Bowman v. City of Chicago Board of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARVIN BOWMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 1:21-CV-03015

)

v. )

) Judge Edmond E. Chang

SHARON JONES COLEMAN, )

ALI MUHAMMAD, and )

CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Chicago public school teacher Marvin Bowman has filed a complaint of employ-

ment discrimination against the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, and Bow-

man also named as defendants his boss and a colleague. Bowman alleges that he has

faced discrimination and retaliation because of his religion and because of his advo-

cacy on behalf of special-needs students. R. 1, Orig. Compl.; R. 5, Am. Compl.1 The

Defendants have moved to dismiss the individually named defendants, Ali Muham-

mad and Sharon Jones Coleman, and to strike Bowman’s request for damages for his

former special-needs students. R. 20, Defs.’ Mot. For the following reasons, the De-

fendants’ motion is granted.

1Citations to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket entry. The Court has

jurisdiction over this case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

I. Background

The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The operative complaint in this case is the amended complaint

that Bowman filed pro se on June 9, 2021. R. 5. The Court will also consider the alle-

gations in the EEOC charge that was attached to Bowman’s original Complaint, and

the consistent allegations presented in his response brief. Bowman is a pro se litigant,

so he is entitled to have the filings liberally construed.

Marvin Bowman is employed by the Chicago Board of Education as a regular

classroom education teacher at Corliss High School. R. 1, Orig. Compl. at 2; Am.

Compl. at 2; R. 1 at 7, EEOC Charge. He has worked for the Board since around 2004.

EEOC Charge. Bowman says that he identifies as a “Bible Christian” and sometimes

needs to take time off work to observe religious holidays. EEOC Charge; R. 22, Pl.’s

Resp. at 2.

Bowman claims that when Ali Muhammad became principal of Corliss High

School (four years before the filing of this lawsuit), Bowman’s classes began filling up

with “unusually high numbers of special needs students.” Orig. Compl. at 5; Am.

Compl. at 4. Bowman raised the issue with Muhammad, which led to four-plus years

of harassment and retaliation. Orig. Compl. at 5. Bowman says that he has “endured

a number of different harassing actions that denied [his] students access to a fair and

equitable education and prevented [him] from doing [his] job unimpeded.” Am.

Compl. at 4. The filings are sparse on details about the alleged harassment, although

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his EEOC Charge does say that he was assigned additional special-needs students

and had his pay withheld. EEOC Charge. Bowman says that, at first, Muhammad

was the main harasser, but over the course of the last school year (2020–21), another

teacher, Sheila Jones-Coleman, also began harassing him. Am. Compl. at 4. Appar-

ently, Bowman and Jones-Coleman met to discuss Bowman’s concerns, and then

Jones-Coleman began harassing and retaliating against Bowman, which Muhammad

allowed her to do. Id. When Bowman “tried to stand up for [him]self” in an unspecified

way, Muhammad would threaten to discipline him. Id. at 4–5.

Bowman appears to believe he was retaliated against because of his religious

beliefs, and because of his advocacy on behalf of special-needs students. In the request

for relief in his Amended Complaint, he writes that he would like the defendant to

stop treating him differently because of his religion, expressing his desire to “take

religious high days off unimpeded.” Am. Compl. at 6. In his response brief, Bowman

explains that he never had to explain his absences for religious observances until

Muhammad became principal. Pl.’s Resp. at 2. Muhammad apparently questioned

those absences and Bowman faced an “inquiry about the faith [he] practice[s].” Id.

Apparently as part of this problem, his pay was withheld while he addressed these

questions about his religion, although he was ultimately able to resolve the issue. Id.

Bowman also explains in his response brief that, after Muhammad refused to

act on his concerns about the number of special-needs students in his classroom, Bow-

man brought those concerns to the Chicago Teachers Union. Pl.’s Resp. at 1. This

resulted in even more students being added to his classes. Id. Bowman views this as

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retaliation from Muhammad for Bowman’s standing up for his rights under his con-

tract, and for his students’ rights under laws governing special education. Id. Bow-

man also filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Education about the num-

bers of special-needs students in his classroom. Am. Compl. at 4. Despite his attempts

to bring the issue to the attention of various authorities, Bowman continued to be

assigned high percentages of special-education students. Pl.’s Resp. at 1.

Bowman filed his original Complaint using the form for a “Complaint of Em-

ployment Discrimination,” and checked a box indicating that he suffered discrimina-

tion because of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Orig. Compl. at 1, 4. A few days later, he filed an Amended Complaint (again using a

fill-in-the-blank form) largely repeating the allegations in his original Complaint but

adding Jones-Coleman as a defendant. Am. Compl. Bowman seeks several types of

relief from the Court. Id. at 6. He seeks an injunction against the Board to stop vio-

lating anti-discrimination laws and stop retaliating against him, including by making

it difficult for him to take time off of work for religious purposes; compensation for

the harassment he experienced; and compensation for his special-needs students. Id.

at 5–6.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).2 The Seventh Circuit has

explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended

to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might

keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). These allegations

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those

that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

A. Individual Defendants

The defense asks the Court to dismiss Ali Muhammad, the principal at Bow-

man’s school, and Sheila Jones-Coleman, another teacher there (or more specifically,

a Curriculum and Instructional Coach) from this suit. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. They contend

that Muhammad and Jones-Coleman cannot be held liable as individuals, and that

2This opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

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suing them in their official capacities would be redundant with suing the Board. Id.

at 3. They are correct.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminat-

ing against their employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit has long held that in both 1964 and

in 1991, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amending the damages

available under Title VII, “Congress never intended individual liability.” E.E.O.C. v.

AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995). The remedies avail-

able under Title VII (as well as the Americans with Disability Act and the Age Dis-

crimination in Employment Act) are of the kind “that an employing entity, not an

individual, could provide.” Id. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided for

different caps on damages for employers of different sizes, but was silent on the ques-

tion of what kind of damages could be assessed against an individual defendant, fur-

ther implying that individual defendants are not proper under Title VII. Id. There is

an exception of sorts for sole proprietors of a business, but that exception does not, of

course, apply here. Id. at 1280 n. 2; see also Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453

F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Legally, Gonzalez as the sole proprietor is Castaways;

she is the individual, whether by hands-on management or delegation to others of her

choosing, who decides the course of the business.” (emphasis in original)). There is

also no need to keep the individual defendants in the case in their official capacities–

this would indeed be redundant with suing the Board. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle

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Cty., Illinois, 243 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2001) (a “Title VII claim necessarily was an

official-capacity action because only an ‘employer’ is covered by that statute.”).

To the extent that Bowman intends to bring state law claims, the Illinois Hu-

man Rights Act also applies to employers only, and not to individuals. Watkins v.

Office of State Appellate Defender, 976 N.E.2d 387, 399 (Ill. App. 1st 2012). So, the

City is correct—Jones-Coleman and Muhammad must be dismissed from the case.

B. Relief Requested

Next, the Defendants ask the Court to strike Bowman’s request for damages

in the form of funds for the special-needs students who have, he says, suffered along-

side him because of the harassment he experienced. Defs.’ Mot. at 4. The Board out-

lines two problems with Bowman’s request: first, the relief that Bowman seeks is not

included in the remedies available under Title VII; second, Bowman does not have

standing to seek relief on behalf of the non-party students. Defs.’ Mot. at 4. Under

either analysis, the Board is correct, and Bowman cannot obtain the relief he seeks

on behalf of his students.

Title VII authorizes several forms of relief to a successful plaintiff, including

injunctions against the employer, reinstatement, back pay, and more. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(g). In extreme cases, plaintiffs can even receive punitive damages. Pickett

v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 610 F.3d 434, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2001). But Title VII’s

enforcement section makes no provision for damages to benefit non-parties affected

by the discrimination suffered by the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII protects

employees from discrimination; it does not protect non-parties from the ripple effects

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of that discrimination. See, e.g., Taylor v. ADS, Inc., 327 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2003)

(“Title VII protects only employees, and the evidence here unequivocally established

that there was no employment relationship between Herbert Taylor and any of the

defendants.” (cleaned up)).3

Even more fundamentally, a plaintiff always bears the burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction, which includes the constitutional requirement of stand-

ing. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). “In

essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court

decide the merits of the dispute or particular issues.” Id. (cleaned up). To satisfy Ar-

ticle III’s standing requirement at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts

that plausibly suggest that the plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly trace-

able to the conduct of the defendant and can be redressed by a favorable decision.

Larkin v. Finance Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 982 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). An injury-in-fact must be both

concrete and particularized. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct at 1548.

Bowman does not have standing to bring claims on behalf of his students for

damages under Title VII. The Court understands that actions that affect Bowman as

a teacher might also affect his students, as in his vivid example of the heat being

3The same is generally true under the Illinois Human Rights Act, to the extent Bow-

man intends to bring a claim under that statute; it applies to actions employers take against

their employees (or sometimes, contractors and consultants). ILCS 775 § 5/2-102. The Act

provides for similar damages as Title VII, and similarly does not permit damages to non-

parties. ILCS 665 § 5/8A-104.

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turned up in his classroom. R. 22, Pl.’s Resp. at 2. But even in that type of situation,

the students suffer harm separately from Bowman. One limitation on standing is “the

general rule that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the

legal rights of a third party.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 739 (7th Cir. 1999).

The Supreme Court has recognized rare exceptions to this rule, “when the plaintiff

can show a sufficiently significant personal interest in the outcome of the case to sat-

isfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement.” Id. But even if Bowman could

demonstrate such an interest, he could not bring claims on behalf of his students,

because they are not entitled to recover damages under Title VII, which appears to

be the sole basis of his lawsuit. As discussed above, because the students are not

employees of the Board of Education, they cannot seek relief under Title VII based on

alleged discrimination against Bowman. Remember that a necessary component of

standing is redressability—a plaintiff does not have standing if the Court could not

order relief to help him or her. Larkin, 982 F.3d at 1064. So even if Bowman were

somehow able to act on behalf of the students, he could not get them any relief from

this Court, and would therefore not have standing to request relief for them.

IV. Conclusion

The motion to dismiss Sharon Jones-Coleman and Ali Muhammad from the

case is granted. Ordinarily, a plaintiff would be given a chance to amend after a dis-

missal, but the complaint has already been amended once and given the legal flaw in

suing individuals under Title VII, there is no realistic prospect of adding the individ-

uals back into the case. So the dismissal of those two Defendants is with prejudice.

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To the extent that Bowman purports to bring a claim under Title VII for damages for

his students resulting from the harassment and discrimination he allegedly experi-

enced, that claim is dismissed due to the lack of Article III standing. Technically, the

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a dismissal without prejudice, and

that applies here. But there is no way to overcome that legal obstacle, so again no

amendment is permitted to add back a claim of damages for the students. If Bowman

intended to bring a different sort of claim or form of damages, then he can ask for

permission to amend his Complaint, but he must keep in mind the limitations on

standing (and on Title VII) discussed in this Opinion.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: December 25, 2021

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