Caruth v. Illinois Department Of Corrections

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES CARUTH,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-10340

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

RANDY PFISTER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff James Caruth, a former inmate at Northern Reception Classification

Center, brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials and/or officers

Randy Pfister, Sherwin Miles, Darrin Hunter, Tracy Engleson, and Pedro Dominguez

violated his rights to the free exercise of religion by subjecting him to group strip

searching practices. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

[118] [120]. For the reasons set out below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Caruth is an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, an Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) facility. (Dkt. 130 at ¶ 4). At all times pertinent

to this action, however, Caruth was an incarcerated at Northern Reception

Classification Center (“NRC”), another IDOC facility. (Dkt. 123 Exhibit 1 at ¶ 3).

During this time, Defendants worked at NRC in various capacities. (Id. a ¶¶ 4-8).

Defendant Pfister was the warden of NRC, Defendant Miles was an assistant warden,

Defendants Hunter and Engleson were superintendents, and Defendant Dominguez

was a correctional officer. (Id.)

Caruth has been a devout and practicing Muslim since 1995. (Dkt. 130 at ¶ 1).

He claims that modesty is a central tenet of Islam and “that to be naked in front of

[an]other person is a sin.” (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3). Every time Caruth travelled to and from

court, he had to submit to a group strip-search. (Dkt. 123 at ¶¶ 21; 27). Approximately

thirty inmates, including Caruth, would be searched simultaneously by two officers.

(Id. at ¶¶ 17; 19). Although Caruth requested to be strip-searched in a non-group

setting on account of his Muslim faith, his requests were denied. (Dkt. 130 at ¶ 9).

Caruth brings the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendants

infringed his rights to freely exercise Islam by requiring him to submit to group strip

searches.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts

are material. Id. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of

establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323 (1986).

After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the

adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted). Construing the evidence and

facts supported by the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court gives the

non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not

speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir.

2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable

trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in

support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation

omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Personal Involvement

Defendants argue that the claims against them should be dismissed because,

excepting Defendant Dominguez, they did not personally participate in the

challenged strip searches. To hold an individual liable under Section 1983, “a plaintiff

must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a

constitutional right.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotations omitted). “To be personally responsible, an official must know

about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted).

The Court agrees that summary judgment should be granted to Defendant

Pfister on these grounds. Caruth admits that Pfister was not present during any of

the challenged searches and fails to present any facts indicating that Pfister knew

about his complaints regarding the strip searches or failed to address them. (Dkt. 123

at ¶ 23). Caruth admits that he “sued Defendant Pfister because it’s his ship. He’s

responsible. He’s the chief administrator [sic] officer and he’s responsible for his

officers and employees.” (Id. at ¶ 24) (internal quotations omitted). It is clear from

this statement that Caruth impermissibly relies on a theory of respondeat superior

for his § 1983 claim against Pfister. See e.g, Robinson v. Welborn, 107 F.3d 873 (1997)

(“A prisoner, in a § 1983 case, may not recover damages from a supervisory official

under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”). Consequently, the Court grants

summary judgment against Caruth on his claim against Defendant Pfister.

As to Defendants Engleson, Miles, and Hunter, although Caruth admits they

were not physically present during the strip searches (Dkt. 123 at ¶¶ 22; 25-26),

Caruth stated during his deposition that (in so many words) he informed each of them

that the strip searches violated his free exercise rights on account of his being

Muslim, but that they failed to take action. (Dkt. 119 Exhibit 3 at 37-43). These facts

are unrebutted by Defendants. (See Dkt. 120 at 7). The Court therefore declines to

grant the remaining Defendants summary judgment on account of their lack of

physically involvement in the strip searches.1

II. Plaintiff’s Free Exercise Claim

A. Legal Standard

1 On the day Caruth filed his response, he filed a motion requesting permission to conduct discovery

to discover the identities of prison personnel who were present when he was strip searched. (Dkt. 124

at 1). That request, brought more than a year after discovery had closed, was denied by the Court.

(Dkt. 128).

Caruth’s Section 1983 claim is based on a violation of his First Amendment

free exercise rights. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment “prohibits the

state from imposing a substantial burden on a central religious belief or practice,” by

“pressuring him to either commit an act forbidden by the religion or by preventing

him from engaging in conduct which his faith mandates.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d

692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); McRoy v. Cook Cty. Dep't of Corr., 366 F. Supp. 2d 662, 673

(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff'd sub nom. McRoy v. Sheahan, 205 F. App'x 462 (7th Cir. 2006).

Caruth argues that because being seen nude in front of even a single non-Muslim is

violative of his religion, Defendants requiring him to be seen nude in front of 29 other

inmates and two officers during group strip searches substantially burdened his

religious beliefs. (Dkt. 119 Exhibit 3, Deposition of J. Caruth at 37-43) (“My problem

wasn't about being striped searched, my problem is about being striped searched in

front of others.”).

An inmate’s religious freedoms, however, must be balanced against the

realities of running a correctional facility and with deference to the judgment of

prison officials: “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that

requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are

peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of

government.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S 78, 84-85 (1987). Thus, “when a prison

regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89; Kaufman, 733 F.3d

at 696. In assessing the reasonableness of a prison regulation, federal courts apply a

four-part test. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482

U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (applying Turner test to free exercise challenge to prison

practices); Tarpley v. Allen Cty., Indiana, 312 F.3d 895, 898-89 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).

Under the Turner test, the court must first find that there is “a valid, rational

connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest

put forward to justify it,” so that the “policy [is not] arbitrary or irrational.” 482 U.S.

at 89-90 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the court considers “whether there are

alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Id. at

90. Third, courts assess “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional

right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources

generally.” Id. Finally, courts consider whether there are “obvious, easy alternatives”

to the regulation that show it is “an exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). “[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative

that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological

interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy

the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 90-91 (italics in original). The burden of

proving the invalidity of the regulation lies with the prisoner and “substantial

deference” is given to the professional judgment of prison administrators. Overton v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).

B. Application of Turner to the Present Case

Applying the Turner factors to the present facts, summary judgment in favor

of Defendants is warranted because on the evidence submitted to the Court a

reasonable trier of fact could not find that Caruth’s free exercise rights were

substantially burdened without a legitimate penological interest. The Court

reiterates that Caruth does not argue that strip searches fail to serve legitimate

penological interests. Rather, he challenges the group nature of the strip searches at

NRC. The Court must analyze the Turner factors bearing this in mind.

i. Factor One: Rational Relation to Penological Interests

First, the sworn declaration of NRC Shift Commander Theodore Fredericks

explains that group strip searches are necessary at NRC due to the limited quantity

of staff available. (Dkt. 119 Exhibit 4 at ¶¶ 8-9). Fredericks explains that prison

officers “have defined security roles at all times” and “removing correctional officers

from their security posts in order to conduct private strip searches” would create

security risks. (Id.) Caruth does not rebut Fredericks’ statements with evidence of his

own but argues that “there cannot be a protection of the safety of staff, or of

incarcerated persons, by providing only 2 guards for as many as 30 inmates.” (Dkt.

122 at 6). Caurth’s argument fails to address: (1) the limited staff available to conduct

strip searches; or (2) the fact that removing staff from other positions would create

vacancies in other areas of the prison and give rise to security issues. Cf Show v.

Patterson, 955 F. Supp. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying summary judgment to

defendants on free exercise claim challenging group strip search of Muslim inmate in

part because “approximately fifteen guards were present when the inmates were

ordered to remove their clothes.”).

Caruth asserts that there is no “valid, rational connection” between group strip

searches and the asserted safety interests because group strip searches violate the

following Illinois regulation:

Strip searches … of committed persons shall be conducted by persons of the

same sex as the committed person and in an area where the search cannot be

observed by persons not conducting the search, except in cases of an

emergency.

Ill. Admin. Code 20, § 501.220(b)(2). First, it is unclear whether NRC’s group strip

search policy violates this regulation. The parties agree that strip searches are

“conducted in a side room” in the presence of only the two officers conducting the

search. (Dkt 123 at ¶¶ 18-19). While each of the 30 inmates can observe their fellow

inmates, it is unclear whether the regulation aims to prevent these inmates from

observing one another or is intended to prevent officers and inmates who are not

participating in or subject to a search from being present and therefore observing

inmates who are being searched. But assuming the group strip searches violate the

state regulation, Caruth does not explain how a violation of this regulation

invalidates the asserted security goals behind group strip searches. There is no

evidence, for example, that the regulation was implemented to further security goals

(as opposed to protecting the inmate’s privacy) such that violating it would cast doubt

on Defendants’ explanation that group searches are necessary for safety.

Moreover, a ‘“[m]ere violation of a state statute [or regulation] does not infringe

the federal Constitution.”’ Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216 (7th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 64 S. Ct. 397, 402, 88 L. Ed. 497 (1944)).

Caruth cites to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Mays v. Springborn, where in the

context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a group strip search, the court observed

that “although violation of the prison's rule against public searches was not, by itself,

a violation of the constitution, it was relevant evidence on which the jury could have

relied to conclude that the searches were done with an intent to harass.” 575 F.3d

643, 650 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Mays, however, has limited

application outside of the Eighth Amendment context where plaintiff must

demonstrate that defendant acted with an intent to harass. Id. at 649 (strip search

violates the Eighth Amendment if it is “conducted in a harassing manner intended to

humiliate and cause psychological pain.”). But see Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472

F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, “the

violation of police regulations or even a state law is completely immaterial as to the

question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established.”);

Estate of Carlock v. Williamson, No. 08-3075, 2013 WL 12244415, at *7 (C.D. Ill. June

21, 2013) (finding that the court’s ruling in Mays considering a violation of state or

department policies only extends to constitutional claims requiring subjective intent);

Davis v. Nanny, No. 3:13-CV-1260-SMY-RJD, 2018 WL 2087994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. May

4, 2018) (concluding that “Seventh Circuit precedent dictates that evidence regarding

an Administrative Code provision or facility policy on use of force and whether it was

ignored by Defendants is not relevant to or probative” in an excessive force claim).

Finally, Caruth fails to explain how a group strip search conducted with an

intent to harass tends to violate his Free Exercise rights. Caruth claims that several

officials (but none of the Defendants) insulted him during the strip searches and that

these “abusive and humiliating remarks” are “a key component of plaintiff’s [free

exercise] claim.” (Dkt. 122 at 3). He submits several declarations from other inmates

supporting explaining that the en mass strip searches at the NRC are degrading.

(Dkt. 123 Exhibit 3). Caruth does not claim, however, that he was subject to abusive

comments because of his religion or that the comments were degrading of his religious

beliefs. It is unclear how Caruth’s religious belief and the requirement that he not be

observed nude by non-Muslims is substantially burdened by humiliating comments

unrelated to his religion.

Defendants’ explanation regarding the necessity of group strip searches due to

staffing concerns is rational and unrebutted by Caruth. Caruth presents affidavits

stating that the group strip searches are humiliating, but he fails to present evidence

that group strip searches are “arbitrary or irrational.” This Turner factor weighs in

favor of Defendants.

ii. Factor Two: Alternative Means of Exercising Right

The second Turner factor “is an awkward fit” where, as here, Plaintiff “does

not allege that the defendants prevented him from taking some affirmative action,

such as praying or fasting or attending services” but rather “that the defendants

forced him to do something that violates his beliefs.” West v. Kind, No. 17-CV-482-PP,

2020 WL 1139800, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 9, 2020). That Caruth may be able to

practice his religion in other ways does not allow him to avoid an action that violates

his religious beliefs. Id.; see also Bradford v. Kramer, No. 15-CV-1405-JPG-SCW,

2017 WL 1169730, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2017), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 15-CV-01405-JPG-SCW, 2017 WL 1152870 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2017) (Muslim

inmate who brought free exercise claim challenging video surveillance of him while

nude “ha[d] no real alternatives in exercising the religious right restricted.”). This

factor thus weighs in Caruth’s favor.

iii. Factors Three and Four: Impact of Accommodation and

Availability of Ready Alternatives

With respect to the final two Turner factors, Caruth claims that because

dividers allowing for privacy during strip searches have always been available at

NRC, ready alternatives to group strip searches exist and accommodating private

strip searches of Muslim inmates would not be significantly burdensome on prison

administration. As Defendants argue, however, Caruth fails to present adequate facts

to support this assertion. Caruth avers in his declaration that “[t]here was always a

facility at the NRC to strip search, a single-man cell, for unruly inmates, transgender

inmates, inmates who refused to be strip-searched in a group.” (Dkt. 123 Exhibit 2 at

¶ 10). But this assertion is directly contradicted by Caruth’s deposition testimony

describing the strip searches at issue in the case: “Keep in mind, the stalls are up

now. At [the time] time there was no stalls.” (Dkt. 119 Exhibit 3 at 51-52).

Caruth relatedly argues that because NRC no longer conducts group strip

searches at all, individual strip searches must have always been a ready alternative

and accommodation that could have been implemented earlier. But once again,

Caruth does not present admissible evidence to support this argument. Caruth states

in his declaration:

It is my understanding from talking with other inmates that strip searches at

the NRC do not occur in group settings anymore, and those stalls are employed

instead. I learned from another inmate at Pontiac … that the new practices at

the NRC to conduct strip searches individually are referred to as the ‘Caruth

Rules,’ because they were instituted after I filed this lawsuit and because of it.

(Dkt. 123 Exhibit 3 at ¶¶ 15-16). The Court must disregard these statements because

they are based on inadmissible hearsay. Carlisle v. Deere & Co., 576 F.3d 649, 655

(7th Cir. 2009) (“If, as here, evidence is inadmissible hearsay, we may not consider it”

on a motion for summary judgment.); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or

declaration used to support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made

on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show

that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). The

statements of other inmates regarding the use of stalls are out of court statements

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The many

exceptions to hearsay are also inapplicable. Statements regarding NRC’s elimination

of group strip searches after Caruth’s lawsuit are also inadmissible as subsequent

remedial measures because Caruth offers them to demonstrate fault. Id. at 407. Thus,

Caruth fails to rebut Defendants’ contention that removing officers from their posts

to accommodate individual strip searches is infeasible and would create safety risks.

Factors three and four weigh in favor of Defendants.

A balance of the Turner factors thus supports summary judgment in favor of

the Defendants. Defendants have demonstrated a rational basis for group strip

searches and Caruth has failed to satisfy his burden under Turner to prove that the

policy is invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.

III. Qualified Immunity

Even assuming that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

the group strip searches violated Caruth’s free exercise rights, summary judgment is

warranted based on qualified immunity. In § 1983 actions, “qualified immunity

shields an official from liability for civil damages, provided that the illegality of the

official’s conducts was not clearly established at the time he acted.” Roe v. Elyea, 631

F.3d 843, 858 (7th Cir. 2011).2 “The basic question is whether the state of law at the

time that [Defendants] acted gave [them] reasonable notice that [their] actions

violated the Constitution.” Id.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has considered and upheld

a free exercise challenge to an individual or group strip search. While the Seventh

Circuit considered a free exercise challenge to an individual strip search in Canedy v.

Boardman, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on grounds of

qualified immunity without considering the merits of the claim. 91 F.3d 30, 33-34

(7th Cir. 1996) (involving Muslim inmate who in part challenged strip searches

conducted by female officers, claiming that his faith prohibited him from being seen

2 In his Amended Complaint, Caruth sued each Defendant in his or her individual capacity for money

damages and official capacity for injunctive relief. (Dkt. 119 Ex. 1 at 2-3). Although the parties do not

address Caruth’s official capacity claims in their briefs, Caruth’s official capacity claims became moot

upon his transfer from NRC to Pontiac Correctional Center. See Jones v. Bulter, 663 F. App’x 468, 470

71 (7th Cir. 2016) (inmate’s demand for injunctive relief against prison officials became moot after he

transferred to another facility). Therefore, qualified immunity, which shields defendants from claims

for monetary damages not injunctive relief, provides a complete defense against the individual

capacity claims brought against Defendants. Canedy v. Boardman, 91 F.3d 30, 33 (7th Cir. 1996).

nude in front of the opposite gender).3 In Madyun v. Franzen, an earlier Seventh

Circuit case, the Court upheld a frisk search of a male Muslim inmate by a female

officer under the Free Exercise Clause, but the Circuit has not yet applied its

reasoning to a strip search, which is objectively more burdensome and intrusive than

a frisk search. 704 F.2d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 1983). The Court is also unaware of

persuasive opinions from other Circuits.

District courts, however, including two in this Circuit, have, on a consideration

of the merits, upheld individual strip searches when challenged as violating an

inmate’s constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See e.g, West, 2020 WL

1139800, at *14-*15 (granting summary judgment to defendant officials on free

exercise claim challenging individual strip search of Muslim inmate by transgender

male on grounds that inmate’s faith prohibited him from being seen nude by the

opposite gender); McRoy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (granting summary judgment to

defendant officials on free exercise claim challenging strip searches of Muslim

inmates on their way to and from religious services); Collins v. Davis, No. 17-CV-

06976-VKD, 2019 WL 4471469, at *5-*9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2019) (granting summary

judgment to defendant officials on free exercise claim challenging strip searches

conducted every time a prisoner left his cell on grounds that the searches deterred

his attendance of religious services). At least one district court has also upheld a

group strip search challenged under the Free Exercise Clause as violating an inmate’s

3 The court did note that “the prison had a very strong interest in having its guards observe prisoners

at all times and in all situations, and it had an interest in providing equal employment opportunity to

women.” Canedy, 91 F.3d at 34.

religious belief of not exposing his body to unknown individuals. See Beers v. Fouts,

No. 15-CV-454-SM, 2018 WL 3370628, at *3-*4 (D.N.H. July 10, 2018) (granting

summary judgment to defendant prison officials).

Given the lack of controlling authority and the opinions of district courts

upholding strip searches, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer at the

time that an inmate had a right to be free from group strip searches on the basis of

religious beliefs. See e.g, Canedy, 91 F.3d at 34 (granting qualified immunity to prison

officials on free exercise challenge to strip searches); Harvey v. Segura, No. 13-CV-

01574-RBJ-BNB, 2014 WL 4057043, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2014), aff'd, 646 F. App'x

650 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 3d 529, 540-

42 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same); Lewis v. Soto, No. 215CV02938CJCSK, 2019 WL 6486031,

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019) (same); Beers, 2018 WL 3370628, at *4-*5 (same).

Caruth argues that qualified immunity is inappropriate because the

Defendants’ actions violated a state regulatory requirement and NRC’s “practices

have been subsequently altered to bring them into line with those requirements.”

(Dkt. 122 at 9). As the Court has already discussed, however, “the mere fact that state

rules or statutes are violated does not in and of itself amount to a constitutional

violation or give rise to an actionable § 1983 claim,” and thus, fails to put an officer

on notice that his conduct violates federal law. Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, fn. 1

(7th Cir. 2004). Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.4

4 Having concluded that summary judgment is appropriate as to all Defendants, the Court declines to

consider Defendants’ arguments that Caruth (1) has failed to prove that not being seen naked by non-

Muslims is central to his religious beliefs, and (2) has not suffered physical injury necessary to claim

compensatory damages.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted.

ENTER:

Dated: August 17, 2020 Mass VY bu L/

MARY M. ROWLAND

United States District Judge

16