Allen v. Chicago Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES ALLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 15 C 7702

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:

Now before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1. For the following reasons, the Court

grants the Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

For purposes of this motion, the Court recites the following facts from the record.

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff Charles Allen (“Allen”) is a Chicago resident. Defendant Officers

Kenhasa Martin (“Officer Martin”), Angela B. Cowart-Smith (“Officer Cowart-

Smith”), Steven A. Davis (“Officer S. Davis”), Mark H. Davis (“Evidence Technician

M. Davis”), Allen Smith (“Detention Aide Smith”), Eric Medina (“Officer Medina”),

Stanley L. Williams (“Sergeant Williams”), Daniel Corral (“Officer Corral”), Martin J.

Tannehill (“Lieutenant Tannehill”), Francis J. Heslin (“Detective Heslin”), Robert D.

Watkins (“Officer Watkins”), Eric L. Johnson (“Detention Aide Johnson”), Roy A.

Boffo (“Sergeant Boffo”), Fred J. Marcellino (“Sergeant Marcellino”), and Vance E.

Bonner (“Sergeant Bonner”) (collectively, “Defendants”) were employed by Defendant

City of Chicago (“the City”), a municipal corporation, at all relevant times.

On July 21, 2014, an individual called 9-1-1 to request help at 8101 S. Maryland

Avenue in connection with an alleged domestic battery. In response, the Office of

Emergency Management and Communication (“OEMC”) dispatched Beat 632, Officer

S. Davis, to the scene at 23:00:02. Dispatch then called to request backup for Officer

S. Davis, as he was without a partner that evening. Officer Cowart-Smith responded

that Beat 642 was available, and she and Officer Martin were assigned as the assist at

23:00:19.

At approximately 23:30:26, Officer S. Davis notified dispatch that the officers

were going to apartment 203. Sergeant Williams, Beat 610, heard the calls on the radio

and responded to the scene as the Beat Sergeant.

The officers arrested Allen at 23:32:00. During the arrest, the officers tased

Allen and deployed OC spray, more commonly referred to as pepper spray. At some

point in the apartment, Allen passed out and has no recollection of the events that

occurred until he woke up in the police station the following morning.

After Allen’s arrest, Officer Cowart-Smith called over the radio that there was

an emergency at 23:40:05. Seven seconds later, she requested a “wagon” and an

ambulance. At 23:41:10, Officer Cowart-Smith reiterated over the radio, “We need an

ambulance, get it over here. We need the wagon and an ambulance for this offender.”

Dispatch responded to ask what type of injuries they had on scene, and Officer Cowart-

Smith stated at 23:41:50, “Taser, he got tased.”

At 23:42:28, Emergency Medical Services, Ambulance 24 was dispatched to the

scene. The ambulance arrived on scene by 23:46:51. However, the parties dispute

whether the paramedics provided treatment on the scene.

At 00:02:02, dispatch assigned Beat 631R, Officers Medina and Corral, to

respond to the scene. At 00:03:25, the ambulance returned to being “in service,”

meaning that the paramedics completed the call and may be assigned a new job.

Evidence Technician M. Davis arrived on scene at 00:17:01. He took

photographs of the victim and apartment 203. Evidence Technician M. Davis had no

interaction with Allen.

At 00:38:00, Officers Medina and Corral transported Allen to the 6th District.

After transport, Officers Medina, Corral, and S. Davis, and Sergeant Williams did not

have any further interaction with Allen. Officers Medina and Corral were cleared of

the assignment at 00:58:35. Officer S. Davis was cleared from the assignment at

02:20:43, after completing a Tactical Response Report (“TRR”) to document the use of

force and submitting it to Sergeant Williams.

At 00:53:00, Detective Heslin of the Area South Special Victims Unit was

assigned to this case. Upon assignment, Detective Heslin went to the scene to interview

witnesses and the victim. Allen had already been transported from the scene by the

time Detective Heslin arrived. Detective Heslin did not interact with Allen until

interviewing him at the hospital later that day.

At 01:23:06, Lieutenant Tannehill interviewed Allen. Lieutenant Tannehill

stated that Allen never requested medical treatment during this interview. He had no

further interactions with Allen after the interview.

Once arriving back to the station, Officer Martin completed at TRR and

submitted it for Sergeant Williams’ review at 02:04:27. Officer Martin then worked

with Officer Cowart-Smith to draft an arrest report. Officer Cowart-Smith submitted

the arrest report at 03:17:00. Sergeant Marcellino reviewed the arrest report at 03:20:00

and approved probable cause for the charges. He never observed or spoke with Allen

during the events on July 21 and 22. After receiving Sergeant Marcellino’s approval,

Officers Martin and Cowart-Smith were cleared from the assignment at 03:40:14.

Sergeant Boffo was working as a sector sergeant in the 6th District starting at

05:00:00 on July 22, 2014. Officer Watkins was the lockup keeper in the 6th District

on July 22, 2014, starting at 05:30:00. Starting at 06:00:00, Detention Aides Johnson

and Smith began their shifts in the 6th District lockup.

Once Allen woke up in his holding cell on July 22, 2014, lockup personnel let

him wash his eyes out with water. Allen was then fingerprinted by lockup personnel at

07:58:00. During his fingerprinting, Allen told lockup personnel that his chest and knee

hurt. Allen told them that he had been tased and lifted up his shirt to show Officer

Watkins the marks on his stomach from the taser prongs.

After being informed of this injury, lockup personnel sent for Sergeant Boffo,

who arrived within fifteen minutes. Sergeant Boffo reviewed Allen’s paperwork and

stated, “not on my watch.” Sergeant Boffo arranged for Allen to be transported to the

hospital in about fifteen minutes. Prior to that interaction, Sergeant Boffo had not

spoken to or seen Allen and had no reason to believe he was injured.

Allen arrived at Little Company of Mary Hospital at approximately 10:46:00.

He saw the triage nurse at 11:10:00. After evaluation, Allen’s vital signs were normal,

and he was designated at “Fast Track,” meaning that his injuries were non-urgent.

At 12:00:00, Doctor Barry Lewis (“Dr. Lewis”) saw Allen in the emergency

room. Allen told Dr. Lewis that he had been tased and was experiencing numbness in

his left hand and fingers. He explained that in March 2014, he was stabbed in his left

forearm and experienced pain and numbness in his left hand ever since. Based on that

information, Dr. Lewis found that Allen had a “chronic pain syndrome or injury.” The

parties dispute whether Dr. Lewis opined that the tasering exacerbated Allen’s stab-

related injuries.

Dr. Lewis recommended that Allen take Motrin, apply ice, and follow up with

his primary care physician. At approximately 12:13:00, Allen was discharged as “fit

for confinement.”

Sergeant Bonner approved charges against Allen at approximately 16:03:00.

Sergeant Bonner had no interactions with Allen on either July 21 or 22.

Based on these interactions, Allen filed his original complaint on September 21,

2015. He filed the operative complaint on July 20, 2016, alleging excessive force and

failure to intervene, failure to provide medical care, two state law tort claims, and a

respondeat superior claim against the City. Allen voluntarily dismissed his state law

claims, and the Court dismissed his respondeat superior claim, leaving only Count I for

excessive force and failure to intervene and Count IV for failure to provide medical

care. The Defendants now move the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor

as to the remaining counts.

LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all facts and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact

arises where a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence of record, in favor of

the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the Court considers the “record as a whole.” Morgan v. Harris Trust & Sav.

Bank of Chi., 867 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

The Defendants seek summary judgment on Count I as to Officers Medina and

Corral and on Count IV as to all of the officers. The Court evaluates each argument in

turn.

I. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene

Count I of the complaint alleges that the arresting officers are liable for the use

of excessive force and the failure to intervene. An officer may be liable for the use of

excessive force if “judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the

arrest, the officer uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the

arrest.” Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). Even if an

officer did not personally use excessive force in effectuating an arrest, an officer may

still be liable for the failure to intervene if he or she “had reason to know…that

excessive force was being used…and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene

to prevent the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994).

The Defendants contend that the Court should grant summary judgment on

Count I as to Officers Medina and Corral because they were not present at the time the

arresting officers allegedly used excessive force. The undisputed facts show that Allen

had been tased before 23:41:50, when Officer Cowart-Smith told dispatch what injuries

were present at the scene. Allen also admits that Officers Medina and Corral were not

dispatched to the scene until 00:02:07, more than twenty minutes after the alleged

injuries occurred. Given that both of the claims alleged in Count I require an officer’s

presence as a necessary condition of liability, no reasonable jury could find for Allen

with respect to Officers Medina and Corral. Accordingly, the Court grants the

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Count I.

II. Failure to Provide Medical Care

It is undisputed that the Defendants provided Allen with medical care during his

time in custody. Instead, Allen alleges that the Defendants’ delay in providing him

medical care was objectively unreasonable. To determine whether an officer’s actions

regarding the provision of medical were unreasonable, the Court must balance the

following factors: “(1) whether the officer has notice of the detainee's medical needs;

(2) the seriousness of the medical need; (3) the scope of the requested treatment; and

(4) police interests, including administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.”

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, Allen must

show that the officer’s response caused the harm of which he complains. Horton v.

Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 953 (7th Cir. 2018).

i. Officers S. Davis, Martin, and Cowart-Smith, and Sergeant Williams

The Court’s balancing of the Ortiz factors varies depending on each Defendant’s

interaction with Allen. The Court begins with the Defendants present during Allen’s

arrest—Officers S. Davis, Martin, and Cowart-Smith, and Sergeant Williams.

Those officers had notice of Allen’s injuries, as they effectuated his arrest

involving the use of force and resulting in Allen passing out. The officers subsequently

acknowledged his need for medical treatment, calling an ambulance to the scene.

However, the parties dispute whether the paramedics provided treatment to Allen at the

scene. Indeed, the ambulance report states that their services were not needed, and the

police handled the emergency.

Further, the officers were present when Allen was transported back to the 6th

District, rather than the hospital. The parties do not indicate an administrative,

penological, or investigatory concern that would require Allen to be taken to the police

station prior to being taken to the hospital. Accordingly, the Court cannot confidently

state that the officers’ response was objectively reasonable.

ii. Officers Medina and Corral

Officers Medina and Corral were assigned to respond to the scene at 00:02:07,

approximately ninety seconds before the ambulance returned to being “in service.”

Once they arrived on the scene and saw the ambulance present, they would not be on

notice that Allen needed medical attention. It would be objectively reasonable for them

to conclude that Allen had received medical care, given that there were paramedics

present on the scene. Operating under that information, Officers Medina and Corral

played the limited role of transporting Allen to the police station. They had no further

interaction with Allen once they got to the police station. Their entire involvement in

the case concluded in less than an hour, during which time they had reason to believe

that Allen had received medical attention. Therefore, the Court grants summary

judgment on Count IV as to Officers Medina and Corral.

iii. Evidence Technician M. Davis

Evidence Technician M. Davis arrived on scene at 00:17:01. While this occurred

before Allen was transported from the scene, the parties do not dispute that Evidence

Technician M. Davis had no interaction with Allen. Rather, his role was limited to

taking photographs of the victim and the scene. Accordingly, he would have no reason

to know of Allen’s injury or any urgency regarding his need for medical attention.

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on Count IV as to Evidence Technician

M. Davis.

iv. Detective Heslin

Detective Heslin was assigned to the case at 00:53:00, approximately fifteen

minutes after Allen was transported from the scene of the arrest. By the time Detective

Heslin arrived, Allen was not present. Detective Heslin’s first interaction with Allen

was at the hospital, where Allen was being treated. Given that their interaction did not

occur until Allen had received medical treatment, the Court grants summary judgment

on Count IV as to Detective Heslin.

v. Sergeant Marcellino

The parties do not dispute that Sergeant Marcellino never observed or spoke with

Allen on the two dates in question. Therefore, he had no first-hand notice of Allen’s

injury or his need for medical attention. Sergeant Marcellino’s involvement was limited

to reviewing the arrest report on the morning of July 22, 2014 and approving probable

cause for the charges. The arrest report indicated that an ambulance was called to the

scene of the arrest and that Allen received treatment. Accordingly, Sergeant

Marcellino’s response was objectively reasonable, and the Court grants summary

judgment on Count IV as to him.

vi. Lieutenant Tannehill

Lieutenant Tannehill’s interactions with Allen are limited to his post-arrest

interview, which occurred at the police station at approximately 01:23:06. Lieutenant

Tannehill states that Allen never requested medical treatment during this interview,

which would have put him on notice of Allen’s need for medical attention. Lieutenant

Tannehill had no further interactions with Allen after the interview concluded. Given

that Allen’s complained of injuries would not be visible to Lieutenant Tannehill in an

interview, he would not have adequate notice of the need for medical treatment absent

a request. Without knowledge of such a need, the Court finds Lieutenant Tannehill’s

actions objectively reasonable and grants summary judgment on Count IV as to him.

vii. Sergeant Boffo, Officer Watkins, and Detention Aides Smith and Johnson

Sergeant Boffo, Officer Watkins, and Detention Aides Smith and Johnson all

encountered Allen for the first time on the morning of July 22, 2014. Allen told lockup

personnel that his chest and knee hurt, lifting up his shirt to show Officer Watkins where

he was tased. Once notified of Allen’s injuries, lock up personnel sent for Sergeant

Boffo, who arrived within fifteen minutes. After reviewing Allen’s paperwork,

Sergeant Boffo stated, “not on my watch,” and secured an ambulance for Allen. Within

approximately fifteen minutes, the ambulance transported Allen to the hospital. Given

lockup personnel and Sergeant Boffo’s promptness and responsiveness, the Court finds

that their actions were objectively reasonable and grants summary judgment on Count

IV as to each of these Defendants.

viii. Sergeant Bonner

Sergeant Bonner’s first interaction with Allen’s case took place at 16:03:00, well

after Allen had been taken to the hospital for treatment. As Allen had already been

treated by the time Sergeant Bonner became involved in his case, a response regarding

a need for medical treatment was moot. Accordingly, the Court grants summary

judgment on Count IV as to Sergeant Bonner.

ix. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants next argue that “[e]ven if Plaintiff was able to make out any

technical constitutional violation, summary judgment is still proper because Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity.” This doctrine “protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Essentially, “[q]ualified immunity

gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Thus,

“[p]olice officers are entitled to rely on existing lower court cases without facing

personal liability for their actions.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45.

The constitutional right at issue is a pre-arraignment detainee’s Fourth

Amendment right to medical treatment after the use of force during an arrest. More

specifically, Allen appears to allege that he is constitutionally entitled to receive

medical treatment prior to being taken to and held at the police station. However, no

case has “clearly established” that right. In fact, the Northern District of Illinois

recently asserted the opposite conclusion. See Allen v. City of Des Plaines, 262

F.Supp.3d 727, 732-33 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (granting summary judgment on a Fourth

Amendment failure to provide medical care claim where the officers tased the plainuff

during the arrest and took her to the police station prior to bringing her to the hospital).

Given that the constitutional right at issue was not and is still not “clearly established,”

the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their response to Allen’s medical

needs. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on Count IV as to all the officers.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court grants the Defendants’ partial motion

for summary judgment. It is so ordered.

Dated: 7/10/2019 Ch s | , P bree

Charles P.Kocoras

United States District Judge

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