Opinion

In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation

Court
District Court, N.D. Illinois
Filed
Sep 22, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.9%

“The ultimate decision to order a separate trial under Rule 42(b) is at the court’s discretion and will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The ultimate decision to order a separate trial under Rule 42(b) is at the court’s discretion and will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse.”
  • under Rule 42, judicial economy is a sufficient basis to order bifurcation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE BROILER CHICKEN ANTITRUST No. 16 C 8637

LITIGATION

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This antitrust price-fixing conspiracy case consists of a number of actions

consolidated for pretrial management. Four newly consolidated complaints1 and one

amended complaint2 include claims that Defendants engaged in “bid-rigging,”

mimicking charges in a recent criminal indictment in the District of Colorado.

Defendants move to strike or sever these bid-rigging claims, arguing that they are

not part of this case, because the original complaints only alleged claims of

conspiracies to reduce Broiler supply and to manipulate the Georgia Dock price index.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that bid-rigging has been at the heart of the case since

its inception and indicate that they intend to amend all the consolidated complaints

to include this claim.

The Court has consolidated actions in this case pursuant to Local Rule 40.4,

which provides that “[t]wo or more civil cases may be related if . . . the cases involve

some of the same issues of fact or law; [or] the cases grow out of the same transaction

or occurrence.” Designating a case as related under Rule 40.4 is only permitted if:

1 20 C 3450; 20 C 3454; 20 C 3458; 20 C 3459.

2 20 C 2013.

the handling of both cases by the same judge is likely to

result in a substantial saving of judicial time and effort; the

earlier case has not progressed to the point where

designating a later filed case as related would be likely to

delay the proceedings in the earlier case substantially; and

the cases are susceptible of disposition in a single

proceeding.

Similarly, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), when actions “involve

a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all

matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other

orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” In addition, under Rule 42(b), “[f]or

convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a

separate trial of one or more separate issues [or] claims.” These rules give the Court

“virtually unlimited freedom” to manage related or consolidated cases “in whatever

way trial convenience requires.” 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2387 (3d ed.); see also

id. § 2388 (3d ed.) (“sound discretion”); id. § 2388 (“the district court may order

separate trials on its own motion”); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir.

2008) (“The ultimate decision to order a separate trial under Rule 42(b) is at the

court’s discretion and will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse.”). This

includes limiting discovery to a “possibly dispositive issue . . . until after its

resolution.” 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2387. A district court may also “order a

separate trial of independent issues raised in pleadings that are interposed by any

party subsequent to the initial complaint[.]” Id. § 2389. In other words, “Rule 42(b)

provides the district court with discretion to subdivide the case in whatever manner

seems dictated by the circumstances.” Id.; see also id. § 2383 (“In addition, the district

court may deny consolidation when one of the actions has proceeded further in the

discovery process than the other.”).

The Court is aware that some courts in this district have found there to be a

distinction between “relatedness” under Local Rule 40.4 and “consolidation” under

Federal Rule 42(a). See, e.g., Saleh v. Merch., 2017 WL 2424229, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June

5, 2017); Peery v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 2013 WL 5408860, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26,

2013). But the foregoing review shows that if there is a distinction, it is one of

semantics or degree only. A finding that cases are “related” is necessary for them to

be “consolidated.” But “consolidation”—and by extension “relatedness”—permits a

wide range of joint case management options, from the cases simply being presided

over by the same judge at one end of the spectrum, to a single trial at the other. Thus,

the Court does not see the utility in precisely delineating where “relatedness” ends

and “consolidation” begins.

In this case, the three putative class actions and numerous direct actions have

been found to be related, reassigned to the undersigned judge, and consolidated for

pretrial purposes. Plaintiffs point out that the cases have not officially been

consolidated for trial. See R. 256. But certainly, the Court and the parties have

contemplated that the cases likely will be consolidated to some extent, whether for

class certification determinations, summary judgment, or even for trial. And in any

event, the cases the Court has found to be related and “consolidated” under the

caption In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation are subject to this Court’s “virtually

unlimited” management discretion. This order is an exercise of that discretion.

There is a substantial relationship between the alleged bid-rigging claim and

the alleged supply reduction and Georgia Dock price index manipulation claims. All

three claims have the same goal of maintaining a high price for Broilers, involving

the same industry and defendants. These similarities mean that discovery for all

three claims is thoroughly intertwined in terms of the scope of relevant documents,

document custodians, and deponents. Further, legal rulings, factual findings, or

settlements regarding any of the claims will undoubtedly impact the others. This is

a sufficient basis for the Court to have found the four recently filed direct-action

complaints to be related and ordered them reassigned and consolidated at least for

pretrial purposes.

Defendants argue that the bid-rigging claim is distinct from the others because

it employed different means to fix prices during a different time period. But it is

plausible for a single conspiracy to use different means at different times. The Court

permitted the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims to proceed together for just

this reason. See R. 541 at 63 (In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d

772, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2017)). The Court does not perceive there to be a material difference

in the relationship between the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims, which

have proceeded together for almost four years; and the relationship between either of

those two claims and the bid-rigging claim. Absent such a difference there is not a

principled reason to force the bid-rigging claim to proceed in a separate action.3

3 Defendants’ argument that not all defendants have been implicated in the bid-

rigging allegations is well-taken with respect to the criminal indictment. But all

defendants would be at least significant third-parties in discovery on the bid-rigging

To the extent there is merit to Defendants’ argument that the bid-rigging claim

is substantively distinct such that severance is appropriate, there remains extensive

overlap among the parties, document custodians, deponents, and counsel. If the bid-

rigging claim was severed and filed before another judge, it is likely that scheduling

orders issued in that case would interfere with the progress of this case. The parties

and counsel would be required to negotiate the demands of an additional judge or

two, and it is likely that the judges already on this case would need to coordinate with

the new judges. There is no reason to add that complication to an already complicated

case.

However, in litigation as in life, timing is everything. Even though the bid-

rigging claim is properly related to this case, it cannot be denied that the bid-rigging

claim is new, while the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims have been in the

case since its inception four years ago.4 In that time, an immense amount of motion

practice and discovery has occurred. This sprawling case already consists of: 56

related actions, 40 direct actions, and three classes (including every purchaser of

chicken meat in the United States), with each complaint more than 100 pages long;

252 attorney appearances and more than 3,800 entries on the docket; discovery of

more than 8 million documents (totaling millions more in pages), hundreds of

claim whether they are named defendants or not. And Plaintiffs point out that there

are indications that more defendants will be implicated in that claim.

4 Plaintiffs contend that the bid-rigging claim is not so new because discovery has

revealed hints of bid-rigging. But the fact is the claim was not added to any complaint

until after the criminal indictment was returned on June 3, 2020, little more than

three months ago. While Plaintiffs claim that bid-rigging has always been at the

“heart” of this case, that contention is simply not credible.

document custodians, 220 depositions taken with more than 100 to go. On top of all

that, the parties agree that the bid-rigging claims will require more document

discovery and likely re-taking of hundreds of depositions. This additional discovery

will take time that is not accounted for in current Scheduling Order No. 14, which

has no room to spare, and yet anticipates a trial that is still two years away. The

deadline for amending the class complaints has passed. See R. 1230. Now the filing

of class certification motions and the close of fact discovery are relatively imminent.

This case is already on borrowed time.

Furthermore, the government has indicated that it will seek to stay much of

any permitted bid-rigging discovery to protect its criminal prosecution. While as the

government points out that particular issue is not yet ripe, the Court notes that it is

commonplace for civil actions based on the facts underlying criminal charges to be

stayed during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The supply reduction claim

and Georgia Dock claim are not going to wait for the criminal case to resolve itself.

The upshot is all three claims belong together in the same case, but they cannot

proceed together. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides the solution to this

conflict. In accordance with the Court’s authority under Rule 42, and in order to

expedite and economize the process of bringing the supply reduction and Georgia

Dock claims to resolution, the bid-rigging claim is bifurcated from the original two

claims. See Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (under Rule 42,

judicial economy is a sufficient basis to order bifurcation). The original claims will

continue to proceed on the course set, most recently, by Scheduling Order No. 14. The

bid-rigging claim is stayed until the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims are

resolved.

This is a feasible way forward, because although the bid-rigging claim is closely

related to the other two claims, evidence of bid-rigging is not necessary to prove the

supply reduction or Georgia Dock claims, so there is no prejudice to Plaintiffs in

resolving the original claims first. Proof of any of the three claims is sufficient to prove

liability under the Sherman Act. Under Plaintiffs’ theory of the case, all three claims

are means to the same end of manipulating Broiler prices. But because they are

concededly different means, litigation of those claims does not have to proceed

simultaneously. Notably, it was not until the criminal indictment returned three

months ago that Plaintiffs ever seriously suggested that they were going to rely on

bid-rigging evidence to prove their case.

This order also serves to deny the motion to compel currently pending before

Judge Gilbert, R. 3672. That motion turns, for the most part, on an argument that,

in February 2018, Judge Gilbert permitted discovery into bid-rigging in an oral ruling

on the scope of a request for production. Whether he did or did not is now irrelevant

because the Court has stayed litigation of the bid-rigging claim (in addition to

recently granting a protective order prohibiting discovery into the government’s

investigation). Discovery into bid-rigging is closed until the supply reduction and

Georgia Dock claims are resolved.

Some bid-rigging evidence has already come to light, either as a product of

discovery in this case or the government’s investigation and indictment. Plaintiffs

express an intention to use that evidence to help show intent or motive in the supply

reduction and Georgia Dock claims. See R. 3749 at 12. The parties spend many pages

addressing whether this evidence will prejudice defense of the supply reduction and

Georgia Dock claims or “taint” a trial on those claims. But this order is not a ruling

on those issues and it is not a preview of what evidence the Court will consider on

summary judgment or admit at trial of the supply reduction and/or Georgia Dock

claims. The Court will consider the evidentiary relevance or admissibility of any

evidence already discovered at the appropriate time in the future, whether summary

judgment or a motion in limine.

This order is simply a product of the fact that: (1) the three claims are related;

and (2) the supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims are much further along than

the bid-rigging claim. The late appearance of the bid-rigging claim necessarily means

it is on a different track from the other two claims, and this order simply

acknowledges that obvious circumstance. Through massive discovery, a nine-month

stay to accommodate the government’s investigation, and delay due to the COVID-19

pandemic, Plaintiffs have consistently pushed for expedient resolution of this case.

That is also the Court’s goal. The proper administration of the case cannot wait for

the new claim to catch up to the claims that have already been litigated for four years.

All parties—not to mention the Court—are entitled to have the case resolved

in a timely manner. There is a valid perspective that this case has already taken too

long. The attorney fees generated on both sides are enormous and may be problematic

for smaller defendants. This should not be a war of attrition. If the claims in this case

are not bifurcated it could be a decade before a judgment of any kind is reached. That

is unacceptable. True progress towards an end must be made, and bifurcating the

claims is the way to do that.

Another consequence of this order is that the consolidated direct-action

plaintiff complaint the Court has ordered, see R. 3653; R. 3778, should contain the

bid-rigging allegations. The purpose of the consolidated complaint is to streamline

the docket and future motion practice. Even though this case will proceed with the

original two claims and the bid-rigging claim on separate tracks, the intent to

streamline the docket would be frustrated by maintaining two sets of pleadings.

The order also serves to permit further amendment of already filed direct-

action complaints to include bid-rigging claims. However, the Court does not see the

need for every direct-action plaintiff to actually file an amended complaint; the

consolidated complaint should contain sufficient notice of which direct-action

plaintiffs are making which allegations and claims. But this order does not serve to

grant leave for further amendment beyond bid-rigging allegations without a separate

motion.

The direct-action plaintiffs should prepare and file a consolidated complaint by

October 23, 2020. Defendants should file their consolidated answer by November 23,

2020.

It is unclear to the Court whether the putative classes intend to amend their

complaints to include bid-rigging claims. And it is not apparent to the Court that the

bid-rigging claim is necessarily amenable to class treatment. But if class plaintiffs

intend to amend their complaints to include bid-rigging claims, those amended

complaints should also be filed by October 23, 2020. Defendants are prohibited from

filing individual answers to each class complaint. Instead, Defendants’ answers to

the class complaints should also be consolidated into one answer for each class

complaint, which are due November 23, 2020.

Conclusion

Therefore, Defendants’ motions [3687] [3745] are denied in part and granted

in part in accordance with this opinion and order. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel [3672]

is denied.

ENTERED:

beanies M Luther

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: September 22, 2020

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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