Opinion

In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation

Court
District Court, N.D. Illinois
Filed
Jul 15, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.9%

“Puerto Rico’s antitrust statute is coterminous with the Sherman Act.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Puerto Rico’s antitrust statute is coterminous with the Sherman Act.”
  • “Puerto Rico courts generally follow federal antitrust law when interpreting local antitrust laws[.]”
  • “[C]ourts interpret Puerto Rico’s [antitrust] laws as essentially embodying the jurisprudence relevant to the parallel federal [antitrust] law.”
  • “Because Puerto Rico liberally construes its standing requirements in private antitrust cases, it is immaterial whether Plaintiffs are direct or indirect purchasers[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE BROILER CHICKEN ANTITRUST No. 16 C 8637

LITIGATION

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

All but one defendant in this case is an industrial producer of chicken meat.1

(The industry term for such meat is “Broilers.”) Plaintiffs are entities and individuals

who purchased Broilers from Defendants—either directly or indirectly—for resale,

business, or personal use, between 2008 and 2016. In three class complaints (by

classes of direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, and end-user consumers), Plaintiffs

alleged that Defendants conspired to fix Broiler prices higher than the market would

naturally support, in violation of the Sherman Act § 1 and state law. On November

20, 2017, the Court denied motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a

claim. See R. 541 (In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill.

2017)).

After the Court denied the motions to dismiss, a number of new plaintiffs, who

claim to purchase Broilers directly from Defendants, filed complaints separate from

the direct-purchaser class alleging the same price-fixing conspiracy against

Defendants. One of those plaintiffs is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See Case No

1 The exception is Agri Stats, Inc., a subsidiary of Eli Lilly & Co. that produces

subscription reports about the Broiler industry.

19 C 5114. Defendants have moved to dismiss several of Puerto Rico’s claims for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 3159.

That motion is denied in part and granted in part.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v.

Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of

the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d

362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard,

the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences

in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).

Background

Puerto Rico’s allegations regarding Defendants’ conduct echo the allegations

in the other complaints in this case. Defendants’ motion does not attack those

allegations.

Instead, Defendants argue that Puerto Rico’s allegations about its Broiler

purchases are insufficient to establish Puerto Rico’s antitrust standing. Puerto Rico

alleges that it purchases Broilers for its “students, prisoners and corrections officers,

and hospital patients.” 19 C 5114, R. 1 ¶ 421. Puerto Rico alleges that it makes these

purchases “indirectly from the Defendants,” id. ¶ 454, “through a network of

authorized distributors.” Id. ¶ 421. Puerto Rico also alleges that it “directly purchased

Broilers from Defendants.” Id. ¶ 450(C). In addition to damages for its direct and

indirect purchases of Broilers from Defendants, Puerto Rico “seeks damages for

violations . . . suffered by its citizens,” and “seeks to recover these damages on behalf

of its citizens and as parens patriae.” Id. ¶ 423.

Analysis

I. Allegation of Direct Purchases

Defendants argue that Puerto Rico’s allegation of direct purchases is

“conclusory” and “lacking any factual support.” R. 3407 at 5. But there is nothing

facially implausible about Puerto Rico’s allegation that it directly purchases Broilers

from Defendants, and it would not be surprising if an entity the size of the Puerto

Rico made such purchases. Indeed, Defendants do not expressly argue that this

allegation is not plausible.

Defendants real argument is that Puerto Rico’s allegation of direct purchases

is “contradicted” by Puerto Rico’s allegations of indirect purchases, and it “should be

disregarded due to the more specific allegations of indirect purchases.” R. 3407 at 5.

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees that the allegations of indirect purchases

are more specific than the allegation of direct purchases. Puerto Rico alleges that it

purchases Broilers “through a network of authorized dealers.” 19 C 5114, R. 1 ¶ 421.

But this allegation is simply another way of saying that Puerto Rico makes indirect

purchases. It is not anymore factually specific than simply saying Puerto Rico makes

indirect (or direct) purchases. While Puerto Rico alleges that it makes indirect

purchases twice in the complaint, whereas it alleges that it makes direct purchases

only once, this is not an indication that the allegations are contradictory. It is

plausible that Puerto Rico makes both direct and indirect purchases. Defendants do

not explain why this is an implausible or contradictory scenario.

Furthermore, the Court notes that the allegations of other direct-action

plaintiffs in this case are not materially different from Puerto Rico’s. Most of the

direct-action plaintiffs in this case do not allege which specific defendants they made

purchases from, let alone any details about those purchases. This is not surprising

because such details are unnecessary for Defendants to be on notice of the claims

against them. Plaintiffs were required to allege greater detail about Defendants’

conduct to plausibly allege a price fixing conspiracy. But, barring some circumstance

making direct purchases impossible (whether factually or legally), Puerto Rico does

not need to allege anything more than the simple fact that it made direct purchases

in order to make their claims plausible. Therefore, Defendants motion to dismiss

Puerto Rico’s claims based on direct purchases is denied.

II. Puerto Rico Antitrust Act

In Illinois Brick v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that federal antitrust

statutes do not permit a plaintiff to seek damages for increased prices passed on

through wholesalers and retailers. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The Supreme Court reasoned

that permitting lawsuits by indirect purchasers risked double recovery by the direct

and indirect purchasers for what was in fact the same injury, just passed on from the

direct purchasers to the indirect purchasers. To avoid this potential problem, and the

complex tracing of costs passed on down a supply chain, the Supreme Court restricted

“antitrust standing” under federal law to plaintiffs who allege they were directly

harmed by the defendant’s conduct.

Because damages are not available for indirect purchases under federal

antitrust law, Puerto Rico seeks damages for its indirect purchases, and those of its

citizens, under the Puerto Rico Antitrust Act (“PRAA”). As is the case under the laws

of most states, Puerto Rico courts have held that the PRAA should be interpreted in

harmony with the federal antitrust statutes. See Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d

849, 853 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Puerto Rico’s antitrust statute is coterminous with the

Sherman Act.”); Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft,

19 F.3d 745, 754 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts interpret Puerto Rico’s [antitrust] laws as

essentially embodying the jurisprudence relevant to the parallel federal [antitrust]

law.”); Shell Co. (P.R.) Ltd. v. Los Frailes Serv. Station, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135

(D.P.R. 2007) (“Puerto Rico courts generally follow federal antitrust law when

interpreting local antitrust laws[.]”). In order to avoid the impact of Illinois Brick,

some state legislatures have passed statutes rejecting Illinois Brick (known as

“repealer” statutes) and expressly permitting indirect purchasers to sue for damages

under state law. The Puerto Rico legislature has not passed such a statute. See In re

Opana ER Antritrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2016); In re Loestrin

24 FE Antitrust Litig., 410 F. Supp. 3d 352, 374 (D.R.I. 2019).

Nevertheless, Puerto Rico cites the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision in

Pressure Vessels v. Empire Gas, 137 DPR 497 (P.R. 1994), to argue that Illinois Brick

has been “repealed” in Puerto Rico. The initial problem with this argument is that

Pressure Vessels does not involve a price fixing claim by purchasers against

producers. Indeed, Pressure Vessels does not mention Illinois Brick at all or whether

indirect purchasers can bring claims under the PRAA. On this basis alone, the

majority of courts have rejected the argument that Pressure Vessels serves to repeal

Illinois Brick under the PRAA. See, e.g., Opana, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 723; In re Aggrenox

Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 252 (D. Conn. 2015); United Food & Commercial

Workers v. Teikoku Pharma, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

However, even though Pressure Vessels does not expressly discuss Illinois

Brick, it cites a more recent Supreme Court decision addressing the prohibition on

claims by indirect purchasers. See Pressure Vessels, 137 DPR at 519 (citing Kansas v.

Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990)). Furthermore, Pressure Vessels expressly

held that federal case law requiring “antitrust injury” and “antitrust standing”—

Illinois Brick’s prohibition on claims by indirect purchasers being an aspect of

“antitrust standing”—did not restrict claims under the PRAA, because those court

decisions were issued after enactment of the PRAA. See Pressure Vessels, 137 DPR at

518-19. Instead, the court held that the PRAA should be interpreted in accordance

with the “liberal theory of standing” applied by federal courts at the time of the

PRAA’s enactment. Id. at 520.

Puerto Rico points out that a federal district court in Puerto Rico has

interpreted Pressure Vessels to stand for the proposition that the PRAA rejects Illinois

Brick and permits damages claims by indirect purchasers. See Rivera-Muñiz v.

Horizon Lines Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.P.R. 2010). Even though Pressure Vessels

does not mention Illinois Brick, Rivera-Muñiz relied on Pressure Vessels’s historical

analysis of the development of federal antitrust standing doctrine to find that the

PRAA rejects Illinois Brick because that case was issued in 1977, thirteen years after

the PRAA was enacted. See Rivera-Muñiz, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (“Because Puerto

Rico liberally construes its standing requirements in private antitrust cases, it is

immaterial whether Plaintiffs are direct or indirect purchasers[.]”). And for that

reason, Rivera-Muñiz found that indirect purchasers have standing under the PRAA.

But Pressure Vessels’s analysis of the state of antitrust case law at the time the

PRAA was enacted is flawed. True, Illinois Brick was not issued until 1977, whereas

the PRAA was enacted in 1964. But as one of the sources relied on by the court in

Pressure Vessels notes, by the 1950s, courts “began to subscribe to [the] direct-injury

standing requirement,” and by 1960 it “had become commonplace in antitrust

standing doctrine.” John F. Hart, Standing Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890

- 1975: Statutory Exegesis, Innovation, and the Influence of Doctrinal History, 59

Tenn. L. Rev. 191, 229 (1992) (cited by Pressure Vessels, 137 DPR at 519). Indeed, as

early as 1918, the Supreme Court had already held that:

The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at

least, is not to go beyond the first step. As it does not

attribute remote consequences to a defendant so it holds

him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss. .

. . The [defendant] ought not to be allowed to retain his

illegal profit, and the only one who can take it from him is

the one that alone was in relation with him, and from

whom the carrier took the sum.

S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918) (emphases

added). Relying in part on this holding, the Supreme Court later expressly prohibited

the defense that a direct purchaser had passed on higher prices to indirect

purchasers. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,

490 n.8 (1968). And in “parity” with Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court in Illinois

Brick barred indirect purchasers from bringing claims. See Loeb Indus., Inc. v.

Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (“By parity of reasoning, the Court

decided in Illinois Brick that the persons authorized to sue under the antitrust laws

in this type of case were the direct purchasers.”).

In sum, Pressure Vessels is an insufficient authority to find that the PRAA

rejects Illinois Brick, if only because Pressure Vessels is not about claims by indirect

purchasers. Furthermore, to the extent Pressure Vessels’s general historical analysis

of “antitrust standing” is relevant to whether the PRAA permits claims by indirect

purchasers, the analysis is flawed. This Court joins the majority of courts and finds

Rivera-Muñiz’s reliance on Pressure Vessels as an Illinois Brick repealer

unpersuasive. Therefore, the Court finds that the PRAA does not permit claims by

indirect purchasers.2

III. Unjust Enrichment

In the alternative to its antitrust claims, Puerto Rico seeks relief under a

theory of unjust enrichment. Generally, unjust enrichment provides a remedy for

harms that are not otherwise covered by statute or common law. Puerto Rico argues

that since indirect purchasers cannot bring a cause of action under federal law or the

PRAA, they should be able to sue for unjust enrichment. But there is a difference

between a remedy being unavailable and remedy being barred. As discussed, lawsuits

by indirect purchasers are barred under federal law, and Puerto Rico has adopted (or

at least not rejected) application of this bar to the PRAA. As Defendants argue,

permitting indirect purchasers to bring unjust enrichment claims would operate as

an end-run around the bar established by Illinois Brick. The great majority of courts

have held that in jurisdictions where Illinois Brick controls, plaintiffs are also

prohibited from seeking relief for unjust enrichment based on indirect purchases. See,

e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 692 F. Supp. 2d 524, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2010); In re

Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464 (D. Md. 2005); In re

Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2001);

Opana, 2016 WL 4245516, at *2. By failing to repeal Illinois Brick, Puerto Rico has

2 Notably, in other lawsuits, Puerto Rico itself has agreed with this finding. See R.

3160-1 at 7-8 (pp. 6-7) (“Puerto Rico’s existing anti-trust law precludes indirect

purchasers from recovering for the harm caused by Defendants.”).

effectively decided that there should not be a claim for indirect purchases under its

law, whether statutory or otherwise. Therefore, Puerto Rico’s unjust enrichment

claim is dismissed.

IV. Parens Patriae Claim

Puerto Rico also seeks damages on behalf of its citizens parens patriae.3

Presumably, however, all of Puerto Rico’s individual citizens purchase chicken meat

indirectly from retailers or wholesalers, and not directly from Defendants, just as has

been alleged in the End-User Class complaint. The Court has already held that the

PRAA does not provide for damages claims by indirect purchasers like Puerto Rico’s

citizens. Thus, no claim remains for Puerto Rico to bring parens patriae.

It is true that the Illinois Brick doctrine does not prevent Puerto Rico from

seeking injunctive relief. See U.S. Gypsum, 350 F.3d at 627 (“the direct-purchaser

doctrine does not foreclose equitable relief”). But an injunction prohibiting

Defendants from engaging in price fixing in Puerto Rico would benefit Puerto Rico’s

citizens whether Puerto Rico brings its claims on its own behalf or on behalf of its

citizens. Thus, it is unnecessary for the Court to analyze whether Puerto Rico has

parens patriae standing under any statute or Snapp, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).

Conclusion

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part.

The motion is denied to the extent that Puerto Rico’s claims based on its direct

3 “Parens patriae” is a “doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a

lawsuit on behalf of a citizen.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

purchases from Defendants may proceed. The motion is granted to the extent that

Puerto Rico’s claims based on indirect purchases, its unjust enrichment claims, and

its claims parens patriae, are dismissed.

ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: July 15, 2020

11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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