Castaneda v. Board Of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

)

SAUL CASTANEDA,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) No. 16 C 10167

v.

)

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Saul Castaneda sued Defendant Board of Education of the City of

Chicago claiming violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family

Medical Leave Act. (Id.). This Court denied the Board’s motion for summary

judgment determining that there were disputed issues of material fact that needed

to be decided by a jury. The jury trial began August 26, 2019. (Dkt. 129). On

September 6, 2019, the jury found in favor of the Board on all three of Castaneda’s

claims, (Dkt. 131) and this Court entered judgment on the same day, (Dkt. 132).

Castaneda filed this Motion for a New Trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(a), or in the alternative, to Alter or Amend the Judgment on his FMLA claims

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Dkt. 141 at 1). For the following reasons,

Castaneda’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Castaneda was a second-grade bilingual education teacher at Hanson Park

Elementary School (“Hanson Park”), part of Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”), from

2013 to 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 45 ¶¶ 5–6; 74 ¶¶ 9–10). During the 2013 to 2014 school

year, Castaneda met expectations and was invited back to teach for a second year.

(Id. at 47 ¶¶ 20–22; 54 ¶ 12–14). But as the 2014 to 2015 school year progressed,

Castaneda’s job performance gradually declined, and his behavior became

increasingly strange. (Id. at 234 ¶¶ 20–23; 259 ¶¶ 3–15; 856 ¶¶ 17–21). On April 17,

2015, a colleague observed Castaneda standing on a ledge or a desk in his classroom,

not attending to the students. (Id. at 645 ¶¶ 16–648 ¶¶ 22). That same month, two

students were injured under Castaneda’s supervision. (Id. at 956 ¶¶16–25; 957 ¶¶ 1–

22).

After these incidents, Principal David Belanger and Assistant Principal

Esmerelda Roman escalated their concerns to the Office of Employee Engagement

(“OEE”). (Id. at 958 ¶¶ 5–9). Mr. Thomas Krieger, the Assistant Director of OEE,

determined that an investigatory hearing should occur. (Id. at 422 ¶¶ 1–8). On May

6, 2015, Ms. Mary Ernesti, a Hearing Officer for OEE, presided over the investigatory

conference. (Id. at 293 ¶¶ 1–7). Castaneda and his Union Representative, Ms. Annette

Rizzo, appeared before Hearing Officer Ernesti. (Id. at 102 ¶¶ 20–24).

After the investigatory conference, Castaneda applied for Short-Term

Disability (“STD”) benefits and FMLA leave through Sedgwick, the third-part

responsible for administrating benefits. (Id. at 66 ¶¶ 3–13; 401 ¶ 1). Sedgwick

conditionally approved Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave that same day, May

6, 2015. (Id. at 605 ¶¶ 6–12). The next day, May 7, 2015, the Board suspended

Castaneda. (Id. at 70 ¶¶ 19–25). Beginning on May 8, 2015, Castaneda sought

medical attention. (Id. at 67 ¶¶ 20–23). Sedgwick denied Castaneda’s application for

STD benefits on May 12, 2015. (Id. at 111 ¶¶ 8–12). The Board terminated

Castaneda’s employment on June 26, 2015. (Id. at 74 ¶¶ 5–15).

In his Amended Complaint, Castaneda first alleged the Board discriminated

against him by not reasonably accommodating his disability and terminating him in

violation of the ADA. (Dkt. 16 at 4 ¶¶ 1–5). Second, Castaneda alleged the Board

interfered with his right to take leave by denying him leave in violation of the FMLA.

(Id. at 5 ¶¶ 1–3). Third, Castaneda alleged the Board interfered with his right to take

leave by terminating his employment in violation of the FMLA. (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 1–3).

The trial began on August 26, 2019. (Dkt. 129). After hearing five days of

testimony, jury deliberations began the afternoon of September 5, 2019. (Id.). The

jury deliberated for approximately forty-five minutes before Court was adjourned.

(Dkt. 141 at 1). Jury deliberations resumed at 9:00 AM the next day, on September

6, 2019. (Dkt. 131). At approximately 10:00 AM, the jury submitted four questions to

the Court. (Dkt. 135 at 1083 ¶¶ 13–19). After discussing the questions and answers

with the Parties and obtaining agreement from them, the Court answered the jury’s

questions approximately fifteen minutes later. (Dkt. 141 at 1). At approximately

11:00 AM, the jury reached a verdict on all three claims. (Dkt. 141 at 1). The jury

returned a verdict in favor of the Board on all three claims. (Dkt. 134). Castaneda

timely filed this Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and/or for a New Trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e); Dkt. 141.

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON CASTANEDA’S FMLA AND ADA

CLAIMS

Castaneda moves for a new trial on both his FMLA and ADA claims under Rule

59(a), arguing the jury’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and

a substantial injustice would occur if the verdicts were allowed to stand. (Dkt. 141

at 1). For the reasons discussed below, Castaneda’s motion for a new trial is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

Castaneda first brings a Motion for a New Trial. Rule 59(a) authorizes the

Court to grant a new trial as to some or all issues that were tried to a jury. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The movant bears a “particularly heavy burden” of establishing

the need for a new trial. Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of Chicago, Inc. v. Sekulovski,

639 F.3d 301, 314 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “A new trial is appropriate if the

jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial was in some

way unfair to the moving party.” Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir.

2014); see also Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004). “The ruling

on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the district court’s

discretion.” Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 588 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Research

Sys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicite, 276 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.2002) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (“The district court, having seen the presentation of the

evidence and observed the witnesses, is in a unique position to rule on a new trial

motion.”).

DISCUSSION

In support of his Motion for a New Trial, Castaneda argues that the jury’s

verdicts on both his FMLA and ADA claims were against the manifest weight of the

evidence. (Dkt. 141 at 2, 9). When determining whether the jury’s verdict is against

the manifest weight of the evidence, the Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party . . .” Barrington Music Prods., Inc. v. Music & Arts

Ctr., 924 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525,

530 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Court should be “particularly careful in employment

discrimination cases to avoid supplanting [its own] view of the credibility or weight

of the evidence for that of . . . the jury . . .” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610

F.3d 434, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hybert v. The Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050,

1054 (7th Cir. 1990)). The Court “cannot grant a new trial just because it believes the

jury got it wrong” or “merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Whitehead

v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

When considering whether the jury's verdict goes against the manifest weight

of the evidence, a court analyzes the “general sense of the evidence, assessing the

credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put forth at

trial.” Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Mejia v. Cook Cnty.,

650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011). Simply because a movant can present evidence

that is “inconsistent with the jury's verdict does not mean that the verdict should be

reversed.” Lowe v. Consol. Freightways of Del., Inc., 177 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1999).

There are narrow circumstances where a verdict will be set aside, namely “if ‘no

rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict;” the “jury’s verdict resulted in a

miscarriage of justice;” or “where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned

or shocks [the] conscience.” Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423, 427

(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2006); Clarett

v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Finally, “[j]ury

verdicts deserve particular deference in cases with ‘simple issues but highly disputed

facts.’” Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427 (citation omitted). The Court shall uphold a jury

verdict “as long as a reasonable basis exists in the record to support [the] verdict.”

Pickett, 610 F.3d at 440.

A. The Jury’s Verdict on Castaneda’s FMLA Claims Was Not Against the

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

On Castaneda’s FMLA claims, the Court instructed the jury:

To succeed on his FMLA interference claim, Mr. Castaneda must

prove each of the following propositions by a preponderance of the

evidence: 1. Mr. Castaneda was eligible for FMLA leave; 2. Mr.

Castaneda had a mental health condition; 3. Mr. Castaneda’s

mental health condition was a serious health condition; 4. The

Board had appropriate notice of Mr. Castaneda’s need for leave; 5.

The Board interfered with Mr. Castaneda’s right to take FMLA

leave by denying him FMLA leave and/or by terminating him.

i. Whether Castaneda Was Eligible for FMLA Leave

The first element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was “that Castaneda was eligible for FMLA leave.” (Dkt. 130 at 13). In

addition, the Court instructed the jury: “To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee

must have worked for the employer from whom he requests leave for at least 12

months and must have worked 1250 hours for that employer during the 12-month

period preceding the leave.” (Dkt. 130 at 12).

The record shows that there was ample evidence to rebut the claim that

Castaneda was eligible for FMLA leave. During trial, Kerry Frank, Senior Customer

Service Representative in Human Resources, testified that Castaneda had worked

900 hours for CPS during the preceding twelve months. (Dkt. 135 at 601 ¶¶ 7–13).

Frank further testified that Castaneda was a “school-based employee.” (Id. at 601 ¶¶

7–8). She added, “We have established a bright line of 900 hours for school-based

employees for their hours worked.” (Id. at 601 ¶¶ 7–13). Based on this testimony, a

rational jury could have concluded that Castaneda only worked 900 hours during the

preceding year, which is short of the 1250 hours required to be eligible for FMLA

leave. Joseph Moriarty, Labor Relations Officer and supervisor of the Equal

Opportunity Compliance Office, Id. at 542 ¶ 17–543 ¶ 8, additionally testified that

the requirement to work 1250 hours during the preceding twelve months is “for

somebody who worked 52 weeks. It’s a little different for teachers who have a shorter

. . . the number of hours that they’re required to work are prorated, because they don’t

work a full year, they only work a 10-month year.” (Id. at 535 ¶¶ 13–21). Moriarty

did not know the exact number of hours required for the teachers who only work a

10-month year but testified that it was “less than” 1250 hours. (Id. at 535 ¶ 25–536

¶ 7).

When the Court and the Parties discussed the jury instructions for the first

element, Castaneda argued that an employee must have worked 900 hours during

the 12-month period preceding the leave, instead of 1250 hours. (Id. at 901 ¶¶ 2–6).

The Board countered that, although the Board’s practice is to only require school-

based employees to work 900 hours per year, the law requires employees to work 1250

hours. (Id. at 901 ¶¶ 7–10). The Court agreed, explaining Castaneda may argue the

Board only requires 900 hours, but the law requires 1250 hours. (Id. at 901 ¶¶ 14–

16). Castaneda conceded, “That’s true. We can argue that . . . . We’re fine with it.” (Id.

at 901 ¶¶ 17–18). This is an example of a “simple issue[] but highly disputed facts,”

(citation omitted), to which the “jury verdict[] deserve[s] particular deference.”

Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427. Therefore, “reasonable basis exists in the record” for a

“rational jury” could have concluded that Castaneda was not eligible for FLMA leave

and failed to prove the first element by a preponderance of the evidence. Pickett, 610

F.3d at 440; Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427 (citation omitted).

ii. Whether Castaneda Had a Mental Health Condition

The second element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that “Castaneda had a mental health condition.” (Dkt. 130 at 13).

Castaneda testified that he had “been diagnosed with a mental illness.” (Dkt. 135 at

42 ¶¶ 3–9). Dr. Mark Johns, a psychologist, testified that on May 8, 2015, he initially

diagnosed Castaneda with “major depression with psychotic features.” (Id. at 46 ¶¶

18–25). Dr. Johns later ruled out schizophrenia and added the diagnosis of “social

anxiety disorder.” (Id. at 149 ¶¶ 1–7). Howard Pollack, a Licensed Clinical Social

Worker, testified that he diagnosed Castaneda with “schizophrenic reaction, paranoid

type” that same day after receiving a call from Castaneda matter-of-factly describing

his symptoms while discussing how he was facing disciplinary action and that

Castaneda himself suggested this diagnosis. (Id. at 798 ¶¶ 9–10; 799 ¶¶ 1-25; 801 ¶¶

13–18). On cross-examination, Pollack testified that if he could have, he would have

put ‘diagnosis deferred’ but that he needed to put a diagnosis in and that was why he

put in “schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type.” (Id. at 805 ¶¶ 15–22). Dr. Daniel Litoff,

a physician, testified that on January 26, 2015, he “agree[d] with the already

diagnosis” of “psychosis,” but that he did not observe any psychotic symptoms. (Id. at

818 ¶¶ 21–25). Finally, Dr. Morteza Mohajer, a psychiatrist, testified that on June

25, 2016, he diagnosed Castaneda with “psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified,”

Id. at 824 ¶¶ 11–16; 827 ¶¶ 21–23, and was ruling out schizophrenia, Id.at 832 ¶¶

12–15. All of the testimony regarding any mental diagnosis stated that the mental

health condition was diagnosed after Castaneda left the school. There was no

evidence that Castaneda was aware of a mental health condition, informed his

employer of a mental health condition, or sought treatment for a mental health

condition until his first visit on May 8, 2015.

While there was evidence that Castaneda suffered from a mental illness, “[t]he

fact that [the movant] presented evidence that is inconsistent with the jury's verdict

does not mean that the verdict should be reversed.” Lowe, 177 F.3d at 643. The Court

cannot say that “no rational jury” could have rendered the verdict or that this shocks

the conscience considering the conflicting testimony. Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427. In any

event, the Court cannot say this resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Id. A rational

jury may have concluded that Castaneda did have a mental health condition, and he

did prove the second element by a preponderance of the evidence. Castaneda,

however, must have proven all five elements by preponderance of the evidence to

succeed on his FMLA claims. (Dkt. 130 at 12). If a rational jury could have concluded

that Castaneda failed to meet his burden of proof for just one of the five elements, the

Court will uphold the jury’s verdict in favor of the Board. Pickett, 610 F.3d at 440.

(The Court shall uphold a jury verdict “as long as a reasonable basis exists in the

record to support [the] verdict.”).

iii. Whether Castaneda’s Mental Health Condition Was a Serious Health

Condition

The third element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that Castaneda’s “mental health condition was a serious health

condition.” (Dkt. 130 at 13). The Court’s instructions defined “serious health

condition” as a “mental condition that involves continuing treatment by a health care

provider. To establish continuing treatment by a health provider, Mr. Castaneda

must prove that he was unable to work due to the condition and was treated two or

more times by a health provider.” (Id. at 13). Dr. Johns testified that on May 8, 2015,

he recommended that Castaneda was “unable to work at this time” and projected

Castaneda would be able to “return to work” on September 1, 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 150

¶ 25–151 ¶ 8). Moreover, Dr. Johns testified that he treated Castaneda over one

hundred times. (Id. at 148 ¶¶ 2–6). All of these times were after the time that

Castaneda worked for CPD.

However, other witnesses testified conflicting evidence. Dr. Litoff, his primary

care physician, testified that he did not observe psychotic symptoms. (Id. at 818 ¶¶

7–9). Pollack testified that Castaneda called him and suggested that he receive a

diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, on the same day that he called Dr.

Johns and received a diagnosis. (Id. at 799 ¶¶ 23–25; 799 ¶¶ 1–25; 801 ¶¶ 13–18).

Pollack further testified that while he recommended Castaneda not return to the

classroom, it had little to do with his diagnosis, but rather primarily based this on

“what he said about his behavior in the classroom, how he transposed the rules. He

decided that he wasn’t going to use the lesson plan and he was going to just let the

kids socialize.” (Id. at 806 ¶¶ 14–19). Dr. Mohajer stated that he told Castaneda to

stop taking Adderall to see if it affected his psychosis and prescribed other drugs, and

that on his next visit he was calmer and denied paranoid or grandiose ideation. (Id.

at 833 ¶¶ 1–25; 834 ¶¶ 10–12).

Based on Dr. Johns’ testimony, a rational jury may have concluded that

Castaneda’s mental health condition was a serious health condition. However, there

was substantial conflicting testimony and no other witness besides Dr. Johns

indicated that Castaneda was unable to work because of his mental health issue,

which is a key element of the standard. As stated above, “[t]he fact that [the movant]

presented evidence that is inconsistent with the jury's verdict does not mean that the

verdict should be reversed.” Lowe, 177 F.3d at 643. Again, even if the jury could have

concluded that Castaneda had a serious mental illness, if a rational jury could have

concluded that Castaneda failed to meet his burden of proof for just one of the five

elements, the Court will uphold the jury’s verdict in favor of the Board.

iv. Whether the Board Had Appropriate Notice of Castaneda’s Need for

Leave

The fourth element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that “the Board had appropriate notice of Mr. Castaneda’s need for

leave.” (Dkt. 130 at 12). The Court further instructed that Castaneda “must have

given the Board at least 30 days’ notice before FMLA leave was to begin. If that was

not possible, Mr. Castaneda must have given notice as soon as both possible and

practical, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances.” (Id.). The Board

refers to this as “actual notice.” (Dkt. 158 at 10). Alternatively, the Court instructed

that “Mr. Castaneda must have given at least verbal notice sufficient to make the

Board aware that he needed FMLA leave. Mr. Castaneda did not need to mention the

FMLA or use any specific words if he gave the Board enough information that the

Board knew, or should have known, that Mr. Castaneda needed FMLA leave. Mr.

Castaneda did not need to request FMLA leave if the Board knew or should have

known from the circumstances that Mr. Castaneda needed FMLA leave or was so

incapacitated that he could not provide notice of his need for leave.” (Dkt. 130 at 12–

13). The Board refers to this as “constructive notice.” (Dkt. 158 at 12). The Court will

discuss each in turn.

1. Actual Notice

Castaneda testified that he did not know that he had a mental illness until

May 8, 2015, when LCSW Pollack and Dr. Johns diagnosed him, and, consequently,

he did not notify anyone at CPS that he had a mental illness prior to that date. (Dkt.

135 at 6 ¶¶ 12–15; 105 ¶¶ 18–23). Therefore, at the time he applied for STD benefits

and FMLA leave through Sedgwick, the third-party responsible for administrating

benefits on May 6, 2015, Castaneda did not know and could not have notified anyone

at CPS that he had a mental illness. (Id. at 66 ¶¶ 3–13; 401 ¶ 1). Assistant Director

Krieger and Principal Belanger testified that they did not became aware of

Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave until the next day, May 7, 2015. (Id. at 479

¶¶ 12–17; 734 ¶¶ 15–25; 735 ¶¶ 1–4). Castaneda argues that, as soon as the Board

became aware of Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave on May 7, 2015, Castaneda

had given the Board actual notice of his need for leave “as soon as both possible and

practical.” (Dkt. 141 at 5; Dkt. 131 at 12). However, based on the evidence, the Court

cannot say that the jury unreasonably found that there was no notice. Here, the facts

are highly disputed, and “[j]ury verdicts deserve particular deference in cases with

‘simple issues but highly disputed facts.’” Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427.

2. Constructive Notice

Castaneda contends that even if the Board did not have actual notice before

May 7, 2015, other incidents leading up to the Castaneda’s application for FMLA

leave put the Board on constructive notice of his need for leave. (Dkt. 141 at 5–6).

This was precisely why the Court denied summary judgment. The facts were highly

conflicting and the jury was needed to judge the credibility of the witnesses. For

example, Principal Belanger testified that he had an “inkling” that Castaneda did not

have a “typical” mental state as early as January 14, 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 696 ¶ 14–697

¶ 16) (emphasis added). But Belanger clarified that by “mental state” he meant

Castaneda’s “state of mind,” and that he “had no inkling that Mr. Castaneda had any

kind of mental illness.” (Id. at 737 ¶¶ 10–11; 697 ¶¶ 10–11) (emphasis added).

Principal Belanger also testified that Castaneda stated he was “burnt out” from the

previous school year. (Id. at 771 ¶¶ 17–19). On April 22, 2015, Principal Belanger

emailed Assistant Director Krieger to ask whether Castaneda should be sent for a

Fitness-for-Duty evaluation, which would have included a medical evaluation. (Id. at

726 ¶¶ 9–12; 727 ¶¶ 21–24; 755 ¶¶ 2–6.) According to Principal Belanger, Assistant

Director Krieger chose to follow the disciplinary route instead of the fitness-for-duty

route. (Id. at 728 ¶¶ 4–22.)

Shelley Eckerman and Dawn Ghawaly (“Ghawaly”), teachers at Hanson Park,

and Assistant Principal Roman, each testified that Castaneda’s job performance

gradually declined and his behavior became increasingly strange as the school year

progressed. (Id. at 234 ¶¶ 20–23; 259 ¶¶ 3–15; 856 ¶¶ 17–21). According to Assistant

Principal Roman’s testimony, however, Castaneda never voiced any concerns or

asked for help. (Id. at 873 ¶¶ 16–20). Tammy Siegel, Case Manager at Hanson Park,

testified that on April 17, 2015, she observed Castaneda standing on a ledge or on a

desk and was “very concerned” about his “spacey” behavior. (Id. at 646 ¶¶ 19–25; 648

¶¶ 11–22). She immediately informed Principal Belanger. (Id. at 648 ¶¶ 11–22).

Hearing Officer Ernesti testified that during the investigatory conference on

May 6, 2015, Castaneda “said he wanted to go the medical leave route.” (Id. at 310

¶¶ 10–19). Hearing Officer Ernesti further testified that Union Representative Rizzo

mentioned Castaneda’s “mental state” at the investigatory conference. (Id. at 301 ¶¶

8). However, Hearing Officer Ernesti testified that during the investigatory

conference, neither Rizzo nor Castaneda discussed how Castaneda’s “mental state”

related to the conduct under investigation. (Id. at 359 ¶¶ 1–10). Union Representative

Rizzo only stated that Castaneda was “sleep-deprived because of the demands of his

job.” (Id. at 358 ¶¶ 9–11). Moreover, Castaneda understood and responded to the

questions asked of him, remained “calm,” and maintained a “steady tone of voice.”

(Id. at p. 363 ¶¶ 12–17).

Castaneda contends that even if the Board did not have actual or constructive

notice before May 7, 2015, other incidents after Castaneda’s application for FMLA

leave put the Board on constructive notice of his need for leave before its decision to

terminate him on June 24, 2015. (Dkt. 141 at 5–6). On May 14, 2015, Castaneda

emailed Assistant Director Krieger and Labor Relations Officer Moriarty to inform

them he had applied for STD benefits and FMLA leave on May 6, 2015 and had

received a diagnosis from a medical provider. (Dkt. 141-1 at 62). Dr. Johns testified

that he faxed Castaneda’s diagnosis and recommended return-to-work date to CPS

on May 19, 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 149 ¶¶ 11–25; 150 ¶¶ 1–8; Dkt. 141-1 at 64–65). Lastly,

on June 10, 2015, Castaneda emailed Principal Belanger. (Dkt. 141-1 at 67).

Based on this testimony, a rational jury could have viewed the above-cited

testimony and concluded that the decline in performance and change in behavior was

too gradual to give rise to constructive notice, or that failure to voice any concerns

and his sleep-deprivation and burn-out explanations were enough to dispel such

notice. There is not enough evidence to say that the Board was certainly on notice of

Castaneda’s mental state or that the jury went against the preponderance of the

evidence. While there is evidence that suggests that the Board could have had

constructive notice, there is also substantial evidence that the Board did not have

this notice. This is a fact-intensive process and the Court will not disturb the jury’s

findings unless it can be shown there was manifest error, which Castaneda cannot

do. The Court “cannot grant a new trial just because it believes the jury got it wrong”

or “merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Whitehead, 680 F.3d at 928.

Here, the evidence was undoubtedly in conflict, but Castaneda has only shown there

was evidence at odds, not that the jury got it wrong.

v. Whether the Board Interfered with Mr. Castaneda’s Right to Take

FMLA Leave by Denying Him FMLA Leave and/or by Terminating Him

The fifth and final element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence was that “the Board interfered with Mr. Castaneda’s

right to take FMLA leave by denying him FMLA leave and/or by terminating him.”

(Dkt. 130 at 13). The Parties do not dispute that the Board terminated Castaneda on

June 26, 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 74 ¶¶ 5–15). The remaining issue, therefore, is whether

the Board interfered with Castaneda’s right to take FMLA leave prior to his

dismissal.

The Parties do not dispute the following facts: Castaneda applied for STD

benefits and FMLA leave on May 6, 2015; Sedgwick conditionally approved

Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave on May 6, 2015; Sedgwick denied

Castaneda’s STD benefits on May 12, 2015; Castaneda appealed Sedgwick’s denial of

STD benefits; and Castaneda’s final appeal of Sedgwick’s denial of STD benefits was

denied in August 2015. (Id. at 66 ¶¶ 3–13; 605 ¶¶ 6–12; 111 ¶¶ 8–11; 616 ¶¶ 9–13).

Whether Sedgwick ever denied Castaneda’s FMLA leave, however, is highly disputed.

For example, Frank testified that it was her “understanding that Sedgwick never

rendered a verdict about the FMLA leave.” (Id. at 606 ¶¶ 21). But when asked, “[s]o

they denied [Castaneda] leave against the terms of the FMLA…?” she responded,

“[t]hat is the Sedgwick process.” (Id. at 640 ¶¶ 3–5).

Frank testified that Sedgwick evaluates STD benefits before it evaluates

FMLA leave. (Id. at 606 ¶ 25–607 ¶ 9). Frank further testified that Sedgwick “stalled”

considering Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave until Castaneda’s final appeal

for STD benefits was decided in August 2015. (Id. at 616 ¶¶ 9–13; 639¶ 24640 ¶ 2).

By then, Castaneda had already been terminated, so he was no longer an employee

of the Board and thus no longer eligible for FMLA leave. (Id. at 606 ¶¶ 16–19). Frank

testified, however, that Sedgwick conditionally approved Castaneda’s application for

FMLA leave from May 6 to June 4, 2015. (Id. at 620 ¶¶ 5–8). The Board, however, did

not terminate Castaneda until June 24, 2015. (Id. at 74 ¶¶ 8–15). Frank concluded

that “[t]here should have been a decision about the FMLA.” (Id. at 640 ¶ 9). This is

another example of a “simple issue[] but highly disputed facts” to which the “jury

verdict[] deserve[s] particular deference.” Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427 (citation omitted).

Just as a rational jury could have concluded that Sedgwick denied Castaneda’s

application for FMLA leave, an equally rational jury could have concluded that

Sedgwick conditionally approved Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave, and by the

time Castaneda’s appeals for STD benefits were complete, Castaneda was no longer

eligible for FMLA leave. For these reasons, reasonable basis exists in the record for a

rational jury to have concluded that the Board did not interfere with Castaneda’s

right to take FMLA leave by denying him FMLA leave, and Castaneda failed to prove

the fifth element by a preponderance of the evidence. Although Castaneda argues

that he presented “uncontroverted” testimony in support of his FMLA claims, it

cannot be said that the jury heard no evidence refuting his allegations. (Dkt. 162 at

1). The Court cannot “grant a new trial merely because the evidence was sharply in

conflict.” Whitehead, 680 F.3d at 928. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

In conclusion, Castaneda must have proven all five elements by a

preponderance of the evidence to succeed on his FMLA claims. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the Board, there was enough evidence for a rational

jury to have concluded that Castaneda failed to meet his burden of proof on at least

one of the five required elements, which was enough to return a verdict in favor of

the Board. Accordingly, the Court upholds the jury’s verdict as not against the

manifest weight of the evidence and denies Castaneda’s Motion for a New Trial on

these grounds.

B. The Jury’s Verdict on Castaneda’s ADA Claim Was Not Against the

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

On Castaneda’s ADA claim, the Court instructed the jury:

To succeed on his ADA accommodation claim, Mr.

Castaneda must prove each of the following propositions by a

preponderance of the evidence: 1. Mr. Castaneda had a disability

or the Board regarded him as having a disability. 2. Mr.

Castaneda was qualified to perform his job. 3. Mr. Castaneda

requested an accommodation and/or Mr. Castaneda’s disability

made it difficult for him to communicate his need for an

accommodation. 4. The Board was aware of Mr. Castaneda’s

disability at the time of his request; however, if the disability

made it difficult for Mr. Castaneda to communicate his needs,

the Board was required to make a reasonable effort to

understand those needs and begin communicating with him if

the Board knew he might be mentally disabled. 5. The Board

failed to provide Mr. Castaneda with a reasonable

accommodation and terminated him.

i. Whether Castaneda Had a Disability or the Board Regarded Him

as Having a Disability

The first element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that Castaneda “had a disability or the Board regarded him as

having a disability.” (Id.). In addition, the Court’s instructions defined “disability” as

“a mental impairment that substantially limits Mr. Castaneda’s ability to work;”

defined “mental impairment” as “any condition that prevents the mind from

functioning normally;” and defined “substantially limit[s]” as “significantly

restrict[ing] him from performing a class of jobs, or a broad range of jobs in various

classes, compared to someone with similar knowledge, skills, and training. being

unable to do a particular job, however, is not by itself a substantial limited on the

ability to work.” (Id. at 17).

As discussed in Part I.A.ii supra, the witnesses’ diagnoses for Castaneda

differed. (See “a mental illness,” Dkt. 135 at p. 42 ¶¶ 3–9; “major depression with

psychotic features” and ruling out schizophrenia, Id. at 146 ¶¶ 18–25; “social anxiety

disorder” with schizophrenia ruled out, Id. at 149 ¶¶ 1–7; “schizophrenic reaction,

paranoid type,” Id. at 801 ¶¶ 13–18; “psychosis,” Id. at 818 ¶¶ 21–25; and “psychotic

disorder, not otherwise specified” and ruling out schizophrenia, Id. at 827 ¶¶ 21–23).

Because the witnesses’ diagnoses differ, a “rational jury” may have debated which

“mental impairment” Castaneda had during the spring of 2015. Again, not one of

these diagnoses came until May 8, 2015 at the earliest.

Moreover, the jury heard evidence that Castaneda’s “mental impairment”

“substantially limit[ed his] ability to work.” Dr. Johns testified that he recommended

Castaneda was “unable to work at this time,” Id. at 150 ¶¶ 25–151 ¶ 2, because

Castaneda was “not mentally stable to resume responsibilities [and] work demands

of his expected role.” (Dkt. 141-1 at 64). However, none of the other witnesses

indicated that Castaneda’s mental illness was severe enough to preclude working.

Once again, the Court cannot say that the jury’s verdict goes against the manifest

weight of the evidence when assessing the credibility of the witnesses and

comparative strength of the facts. Willis, 687 F.3d at 836. At most, the Court can say

that the evidence here was conflicting, but it cannot say that the evidence presented

incontrovertible proof that the jury chose to ignore. Castaneda cannot show that no

rational jury could have found he did not suffer from mental illness, that it shocked

the conscience, or that it was a miscarriage of justice. Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427. In any

event, Castaneda needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that all

elements of his claim were met, which as discussed below, he cannot do.

ii. Whether Castaneda Was Qualified to Perform His Job

The second element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that Castaneda “was qualified to perform his job.” (Dkt. 130 at 15).

The Court’s instructions defined “qualified” as having “the skill, experience,

education, and other requirements for the job and could do the job’s essential

functions, either with or without a leave of absence.” (Id. at 17). The Court further

instructed the jury to “only consider Mr. Castaneda’s abilities at the time when he

was terminated.” (Id.). The Parties do not dispute that, “at the time [Castaneda] was

terminated,” he had the “experience” and “education” for his job. He possessed a

college degree and was licensed to teach at the elementary school level in the State

of Illinois. (Dkt. 135 at 37 ¶¶ 14–21; 39 ¶¶ 8–22).

The Board presented evidence that Castaneda may not, however, have been

able to “do the job’s essential functions.” (Dkt. 130 at 17). Castaneda does not dispute

this, instead stating that “there was no factual dispute at trial that Plaintiff had the

skill, experience, education, and other requirements of his job as a teacher.” (Dkt. 141

at 10). Castaneda leaves out that there is ample evidence showing Castaneda could

not do his job’s essential functions. Castaneda testified that, according to his job

description, his “essential functions” included: “providing lesson plans,” “assessing

student progress,” “establishing and maintaining responsible rules of conduct within

the classroom,” and “supervis[ing] students.” (Dkt. 135 at 87 ¶ 16–89 ¶ 17).

Castaneda himself testified that he was “sure” that he was not performing all of the

“essential functions” of his job in the spring of 2015. (Id. at 89 ¶¶ 18–25). Dr. Johns,

Castaneda’s psychologist, testified that as of May 8, 2015, Castaneda was “unable to

work at this time.” (Id. at 150 ¶ 25–151 ¶ 2). The jury also heard evidence that

Castaneda was unable to provide students with proper instruction or supervision.

Ms. Deborah Yaker, a Union Delegate, testified that Castaneda was unable to provide

students with proper instruction (Id. at 216 ¶¶ 3–13). She further testified that in the

spring of 2015, when it was time for Castaneda’s second-grade students to move on

to the third grade, many of them had to attend additional schooling in order to catch

up with their peers. (Id. at 216 ¶¶ 9–13). Assistant Principal Roman testified that in

the spring of 2015, Castaneda repeatedly arrived at school after 9:00 AM, even though

instruction was supposed to begin at 9:00 AM. (Id. at 955 ¶¶ 1–17; Dkt. 141-1 at 64).

Moreover, Yaker testified that Castaneda was unable to provide students with proper

supervision. (Dkt. 135 at 217 ¶¶ 2–3). Assistant Principal Roman testified that in

April 2015, two students were injured in Castaneda’s classroom. (Id. at 956 ¶16–957

¶ 22). Given the substantial testimony by Castaneda himself and other witnesses, it

is clear that a rational jury could find that Castaneda was unable to perform his “job’s

essential functions.” (Dkt. 130 at 17).

On the issue of whether he was qualified “with or without a leave of absence,”

Id., Dr. Johns projected Castaneda would be able to “return to work” on September

1, 2015. (Dkt. 135 at 150 ¶ 25–151 ¶ 8). On cross-examination, however, Dr. Johns

testified that Castaneda was not able to return to work on September 1, 2015, and

required a few more months of treatment before he was able to work again. (Id. at

154 ¶ 23–155 ¶ 14). Dr. Johns attributed this delay to Castaneda’s termination,

which, he testified, caused Castaneda “serious emotional and mental setback.” (Id. at

154 ¶¶ 5–14). Thus, Castaneda is incorrect that “the jury could not rationally

conclude that Plaintiff absolutely needed a months-long leave…” (Dkt. 141 at 10).

There is, at best, conflicting evidence that the jury could take into consideration.

iii. Whether Castaneda Requested an Accommodation and/or Castaneda’s

Disability Made It Difficult for Him to Communicate His Need for an

Accommodation

The third element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence was that Castaneda “requested an accommodation and/or [his] disability

made it difficult for him to communicate his need for an accommodation.” (Dkt. 130

at 15). The Court’s instructions defined “accommodation” as “a change that will allow

a person with a disability to perform a job.” (Id. at 18). “An accommodation is

‘reasonable’ if it is effective and its costs are not clearly disproportionate to the

benefits that it will produce. A reasonable accommodation may include such things

as a reasonable leave of absence, a change in work rules, location, equipment,

schedules, or assigning non-essential functions of the job to another employee. An

employer is not required, however, to excuse the employee from performing the

essential functions of the job, or to give one or more of them to another employee. Nor

does the employer have to accept lower productivity than is expected of other

employees doing the same job. A brief period of leave to deal with a medical condition

may be a reasonable accommodation in some circumstances. However, a medical

leave spanning multiple months does not permit the employee to perform the

essential functions of his job and he would be deemed unqualified.” (Id.).

Castaneda argues that he applied for FMLA leave and STD leave on May 6,

2015. (Dkt. 141 at 10, citing Dkt. 135 at 66 ¶¶ 3–13). Castaneda also claims he

requested a medical leave during the May 6, 2015 investigatory conference. (Dkt. 141

at 10, citing Dkt. 135 at 301 ¶¶ 1–8; 305 ¶ 5; 306 ¶ 14). While this is uncontroverted,

Castaneda does not show how requests for FMLA leave and STD leave are

accommodations under the ADA, nor can he since case law indicates that employees

who need long-term medical leave and cannot work, such as under the FMLA, are not

“qualified individuals” under the ADA. Golden v. Indianapolis Housing Agency, 698

Fed App’x 835 (7th Cir. 2017). What the record does show is that while Castaneda

testified that he knew as early as May 7, 2015 who to contact to file a reasonable

accommodation request under the ADA, he did not do so until July 8, 2015, when he

requested an accommodation in the form of a “lower stress, reduced stimuli

environment” at work. (Dkt. 135 at 113 ¶¶ 5–25; 162 ¶¶ 8–12). By this point, however,

Castaneda had already been terminated.

Unable to rely on arguments that he timely requested an accommodation,

Castaneda argues that, prior to Dr. Johns’s diagnosis on May 8, 2015, Castaneda

could not have communicated his need for an accommodation because Castaneda did

not know he had a mental disability. (Dkt. 141 at 10; 135 at 146 ¶¶ 18–25). However,

a jury could just as reasonably determine that, because of his email communications

throughout the spring of 2015, including his ability to request STD and FMLA leave

without issues, Castaneda was able to communicate his needs without difficulty.

Reasonable basis exists in the record for a rational jury to have concluded that his

disability did not make “it difficult for him to communicate his need for an

accommodation,” especially given his ability to request other forms a leave. (Dkt. 130

at 15). Therefore, a rational jury could have concluded that Castaneda failed to prove

the third element by a preponderance of the evidence.

iv. Whether the Board was Aware of Castaneda’s Disability at the Time

of the Request or, if the Disability Made it Difficult for Castaneda to

Communicate His Needs, Whether the Board Made a Reasonable

Effort to Understand Those Needs and Began Communicating with

Him

The fourth element Castaneda had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

was that “[t]he Board was aware of Mr. Castaneda’s disability at the time of his

request,” or “if the disability made it difficult for Mr. Castaneda to communicate his

needs, the Board [made] a reasonable effort to understand those needs and beg[a]n

communicating with him if the Board knew he might be mentally disabled.” (Dkt. 130

at 15).

Relying on many of the same arguments he made for whether the Board had

appropriate notice of Mr. Castaneda’s need for leave, see Part I.A.iv.2 supra,

Castaneda makes conclusory statements such as “the Board was well aware that

[Castaneda] had a medical issue,” and “[Castaneda’s] mental disability made it

impossible to communicate his needs.” (Dkt. 162 at 12; Dkt. 141 at 11). These

determinations are fact-intensive inquiries best conducted by a jury and conclusory

statements to the contrary do not rebut this. Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427 (“[Jury verdicts

deserve particular deference in cases with ‘simple issues but highly disputed facts.’”)

Although Castaneda presented evidence that members of CPS were “concerned”

about Castaneda’s “mental state” as early as January 2015, the Board presented

evidence that no fewer than six members of CPS denied that they knew Castaneda

had a mental disability. (See Dkt. 135 at pp. 648 ¶¶ 11–22; 696 ¶ 14– 697 ¶ 16; but

see Dkt 135 at pp. 386 ¶¶ 14–17 (Hearing Officer Ernesti); 697 ¶¶ 10–11 (Principal

Belanger); 940 ¶¶ 3–5 (Assistant Principal Roman); 253 ¶¶ 2–11 (Mr. George

Costopoulous, a teacher at Hanson Park); 509 ¶¶ 5–12 (Assistant Director Krieger)).

The jury weighed the evidence and assessed the credibility of witnesses to arrive at

its conclusion, and the Court will not “supplant[ its own] view . . . for that of . . . the

jury . . . .” Pickett, 610 F.3d at 440 (quoting Hybert, 900 F.2d at 1054). There is ample

evidence in the record for a rational jury to have concluded that the Board was not

“aware of Castaneda’s disability at the time of the request.” (Dkt. 130 at 15).

Alternatively, “if the disability made it difficult for Mr. Castaneda to

communicate his needs,” Castaneda had the burden to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that “the Board [made] a reasonable effort to understand those needs

and beg[a]n communicating with him if the Board knew he might be mentally

disabled.” (Id.). The Court further instructed “[o]nce an employer becomes aware of

an employee’s disability and an accommodation has been requested, the employer

must discuss with the employee whether there is a reasonable accommodation that

will permit him to perform the job. When an employer knows that an employee might

be mentally disabled, the employer should start communicating with the employee.

Both the employer and the employee must cooperate in this interactive process in

good faith. Neither party can prevail on Mr. Castaneda’s failure to accommodate

claim simply because the other party did not cooperate in this process. However, you

may consider whether a party cooperated in this process in deciding whether a

reasonable accommodation existed.” (Id. at 16).

Castaneda argues that the Board ignored opportunities to initiate the

interactive process both before and after the May 6, 2015 investigatory conference.

(Dkt. 162 at 12–13). For example, when Principal Belanger emailed Assistant

Director Krieger to ask whether Castaneda should be sent for a fitness-for-duty

evaluation, which would have included a medical evaluation, Dkt 135 at 727 ¶¶ 21–

24; 755 ¶¶ 2–6, Assistant Director Krieger chose to follow the disciplinary route

instead. Dkt. 135 at p. 728 ¶¶ 4–22. Assistant Director Krieger testified that he did

not believe Castaneda’s behavior warranted a fitness-for-duty evaluation. (Dkt. 135

at 445 ¶¶ 2–5). Assistant Director Krieger explained that he “think[s] it’s a dangerous

thing because of confidentiality to go asking employees if they have a disability issue

or to go, you know, probing into an employee’s medical conditions if they’re not

volunteering that type of information.” (Dkt. 135 at 436 ¶¶ 15–19). Similarly, Labor

Relations Officer Moriarty testified that he “wouldn’t have [initiated the interactive

process], given that this appears to be a misconduct issue.” (Dkt. 135 at 555 ¶¶ 13–

18).

Presented with these “highly disputed facts,” Tuelja, 546 F.3d at 427 (citation

omitted), a rational jury could have concluded that Board didn’t know he might be

mentally disabled and thus wasn’t required to make a reasonable effort to understand

those needs and begin communicating with him as the jury instructions required.

Therefore, a rational jury could have concluded that Castaneda failed to prove the

fourth element by a preponderance of the evidence.

v. Whether the Board Failed to Provide Castaneda with a Reasonable

Accommodation and Terminated Him

The fifth and final element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence was the Board failed to provide Mr. Castaneda with a

reasonable accommodation and terminated him.” (Dkt. 130 at 15). As discussed

above, on July 8, 2015, Castaneda requested an accommodation in the form of a

“lower stress, reduced stimuli environment” at work. (Dkt. 135 at 113 ¶¶ 5-25; 162

¶¶ 8–12). By this point, however, Castaneda had already been terminated and so the

accommodation was not granted.

In conclusion, Castaneda must have proved all five elements by a

preponderance of the evidence to succeed on his ADA claim. Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Board, there was enough evidence for a rational jury

to have concluded that Castaneda failed to meet his burden of proof on at least one of

the five required elements, which was enough to return a verdict in favor of the Board.

Although Castaneda argues that he presented “unassailable” testimony in support of

his ADA claim, Dkt. 141 at 10, the Board presented evidence refuting his allegations.

Even if the evidence is contradictory, “[i]t’s the jury’s job—not the district court’s job

. . . —to figure out who’s telling the truth.” United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906,

920 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court upholds the jury’s

verdict as not against the manifest weight of the evidence and denies Castaneda’s

Motion for a New Trial on these grounds.

II. MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT ON CASTANEDA’S

FMLA CLAIMS

Castaneda moves to alter or amend the judgment for his FMLA claims under

Rule 59(e), arguing the jury was plainly confused or mislead by the Court’s FMLA

jury instructions and that the instructions constitute plain error. (Dkt. 141 at 12,

14). For the reasons discussed below, Castaneda’s motion to alter or amend the

judgment is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

Castaneda moves to alter or amend the judgment on his FMLA claims under

Rule 59(e). Rule 59(e) authorizes the Court to alter or amend a judgment “if the

movant presents newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial

or if the movant points to evidence in the record that clearly establishes a manifest

error of law or fact.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 683

F.3d 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.1996)).

The movant bears the burden. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir.2009).

A Rule 59(e) motion is not a “vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures,

and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance

arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to

the judgment.” United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is a Rule 59(e) motion an avenue to

rehash arguments already considered and rejected by the Court. See Oto v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). The decision to grant a Rule 59(e)

motion is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court. Miller, 683 F.3d at

813 (citation omitted). A district court reviews its prior judgment under Rule 59(e) to

determine whether “there exists ‘a manifest error of law or fact,’ so as to enable the

court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary appellate procedures.”

Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Moro, 91 F.3d

at 876). A Rule 59(e) motion should be granted only in the “rare” instances where “the

Court has patently misunderstood a party . . . or has made an error not of reasoning

but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d

1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider

should be equally rare.”)

DISCUSSION

A. Castaneda Failed to Object to the Court’s Instructions and Answers

Castaneda argues that he is entitled to a Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment

under Rule 59(e) because the Court’s jury instructions and the Court’s answers to

three questions from the jury misled the jury. (Dkt. 141 at 12–14). For the reasons

explained below, Castaneda’s Rule 59(e) motion on this issue is denied.

i. The Court’s Jury Instructions

In this case, the Court and the Parties engaged in extensive preparation of jury

instructions. Prior to trial, Castaneda did not include language about a time limit for

the Board to process Castaneda’s application in his proposed jury instructions. See

generally Dkts. 80; 81; 82; 107. Castaneda’s proposed jury instruction read: “The

Board interfered with Mr. Castaneda’s right to take FMLA leave by denying or

otherwise failing to give Mr. Castaneda FMLA leave and then terminating his

employment with the Board.” (Dkt. 135 at 901 ¶ 22–902 ¶ 14) (emphasis added). The

Court instead adopted the Board’s proposed instruction, which read: “The Board

interfered with Mr. Castaneda's right to take FMLA leave by denying him FMLA

leave and/or by terminating him." (Id. at 902 ¶¶ 2–14). To which Castaneda replied,

“Okay.” (Id. at 902 ¶ 12). Due to Castaneda’s repeated failure to object, a Rule 59(e)

motion is inappropriate as he had an opportunity to object during trial. A Rule 59(e)

motion is not a “vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly

does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could

and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.” Resnick,

594 F.3d at 568 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Castaneda seeks

another bite at the apple by attempting to undo his prior procedural error.

ii. The Court’s Answers to the Jury’s Questions

On September 6, 2015, after the jury had deliberated for approximately one

hour, Dkt. 141 at 1, the presiding juror submitted a note to the Court, asking four

questions:

Is CPS required to process FMLA concurrently with STD? Is it illegal

that they did not make a ruling on FMLA? If Sedgwick should have

processed the FMLA request, is that legally the same as CPS not

processing? According to the law, what is the required timeline to

process an FMLA request?

(Dkt. 135 at 1083 ¶¶ 13–19.) Castaneda challenges the Court’s answers to the jury’s

first, second, and fourth questions. (Dkt. 141 at 14). When presented with a jury

question, the Court must: “(1) fairly and adequately address[] the issues; (2) correctly

state[] the law; and (3) answer[] the jury’s question specifically.” United States v.

Funds in the Amount of $100,120.00, 901 F.3d 758, 769 (7th Cir. 2018).

In response to the first question, whether “CPS [is] required to process FMLA

concurrently with STD,” instead of objecting, Plaintiff’s counsel replied, “the FMLA

doesn’t require that at all.” (Dkt. 135 at 1083 ¶¶ 22–25). The Court explicitly asked

Plaintiff’s counsel, “Do you object to the answer of no?” to which Castaneda replied,

“I think that’s fine, as long as they get the rest, it will come out.” (Id. at 1087 ¶¶ 16–

20). Plaintiff’s counsel was presented the opportunity to object, on the record, outside

the hearing of the jury, and offer any other alternative, before the Court delivered the

answer to the questions presented by the jury, but failed to do so.

In response to the second question, whether “it is illegal that [the Board] did

not make a ruling on FMLA?” Plaintiff’s counsel initially replied, “Obviously plaintiff

says yes.” (Id. at 1084 ¶¶ 6–9). After a period of discussion, the Court proposed: “The

second answer is: It is your job to determine if there was a violation of the law.

Anybody object to that one?” to which Plaintiff’s counsel replied, “No.” (Id. at 1087 ¶¶

21–24). Again, Plaintiff’s counsel was presented the opportunity to object, on the

record, outside the hearing of the jury, before the Court delivered the answers to the

jury’s questions, but failed to do so.

In response to the fourth question, “what is the required timeline to process an

FMLA request,” Plaintiff’s counsel replied, “There is no timeline within the text of

the law . . . . it’s just as reasonably—as soon as possible, really . . . .” (Id. at 1085 ¶¶

1–7). After the Court proposed answering: “You have not been provided a timeline

and should reread [the] instruction[s] . . . on FMLA,” Plaintiff’s counsel replied: “[M]y

understanding is it just has to be processed as quickly as possible.” (Id. at 1088 ¶ 21–

1089 ¶ 4). But when the Court explicitly asked Plaintiff’s counsel, “[D]id you want to

say something other than what I have said?” Plaintiff’s counsel did not reply in the

affirmative. (Id. at 1089 ¶¶ 16–23). In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel provided the Court with

the page numbers so that the Court could direct the jury to reread the relevant

portion of the jury instructions. (Id. at 1090 ¶¶ 12–18). Once again, Plaintiff’s counsel

was presented the opportunity to object, on the record, outside the hearing of the jury,

before the Court delivered the answer to the jury questions, but failed to do so. Most

importantly, the answer to the questions was the correct statement of law.

A motion to alter or amend the judgment is not a “vehicle for a party to undo

its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to . . . advance

arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to

the judgment.” Resnick, 594 F.3d at 568 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Castaneda’s counsel was presented several opportunities to object, on the

record, outside the hearing of the jury, both before trial and during trial. Because

they failed to do so, he is not entitled to an alteration or an amendment of the

judgment under 59(e).

B. The Court’s Answers to the Jury’s Questions Did Not Confuse or

Mislead the Jury

In general, the District Court has discretion in fashioning jury instructions

that accurately state the law and do not confuse the jury. Schobert v. Illinois Dept. of

Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A movant is entitled to a new trial based

on jury instruction issues “if the instructions did not sufficiently inform the jury of

the applicable law and the instructions prejudiced the [movant].” E.E.O.C. v.

AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, even where the jury is

confused or misled, a new trial is warranted only where there is evidence that the

movant was prejudiced by the improper jury instruction. See Jiminez v. City of

Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court’s instructions need not be an

“idealized set of perfect jury instructions,” but they must be “correct legal statements”

and a reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict unless the instruction is “so

misleading that a party was prejudiced.” Schobert, 304 F.3d at 730.

In his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Castaneda indicates that,

pursuant to the FMLA, “[w]hen the employer has enough information to determine

whether the leave is being taken for a FMLA-qualifying reason (e.g., after receiving

a certification), the employer must notify the employee whether the leave will be

designated and will be counted as FMLA leave within five business days absent

extenuating circumstances,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(1) (2019), and that failure to do

so “may constitute an interference with . . . or denial of the exercise of an employee’s

FMLA rights.” (Dkt. 141 at 13 citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(e) (2019)).

Assuming, arguendo, that Castaneda did not waive his right to raise this issue

and that it was error for the Court to have not included this regulatory notification

requirement in its answers to the jury’s questions, the Court’s answers to the jury’s

questions did not mislead or confuse the jury. To the contrary, the Court clarified to

the jury, “[y]ou have not been provided a timeline.” (Dkt. 135 at 1088 ¶¶ 21–25; 1089

¶¶ 1–25). The Court further instructed the jury to reread the relevant portion of the

jury instructions, id. at 1090 ¶¶ 12–14, and the jury did not ask any more questions.

“[A] jury is presumed to understand a judge’s answer to its question,” just as it is

“presumed to follow [a judge’s] instructions.” See Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S.

179, 196 (2009) (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000)) (“Where a judge

“respond[s] to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph

of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry,” and the jury

asks no follow-up question, this Court has presumed that the jury fully understood

the judge's answer and appropriately applied the jury instructions.”). Importantly,

even if they were given the instruction about the regulatory period, there was

evidence in the record presented to the jury that the FMLA leave was granted

immediately on the first day. The jury could have easily reached the conclusion that

any five day period was met by Sedwick’s testimony indicating that he granted the

leave conditionally on May 6, 2015. The issue of five days’ notice is a moot issue if

Castaneda applied for it (showing his knowledge that he could) and it was

conditionally granted the very day that he applied.

Similarly, Castaneda was not prejudiced by the alleged error because the jury

likely would have reached the same verdict absent the alleged error. Jiminez, 732

F.3d at 717. The fifth and final element Castaneda had the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence was that “the Board interfered with Mr. Castaneda’s

right to take FMLA leave by denying him FMLA leave and/or by terminating him.”

(Dkt. 130 at 12). Had the Court informed the jury that the Board was required to

notify Castaneda of his eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business days, and

that failure to do so “may constitute an interference with” Castaneda’s FMLA rights,

a reasonable jury may have found in favor of Castaneda on the fifth element of his

FMLA claims. The jury, however, heard testimony that Sedgwick conditionally

approved Castaneda’s application for FMLA leave on May 6, 2015, the same day

Castaneda applied. (Dkt. 135 at 605 ¶¶ 6–12). An equally reasonable jury may have

determined that this conditional approval satisfied the regulatory notification

requirement and found in favor of the Board on the fifth element of his FMLA claims.

Regardless, as discussed in Part I.A., supra, Castaneda, must have proven all

five elements by preponderance of the evidence to succeed on his FMLA claims. Even

if this alleged error caused the jury to find in favor of the Board on the fifth element,

there was reasonable basis in the record for the jury to have found in favor of the

Board on the remaining four elements. Therefore, absent the alleged error, the verdict

likely would have been the same. Although Castaneda was, evidently, not aware of

this regulatory notification requirement at the time of trial when he insisted “[t]here

is no timeline within the text of the law,” (Id. at 1085 ¶¶ 1–7), Castaneda cannot use

his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment as a “vehicle” to “advance arguments

that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.”

Resnick, 594 F.3d at 568 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The record

shows Castaneda had ample opportunity to bring up these arguments during trial

but failed to do so. He cannot use a 59(e) motion to cure his own procedural and legal

deficiencies.

Most importantly, Castaneda uses this newly enlightened position of a five day

turn around period for FMLA leave to demonstrate that the jury would have reached

the wrong result. This simply cannot be said to be the case when other evidence

presented to the jury demonstrated that he was immediately and conditionally

granted the leave he was requesting. Castaneda has not demonstrated that the

Court’s instructions or answers misled or confused the jury and that Castaneda was

prejudiced by the Court’s alleged error. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d at 922. Absent this

showing, the Court denies Castaneda’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on

these grounds.

C. The Court’s Instructions and Answers Did Not Constitute Plain Error

Castaneda argues that the Court’s instructions and answers constitute plain

error. (Dkt. 141 at 15). Castaneda cannot overcome his steep burden to show plain

error, especially due to his repeated waiver of objections. “When a party waives an

objection at trial, only seldom may the waiver be overcome, and even then only at the

discretion of the court with a strong showing of plain error.” Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d

799, 807 (7th Cir. 2017). “In most civil cases, plain error review is unavailable; if a

party fails to object at trial, the issue cannot be raised on appeal. A narrow exception

to this general rule permits review where a party can demonstrate that (1)

exceptional circumstances exist, (2) substantial rights are affected, and (3) a

miscarriage of justice will result if the doctrine is not applied.” Perry v. City of

Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 253 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (declining to perform

plain error review of a civil case). Substantial rights may have been affected if the

“outcome probably would have been different without the error.” United States v.

Pree, 408 F.3d 855, 869 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A miscarriage of justice

may result if “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” is

negatively impacted. Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 408, 409 (7th Cir. 2006).

Castaneda has not demonstrated any “exceptional circumstances” that

prevented him from learning about the regulatory notification requirement prior to

trial or prevented him from objecting to the Court’s instructions or answers during

trial. To the contrary, the Court explicitly asked Castaneda several times if he had

any objections. First, the Court explained to the Parties, “I'm going to propose

something and give you options to object. Okay?” (Dkt. 135 at 1085 ¶¶ 8–9). On

another occasion, the Court explicitly asked Castaneda, “Do you object to the answer

of no?” (Id. at 1087 ¶¶ 16–20). Later, the Court asked, “Anybody object to that one?”

(Id. at 1087 ¶¶ 21–24). Finally, the Court asked, “did you want to say something other

than what I have said?” (Id. at 1089 ¶¶ 16–23).

Similarly, Castaneda has not demonstrated his “substantial rights” were

affected. As discussed above, absent the alleged error, the jury likely would have

reached the same verdict. Lastly, Castaneda has not demonstrated that “a

miscarriage of justice will result.” Castaneda argues that the Court’s omission of the

regulatory notification requirement permitted the Board to “escape liability” for

failing to “notify [Castaneda] whether the leave will be designated and will be counted

as FMLA leave without five business days.” (Dkt. 141 at 13 citing 29 C.F.R. §

825.300(d)(1)(2019)). A reasonable jury, however, may have determined that

Sedgwick’s conditional approval of Castaneda’s application for FLMA leave satisfied

the regulatory notification requirement and found in favor of the Board on the fifth

element of his FMLA claims.

Castaneda has not demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances,

that the Court’s instructions or answers affected his substantial rights, or that a

miscarriage of justice will result. Perry, 733 F.3d at 253. Accordingly, Castaneda has

not “cleared the high bar of plain error,” and the Court denies his Motion to Alter or

Amend the Judgment on these grounds. Groot, 867 F.3d at 807. As stated throughout,

Rule 59(e) does not allow Castaneda to re-do his own errors. He could have objected

to the jury instructions and jury answers but failed to do so despite ample

opportunity. He is thus not entitled to amend or alter the judgment on any of the

arguments he makes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Castaneda’s Motion for a New Trial

on his ADA and FMLA claims under Rule 59(a) and his Motion to Amend or Alter the

Judgment on his FMLA claims under Rule 59(e) [Dkt. 141].

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Ld fh ia M. Kendall

ited States District Judge

Date: May 4, 2020

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