he had alleged

that he went without glasses for three weeks, but not “that he suffered any physical harm . . . ; he

was simply inconvenienced in that he was unable to read”), with Gevas v. Shearing, No. 14-CV-

134-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL 1221937, at *5–6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016) (denying the defendant’s

summary judgment motion where the plaintiff went two weeks without his contact lenses and

testified that without them, he could not see or read and was left to sit in his cell doing nothing).

The Court concludes that Count II successfully states a claim against Larkin. The SAC

does not indicate how bad Mansoori’s eyesight is, which is relevant. But the allegations that he

had contact lenses and that without them, he lost clear eyesight allow the Court to draw the

reasonable inference that Mansoori had prescription lenses to correct an objectively serious vision

problem. In addition, Mansoori alleges that he went without his lenses for several months. Other

courts have found that two weeks without lenses may constitute a constitutional violation. See

Gevas, 2016 WL 1221937, at *5–6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied with respect to

Count II.

C. Dental Care (Count III)

Count III of the SAC alleges that from June 2017 until Mansoori’s release in February or

March 2018, the Jail’s dentist, Dr. Montgomery, “failed to provide proper dental care, including

teeth cleaning and dental floss, causing [Mansoori]’s teeth to decay” and causing him pain. (SAC

at 4.) The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “dental care is one of the most important medical

needs of inmates.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Thus, “dental pain accompanied by various degrees of attenuated medical harm

may constitute an objectively serious medical need.” Id. (collecting cases). By contrast, merely

“being denied preventative dental care,” without further allegations of “any pain, injury or

ongoing serious dental problem,” is not sufficient to state a claim for relief. Rial v. McGinnis, 756

F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

In this case, Mansoori claims that Montgomery’s denial of proper cleaning and dental

floss resulted in his teeth decaying and caused him continuing pain. Because Mansoori points to

actual harm that he suffered as a result of Montgomery’s inadequate dental care, he has

successfully stated a claim. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count

III.

D. Jail Diet (Count IV)

Count IV of the SAC alleges that from September 2016 until Mansoori’s release, Dr.

Chris Stinaki, a health specialist at the Jail, provided inmates “a totally inadequate diet, lacking in

nutrition.” (SAC at 5.) Mansoori claims that his diet was so inadequate that his bones became

weak and one of his fingers broke. (Id.) In the Seventh Circuit, a prisoner’s allegation that he was

served a “nutritionally deficient diet” or that his food was “well below nutritional value” is

sufficient to state a claim under the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment. Smith v. Dart,

803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mansoori’s claim against

Dr. Stinaki meets that standard. Accordingly, Count IV survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

E. Paint Fumes (Count V)

Count V alleges that on March 30, 2016, C.O. McCullough “forced [Mansoori] to stay in

his newly painted cell, causing him to breathe toxic fumes for twenty-four hours,” and then

refused to get Mansoori proper medical attention. (SAC at 5–6.) Again, the Court’s task at this

stage is to determine whether the alleged conditions are “objectively unreasonable and excessive

in relation to any legitimate non-punitive purpose.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824. Conditions are

objectively unreasonable when they are “sufficiently serious that [they] result[] in the denial of

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir.

2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, allegations of long-term exposure to

unhealthy, unsanitary living conditions are sufficient to state § 1983 claims. See Antonelli v.

Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s

claim that prison officials failed to stop a sixteen-month infestation of cockroaches). It is not

necessary for a plaintiff to allege that he sustained an injury as a result of unsanitary conditions of

confinement. See Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006 (“Excessive cold, for example, can also amount to an

Eighth Amendment violation, even if the prisoner has not yet come down with the flu.”). But

allegations of serious injury or resultant health problems are relevant. See id. at 1006–07

(summary judgment in the defendant’s favor reversed where the plaintiff presented evidence that

excessive exposure to dust, dander, and animal feces over several months made his asthma worse

and led to skin breakouts).

The Court concludes that Count V fails to state a claim against McCullough. Mansoori

alleges that he was only forced to stay in a newly painted cell for a period of twenty-four hours.

(SAC at 5–6.) Generally, only prolonged conditions amount to a constitutional violation. See

Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1431. Given the short-term nature of his alleged exposure to paint fumes,

specific and serious allegations regarding how the fumes impacted Mansoori’s health would be

necessary to state a claim. But Mansoori’s allegation that the fumes caused him injury is

conclusory and does not provide sufficient facts for the Court to discern whether the exposure was

objectively unreasonable. Count V is therefore dismissed.

F. Cellmate with Bipolar Disorder (Count VI)

Count VI alleges that on April 21, 2016, Sergeant McCullough (who appears to be a

different person than C.O. McCullough) placed Mansoori in a cell with a prisoner suffering from

bipolar disorder; when Mansoori requested to be placed in a different cell, she refused to move

him. (SAC at 6.) Mansoori alleges that his cellmate attacked him and caused him injuries as a

result of Sergeant McCullough’s actions. (Id.)

“Jail officials have a duty to protect inmates from violent assaults by other inmates.” See

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 669 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). In Miranda, the Seventh Circuit indicated that a pretrial

detainee seeking to state a claim for failure to protect would need to plausibly allege that the

defendant acted with reckless disregard to a known substantial risk. 900 F.3d at 353; see Tidwell

v. Hicks, 791 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2015). For instance, in Kyles v. Beaugard, the district court

found that a prisoner plausibly alleged failure-to-protect claims against prison officials where the

prisoner alleged that officials housed him with an inmate who was a known member of a gang

that was “out to injure or kill” him and that the inmate had a history of violence. No. 15 C 8895,

2017 WL 2559038, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, however, Mansoori has not pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that

Sergeant McCullough recklessly failed to protect him from a known risk. Even if the Court were

to assume that Sergeant McCullough knew Mansoori’s cellmate had bipolar disorder (a fact not

actually alleged), that would not be enough to support a plausible inference that Sergeant

McCullough should have known Mansoori’s cellmate was dangerous. Otherwise, Jail officials

would commit a constitutional violation whenever they assigned inmates bipolar cellmates.

Mansoori’s allegation that he asked McCullough to move him to a different cell also fails to

establish McCullough’s reckless disregard to his safety. If Mansoori had alleged that he told

McCullough his cellmate threatened him or was violent, the outcome might be different. But as

currently pleaded, Count VI fails to state a claim against Sergeant McCullough and is dismissed.

G. Laundry (Count VII)

Count VII alleges that between July 2, 2017 and November 3, 2017, Superintendent

Brown, who was tasked with daily custody and control over inmates, “permitted [Mansoori] to

wash his clothes on only two occasions and refused to permit [him] to wash his clothes more

frequently.” (SAC at 7.) Mansoori also alleges that because Brown denied him access to clean

laundry, he “develop[ed] skin and foot infections.” (Id.)

The Constitution requires prison officials to “provide inmates with a minima of shelter,

sanitation and utilities—basic necessities of civilized life.” Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139

(7th Cir. 1989). Prisoners are entitled to laundry access over long periods of time. See Howard v.

Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s entry of judgment in favor

of a prisoner who established that he “was denied laundry service during his first five months” in

a particular housing unit). But the Constitution does not mandate frequent access to laundry

services. See Martin v. Lane, 766 F. Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting defendants’

summary judgment motion as to a laundry access claim because the deprivation lasted, at most,

eighteen days).

In this case, Mansoori has alleged that Brown allowed him to wash his clothes twice over

a four-month period (from July to November). Based on that allegation, the Court may draw the

reasonable inference that Mansoori went several months without clean laundry, which is

sufficient to state a claim. Moreover, Mansoori has alleged that this deprivation led him to

develop skin and foot infections. The allegation of a specific health consequence suggests that

this condition of confinement may plausibly rise to the level of a unconstitutional violation. See

Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006–07. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is thus denied with respect to Count

VII.

H. Black Mold (Count VIII)

Count VIII alleges that Commander Garcia, who was responsible for prisoners’ daily care,

“failed to remove black mold from the showers, located next to [Mansoori]’s cell” from August

29, 2016 until February or March 2018. (SAC at 7.) Mansoori claims that over that period of

more than a year-and-a-half, he breathed in fumes from the mold, causing him injury. (Id.)

Prisoner allegations of long-term exposure to unhealthy, unsanitary living conditions, are

generally sufficient to state claims. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1431. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has

found viable claims where unhealthy ventilation, including black mold in the duct system,

allegedly gave inmates breathing problems. Board, 394 F.3d at 485–87; see also Morton v. Dart,

No. 16-cv-5057, 2017 WL 4785925, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2017) (denying the motion to

dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 claims when the complaint included an allegation that officials

ignored mold growing in jail cells and showers); but see McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 125 (7th

Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim based on living in a cell near asbestos-

covered pipes for ten months because he did not plead “facts sufficient to establish that he was

exposed to unreasonably high levels of asbestos”). Mansoori has alleged that Garcia, who was

responsible for prisoners’ care on a daily basis, failed to remove black mold growing near

Mansoori’s cell for more than a year-and-a-half. The Court finds that Count VIII sufficiently

alleges that Garcia acted in reckless disregard to a long-term, unsanitary living condition, and

thus, states a valid claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count VIII.

I. Mice Infestation (Count IX)

Count IX alleges that from November 1, 2016 through August 30, 2017, Superintendent

Brown, tasked with the daily care of prisoners, “failed to control the infestation of mice, resulting

in an unhealthy living environment and causing [Mansoori] injury.” (SAC at 8.)

“Depending on how extensive the infestation of a prisoner’s cell is, what the infesting

pests are, what odors or bites or risk of disease they create, . . . and how long the infestation

continues,” an infestation may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thomas v. Illinois,

697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting in dicta that it was not necessary for a prisoner alleging

a mice and cockroach infestation to plead that he sustained significant physical harm); see also

Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1431 (sixteen-month infestation of cockroaches sufficient to state a claim).

Less severe allegations concerning exposure to pests generally will not suffice. See Sain v. Wood,

512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment warranted where the plaintiff had alleged

that over his six-year sentence, he only saw “several” cockroaches in his cell, was bitten twice,

and that exterminators came every month-and-a-half).

Mansoori has not included any facts in the SAC to indicate how bad the mice infestation

was (such as how often he would encounter mice in his cell or how many mice there were) or how

his health suffered as a result. To the contrary, Mansoori’s allegation that the mice created an

“unhealthy living environment” is entirely conclusory. Such sparse, conclusory allegations are not

sufficient to state a claim against Brown. As a result, Count IX is dismissed.

J. Razors (Count X)

Count X alleges that during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Commander Garcia and C.O.

McCullough failed to provide him with razors before his court appearances, causing him to

appear unkempt and hurting his criminal defense. (SAC at 8–9.)

Prisoners are entitled to the “basic necessities of civilized life.” Johnson, 891 F.2d at 139.

But temporary deprivations of minor hygienic items like razors do not rise to the level of

constitutional violations. See Tucker v. Randall, 840 F. Supp. 1237, 1247 (N.D. Ill. 1993)

(granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff was intermittently

deprived of a razor, toothbrush, and nail clippers and limited to one shower per week). And

limiting inmates’ access to a potentially dangerous item like a razor plainly furthers the

“legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose” of inmate safety. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398; see

generally Rice, 675 F.3d 650 (lawsuit brought by a pretrial detainee’s parents alleging that jail

officials should have done more to prevent his suicide when they knew he had previously

attempted suicide in his cell by cutting his neck with a disposable razor).

Because Mansoori emphasizes that Garcia and McCullough hurt his criminal defense by

failing to provide him with razors before his court appearances, Count X could also be liberally

construed as a Sixth Amendment claim concerning meaningful court access. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial . . . .”); Barbosa v McCann, No. 08 C 5012, 2009 WL 2913488, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8,

2009) (analyzing the plaintiff’s allegation that he had limited access to legal materials in prison

under the Sixth Amendment). But this interpretation does not help Mansoori’s cause. To allege

successfully that jail officials violated his Sixth Amendment right, Mansoori would have to plead

facts sufficient for the Court to infer that, by denying him razors, Garcia and McCullough

impeded his efforts to pursue a specific legal claim or meritorious challenge, actually hurting his

criminal case. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009); Barbosa, 2009 WL

2913488, at *5. Mansoori’s claim fails to plausibly allege that Garcia and McCullough’s denial of

razors meaningfully impacted his criminal case. He has not done so. Accordingly, Count X is

dismissed.

K. Habitable Housing (Count XI)

Count XI alleges that, for a period of two months between February 2016 and April 2016,

Sheriff Dart failed in his responsibility of maintaining Jail facilities in a habitable condition. (SAC

at 9.) Specifically, Mansoori alleges that over that two-month period, he was living in “Division

6, Tiers 1P and 1J, which were uninhabitable during that period of time, causing injury.” (Id.)

This allegation falls far short of stating a claim against Dart. Mansoori merely provides a

conclusory statement that the Jail was uninhabitable. He has not provided any details from which

the Court can determine whether he has plausibly alleged an objectively unreasonable condition

of confinement. As currently pleaded, the Count fails to provide Dart fair notice about the facts

giving rise to the claim. Count XI is therefore dismissed as well.

L. Nail Clippers (Count XII)

Count XII alleges that C.O. Larkin and Superintendent Brown, both tasked with daily care

of prisoners, failed to provide Mansoori nail clippers frequently enough during his entire

incarceration. (SAC at 9–10.) Mansoori claims that “the nails on his hands and toes, grew so long,

that [he] could not function, causing him injury.” (Id. at 10.)

As noted above, the Constitution guarantees prisoners access to the “basic necessities of

civilized life.” Johnson, 891 F.2d at 139. That includes access to necessary hygiene items. See

Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (reversing grant of summary judgment where

the plaintiff demonstrated that he received a toothbrush, toothpaste, but no canteen, soap, and

limited toilet paper for around twelve days). But frequent access to less critical (and potentially

dangerous) items such as razors and nail clippers is not required. See Tucker, 840 F. Supp. at

1247. In Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, Division of Prisons, for

example, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that denial of “certain amenities such

as nail clippers and mirrors” for over a year violated her due process rights. 473 F.3d 1334, 1343

(10th Cir. 2007). While Mansoori has alleged that his nails were so long that he “could not

function,” he has not offered any factual allegations about how the length of his nails interfered

with his daily activities. Without such factual allegations, Count XII does not plausibly allege a

constitutional deprivation. This Count is therefore dismissed.

M. Supervision of Barbers (Count XIII)

Count XIII alleges that during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Superintendent Brown

“failed to properly oversee the barbers cutting [Mansoori]’s hair, so that the barbers cut open [his]

skin and inflicted wounds.” (SAC at 10–11.)

Count XIII is based on Brown’s failure to oversee others. To be individually liable under

§ 1983, officials acting in a supervisory capacity must be aware of the unconstitutional conduct

and “facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740. At the

motion to dismiss stage, allegations that supervisors heard prisoners’ complaints about

subordinates’ conduct are generally sufficient to establish supervisors’ knowledge of that conduct.

See, e.g., Barbosa, 2009 WL 2913488, at *7. But Mansoori has not pleaded any facts from which

the Court can infer that Brown knew about the barbers’ alleged actions in cutting open his skin

and inflicting wounds. Count XIII is therefore dismissed.

N. Physical Exercise (Count XIV)

Count XIV alleges that C.O. McGiveny, one of the officers charged with Mansoori’s daily

care, “failed to provide sufficient recreational and exercise time” to Mansoori from March 1, 2017

to September 1, 2017. (SAC at 11.) The Seventh Circuit has recognized that serious interference

with inmates’ ability to exercise could violate the Constitution. Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679,

684–85 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding the prisoner’s allegation that he went six months without the

opportunity to exercise was sufficient to state a claim). But in this case, Mansoori has offered

only a conclusory allegation that he did not receive “sufficient” exercise over a six-month period.

The SAC does not allege any facts from which the Court could determine whether the alleged

deprivation plausibly rises to a violation of constitutional rights—for example, Mansoori does not

allege how much recreational and exercise time he did receive, whether the amount changed over

time, what type of recreation and exercise he was allowed (or denied), or why the amount and

type of recreation and exercise was not sufficient for his needs. In short, Mansoori’s allegations

are too sparse and conclusory to state a claim. Count XIV is therefore dismissed.

O. Genetically Modified Soy (Count XV)

Count XV alleges that during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Sheriff Dart provided

prisoners a diet high in genetically modified soy, “which destroys brain cells, promotes

Alzheimer’s disease and causes cancer to proliferate.” (SAC at 11.) To succeed on a

constitutional claim regarding prison food, the plaintiff must allege that the food, if not

nutritionally inadequate, poses an immediate risk to inmates. Smith, 803 F.3d at 312. Yet

Mansoor’s general allegations that soy kills brain cells and increases the risk of cancer and

Alzheimer’s disease are all speculative and focused on potential long-term consequences rather

not immediate dangers. For that reason, numerous courts have dismissed similar claims, finding

that prisoners’ allegations of soy-rich diets do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

See Riley-El v. Godinez, No. 13 C 8656, 2015 WL 4572322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2015)

(collecting cases). Given the speculative and generalized nature of the allegations, this Court

reaches the same result here. Count XV against Dart is dismissed.

P. Drinking Water (Count XVI)

Count XVI alleges that Dart provided Mansoori and other inmates drinking water with

large black specks. (SAC at 12.) Again, as noted above, prisoners are entitled to food and drink

that does not threaten their immediate health. Smith, 803 F.3d at 312. But food served in prison is

not required to be completely free from all safety hazards or pollutants. Carroll v. DeTella, 255

F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, courts have held “[t]hat the food may occasionally contain

foreign objects or is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional

deprivation.” See Barbosa, 2009 WL 2913488, at *3 (citing Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574,

1580 (7th Cir. 1994) (“complaints about cold and poorly-prepared food must fa[i]l”)).

Here, Mansoori has not alleged any facts suggesting that the large black specks in his

water posed any real, immediate danger. He does not allege that the substance in the water was

dangerous or poisonous; nor does he make any allegation of injury other than the same general

claim that the situation caused injury to him that he includes for each and every one of his

seventeen claims. Drinking water containing large black specks might not be pleasant, but,

without more, it does not suggest a plausible constitutional violation. Count XVI is therefore

dismissed.

Q. Legal Library Access (Count XVII)

Count XVII alleges that during Mansoori’s entire incarceration, Defendants Pickens and

Vanco refused to give him “reasonable access” to the Jail library to conduct legal research. (SAC

at 12–13.) Count XVII amounts to a claim that Defendants violated Mansoori’s Sixth Amendment

right to access the courts. As discussed above, to state such a claim successfully, Mansoori would

need to allege that his limited library access prejudiced a particular defense that may have been

successful. Barbosa, 2009 WL 2913488, at *5. Mansoori has not done so. And like many of

Mansoori’s other counts, Count XVII is simply too conclusory to state a valid claim. Mansoori

has not provided any facts to allow the Court to infer that his access to the Jail library was

actually unreasonable. This Count against Pickens and Vanco is therefore dismissed.

II. Severing Misjoined Claims

The Court has now reviewed all seventeen counts of Mansoori’s SAC and determined that

the following five state valid claims:

• Count II: on December 24, 2016, C.O. Larkin destroyed Mansoori’s contact lenses,

causing him to lose clear eyesight for several months;

• Count III: from June 30, 2017 until Mansoori’s release in February or March 2018,

Jail dentist Dr. Montgomery did not provide Mansoori with proper teeth cleaning

or dental floss;

• Count IV: from September 21, 2016 until Mansoori’s release, Dr. Chris Stinaki, a

health care specialist charged with providing food to prisoners, provided a diet so

lacking in nutrition that Mansoori’s bones became weak and one of his fingers

broke;

• Count VII: from July 2, 2017 to November 3, 2017, Superintendent Brown only

permitted Mansoori to wash his clothes on two occasions, giving him skin and foot

infections; and

• Count VIII: from August 29, 2016 until Mansoori’s release, Commander Garcia

failed to remove black mold from showers near Mansoori’s cell, forcing him to

inhale toxic fumes.

Because it is clear that these Counts do not all belong in the same suit, the Court will sever the

improperly joined claims.

As discussed above, distinct claims against various defendants belong in different suits.

George, 507 F.3d at 607. But joining multiple defendants is permissible under Rule 20(a)(2)

where the claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Two of Mansoori’s surviving claims (Counts VII and VIII)

concern unsanitary conditions of confinement at the Jail during the 2016–2018 time frame; those

claims may proceed in the same case. The remaining Counts II, III, and IV—which concern

Mansoori’s eyesight, dental care, and diet—do not share any common Defendants or arise out of

the same series of transactions or occurrences. Those claims will be severed so that Mansoori may

proceed with those claims as separate cases, if he so desires.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 1s granted in part and denied in

part. (Dkt. No. 35.) Counts I, V, VI, [X, X, XI, XII, XII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII are dismissed

without prejudice. Counts II, III, 1V, VII, and VIII survive the motion to dismiss but may not

proceed all in the same action. Counts VII and VIII may be brought in the same case and will

proceed under the current case number. Counts I, III, and V—which do not share common

Defendants or arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences—are severed and may

proceed as separate actions under separate case numbers. Although the dismissed counts are

dismissed without prejudice, the Court cautions Mansoori that any attempt to amend any

complaint to add back improperly joined claims will result in summary dismissal of those claims.

ENTERED:

Dated: March 8, 2022 ution

Andrea R. Wood

United States District Judge

99