Adamidis v. Cook County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE ADAMIDIS, Independent

Administrator of the Estate of John

Adamidis,

No. 19 CV 7652

Plaintiff,

Judge Manish S. Shah

v.

COOK COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Cook County Sheriff’s Department Police found Judy Glatz dead on her

living-room couch, surrounded by bottles of pills. Officers learned that Glatz’s Jeep

was not in her parking space and asked nearby police departments to help find it.

They also learned the name of John Adamidis from Glatz’s brother. Skokie police

officers quickly located the Jeep in Adamidis’s driveway. Cook County officers and

detectives arrived at the residence, placed Adamidis in handcuffs, told him he was

“being detained,” and took him to the police station for interrogation. Adamidis’s

detention lasted about three to four hours, and he was released without any charges

filed against him. Adamidis filed suit against Cook County and several officers

involved in his detention, alleging false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

1 John Adamidis died on March 27, 2021. [80]. George Adamidis, John’s brother and

administrator of his estate, is now the plaintiff in this case. [85]. For readability, I refer to

John Adamidis and “plaintiff” interchangeably in this opinion.

Defendants move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. The motions are denied. A jury could find that there was no probable

cause to believe that Adamidis committed a crime, and factual disputes about who

communicated the decision to seize Adamidis preclude a decision as a matter of law

on defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.

I. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

I construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the nonmoving

party. Robertson v. Department of Health Services, 949 F.3d 371, 377–78 (7th Cir.

2020). But the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving

party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element” of his case for which

he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also

Wade v. Ramos, ---F. 4th---, No. 20-1241, 2022 WL 483155, at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 17,

2022) (nonmovant’s version of events must be “backed up by a measure of plausible

evidence” in the record).

II. Background

On July 7, 2019, Cook County Sheriff’s Officers David Ribaldo and Susano

Viramontes arrived at Judy Glatz’s apartment for an “ambulance assist.” [88] ¶ 9.2

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except in the case of citations

to depositions, which use the deposition transcript’s original page number. The facts are

largely taken from plaintiff’s response to defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement, [88], and

defendants’ response to plaintiff’s statement of additional material facts, [92], where both the

asserted fact and the opposing party’s response are set forth in one document.

They met Glatz’s father outside the building, who told them that the apartment door

was unlocked and open, and that Glatz was on the sofa—black and blue and

unresponsive. [78] Ex. B, Ribaldo Body Worn Camera at 0:35–0:59. The officers

entered the apartment, found Glatz’s dead body on the living-room couch, notified

dispatch that it would be a death investigation, and began to secure the scene. Id. at

1:29–1:49; [88] ¶¶ 12–13, 18, 24. Officers found multiple prescription-drug bottles on

the table next to Glatz’s body—some bearing the names of other people. [92] ¶ 15. But

Ribaldo did not see any indication of forced entry or signs of violence. [92] ¶ 32.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Roger Guerra and Sergeant Steven Zepeda arrived.

[88] ¶ 14. Ribaldo, Viramontes, and Zepeda examined the inside of Glatz’s apartment.

[88] ¶¶ 26–27.3 Ribaldo told Zepeda that Glatz had cash in her hand, a purse

underneath her, and that he found a bunch of pill bottles. [88] ¶ 20; [78] Ex. B,

3 Defendants assert: “Officer Ribaldo found and examined the parts from the broken locking

mechanism, which was sitting on the kitchen counter, purportedly from the broken parking

lot entry door. Sgt[.] Zepeda pushes open the door to the apartment without pushing the

knob, consistent with [a] broken locking mechanism.” [88] ¶ 28. For support, they cite the

body worn camera videos and depositions of Ribaldo and Zepeda. But this fact is disputed

and neither video clearly shows a broken locking mechanism. At best, the state of the door’s

locking mechanism remains unclear, making an inference in favor of defendants improper at

this stage. Ribaldo’s video shows him standing at the counter, jingling something that sounds

like metal. See [78] Ex. B, Ribaldo BWC at 8:24–8:53. But all Ribaldo’s camera captures are

the cabinets, dishes, and toaster in front of him—it does not reveal what is on the counter.

Id. In fact, Zepeda’s BWC shows the deadbolt intact, and captures what appear to be a receipt,

a large keychain, and a pink screwdriver on the counter where Ribaldo stood. [78] Ex. D,

Zepeda BWC at 6:41–7:03. Ribaldo testified that he was playing with a metal object he

believed were parts of a lock, but he also qualified that he did not “remember exactly what

was on there,” and he did not recall telling anyone that the locking mechanism was a possible

sign of forced entry or making such a note in a report. [75-7] at 49:14–50:5, 81:1–82:4. Finally,

while Zepeda appears to have opened the apartment door without pushing or turning the

doorknob, he arrived after Glatz’s father, Ribaldo, and Viramontes had all already entered

through the same door. Defendants’ assertion that Zepeda’s entry was “consistent with a

broken locking mechanism” is just speculation.

Ribaldo BWC at 11:00–11:11. The cash was rolled up in a way that indicated it was

being used to snort a substance. [88] ¶ 22.

In the parking lot, Glatz’s father told Viramontes that his daughter’s Jeep was

not in her parking space; Viramontes contacted dispatch to help locate the vehicle.

[88] ¶ 15; [78] Ex. C, Viramontes BWC at 5:55–6:24, 7:56–8:40. Glatz’s father also

told officers that to the best of his knowledge, the vehicle had been recently repaired,

returned home, and then towed after Glatz was arrested. [92] ¶ 13. He further

reported that he last communicated with Glatz on June 24 (two weeks earlier), that

Glatz struggled with drugs, and that he had begged her to go to rehab. [88] ¶¶ 32–33;

[92] ¶ 14. The officers started to develop a timeline of Glatz’s death, and asked

dispatch to run a criminal history check to see if Glatz had any history of drug or

alcohol abuse. [88] ¶ 32.

After officers turned off their body cameras, Glatz’s brother arrived on the

scene to meet his father and told officers John Adamidis’s name; officers ran the name

through dispatch and learned Adamidis’s physical description and address. [88]

¶¶ 36–37. At the same time, more investigators continued to arrive at the scene,

including Sergeant Michael Dwyer, who took over the investigation after being

debriefed. [88] ¶¶ 39–41.4 Detective Sheryl Collins also arrived at the scene; officers

4 Dwyer testified that he believed locating the Jeep could be significant because “the vehicle

could have been taken in her death, there could be evidence of the death in the vehicle, there

could be proceeds that could have been taken by force[, and] [t]here’s a lot of questions that

need to be answered.” [88] ¶ 45. Plaintiff disputes this fact, focusing on Dwyer’s testimony

that he has no recollection of ever instructing anyone to question or take Adamidis into

custody, or having probable cause to arrest him. [88] ¶ 45; [75-9] at 9:18–20, 10:1–22. But the

two are not the same. “A response may not set forth any new facts, meaning facts that are

not fairly responsive to the asserted fact to which the response is made.” Local Rule 56.1(e)(2).

told her that Glatz’s death was likely related to a drug overdose but no one indicated

that any crime had been committed. [92] ¶ 8.

Cook County notified nearby police departments of the search for Glatz’s Jeep

and Skokie personnel quickly found it at Adamidis’s residence in Morton Grove. [88]

¶¶ 47–49, 54. There was never any message that the Cook County Sheriff was looking

for Adamidis or indicating that the vehicle was stolen. [88] ¶¶ 47, 56.5 After finding

the Jeep, Skokie Officer Shane Long’s superior told him to stay at Adamidis’s

residence until Cook County officers showed up. [88] ¶ 55.

Back at Glatz’s apartment, Dwyer told Detective Maureen Donohoe that

Adamidis was a suspect in the death investigation and told her to bring Adamidis in

for questioning; Collins also heard Dwyer say that Adamidis should be detained

(though she did not know who Dwyer told). [88] ¶¶ 43, 46; [92] ¶ 9. Collins never

heard Dwyer state that Adamidis was a suspect in any crime or explain why he should

be brought in for questioning. [92] ¶ 8. But according to Collins and Donohoe, Dwyer

instructed them to relocate to Adamidis’s residence. [92] ¶¶ 9–10.

Skokie officers did not arrest Adamidis because they had very little

information, it was not their case, and they were not aware of any reasons to do so.

[92] ¶ 16. After Skokie and Morton Grove police arrived, Adamidis got out of his

residence and approached the officers; according to Adamidis’s testimony, Skokie

Dwyer’s failure to recall these facts does not undermine his testimony that locating the

vehicle might be significant.

5 Adamidis would later testify that Glatz had parked her Jeep in his driveway with two flat

tires approximately a week before her body was discovered. [92] ¶ 2. Body camera footage

appears to confirm a flat front passenger tire. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:48–0:54.

officers told him to stop in the middle of the driveway and get on the ground. [88]

¶ 59. Collins told Skokie personnel that she wanted Adamidis taken into custody, and

plaintiff was handcuffed. Id.; [92] ¶ 16.6 When Donohoe, Collins, and Guerra arrived

at Adamidis’s residence, Skokie officers turned Adamidis over to Cook County

custody. [88] ¶¶ 61, 63.7

Guerra placed Adamidis in handcuffs. [88] ¶¶ 64, 69; [92] ¶ 22.8 Guerra’s body

worn camera indicates Adamidis was handcuffed for at least thirteen minutes before

being placed in a squad car (still handcuffed). [92] ¶ 17; [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC.

During that time, Adamidis was cooperative and did not refuse to answer any

questions or comply with any instructions. Id.

Early on, Adamidis asked Guerra if he could get his medicine from the house;

Guerra said “I’m going to take care of that in one second for you” and led Adamidis

over to Collins and two other officers. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:50–0:58. Collins

questioned Adamidis about his medications, and Guerra suggested that Adamidis tell

6 It’s unclear who originally handcuffed Adamidis. Adamidis testified that Skokie police

handcuffed him in the driveway before Cook County officials arrived. [75-11] at 36:11–37:23,

38:10–13, 43:5–13. Skokie Officer Shane Long, however, testified that no one placed

Adamidis under arrest or detained him before the Cook County Sheriff’s department

handcuffed him. [75-18] at 12:8–13:2, 43:6–22. Guerra further muddies the waters; he

testified that he replaced handcuffs from Morton Grove and placed Cook County handcuffs

on Adamidis. [75-15] at 7:19–22.

7 Skokie and Morton Grove personnel did not provide any information that influenced

Collins’s or Donohoe’s decision to detain Adamidis. [92] ¶ 12.

8 Defendants assert that Guerra switched out handcuffs to place Cook County handcuffs on

Adamidis, an assertion plaintiff does not contest. [88] ¶ 64. And Guerra’s body camera video

appears to show Guerra handing a Skokie officer a set of handcuffs as he fastens other

handcuffs on Adamidis. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 0:03–0:06. Yet as discussed in Note 6, the

record is unclear regarding which department—Skokie, Morton Grove, or Cook County—first

handcuffed Adamidis.

the officers where the medication was so they could escort Adamidis’s father into the

house to retrieve it. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:04–1:54. Adamidis then asked

Guerra and Collins if he was under arrest, to which Guerra responded: “Right now,

sir, you are being detained, and we’re going to transfer you over while you get, uh, for

our investigation.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:54–2:02; [88] ¶ 65. Collins nodded

along and said, “Detained. Yeah.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 1:57–2:01.

Several minutes later, Adamidis again asked officers what was going on. [78]

Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 6:52–6:57. Collins replied, “You are being detained as the

officer earlier told you, ok? Then we are going to take you to our office and follow up,

ok?” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 6:58–7:06. Collins then asked Adamidis whether he

had any identification; Adamidis said it was right inside and he could show her

where. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 7:08–7:15. Adamidis then told officers “I’m not

going to go nowhere,” to which Collins responded: “I know you’re not going anywhere,

but you can’t go back in the house. So can your dad bring, can you like tell me where

it is? Because if not, we’ll just take you and fingerprint you for positive I.D., that’s not

a problem.” [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC at 7:16–7:27.

After a few more minutes, Guerra walked Adamidis from the driveway to a

squad car down the street and placed him in the backseat. [78] Ex. E, Guerra BWC

at 10:40–12:51. None of the officers asked Adamidis about Glatz, why Glatz’s vehicle

was parked in his driveway, or whether he would voluntarily travel to police

headquarters for questioning. [92] ¶ 18. Donohoe and Collins informed Guerra that

Adamidis would be taken to the Cook County Sheriff’s facility in Maywood, Illinois,

for further questioning. [92] ¶ 23.

Donohoe and Collins transported Adamidis—still in handcuffs—to the

Maywood station for questioning regarding the Glatz death investigation and his

possession of the Jeep. [88] ¶¶ 68, 70; [92] ¶ 25. Guerra stayed behind to handle the

tow of the Jeep. [88] ¶ 68. About an hour and a half after being handcuffed in his

driveway, Adamidis arrived at police headquarters, where Donohoe placed him in

locked room for questioning. [92] ¶¶ 24, 26. Dwyer assigned Detective Robert Lobacz9

to interview Adamidis. [92] ¶ 30. Dwyer and Collins told Lobacz that there was a

death investigation of a woman (Glatz) who had potentially died of a drug overdose

and whose vehicle was found in front of Adamidis’s house; they also told Lobacz that

there was no sign of a break-in at Glatz’s apartment. [88] ¶ 71; [92] ¶ 30. Collins and

Lobacz then questioned Adamidis, who signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, did not

ask for an attorney, and answered all of their questions. [88] ¶¶ 72–74; [92] ¶ 28.10

Adamidis told Collins and Lobacz that he had a relationship with Glatz, that her car

was the one in his driveway, and that he had previously seen Glatz use drugs. [88]

¶ 74. After two to three hours, detectives ended the interview and drove Adamidis

home. [88] ¶¶ 73–74. From the time he was placed in handcuffs outside his residence

9 Plaintiff dropped his claims against Lobacz in the third amended complaint. [55].

10 Adamidis testified that officers did not read him his Miranda rights and that he felt like

he had no choice but to sign the waiver. [75-11] at 58:16–59:7. To resolve defendants’ motions

for summary judgment, it is immaterial whether officers read Adamidis his rights or whether

Adamidis voluntarily and knowingly waived those rights. The issue is whether Cook County

officers unlawfully seized him, and the Miranda-related issues do not bear on that question.

until his interrogation ended at the station, Adamidis was detained for approximately

three to four hours total. [88] ¶ 76; [92] ¶ 33. He was never booked, put in a holding

cell, fingerprinted, or charged with any crime. [88] ¶ 77. The investigation never

became a homicide investigation—Glatz’s death was designated an accidental drug

overdose. [92] ¶¶ 1, 31.

Collins, Guerra, Donohoe, and Dwyer knew: (1) Glatz was dead; (2) Glatz’s

vehicle was at Adamidis’s residence; and (3) Glatz was not with the vehicle. [88]

¶ 66.11 None of the officers had any information suggesting that Glatz’s vehicle had

been stolen, and Guerra’s tow report did not indicate that the vehicle had been stolen.

[92] ¶¶ 4, 25. Donohoe and Collins did not have any other information about Adamidis

and testified that their supervisor Dwyer made the call to detain him. [88] ¶¶ 43, 46;

[92] ¶¶ 9, 21. Guerra, for his part, testified that he handcuffed Adamidis at the

direction of Collins and Donohoe, and that the detectives made the decision to take

Adamidis into custody, which Collins and Donohoe dispute. [92] ¶¶ 22–23.

Adamidis sued Dwyer, Collins, Donohoe, and Guerra under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.12 Defendants move for

summary judgment.

11 Defendants also assert that they knew Dwyer wanted Adamidis to be brought in for

questioning, but this fact is disputed. Dwyer testified that he could not recall ever instructing

anyone to question or arrest Adamidis, or whether there was probable cause to arrest

Adamidis. See [75-9] at 9:18–10:22, 17:21–18:7. Dwyer testified repeatedly that he could not

recall any details regarding the decision to detain plaintiff and was not aware of anything

that could refresh his recollection. Id.; [92] ¶¶ 3–6.

12 Cook County is also a defendant, for indemnification purposes. See [55] ¶¶ 51–53.

III. Analysis

Defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds. First, they say that

they had probable cause to arrest Adamidis. Second, they argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity.

A. False Arrest

Section 1983 authorizes suits against officers who violate constitutional rights

while acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fourth Amendment,

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable

seizures, including arrests lacking probable cause. See Bailey v. United States, 568

U.S. 186, 192–93 (2013); see also Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 301 (7th

Cir. 2011). To prevail on his false-arrest claim, Adamidis “must show that there was

no probable cause for his arrest.” Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir.

2016).

1. Adamidis’s Detention Required Probable Cause

Dwyer contests whether Adamidis was arrested within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment.13 He does not dispute that Adamidis was seized; rather, Dwyer

contends that Adamidis’s detention amounted to an investigatory stop under Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), requiring only reasonable suspicion. Handcuffing Adamidis

and taking him to the police station for hours of questioning, Dwyer argues, “is not

13 Defendants Guerra, Collins, and Donohoe do not dispute that Adamidis’s detention

required probable cause, although they elide the remainder of the operative phrase: probable

cause to “believe that the suspect had committed a crime.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992

F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see [74] at 2, 10–11 (arguing defendants had

“probable cause to detain [Adamidis] and bring him in for questioning” without basing such

cause on any crime).

sufficient, on its own, to reasonably conclude it constituted an arrest.” [72] at 6. Dwyer

also emphasizes that officers handcuffed Adamidis during transport for safety

purposes, told Adamidis that he was only being detained (not under arrest), and

questioned him for only as much time as necessary to determine whether he was

involved in Glatz’s death.

Officers may conduct brief investigatory stops “if they reasonably suspect that

an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Torry v. City of Chicago,

932 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2019). Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than

probable cause. See United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2020)

(reasonable suspicion is “more than a hunch but less than probable cause”). “Subtle,

and perhaps tenuous, distinctions exist between a Terry stop, a Terry stop rapidly

evolving into an arrest[,] and a de facto arrest.” United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221,

1224 (7th Cir. 1994). For a Terry stop to “pass constitutional muster, the investigation

following it must be reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances

that justified the stop in the first instance so that it is a minimal intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.” United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548, 552

(7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). While there is no bright-line time limit, a stop that

lasts unreasonably long becomes an arrest and must be supported by probable cause.

See id. at 552–53.

This was not a Terry stop. While “certain seizures may be justified on

something less than probable cause,” neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh

Circuit have ever “sustained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary

removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there for

investigative purposes ... absent probable cause or judicial authorization.” See Kaupp

v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985)).

Here, officers handcuffed Adamidis in front of his home, did not allow him to re-enter

his residence, asked no questions and gathered no information to dispel their

suspicions, removed him from his property, and involuntarily transported him to the

police station for hours of questioning. Even if he were detained at the station only

briefly and for investigative purposes, “such seizures, at least where not under

judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that

arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.” Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.

Further, that officers told Adamidis he was being “detained” rather than

arrested does not matter. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979)

(“The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was not ‘booked,’

and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless,

while not insignificant for all purposes … obviously do not make petitioner’s seizure

even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its

progeny.”) Nor is it significant that officer safety allegedly motivated the decision to

transport Adamidis in handcuffs. See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 632 (“The test is an objective

one … and stressing the officers’ motivation of self-protection does not speak to how

their actions would reasonably be understood.”). The undisputed material facts show

that officers arrested Adamidis, triggering the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause

requirement.

2. Probable Cause

The next question is whether the undisputed material facts compel a finding

that defendants had probable cause to arrest Adamidis. Probable cause is an absolute

defense to a false-arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. See Farnik

v. City of Chicago, 1 F.4th 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Muhammad v. Pearson,

900 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 2018).

“Probable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of

criminal activity; it exists whenever an officer or a court has enough information to

warrant a prudent person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Young v. City of

Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406,

411 (7th Cir. 2010)). The probable-cause determination hinges on the elements of the

underlying criminal offense. See Neita, 830 F.3d at 497; see also Pourghoraishi v.

Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Whether an officer has probable

cause to arrest depends on the requirements of the applicable state criminal law.”).

The subjective motivations of the arresting officer are immaterial. See Gibbs v.

Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 737

F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir.2013)). Instead, an officer has probable cause to arrest a

suspect only “when, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would

believe that the suspect had committed a crime.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d

633, 638 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants invoke the collective knowledge doctrine, which holds that an

officer may arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer “even if the officer

himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level

of suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 596

(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir.

2010)). For the collective knowledge doctrine to apply, “(1) the officer taking the

action must act in objective reliance on the information received, (2) the officer

providing the information—or the agency for which he works—must have facts

supporting the level of suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be no more intrusive

than would have been permissible for the officer requesting it.” Williams, 627 F.3d at

252–53. The collective knowledge doctrine “is not an end around” the probable-cause

requirement; the officer or agency providing the relied upon information must still

have probable cause to justify the arrest. See United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042,

1052 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401

U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (“[A]n otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge

by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.”).

Defendants highlight several facts to argue that they had probable cause to

arrest Adamidis. They knew (1) Glatz was dead in her apartment, surrounded by

bottles of prescription pills and clutching a rolled-up dollar bill in her hand; (2) Glatz’s

Jeep was not in her parking spot; (3) Glatz’s brother provided officers Adamidis’s

name; and (4) the Jeep was parked in Adamidis’s driveway. Dwyer believed, based on

these facts, that Adamidis could have been involved with the illegal drugs at the

apartment, stolen Glatz’s vehicle, or caused her death.

But a reasonable jury could find that the officers’ collective suspicion of

Adamidis amounted to nothing more than speculation. There are no facts, for

example, indicating that anyone other than Glatz caused her own death, let alone

connecting Adamidis to the death. Officers found no signs of violence or struggle,

there was never a homicide investigation, and a jury could infer from Zepeda’s body

camera and Lobacz’s testimony that there was no problem with the lock or signs of

break-in at Glatz’s apartment. See [92] ¶¶ 30–31; [78] Ex. D, Zepeda BWC at 6:41–

7:03.14 And while officers knew that Glatz had struggled with drug addiction, they

had no evidence connecting Adamidis to the drugs in Glatz’s apartment or the cause

of her death.15

A jury could reasonably infer, moreover, that the presence of Glatz’s Jeep in

Adamidis’s driveway was not evidence of a crime that Adamidis committed. Glatz’s

father told officers that the vehicle had been repaired, returned to Glatz’s parking

space, and then towed by police after she was arrested. No one told the police that

they believed the vehicle had been stolen, and no evidence in the record suggests that

14 All defendants contend that there were signs of forced entry into the apartment. But

whether there was a broken lock or any other signs of forced entry, and whether those facts

would support probable cause, are questions for the jury. See Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737,

740 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The probable cause determination must be made by a jury if there is

room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from them.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

15 Guerra, Collins, and Donohoe say that officers “learned Plaintiff and Judy both had a

history of drug use” and that officers shared this information with one another. [74] at 5. To

support this assertion, defendants cite ¶ 32 of their statement of facts, which states in its

entirety: “[Glatz’s father] told Officer Ribaldo that Judy had a problem with drugs and that

he begged her to go to rehab, but she did not go, and the officers asked dispatch to run a

[criminal history check], a criminal history, to help determine if Judy Glatz had any history

of drug use or alcoholism.” [75] ¶ 32. This fact does not support a finding that officers learned

that Adamidis had a history of drug use.

Adamidis’s unlawfully possessed the vehicle. Dwyer believed the Jeep was relevant

to the investigation, and defendants argue that they had a lot of questions, so

bringing Adamidis in for questioning was the “only way” their questions could be

answered. [74] at 11. But officers could have questioned Adamidis at his home or

asked him to voluntarily come to the station for questioning. They also could have

attempted to search the vehicle to confirm their suspicions. Defendants were not

authorized, however, to arrest Adamidis based on a hunch about what might be in

the Jeep. Drawing all inferences in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could conclude

that officers lacked probable cause to believe Adamidis had committed a crime.

Defendants also have not identified what crime supplied the foundation of

their alleged probable cause. “Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest

ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law.” See Michigan v. DeFillippo,

443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). “Federal law asks only whether the officers had probable

cause to believe that the predicate offense, as the state has defined it, has been

committed.” Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2001). Defendants

here simply list several Illinois statutes for the first time in their reply briefs. See [91]

at 5 n.3 (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 720 ILCS 5/9-3.4

(concealment of a homicidal death), 720 ILCS 570/402 (illegal possession of a

controlled substance); 720 ILCS 570/406.2 (unauthorized possession of a prescription

form)); [93] at 7 (same).

These arguments are waived for two independent reasons. First, it is well

settled that “arguments raised for the first time in [a] reply brief are waived because

they leave no chance to respond.” White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir.

2021); see also Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2019). Second,

defendants simply list these statutes without any analysis or application to the facts

of this case. Such perfunctory and undeveloped arguments provide independent

grounds for waiver. See M.G. Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer

Agency, Inc., 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017). Even looking past the waiver issue, a

jury could reasonably conclude that officers lacked probable cause to believe plaintiff

was involved in any homicide or possessed any illegal drugs or prescription forms.

Probable cause to arrest requires more than suspicion that someone may have

committed some unidentified crime. Officers must have an articulable factual basis

to believe that the suspect committed a crime. See Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 638. A

reasonable jury could find that defendants did not have one here.

3. Dwyer’s Personal Involvement

Finally, Dwyer contends that there is no evidence that he was personally

involved in Adamidis’s arrest. A government official is liable under § 1983 only for

his or her own personal involvement in a constitutional violation. See Taylor v. Ways,

999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021). To hold a supervisor like Dwyer liable, plaintiff

must show Dwyer knew about the conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or

turned a blind eye to it. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir.

2017); Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).

There is evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that Dwyer knew

of plaintiff’s arrest and facilitated, approved, or condoned it. Donohoe testified that

Dwyer told her to go to “go to [Adamidis’s] house in Morton Grove to pick up a

suspect.” [92] ¶ 10. Collins testified that Dwyer told her and other officers to relocate

from Glatz’s apartment to Adamidis’s residence, and she personally heard Dwyer

state that Adamidis “should be detained.” [92] ¶ 9. And critically, Lobacz testified

that Dwyer assigned him to interview Adamidis at the station, and that Dwyer and

Collins told him that it was part of the death investigation. [92] ¶ 30. A trier of fact

could reasonably infer from these facts that Dwyer’s involvement throughout

Adamidis’s detention facilitated or approved his arrest, transport, and interrogation.

B. Qualified Immunity

In § 1983 suits, officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless: “(1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their

conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

577, 589 (2018) (quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800,

806 (7th Cir. 2021). This common-law doctrine aims “[t]o strike a balance between

addressing constitutional injuries committed by state actors and limiting the costs of

section 1983 suits.” Est. of Davis v. Ortiz, 987 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2021). When a

government official invokes qualified immunity at summary judgment, “the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to defeat the defense by showing (1) that a trier of fact could

conclude that the officer violated a federal right, and (2) that the unlawfulness of the

conduct was clearly established at the time the officer acted.” Ortiz, 987 F.3d 638–39.

Plaintiff has done so. A trier of fact could conclude that the defendants arrested

Adamidis without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. And

the constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly

established before Adamidis’s arrest. See, e.g. Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719,

725 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) and Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). As was the more specific right to be free from involuntary

detention for custodial interrogation without probable cause. See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at

630–32; Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815–16; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.

Still, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity if they arguably had

probable cause to arrest Adamidis. That is, even if they lacked probable cause,

defendants would be immune from suit “if a reasonable officer in their position could

mistakenly have believed that probable cause existed.” Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677,

684 (7th Cir. 2011).

But unresolved issues of material fact preclude a finding that any defendant

had arguable probable cause to seize Adamidis. A jury, for example, could find that

Dwyer ordered Donohoe and Collins to pick up Adamidis as a “suspect” and “bring

him to the station for questioning.” [92] ¶¶ 10–11. Both Donohoe and Collins testified

that Dwyer made the call to take Adamidis into custody. [92] ¶¶ 10–11, 21. Dwyer

was also involved in advising Adamidis’s questioners once he arrived at the station.

Based on the facts in record, a jury could find that Dwyer was personally involved in

the arrest and lacked even arguable probable cause to suspect Adamidis had

committed a crime. As plaintiff acknowledges, see [90] at 28, if a jury concludes that

Donohoe, Collins, and Guerra were simply acting on another officer’s orders, they

may be entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that they reasonably believed

there was probable cause. See United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir.

2007) (absent reason to believe otherwise, officer is entitled to deem reliable the

information received fellow officer); United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 764 (7th

Cir. 2005) (officers effecting an arrest need not know all facts that constitute probable

cause when they reasonably act at the direction of another officer).

Yet it is not clear from the record that Collins and Donohoe were acting at the

direction of Dwyer when they took Adamidis into custody. There was no

documentation of Dwyer ordering officers to take Adamidis into custody, and Dwyer

testified that he had no recollection of giving the order and would have expected such

an order to be documented. See [92] ¶¶ 3, 11. A jury might believe Dwyer that he did

not cause the arrest and simply ordered detectives to relocate to Adamidis’s residence.

[92] ¶ 10. Indeed, while Collins says she heard Dwyer say that Adamidis should be

detained, she does not recall who Dwyer said this to, and she never heard Dwyer state

that Adamidis was a suspect in a crime. [92] ¶¶ 8–9. If Collins and Donohoe arrested

plaintiff without Dwyer directing them to do so, then they would not be entitled to

qualified immunity. Similarly, Guerra testified that he handcuffed Adamidis at the

direction of Collins and Donohoe, but Donohoe testified that she did not instruct

Guerra to do so, and Collins claimed to have no knowledge of what led to Adamidis

being placed in handcuffs. [92] ¶ 22.

In short, the record is unsettled on what Dwyer told Collins and Donohoe, and

in turn, what Collins and Donohoe told Guerra. These factual gaps preclude a finding

that any defendant reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest Adamidis.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Adamidis, a jury could find that the

defendants violated Adamidis’s clearly established constitutional rights by making a

full-scale arrest without probable cause.

V. Conclusion

The motions for summary judgment, [71] and [73], are denied.

ENTER:

hA CS HA_

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: February 23, 2022

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