Brown v. Dart

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 20-cv-4193

Judge Franklin U. Valderrama

THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook

County, and COOK COUNTY,

ILLINOIS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ron Brown (Brown) has sued Defendants Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of

Cook County (Dart), in both his individual and official capacities, and Cook County,

Illinois (Cook County) (collectively, Defendants), asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

based on injuries he sustained while he was a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail

during the coronavirus pandemic. R. 1, Compl.1 Specifically, Brown appears to allege

two distinct claims—first, he asserts that he was subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement due to Defendants’ inadequate response to the spread of

the coronavirus2 at the Cook County Jail, and second, he alleges that after he grew

ill and was transferred to a hospital, correctional officers used excessive restraint to

shackle him to the hospital bed. Compl. ¶¶ 24–25. Defendants have moved to dismiss

the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 10, Mot.

1Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number or filing name,

and where necessary, a page or paragraph citation.

2COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus that has affected nearly every aspect of everyday life.

Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and

denied in part.

Background

Brown is a 72-year-old pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail who has chronic

medical conditions stemming from a stroke he suffered several years ago, including

substantial limitations on his mobility. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5.3 From September 12, 2019 to

March 24, 2020, Brown was housed in Cook County Jail Tier 3C, a dormitory that

holds approximately 38 inmates in the Residential Treatment Unit (RTU). Id. ¶ 6.

Tier 3C is a congregate housing setting with a large number of inmates living in close-

quarters; inmates share showers, bathrooms, and a dayroom. Id. ¶ 9.

Brown alleges that since January 2020, Defendants knew that the novel

coronavirus posed a significant risk to the health and well-being of inmates at Cook

County Jail. Compl. ¶ 8. Despite this knowledge, Defendants failed to take reasonable

measures to protect “medically fragile inmates,” like Brown, from contracting the

coronavirus. Id. ¶ 10. Specifically, Defendants failed to distribute facemasks and

failed to provide readily available disinfectants or alcohol-based hand sanitizers to

the pretrial detainees. Id. ¶ 11. Moreover, the Cook County Jail staff did not regularly

sanitize common areas, such as showers, bathrooms, and eating areas in Tier 3C to

prevent the spread of coronavirus. Id.

By March 2020, several inmates assigned to Tier 3C exhibited symptoms of

coronavirus. Compl. ¶ 13. In a grievance letter dated March 20, 2020, Brown

3The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of Brown. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).

complained to the Cook County Jail staff about the dangerous conditions of

confinement and the inability to maintain a safe distance from the ill inmates. Id.

(“All of the air vents on 3C has a lot of dust . . . They need to be cleaned A.S.A.P. With

this coronavirus going on we need fresh air. . . . Also[,] no cleaning stuff is being sent

to keep these showers . . . clean.”).

By March 24, 2020, Brown became ill, registering a temperature of

approximately 102 degrees, and after an evaluation by a doctor at Cermak Urgent

Care Clinic, Brown was transferred to St. Anthony Hospital for treatment. Compl.

¶ 16. While at St. Anthony Hospital, Brown was treated for the coronavirus and

related symptoms, including extreme weakness, difficulty breathing, and significant

pain. Id. ¶ 17.

Brown further alleges that at that time, Dart instructed correctional officers

to shackle by hand and foot all seriously ill inmates being treated at local hospitals.

Compl. ¶ 18. Pursuant to this widespread practice, Brown was shackled to his

hospital bed while being treated at St. Anthony hospital. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23. Brown claims

that the constant restraint of his hand and foot caused him severe pain and

significantly limited his ability to position himself on his stomach, which, according

to his doctors, would have assisted with breaching and reduced stress on his already

strained lungs. Id. ¶ 23. On April 17, 2020, Brown was released from St. Anthony

Hospital and returned to Cook County Jail. Id. ¶ 22.

Following these events, Brown filed suit against Defendants, asserting Section

1983 claims. Compl. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Mot. Dismiss.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the

complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811,

820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual

allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Analysis

Section 1983 provides that a person may not be deprived of any constitutional

right by an individual acting under color of state law. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467,

472 (7th Cir. 2009). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that they

were “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, by a person

acting under color of law.” Thurman v. Vill. of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.

2006).

While not a model of clarity, the Complaint apparently alleges two distinct

claims—(i) one unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against Dart (in his

official capacity only4) and Cook County and (ii) one unconstitutional excessive

restraint claim against Dart (in both his official and individual capacities) and Cook

County (as an indispensable party only).5 See Compl. ¶ 25 (“Defendants Dart and

Cook County . . . violated plaintiff’s rights because the conditions of confinement

4Though not readily apparent from the Complaint, Brown clarified in his response brief that

“Plaintiff does not seek to impose individual liability against Dart for the conditions of

confinement at Cook County Jail that caused plaintiff to contract coronavirus.” See R. 20,

Resp. at 14 n.5.

5The Complaint includes some seemingly contradictory allegations regarding Cook County’s

role as a defendant. The Complaint first alleges that “Defendant Cook County shares

responsibility with Defendant Dart for providing medical care for inmates remanded to the

Sheriff’s custody and is also joined in this action pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle

County, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003),” suggesting that Cook County is only added to the

suit as an indispensable party under Carver (explaining that federal law deems the

applicable Illinois county a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an

independently elected county officer, like the sheriff, in an official capacity). Compl. ¶ 4. Later

allegations in the Complaint relating to the conditions of confinement claim, however, assert

that both Dart and Cook County have responsibility for providing adequate conditions of

confinement for medically ill inmates at Cook County Jail and violated Plaintiffs rights by

failing to take reasonable measures to protect medically fragile inmates like Brown. See id.

¶¶ 8–12, 14–15, 25. On the other hand, as to the excessive restraint claim, Brown alleges

that “Dart’s widespread restraint practice, applied to plaintiff, was excessive, caused

gratuitous pain, and violated plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” See id. ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Taking the Complaint’s

allegations together as a whole and drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations,

the Court construes the Complaint to be (i) asserting the conditions of confinement claim

against Cook County under Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)

and (ii) bringing Cook County in as an indispensable defendant only to the excessive restraint

claim under Carver. The Court finds that the Complaint adequately puts Defendants on

notice of these claims. See Sanders v. JGWPT Holdings, Inc., 2016 WL 4009941, at *10 (N.D.

Ill. July 26, 2016) (collecting cases and finding that Rule 8 requires only that the plaintiff

provide “enough detail about the nature of the allegations to put each defendant on fair notice

of the claims”) (internal citation omitted).

posed an unreasonable risk to his health.”); id. ¶ 24 (“Dart’s widespread restraint

practice, applied to plaintiff, was excessive, caused gratuitous pain, and violated

plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.”); see also Resp. at 8 n.3 (“The complaint along with the elaborations in

this response show that the Sheriff and the County have joint responsibility for

providing adequate conditions of confinement for medically ill inmates at Cook

County Jail”); id. at 12–14 (arguing that Brown has adequately alleged a shackling

claim against Dart in his official and individual capacities, without mention of Cook

County). The Court addresses the sufficiency of each claim’s allegations, as against

each Defendant, in turn.

I. Conditions of Confinement Claim

Brown claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by

inadequately responding to the coronavirus outbreak at Cook County Jail and

knowingly subjecting him to conditions of confinement that posed an unreasonable

risk to his health. Compl. ¶ 25. “‘Pretrial detainees may assert a conditions-of-

confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause’ if

subjected to ‘adverse conditions that deny the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.’” Johnson v. Foster, 2020 WL 5891405, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2020)

(quoting Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019)). To state a

conditions of confinement claim, the pretrial detainee must allege that: (1) the

defendant “acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly as to the

conditions of the detainee’s confinement”; and (2) the defendant’s conduct was

objectively unreasonable. Johnson, 2020 WL 5891405 at *2 (citing Miranda v. County

of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018)). An official’s response to a particular

condition may be reasonable even if the response fails to avert the harm. See Cullom

v. Dart, et al., 2020 WL 7698366, at *2 (internal citations omitted). “And the

reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct must be evaluated based upon the totality

of the circumstances and with appropriate deference to jail administrators’

evaluation of safety and security concerns.” Id.

Defendants do not dispute that Brown sufficiently pled the claim’s first

element—knowing conduct. See generally Mot. Dismiss. Indeed, Brown alleges that

Defendants “knew of the serious risk of harm caused by the coronavirus”; “knew [that]

the implementation and enforcement of social distancing, surgical mask use,

increased access to soap and alcohol-based hand sanitizer, and enhanced cleaning

and disinfectant practices likely reduced the spread of the virus”; and failed to take

reasonable steps to curb the spread of coronavirus. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 25.

The element at issue, then, is whether Defendants’ response to the outbreak

was “objectively unreasonable.” Johnson, 2020 WL 5891405 at *2. Defendants insist

that their actions were objectively reasonable and that they took “unprecedented

measures” to respond to a global pandemic that had “no vaccine or solution.” Mot.

Dismiss at 4; R. 21, Reply at 6. In support, Defendants point to the district court’s

findings in Mays v. Dart, 456 F. Supp. 3d 966, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2020), which concerned

a request for a preliminary injunction involving coronavirus prevention measures at

Cook County Jail, and the findings in the subsequent Seventh Circuit opinion, Mays

v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020). See Mot. Dismiss at 5–7; Reply at 5. In granting

the preliminary injunction, the district court explained that it could not “reasonably

be disputed that the Sheriff has undertaken a significant, and impressive, effort to

safeguard detained persons in his custody from infection by coronavirus. And . . . the

Court [was] satisfied that the Sheriff and his staff [had] acted in good faith, with the

goal of protecting the people placed in his custody, consistent with his obligation to

maintain security.” Mays, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 1002 (emphasis added). And on appeal,

in remanding certain aspects of the injunctive relief, the Seventh Circuit specifically

noted that Dart “took numerous protective measures to prevent the spread of COVID-

19,” including “increasing disinfection and sanitization, devising protocols to screen

detainees for symptoms, and moving infected detainees to separate housing.” Mays,

974 F.3d at 815.

Defendants appear to request that the Court take judicial notice of the Mays

commentary and to find that Dart’s demonstrated “good faith” and “impressive”

efforts foreclose Brown’s claim here. See Mot. Dismiss at 5–7; Reply at 5–6. The Court,

like several other courts in this District analyzing nearly identical claims, rejects

Defendants’ position regarding Mays. See Wilson v. Dart, 2021 WL 2549401, at *2

(N.D. Ill. June 22, 2021) (rejecting Dart’s reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s findings

in Mays); Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2 (same); Gama v. Dart, 2020 WL 6802030,

at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2020) (rejecting Dart’s reliance on the district court’s findings

in Mays). As Brown points out, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a court to take

judicial notice of a fact only if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it is

generally known” or “can be accurately determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 952

(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)); see also Resp. at 6 (citing Gen. Elec.

Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997)). The

Mays cases neither indisputably nor “definitively establish” that Defendants’

response to the coronavirus was objectively reasonable. Wilson, 2021 WL 2549401, at

*2. The district court in Mays was ruling only on a request for a preliminary

injunction, which by definition, is “not a decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s suit.”

Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2. And the Seventh Circuit specifically emphasized

that it was “not address[ing] the merits of whether Plaintiffs [had] demonstrated that

they [had] suffered a constitutional violation” and instead was only considering

whether any errors were made in the granting of the preliminary injunction. Mays,

974 F.3d at 815. The Court does not take judicial notice of or otherwise rely on the

Mays commentary.

Aside from Mays, Defendants also summarily contend that they took a “more

aggressive approach to COVID-19 prevention and remediation than many local, state,

national, and international governments, businesses, and nongovernmental

organizations” and were “taking measures that went above and beyond CDC

guidelines.” Mot. Dismiss at 9. But, any counter-facts or affirmative defenses pose

questions for a later stage. On a motion to dismiss, the Court must evaluate the

allegations in the Complaint, and draw all inferences in Brown’s favor without

considering any additional facts proffered by Defendants. See Wilson, 2021 WL

2549401, at *3; Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2. The Court finds that Brown has

sufficiently alleged that Defendants acted objectively unreasonably in failing to

distribute facemasks, disinfectants, or alcohol-based hand sanitizer; failing to

regularly sanitize the showers, bathrooms, and eating areas; failing to implement

social distancing; and failing to administer a testing program for inmates. See Compl.

¶¶ 9, 11, 14–15. As such, the Court finds that Brown has sufficiently stated a claim

for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

As for pleading defendant liability, the Court has construed the conditions of

confinement claim to be brought against both Dart in his official capacity and Cook

County (and, as noted above, the Court has found that Defendants had sufficient

notice of this claim as it pertains to each defendant). See Gama, 2020 WL 6802030,

at *1(evaluating nearly identical conditions of confinement claim as against both

defendants—Dart and Cook County). Claims against Dart in his official capacity and

Cook County arise under Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Defendants do not address the

specific Monell liability requirements (allegations that the injury was caused by a

widespread policy or practice) in their briefing, but regardless, the Court finds that

Brown’s allegations generally concern widespread policies and practices regarding

sanitation, hygiene, the availability of personal protective equipment, and social

distancing at Cook County Jail. See Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, 15. The Court further finds

that Brown alleges these policies and practices caused him to contract coronavirus.

Id. ¶¶ 17, 25; see also Wilson, 2021 WL 2549401, at *2 (finding that nearly identical

allegations had adequately stated a Monell claim against Dart).

Having determined that Brown has sufficiently alleged a conditions of

confinement claim and satisfied the Monell threshold, the Court denies Defendants’

motion to dismiss as to the conditions of confinement claim and permits the claim to

proceed as against Dart in his official capacity and Cook County.

II. Shackling Claim

Brown also alleges that he was subjected to unconstitutional excessive

restraint when he was shackled to his hospital bed pursuant to “Dart’s widespread

restraint practice” and brings a shackling claim against Dart in both his official and

individual capacities. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment prohibits the use of bodily restraints in a manner that serves to punish

a pre-trial detainee.” May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal

citations omitted). “The use of bodily restraints constitutes punishment in the

constitutional sense if their use is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive

government purpose or they appear excessive in relation to the purpose they allegedly

serve.” Id. (emphasis added).

Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss the excessive restraint

claim because there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about restraining

detainees in unsecure hospital facilities, as shackling “serves the legitimate

penological goal of preventing inmates awaiting trial from escaping . . . less secure

confines, and is not excessive in that goal.” Mot. Dismiss at 10 (quoting Haslar v.

Megerman, 104 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, Defendants insist that

handcuffing a detainee without preventing him from receiving medical care and

without causing any apparent injury is not excessive. Mot. Dismiss at 11.

In response, Brown concedes that preventing detainee escape is a legitimate

non-punitive government purpose for the shackling policy. Resp. at 9–10

(“Defendants are correct that there is a legitimate non-punitive government purpose

for the shackling policy. . . . And shackling detainees while they are on hospital visits

furthers that purpose.”) (internal citations omitted). However, Brown correctly insists

that even when shackling may serve a rationally related non-punitive purpose,

shackling can still violate substantive due process if it is executed in an excessive

manner. Id. Brown maintains that courts in this District have found that the

continuous restraint of a hospitalized detainee states a viable claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 10 (citing May, 226 F.3d at 884; Thurman v. Unknown

Cook Cty. Sheriff Emps., 2018 WL 5315208, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Harper v. Dart,

2015 WL 6407577, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Moore v. Dart, 2014 WL 7205575, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. 2014); Flores v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 2014 WL 1031494, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2014)).

Brown specifically highlights May, in which the Seventh Circuit found that shackling

an AIDS patient to a hospital bed around the clock while under constant watch of a

guard was “plainly excessive in the absence of any indication that the detainee pose[d]

some sort of security risk.” 226 F.3d at 884.

In reply, Defendants attempt to distinguish May. Mot. Dismiss at 10.

Defendants maintain that in May, the 24-hour shackling prevented the plaintiff from

receiving visitors, meeting with his lawyers, and generally participating in the legal

process, in addition to causing the plaintiff physical and emotional pain. Id. (citing

May, 226 F.3d at 878). Defendants insist that Brown alleges no similar facts here.

The Court finds that Defendants misconstrue the relevant holding in May. The

Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss as to the

substantive due process claim, explaining that “it [was] hard to see how shackling an

AIDS patient to his or her bed around the clock, despite the continuous presence of a

guard, [was] an appropriate policy for carrying out [a non-punitive government]

purpose.” May, 226 F.3d at 884. Factual allegations involving meeting with lawyers

and visitors related to May’s equal protection and access to the courts claims,

irrelevant for evaluating a shackling claim. Id. at 882–83. Moreover, Brown did allege

a physical injury here. Compl. ¶ 23. The Court disagrees with Defendants and finds

that May sets guideposts for deeming a specific shackling “excessive.” 226 F.3d at

884.

Here, Brown has alleged that while at the hospital, he was being “treated for

the coronavirus and related symptoms including extreme weakness, difficulty

breathing, and significant pain.” Compl. ¶ 17. Brown further alleges that “the

continuous restraint of plaintiff’s hand and foot caused significant pain. The restraint

also significantly limited the plaintiff’s ability to position himself on his stomach,

pursuant to advice from the medical staff, to assist with breathing and reduce stress

on his strained lungs.” Id. ¶ 23. Importantly, and as Defendants point out, Plaintiff

does not specifically allege that he was “shackled to his bed 24 hours-a-day or that an

armed guard was present 24 hours-a-day,” which was a crucial non-security risk

finding in May.6 Reply at 4; May, 226 F.3d at 884. But, the allegations that Brown

was suffering from coronavirus, was having difficulty breathing, and had previous

chronic medical conditions that limited his mobility are sufficient to infer that he was

not a security risk and did not require shackling at that time. See Gama, 2020 WL

6802030, at *4 (“The elaboration that he had difficulty breathing and that he was

very weak is consistent, however, with his allegation that he had coronavirus, and

that allegation is sufficient to infer that he was not a security risk and did not require

shackling.”). Based on (i) Brown’s allegations that the “continuous” shackling caused

Brown significant pain and prevented him from positioning himself on his stomach

against his doctor’s recommendation and (ii) the reasonable inference that Brown did

not pose a security risk, the Court finds that Brown has sufficiently pled an excessive

restraint claim as it relates to his shackling at the hospital.

Finally, regarding pleading defendant liability, Brown brings his shackling

claim against Dart in both his official and individual capacities. Again, Defendants

do not appear to challenge the official capacity claim, but regardless, the Court finds

that Brown has adequately alleged that the shackling was executed, and the violation

of his constitutional rights was caused, pursuant to a common policy or widespread

practice implemented by the Sheriff’s Office. See Compl. ¶ 18–19 (“The Sheriff

6In his response brief, Brown attempts to “elaborate” on his allegations and adds that “the

plaintiff was under the constant monitoring by at least two armed correctional officers.” Resp.

at 5. Though a plaintiff is permitted to add factual allegations in responding to a motion to

dismiss, any new allegations must be consistent with the facts already alleged in the

complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court finds

that the response brief’s allegation that “two armed correctional officers” were “assigned to

directly watch plaintiff in his hospital room” is an entirely new fact, not consistent with any

facts alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the Court does not consider it.

instructs correctional officers to shackle by hand and foot all seriously ill inmates

hospitalized at Stroger and other outlying hospitals. . . . Consistent with Dart’s

instruction, correctional officers assigned to guard inmates at outlying hospitals

engage in a widespread practice of shackling inmates to the bed.”). This is sufficient

to support an official capacity (Monell) claim against Dart.

However, the Court finds that Brown has not adequately alleged an individual

capacity claim against Dart. Individual liability under Section 1983 requires a

defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015); Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 594

(7th Cir. 2003). “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and

predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant

caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987,

991 (7th Cir. 1996). As such, allegations must demonstrate that a defendant was

“personally involved in the particular deprivation alleged or that the deprivation

occurred at the defendant’s direction or with the defendant’s knowledge and

consent.” Neely v. Randel, 2013 WL 3321451, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2013). As

explained above, Brown’s claim of a constitutional violation involving the application

of excessive shackling is premised upon and evaluated by his particular

circumstances, specifically his critical health condition and the conditions under

which he was restrained. See supra at 12–14. Brown has not plausibly alleged that

Dart was aware of any of his particular conditions, and therefore has failed to state

a claim against Dart in his individual capacity. See Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *4

(dismissing nearly identical claim against Dart in his individual capacity because the

plaintiff had not alleged that Dart was aware of his severe health conditions or the

circumstances under which he was being restrained).

In sum, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the shackling

claim against Dart in his official capacity but grants the motion to dismiss as to the

shackling claim against Dart in his individual capacity. The dismissal of the

individual capacity claim is with prejudice, as Brown neither suggests how he might

cure the defects nor requests leave to amend in the event of dismissal. See Haywood

v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Nothing in

Rule 15, nor in any of our cases, suggests that a district court must give leave to

amend a complaint where a party does not request it or suggest to the court the ways

in which it might cure the defects. To the contrary, we have held that courts are

within their discretion to dismiss with prejudice where a party does not make such a

request or showing.”); Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A

district court acts within its discretion in . . . dismissing a complaint with prejudice .

. . when the plaintiff fails to demonstrate how [an] amendment would cure the

deficiencies in the prior complaint.”).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [10] is granted in part

and denied in part. Specifically, the Court dismisses with prejudice Brown’s shackling

claim against Dart in his individual capacity but otherwise denies Defendants’

motion to dismiss.’ Defendants are instructed to answer the Complaint by October

25, 2021. The parties are instructed to file a joint status report on or before November

5, 2021.

Franklin U. Valderrama

United States District Judge

Dated: September 25, 2021

7As referenced above, Defendants filed nearly identical motions to dismiss challenging nearly

identical complaints in Gama, 2020 WL 6802030, at *4 and Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *4,

and the district judges in both cases permitted the Cook County and Dart official capacity

claims to proceed but dismissed the Dart individual capacity claims. While this Court is, of

course, not bound by the decision in another district court case, the Court finds the reasoning

in these cases to be sound and persuasive. See Townsel v. DISH Network L.L.C., 668 F.3d

967, 970 (7th Cir. 2012) C[D]istrict courts’ decisions are not authoritative, even in the

rendering district (other district judges may disagree).”).

17