The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DONDRE ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 19-cv-5452
Judge Franklin U. Valderrama
ROB JEFFREYS, ACTING
DIRECTOR of the ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dondre Adams (Adams), formerly an inmate in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), was imprisoned for six months beyond his
release date. Adams has filed suit asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Rob
Jeffreys (Jeffreys), the Acting Director of the IDOC, and several correction officers,
including Bernita Thigpen (Thigpen), Michael Sturch (Sturch) (collectively
Defendants), as well as several unknown “John Doe” correction officers. R. 41, SAC.1
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 54, Mot. Dismiss. For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
1Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number or filing name,
and where necessary, a page or paragraph citation.
Background
Adams was convicted of a sex offense in 1994. SAC ¶ 16.2 As a result of his
conviction, Adams was required to register annually and notify a reporting agency if
his address or contact information changed. Id. ¶ 17. In August 2017, Adams was
charged with violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 Ill. Comp. Stat.
150/10(a). Id. ¶ 18. On May 14, 2019, Adams pleaded guilty to the charge and was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30 months, to be served at 50%, subject to
time served. Id. ¶ 19. Adams was also sentenced to a one-year term of Mandatory
Supervised Release (MSR). Id. ¶ 20. After pleading guilty, Adams was transferred
into IDOC custody and arrived at Stateville Correctional Center (Stateville) on May
17, 2019. Id. ¶ 22. Before being transferred into IDOC custody, Adams had been in
custody in McLean County, Illinois, from August 29, 2017 to January 22, 2018; March
22, 2018 to August 16, 2018; and November 10, 2018 to May 13, 2019. Id. ¶ 21, Exh.
D. Adams was given credit for 479 days of time served, or approximately 15.5 months.
Id. ¶ 21, Exhs. C–D.
Based on his sentence and prior incarceration, Adams alleges that by the time
he arrived at Stateville on May 17, 2019, he was eligible for release on MSR. SAC
¶¶ 22–23. To be released on MSR, Adams was required to have a “host site” approved
by IDOC where he could serve his one-year MSR term. Id. ¶ 24. Upon his arrival at
Stateville and in anticipation of his release, Adams gave his counselor, John Doe 1,
his aunt’s address and contact information for an investigation of his aunt’s home as
2The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of Brown. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).
a host site. Id. ¶ 25. Adams also submitted a request to John Doe 1 to discuss his host
site. Id. ¶ 27. John Doe 1 informed Adamas that he would have to see the parole board
first. Id.
On May 20, 2019, Adams received a Parole Violation Report from IDOC
correctional officer Thigpen. SAC ¶ 28. The report was prepared by parole agent
Michael Sturch, which listed a release date of May 17, 2019, and a parole violation of
the same date. Id. ¶ 28. Per the report, Adams was in “violation of MSR Rule #5
because no suitable host site for intensive supervision could be found. This agency
attempted to place the offender at (all) places with family and/or friends in the
community and no suitable host site was found to supervise the offender on intensive
supervision. This agency attempted to place the offender at (all) places that [IDOC]
would pay for and the paid placements for any number of reasons could not accept
the offender.” Id. ¶ 28, Exh. F. Adams was not told why his aunt’s home had not been
approved as a host site. Id. ¶ 29.
On May 21, 2019, Adams contacted John Doe 1 and informed John Doe 1 that
he had additional site addresses he could submit for consideration. SAC ¶ 31. Adams
was informed that he would have to see the Prisoner Review Board (PRB or parole
board) first. Id. On June 11, 2019, Adams met with the PRB. Id. ¶ 33. The PRB
“resumed” Adams’s parole on that date, meaning that he was eligible for release on
MSR, subject to IDOC approval of a host site. Id. ¶ 33. Adams subsequently submitted
three host sites, including his aunt’s home. Id. ¶ 34. Adams submitted three
addresses of family members for consideration as proposed sites, and also provided
IDOC with the contact information for each family member. Id. ¶ 34. In July 2019,
John Doe 1 informed Adams, without explanation, that his host sites had not been
approved. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
In August 2019, Adams was transferred to Danville Correctional Center
(Danville). SAC ¶ 38. Shortly after arriving at Danville, Adams submitted several
proposed host sites to his counselor, John Doe 2, again including his aunt’s home in
Bloomington. Id. ¶ 39. Approximately one week later, Jon Doe 2 informed Adams that
his proposed sites had not been approved. Id. ¶ 40. Without the approval of a host
site, Adams remained incarcerated until his release on November 15, 2019. Id. ¶ 44.
Adams was released on said date because he had “maxed out” his MSR time, meaning
that he had served his entire term of MSR while remaining in prison. Id.
Adams subsequently filed suit against Defendants, asserting violations of his
constitutional rights as the Defendants failed to properly investigate Adams’
proposed host sites, resulting in his extended incarceration. Adams’ SAC is the
operative complaint, in which he asserts a Section 1983 claim for violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights (Count I) and a Section 1983 claim for violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count II).
Defendants move to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss; R. 55,
Memo. Dismiss.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811,
820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual
allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,
rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Analysis
Section 1983 provides that a person may not be deprived of any constitutional
right by an individual acting under color of state law. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467,
472 (7th Cir. 2009). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that they
were “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, by a person
acting under color of law.” Thurman v. Vill. of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.
2006). Individual liability under Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d
768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015); Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003).
“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated
upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th
Cir. 1996). As such, allegations must demonstrate that a defendant was “personally
involved in the particular deprivation alleged or that the deprivation occurred at the
defendant’s direction or with the defendant’s knowledge and consent.” Neely v.
Randel, 2013 WL 3321451, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2013).
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint for three
reasons. First, Adams fails to plead the requisite personal involvement required for
Section 1983 liability as the allegations against the Defendants are all “lump[ed]
together.” Memo. Dismiss at 2–4. Second, Defendants are not responsible for finding
housing for Adams. Id. at 4–5. Last, Defendants are immune from damages based on
the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 5–7. The Court addresses each argument in
turn.
I. Defendants’ Personal Involvement
Defendants contend that Adams fails to adequately allege any Defendant’s
personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights to
sufficiently plead individual violations of Section 1983. Memo. Dismiss at 2–3.
Instead, they argue that Adams impermissibly resorts to group pleading by alleging
that Defendants “did not properly investigate Adam’s proposed host sites prior to
denying approval, and/or did not take steps to ensure that the proposed host sites
would be properly investigate.” Id. at 3.
Adams counters that Defendants seek to impose a higher pleading standard
than what is required under Rule 8(a), which requires only a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [Adams] is entitled to relief, in order to give
defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they rest.” R. 63,
Resp. at 6. The key question at the motion to dismiss stage, asserts Adams, is whether
the plaintiff has “generally name[d] the persons responsible for the problem.” Id. at
7 (quoting Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, 2013 WL 5348326 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013)).
Adams insist that he has done so. The Court agrees.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment of a
prisoner.” U.S. CONST. AMEND VIII. A plaintiff states a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation if he or she is detained in jail for longer than he or she should
have been, due to the deliberate indifference of correction officials. Childress v.
Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2015). “[D]eliberate indifference may be found
where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct, facilitates, approves,
condones, or ‘turn[s] a blind eye to it.’” Perez, 792 F.3d at 781 (quoting Vance v.
Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992–93 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Beginning with Defendant Jeffreys, Adams alleges that Jeffreys, in his role as
Acting Director of IDOC, had authority to release incarcerated persons like Adams
who had served their court-ordered sentences. Resp. at 7–8 (citing SAC ¶ 10). Adams
further pleads that Jeffreys, despite having this authority and knowledge that the
failure to investigate proposed sites would result in an inmate’s continued
incarceration, failed to investigate and/or failed to take steps to ensure that an
investigation was caried out. Id. at 8 (citing SAC 30, 37, 41, 49–50, 59). These
allegations, however, fail to reveal that Jeffreys had any knowledge of or personal
involvement in Adams’ alleged constitutional deprivations. Standing alone, these
allegations seem to suggest liability based on respondeat superior, which is improper.
See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1982). Adams, however, alleges more:
he also alleges that there exists an “established IDOC practice” of incarcerating
individuals convicted of sex offenses beyond their release date. SAC ¶ 3. As Adams
correctly points out, “the personal involvement of senior jail officials . . . can be
inferred at the motion to dismiss stage where . . . the plaintiff alleges potentially
systemic, as opposed to clearly localized, constitutional violations.” Resp. at 8
(quoting Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations
omitted)); see also Eason v. Pritzker, 2020 WL 6781794, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2020).
Therefore, Jeffreys, as the Acting Director of the IDOC who has authority over the
release of inmates like Adams, is presumed to know about the alleged practice of
incarcerating convicted sex offenders beyond their release dates. The SAC alleges
enough to move beyond the pleadings, as Adams plausibly alleges that Jeffreys was
aware of the constitutional deprivations.
As to Sturch, the Court also finds that Adams has adequately pled his
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Adams alleges that Sturch
prepared a parole violation report indicating that no suitable host site could be found
for Adams. Resp. at 3 (citing SAC ¶¶ 12, 28). He did so without investigating Adams’s
proposed host site (including contacting Adams’ relatives) or taking steps to ensure
that a proper investigation was carried out, despite knowing that Adams would
remain incarcerated past his release date if his proposed site was not investigated.
Id. at 3–4 (citing SAC ¶¶ 30, 37, 45–62). The Court agrees with Adams that these
allegations are sufficient to put Sturch on notice of the basis of Adams’ claims against
him. See, e.g., Ortega v. Halliday, 2020 WL 6681376, at *2, *5 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2020)
(denying motion to dismiss similar claims against defendant correctional counselor
who refused prisoner-plaintiff’s proposed host site and did not enter it into the IDOC’s
offender tracking system).
The Court, however, cannot say the same for Thigpen. The entire allegation
against Thigpen is that he delivered to Adams the parole violation report prepared
by Sturch. Resp. at 4 (citing SAC ¶¶ 11, 28). That is not enough. See, e.g., Ortega,
2020 WL 6681376, at *3 (dismissing similar claim against defendant who provided to
plaintiff-prison a report opposing proposed MSR site, and noting that such an action
actually seemed to have helped plaintiff’s claims against other prison officials).
In sum, the Court finds in viewing the allegations of the SAC in the light most
favorable to Adams and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Adams, that the
SAC adequately alleges claims against Jeffreys and Sturch, but fails to do so against
Thigpen.
II. Housing Site
Next, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the SAC because they
are not required under Illinois law to find a host site for an inmate on MSR. Memo.
Dismiss at 4–5 (citing Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 967 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2012)). Adams responds that Defendants misconstrue his claims: his claims
are based on Defendants’ failure to ensure that the host sites Adams proposed were
properly investigated, not that Defendants failed to independently search for and
obtain housing for Adams. Resp. at 9–10.
Adams clarifies that he is alleging in Count I that his Eighth Amendment
rights were violated when the Defendants failed to investigate host sites that Adams
proposed in numerous written requests, which forced Adams to serve an additional
six months past his release date. Resp. at 9 (citing SAC ¶¶ 45–53). Adams cites to
two similar cases within the Seventh Circuit where courts have held that the failure
to investigate a proposed host site states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Resp.
at 9–10 (citing Ortega, 2020 WL 6681376, at *2, 4–5; Stepney v. Johnson, 2016 WL
5720367, *3–5 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). Similarly, for his Count II Fourteenth Amendment
claim, Adams explains that he alleges that Defendants violated his procedural due
process by repeatedly denying approval of his proposed sites without undertaking an
adequate investigation, including by failing to contact or visit the homes of the
relatives who were willing to host him while he served his term of MSR. Resp. at 10.
Again, Adams cites to two similar in-Circuit cases that have held that the failure to
properly investigate proposed host cites can give rise to procedural due process
claims. Id. (citing Ortega, 2020 WL 6681376, at *4–5; Murphy v. Madigan, 2017 WL
3581175, *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2017)). Notably, in their Reply, Defendants fail to
address, much less distinguish the cases cited by Adams in support of his argument
as to both claims. R. 64, Reply. Again, the Court agrees with Adams. He has properly
alleged violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on
Defendants’ failure to adequately investigate his proposed host sites, resulting in
Adams serving an additional six month in custody past his release date.
III. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants argue that they are immune from damages under the
doctrine of qualified immunity, as the law they are alleged to have violated was
neither clearly established nor was the violation intentional or the result of gross
misfeasance or nonfeasance. Memo. Dismiss 5–7. Adams retorts that dismissal on the
basis of qualified immunity is premature because such a defense is fact intensive.
Resp. at 11 (citing Thuet v. Chi. Pub. Sch., 2020 WL 5702195, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
24, 2020); Baker v. City of Chi., 2020 WL 5110377, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2020);
Johnson v. Winstead, 447 F. Supp. 3d 715, 720–71 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Blacher v. Vill. of
Dolton, 2019 WL 1584552, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2019); Cage v. Harper, 2018 WL
4144624, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2018)).
Qualified immunity “‘shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007
(2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per
curiam)). “The doctrine of qualified immunity balances dueling interests—allowing
officials to perform their duties reasonably without fear of liability on the one hand
and affording members of the public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations
by government officials who abuse their offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook
Cty., 993 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.’” Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 727 (7th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once a defendant properly
raises the defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it. Leiser v. Kloth, 933
F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2722 (2020). Courts, in
determining whether qualified immunity applies, engage in a two-prong inquiry. Rose
ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2018). Under the first
prong, the court inquires whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
injured party, show that the officer’s conduct violated a federal right. Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Under the second prong, the court inquires whether the
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Id.
“[D]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate based on qualified immunity only
when the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, do not ‘state a claim of
violation of clearly established law.’” Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996)).
The Court finds that Adams has alleged facts that, taken in the light most
favorable to Adams, plausibly support claims of deliberate indifference to Adams’
Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Count I) and
of a violation of his procedural due process rights infringing in his cognizable liberty
interest in being released from prison (Count II), and that said rights were clearly
established at the time of the violations of Adams’s right. This conclusion is consistent
with Seventh Circuit precedent which teaches that “because a qualified immunity
defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a complaint is not generally
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Reed v. Palmer, 906
F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018). This is so “because a plaintiff is not required to
anticipate and overcome the qualified immunity defense in their pleadings.“ Id. at
589. Whether Defendants are ultimately entitled to immunity is a question for
another day.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [54] is granted in
part and denied in part. Specifically, the Court dismisses without prejudice Adams’s
claim against Thigpen but otherwise denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Also
before the Court is Adam’s Motion to Expedite Discovery and File an Amended
Complaint to Identify Doe Defendants [67]. Mot. Disc. In the Motion, Adams
indicated the as a matter of policy, the IDOC opposes discovery while a motion to
dismiss is pending. Mot. Disc. at 3 (citing Exh. 3 ¶ 7). Now that the Motion to Dismiss
has been resolved, by October 26, 2021, Defendants are directed to file either a
Response to the Motion to Expedite Discovery or a Status Report indicating that they
do not oppose the Motion. Plaintiff has until November 15, 2021 to file an Amended
Complaint as to Defendant Thigpen and potentially as to the Doe Defendants.
inbles Tob ——
Franklin U. Valderrama
United States District Judge
Dated: October 21, 2021
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