Brown v. Wilhelmi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Dontee L. Brown (20866), )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No: 16 C 50337

v. )

)

Lt. Tim Erickson, et al., ) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Dontee L. Brown, a pre-trial detainee at the Whiteside County Jail, brought this

action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendants jail administrator Lt.

Erickson and medical personnel Dr. Alma Martija and nurse Julie Warkins provided him with

inadequate medical care in violation of his constitutional rights. Before the court are defendants’

motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions [69] [72]

are granted. This case is dismissed in its entirety. Final judgment shall enter.

STATEMENT-OPINION

A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Local Rule 56.1 sets out a procedure for presenting facts pertinent to a party’s request for

summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the

moving party to submit “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there

is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Petty v. City

of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). Each paragraph of the movant’s statement of facts

must include “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting

materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph.” L.R. 56.1(a). The opposing

party must file a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement, “including,

in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other

supporting materials relied upon.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). “All material facts set forth in the statement

required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement

of the opposing party.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). The nonmoving party may also present a separate

statement of additional facts “consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that

require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record,

and other supporting materials relied upon.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C).

“[A] district court is entitled to decide [a summary judgment] motion based on the factual

record outlined in the [Local Rule 56.1] statements.” Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 385 F.3d

1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004) (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stevo

v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because of the high volume of summary

judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have

repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules

designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings.”). Plaintiff’s status as a pro se

litigant does not excuse him from complying with Local Rule 56.1. See McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil

litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”);

Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se. Wis., Inc., 423 Fed. Appx. 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Though

courts are solicitous of pro se litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance with local

rules.”).

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, defendants each served him with a “Notice to Pro

Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” as required by Local Rule 56.2. ([75], ]76].)

This notice explained how to respond to defendants’ summary judgment motions and Rule 56.1

Statements and cautioned plaintiff that the court would deem defendants’ factual contentions

admitted if he failed to follow the procedures delineated in Local Rule 56.1. (Id.)

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ undisputed facts.1 Instead, plaintiff submitted a

two-page “response” to defendant Erickson’s motion for summary judgment.2 ([83].) This

document generally disputes defendants’ version of events but cites to no supporting factual

information. (Id.) The court thus considers defendants’ statements of fact to which plaintiff did

not properly respond, as admitted. Notwithstanding these admissions, the court construes

plaintiff’s submissions, and the record evidence, in the light most favorable to him. With these

guidelines in mind, the court turns to the facts of this case.

1 The court notes that after the timely filing of his “response” ([83]) on October 12, 2018, plaintiff submitted

two letters to the court ([84], [88]). In both of these letters, plaintiff conveys, as he has in the past, his purported

inability to meaningfully respond to defendants’ summary judgment motions on his own. The court finds plaintiff’s

position disingenuous given the procedural history of this case and the fact that this is not the first time that he has

claimed to be unable to meaningfully litigate this case on a pro se basis. Specifically, the docket reflects that the court

initially assigned counsel in this case and the attorney was permitted to withdraw (based on recruited counsel’s

representations that he had been “discharged” by plaintiff due to “[a] difference of opinion[.]”). (See [79] at pg. 2.)

In its September 21, 2018 order denying plaintiff’s renewed request for counsel (see id.), the court noted plaintiff’s

claim was not particularly complex (legally or factually). (Id. at pg. 2.) In that order, the court also addressed

plaintiff’s concerns about responding to defendants’ summary judgment motions, explaining that it found plaintiff’s

contentions about access to legal materials and his inability to respond meaningfully, on his own, to defendants’

motion “highly dubious” given that plaintiff (who has been confined at Whiteside County Jail since the filing of this

case) had competently litigated the case on a pro se basis for over a year (up until his recruited attorney was permitted

to withdraw in May 2017). (Id.) The court went on to explain that during that time, plaintiff complied with court

instructions and deadlines, and filed appropriate motions and pleadings. (Id.) The court also explained that, with

respect to the summary judgment motions, plaintiff was served with Rule 56.2 notices that explain what plaintiff must

do to oppose summary judgment. (Id.) The court also noted that plaintiff’s concerns about the potential of having his

case “thrown out” for not complying with court rules (or rules of civil procedure) were generalized and hypothetical

in nature and did not warrant the recruitment of new counsel. (Id.)

2 This document is captioned as a response to defendant Erickson’s summary judgment motion; however, it

also references the other defendants in this action. As such, the court construes plaintiff’s “response” to be directed

at both defendant Erickson’s summary judgment motion and the summary judgment motion of defendants Dr. Martija

and nurse Warkins.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dontee Brown is a pre-trial detainee in the Whiteside County Jail (“jail”). He has

been detained in the jail since February 25, 2016 to the present, except for a period from March

31, 2016 to June 22, 2016, when he was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”). ([70] at ¶ 3; [73] at ¶ 2.)

In his amended complaint ([19]), plaintiff alleged that in March 2016, he was given the

wrong medication by a correctional officer at the jail. He also claimed that he was forced to take

his prescribed medication in addition to the wrong medication that day. According to the amended

complaint, plaintiff began to experience chest and abdominal pain and diarrhea following the

incident. Plaintiff claimed that he alerted jail officials to his conditions and that he received no

medical attention. Plaintiff claimed further that in June 2016, he alerted jail officials that he had

been experiencing abnormal bowel movements and stomach pains since the end of March.

Plaintiff claimed that he saw nurse Warkins at the end of June 2016, and she became frustrated

with him and left before rendering any medical attention. Plaintiff claimed that he filed grievances

about this incident, made verbal complaints, and was finally seen by nurse Warkins (who indicated

to him that his problems were “in his head”). Plaintiff also alleged in the amended complaint that

he had been taking psychotropic medication for three years to help him control his PTSD and night

terrors. Plaintiff claimed that, at some point, he met with Dr. Martija and complained about

abdominal and bowel issues. Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Martija refused to send him to an outside

hospital, ordered him to be taken off of his medications, and refused to put him back on his mental

health medication. Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Martija became “fixated” on his blood pressure,

refused to order him an MRI, and refused to put him back on his prescribed medication for PTSD

and night terrors. Plaintiff also claimed that Dr. Martija forced him to take a medicine called

Clonidine, which caused insomnia and induced nightmares. Plaintiff claims that he complained to

Lt. Erickson about these issues, and Lt. Erickson failed to adequately address them. (Id. at pgs. 5-

8.) The court found that plaintiff’s allegations about the medical care (or lack thereof) that he

received for his abdominal/bowel issues (allegedly following the ingestion of the wrong

medication) and his PTSD and night terrors were sufficient to state a claim for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs against Lt. Erickson, nurse Julie Warkins, and Dr. Alma

Martija. ([20] at pg. 3.) All other claims and defendants were dismissed. (Id.)

Facts Relevant to Defendants Dr. Martija and Nurse Warkins

Defendant Alma Martija, M.D. was employed by Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.

(“ACH”), as of September 2, 2016, to provide medical care at the jail in person once every other

week and phone consultation 24 hours per day, seven days per week. ([70] at ¶ 1.)

Defendant Julie Warkins, L.P.N. was employed as a site nurse by ACH from April 21,

2011 to March 10, 2017 to provide nursing care at the jail in person during weekdays. Nurse

Warkins was not allowed to prescribe medication as a part of her duties at the jail. (Id. at ¶ 2.)

At some time prior to his incarceration at jail, plaintiff began suffering from nightmares

and waking up with the taste of leather and metal in his mouth. (Id. at ¶ 6.) As a result of these

symptoms, plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD by an individual at the IDOC. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Upon

arriving at the jail, plaintiff was taking Paxil (for PTSD), Naproxen, and Prazosin (for high blood

pressure). (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was provided with Prazosin and Paxil for the dates of March 7,

2016 through March 30, 2017. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Prazosin and Paxil were the same medications plaintiff

was taking on the outside prior to his incarceration at the jail. (Id. at ¶ 10.) According to plaintiff,

the effectiveness of Prazosin and Paxin “was kind of like up and down.” ([69-3] at pg. 20:24;

21:1.)

On March 22, 2016, plaintiff filled out a sick-call request form stating that he threw up

blood, was having night terrors, and bad tastes in his mouth. ([70] at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff had thrown

up blood in the toilet. No one else saw the vomit. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s sick-call request from

March 22, 2016 was acknowledged by nurse Warkins, and it was indicated that plaintiff’s

medications for PTSD were to be increased. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On March 27, 2016, plaintiff was given the wrong medication by a correctional officer.

(Id. at ¶ 15.) In a sick-call request dated March 30, 2016, plaintiff stated that the incorrect pill was

a purple and grey capsule, and that since taking it, his chest felt tight, his stomach did not feel

right, and he had a loose and runny bowel movement. (Id. at ¶ 16.) This sick-call request was

acknowledged by nurse Mary Brandon, and it was indicated that plaintiff was accidentally given

Prilosec, which would not give him chest pains. Rather, it was indicated that plaintiff’s issues

were most likely due to his anxiety. (Id. at ¶ 18.) At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he

continues to have abdominal pain. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

On March 31, 2016,3 plaintiff was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center

(“Stateville”). (Id. at ¶ 20.) While at Stateville, plaintiff was prescribed Prazosin 4mg for his high

blood pressure and Remeron 30mg for PTSD. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff testified that the Prazosin

and Remeron were the most helpful for his mental health issues. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Upon his return to

the jail on June 22, 2016, plaintiff’s Prazosin and Remeron4 prescriptions were continued. (Id. at

¶ 23; [73-4] at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff received his prescribed Remeron and Prazosin through at least July

31, 2016. ([70] at ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff testified that in late June 2016, nurse Warkins came to his cell and called him out

to the door. Plaintiff testified that he discussed his medication with her and then began to explain

the abdominal issues he was having. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff testified that before he was able to

fully express the abdominal issues he was having, an officer pushed him back into his cell and the

officer and nurse Warkins left. (Id. at ¶ 26.) If an inmate at the jail wishes to speak with a nurse

regarding an issue, the person is to fill out a sick call request form. The inmate is not to simply

attempt to talk to a nurse as he or she walks by the cell. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff testified that he

3 The court notes defendants Martija and Warkins indicate in their Statement of Material Facts that plaintiff

was transferred to Stateville on March 31, 2017, and they cite to plaintiff’s deposition testimony in support of this

statement. ([70] at ¶ 20.) This particular date appears to be a typo given that plaintiff’s cited deposition testimony

indicates he was transferred to Stateville on March 31, 2016 (not 2017). ([69-3] at pg. 29:12-17.) The 2016 date is

also consistent with other evidence in the record, namely defendant Lt. Erickson’s affidavit (see [73-2] at ¶ 4.)

4 Defendants Martija and Warkins point out in their Statement of Material Facts that “Remeron is a brand name

for Mirtazapine.” ([70] at ¶ 23.) According to information available on WebMD, Mirtazapine is used to treat

depression. Mirtazapine is identified as a “generic” for the “common brand” Remeron. See

https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-13706-2047/mirtazapine-oral/mirtazapine-disintegrating-tablet-oral/details

(last visited April 8, 2019).

then made a verbal grievance regarding nurse Warkins leaving before he explained his condition

to her. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff testified that, in response, nurse Warkins returned to plaintiff’s cell

and he explained he had been having abdominal pain since taking the incorrect medication

(Prilosec) on March 27, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

On July 7, 2016, plaintiff was seen for abdominal pain and diarrhea. The record of this

visit was signed by nurse Warkins. Plaintiff’s complaints were forwarded to the doctor, and, as a

result, plaintiff was prescribed Zantac. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff testified that Zantac was not helpful

for his abdominal pain and diarrhea. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff received Remeron and Prazosin for

the entire months of August and September 2016.5 (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33.)

On November 10, 2016, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija. At that time, Dr. Martija

understood that plaintiff was complaining that his medications were not working well enough and

that he was asking for an increase in dosage. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Dr. Martija discontinued plaintiff’s

Remeron and Prazosin on November 10, 2016 because she believed that plaintiff was complaining

that the medication was not effective and that he therefore wanted more than the current dosage.

(Id. at ¶ 36.) Plaintiff testified that he did not ask for a higher dosage of Remeron on November

10, 2016. Rather, he asked that they change the delivery of the medication from night time to day

time. Plaintiff testified that he believes that the doctor confused this request. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Dr.

Martija then prescribed Clonidine for plaintiff’s blood pressure and anxiety issues as a replacement

for Prazosin and Remeron and ordered blood pressure checks three times a week with a log for

plaintiff. Clonidine can be used to treat both high blood pressure and anxiety disorders. (Id. at ¶

38.) The Clonidine helped plaintiff relax during the day and when he slept, but he still had night

terrors. (Id. at ¶ 41.)

At some point, plaintiff complained to Dr. Martija that he was having abdominal pain as a

result of ingesting the incorrect medications. The doctor performed an examination and noted that

there were normal abdominal findings. She ordered that this condition continue to be monitored.

Because the complaint and cause of the complaint were vague, Dr. Martija found it to be reasonable

to observe plaintiff for a progression of symptoms during the subsequent times that she saw him.

(Id. at ¶ 39.)

On November 14, 2016, nurse Warkins attempted to check plaintiff’s blood pressure

pursuant to Dr. Martija’s orders, but plaintiff refused. (Id. at ¶ 40.) The Clonidine helped plaintiff

relax during the day and sleep, but he still had night terrors. (Id. at ¶ 41.) On November 22, 2016,

plaintiff refused to go to the nurse for sick call and stated that it was a waste of time. (Id. at ¶ 42.)

As plaintiff continued to refuse to be treated for his high blood pressure, Dr. Martija ordered that

plaintiff be put on medical watch to monitor him for symptoms of hypertension. This record was

also signed by nurse Warkins. (Id. at ¶ 43.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija on November 23,

2016. At that time, plaintiff was refusing to comply with his high blood pressure/hypertension

treatment. This included a refusal to take Clonidine, which was also prescribed for plaintiff’s

5 The court notes that ¶ 33 of defendants’ Statement of Material Facts indicates that plaintiff received Remeron

and Prazosin for the entire month of August 2016, and it cites to plaintiff’s medical records. ([70] at ¶ 33.) This date

appears to be a typo given that it duplicates the prior factual statement (¶ 32) and is also inconsistent with the cited

medical record (which shows plaintiff’s medical chart/medications for the month of September 2016, not August

2016).

mental health issues. Dr. Martija explained the value of complying with the treatment at that time.

(Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins on November 30, 2016. At that

time, plaintiff was still non-compliant with his blood pressure/hypertension/anxiety medication.

The importance of taking his medication was explained to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 45.)

On December 7, 2016, plaintiff refused medical treatment by Dr. Martija, and refused to

allow his blood to be drawn for testing by nurse Warkins on December 28, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 46.)

Nurse Warkins or Dr. Martija followed up on plaintiff’s condition on December 12, 2016

(Clonidine was increased), December 15, 2016 (follow-up on blood pressure after increase in

Clonidine); and December 22, 2016 (follow-up on blood pressure). (Id. at ¶ 47.)

On March 17, 2017, plaintiff complained of heartburn and was prescribed Zantac in order

to treat that ailment. (Id. at ¶ 48.) On April 7 and 14, 2017, plaintiff put in sick-call requests,

which indicated that his night terrors and mental symptoms were getting worse at that time. (Id.

at ¶ 49.) In response to these complaints, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija on April 11, 2017. He

was assessed with mood disorder and was started on a daily dose of Prozac for his mental

conditions. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija on April 26, 2017. It was noted that

plaintiff complained he wanted Remeron and Prazosin and that he could not sleep. The jail staff

noted that plaintiff slept during the day. At this time, plaintiff was tolerating the Prozac, so it was

continued. (Id. at ¶ 51.)

On June 22, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick-call request indicating that there were some

negative effects of the prescribed Prozac and he requested to speak with the doctor about same.

(Id. at ¶ 52.) On July 3, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick-call request stating that he believed the

Clonidine and Prozac were making his sleep and dreams worse and that he was still having upper

abdominal pain, so he wished to have an MRI. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Plaintiff was seen by the medical

staff on July 6, 2017. There was no mention of abdominal pain at that this time. Plaintiff was

treated for chest pain and a sore throat. Plaintiff’s Prozac was also increased by Dr. Martija from

20mg to 40mg to address his issues with sleeping and nightmares. (Id. at ¶ 54.)

On July 8, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick call request for his chest, stomach, and throat, which

were still bothering him. At this time, plaintiff attributed his conditions to black mold. (Id. at ¶

55.) A nurse indicated that plaintiff’s July 8, 2017 sick call request did not warrant any further

medical work-up. (Id. at ¶ 56.)

On July 13, 2017, plaintiff was again given the incorrect medication, this time by

correctional officer Curt Ebersohl. Dr. Martija ordered that plaintiff be monitored every half hour

for the following six hours to determine if his blood pressure would remain steady as a result of

the incorrect medication. (Id. at ¶ 57.) A follow-up was performed with plaintiff on July 14, 2017

regarding the July 13, 2017 medication error. (Id. at ¶ 59.)

On July 17, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick-call request claiming that his diarrhea and

abdominal pain had continued from the first medication error and were getting worse. The

following day, Bactrim was ordered for plaintiff, as his urine sample showed some blood and

infection which would explain his abdominal pain. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija

on July 20, 2017 and complained of abdominal pain and weight loss. The doctor indicated that

plaintiff was doing fine mentally and that based on her examination, there was no basis for the

weight loss or abdominal pain claims. Plaintiff stated that his prescribed Ranitidine (Zantac) was

helping. The Ranitidine was continued, as was the Bactrim for plaintiff’s infection. (Id. at ¶ 61.)

On August 26, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick-call request claiming that he would like to speak

with a doctor and nurse because the medication he was currently prescribed was not working. (Id.

at ¶ 62.) On August 31, 2017, Dr. Martija prescribed plaintiff with Remeron, as requested by

plaintiff, for his mental conditions. Plaintiff was not prescribed Prazosin as he requested because

he was already prescribed a comparable medication (Clonidine). (Id. at ¶ 63.)

On September 14, 2017, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija and asked that his Prozac be

discontinued and Remeron increased to twice a day. Remeron remained as prescribed and Prozac

was discontinued as requested. (Id. at ¶ 64.)

On October 9, 2017, plaintiff stated that he wanted his Remeron increased from 15mg to

30 mg and complained that he has had pain in his “upper left quadrant” for one year. Plaintiff was

instructed to rest from working out his upper left quadrant. (Id. at ¶ 65.) On October 27, 2017,

plaintiff put in multiple sick call requests stating that he wanted morning medications to be

discontinued and that he wanted medication for his stomach pain. Plaintiff refused his morning

medications. (Id. at ¶ 66.)

On November 20, 2017, plaintiff put in a sick call request because his right hand had a

bump on it and he had stomach pain for one year. (Id. at ¶ 67.) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martija

for these complaints on November 27, 2017 and his Ranitidine (Zantac) was switched from an

evening to morning medication. (Id. at ¶ 68.) Dr. Martija sees those inmates which are brought

to her at sick-call. She does not receive sick-call requests directly from the inmates. (Id. at ¶ 69.)

Though plaintiff occasionally mentioned abdominal pain to Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins as a

result of taking the incorrect medication, neither individual ever saw evidence to support this

claim. Plaintiff was assessed for abdominal issues on multiple occasions and the findings were

normal. (Id. at ¶ 70.)

Facts Relevant to Defendant Lt. Erickson

Defendant Tim Erickson was the jail administrator during plaintiff’s detention in the jail in

2016-2018. He holds the rank of lieutenant. Lt. Erickson has been the jail administrator since

2008. ([73] at ¶ 3.) Jail administrator Erickson is responsible for the day to day operations and

supervision of the jail and reports directly to the Sheriff. Lt. Erickson’s duties include reviewing

and responding to inmate grievances, communicating with medical staff on matters concerning the

provision of medical care to inmates, and providing the jail doctor and nurse with logistical and

other non-medical assistance in the jail. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Jail administrator Lt. Erickson is not a

physician or nurse, and does not have a license to practice medicine. Lt. Erickson does not

medically examine, diagnose, or treat inmates. Erickson does not order medications or pass them

out to inmates. (Id. at ¶ 7.) During plaintiff’s detention in the jail in 2016-2018, the jail provided

medical care to inmates through licensed medical staff employed by ACH, a private healthcare

company, under ACH’s contract with Whiteside County and the Sheriff. (Id. at ¶ 8.) During

plaintiff’s detention in the jail in 2016-2018 a physician or physician assistant visited the jail once

every other week, but they were also available by telephone on an on-call basis 7 days a week, 24

hours a day. A nurse visited the jail five days a week for a total of 35 hours per week. A mental

health professional visited the jail for up to four hours every week. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

Inmates with medical problems can see the nurse by submitting a written request using the

sick call request form. Until early 2018, sick call request forms were available in paper form

through jail officers. Inmates would fill the form out and submit it to a jail officer, who forwarded

the form to the nurse. Since the beginning of 2018, sick call request forms are available

electronically through kiosks or data terminals located in the cell blocks. The inmates can now

sign on to the kiosk in their cell block using a pin code, and then fill out and submit a sick call

request form electronically. The medical staff then addresses the inmate’s medical request. (Id.

at ¶ 10.) Completed sick call request forms are not and were not channeled through jail

administrator Lt. Erickson, and he does not and did not receive or review sick call request forms

submitted by inmates before the forms are or were received by the nurse. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In addition

to on-site medical evaluation and care, ACH provides basic pharmaceuticals for inmates in

accordance with the contract. Medications are prescribed by the jail physician or physician

assistant, and the nurse is responsible for ordering them. Medications are usually handed to

inmates by the nurse in the morning hours on the days she works in the jail and by the jail officers

in her absence during the evenings or weekends based on the instructions of the nurse, physician,

or physician’s assistant. (Id. at ¶ 12.) It is jail procedure and practice for all jail officers and

officials, including jail administrator Lt. Erickson, to defer to the medical judgment of the

physician, physician assistant, or nurse and comply with their recommendations and instructions

concerning the medical care and treatment of inmates. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Other than a clear emergency,

it is jail procedure and practice to let only the ACH physician or physician assistant determine

whether and when it is medically necessary or appropriate to refer an inmate for medical treatment

or tests to a medical provider or facility outside the jail. Jail administrator Erickson does not make

that determination, nor is he consulted before ACH medical staff makes that determination. The

physician and physician assistant do not need the approval of jail administrator Erickson before

referring an inmate for outside non-emergency medical treatment or tests. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Jail administrator Erickson’s involvement with plaintiff’s medical care during plaintiff’s

detention in the jail was limited to reviewing and responding to plaintiff’s oral and written

complaints or grievances. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The first time plaintiff complained to Lt. Erickson about

medical issues was on or about November 22, 2016, when he complained verbally and also

submitted a written complaint about his interactions with Dr. Martija and Warkins. Plaintiff asked

Lt. Erickson to talk to Dr. Martija and ask her to put him back on his previously-prescribed

medication, which plaintiff said had been working well, and to talk to nurse Warkins about her

“unprofessional conduct.” (Id. at ¶ 16.)

After receiving plaintiff’s November 22, 2016 complaint, Lt. Erickson spoke with nurse

Warkins about plaintiff’s concerns. Nurse Warkins told Lt. Erickson that Dr. Martija had met with

plaintiff during her visit to the jail on November 10, 2016; Dr. Martija had discontinued plaintiff’s

previously prescribed medications and prescribed a new blood pressure medication for plaintiff

because she was concerned about his elevated blood pressure; and ordered the nurse to check

plaintiff’s blood pressure three times a week. Nurse Warkins told Lt. Erickson that plaintiff was

no longer complying with Dr. Martija’s orders because he disagreed with the doctor’s assessment

and was upset about the change in medication. Nurse Warkins said she had seen plaintiff on

November 21 and 22, 2016, and he was not allowing her to check his blood pressure and had

stopped taking his blood pressure medication. Nurse Warkins said that the medical staff had

thought of placing plaintiff on suicide watch for neglecting his health and refusing medical care,

but they determined he was not a suicide risk after the mental health counselor, Tracy Banks, met

and evaluated plaintiff on November 22, 2016. Instead, Dr. Martija had ordered plaintiff to be

placed on medical observation and to call an ACH medical provider if he displayed certain

symptoms of hypertension. Nurse Warkins also informed Lt. Erickson that plaintiff was already

scheduled to see Dr. Martija for a follow-up visit the following day (November 23, 2016). (Id. at

¶ 17.)

Lt. Erickson also spoke to Dr. Martija about plaintiff’s concerns when she visited the jail

on November 23, 2016. Dr. Martija told Lt. Erickson she was aware that plaintiff was upset that

she had changed his medication, and the nurse had reported to her that plaintiff was refusing blood

pressure monitoring and medication. Dr. Martija explained that she had met with plaintiff on

November 10 and 23, 2016, and discussed her assessment and change in medications with him.

Dr. Martija explained that, in her assessment, plaintiff had high blood pressure, which she planned

to monitor and treat with medication. Dr. Martija also explained that she had reviewed plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history and records, and, in her assessment, plaintiff did not present a

medical need for one of the two previously-prescribed medications any longer, and she had

explained to plaintiff that the new blood pressure medication she had prescribed for him had a

similar action to one of the medications she had discontinued. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Dr. Martija assured

Lt. Erickson when they spoke on November 23, 2016 that she was aware of plaintiff’s medical and

mental health needs; that she was addressing those needs; that she was trying to provide treatment

for the problem she was concerned with – his high blood pressure – and that she had explained to

plaintiff the importance of taking the new medication and lowering his blood pressure. (Id. at ¶

19.) In his affidavit, Lt. Erickson attested that after speaking with Warkins and Dr. Martija, he

spoke with plaintiff about his November 22, 2016 complaint. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

During the remainder of 2016 and 2017, plaintiff spoke with Lt. Erickson several times

and expressed his dissatisfaction with Dr. Martija for not prescribing him certain medications.

Plaintiff also brought up his abdominal issues. Lt. Erickson did not receive any written complaints

from plaintiff in 2017. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Lt. Erickson discussed plaintiff’s medical concerns with Dr.

Martija several times in late 2016 and in 2017 when she visited the jail. Dr. Martija assured Lt.

Erickson that she was aware of plaintiff’s medical needs and was providing him treatment. Lt.

Erickson also learned that plaintiff saw the nurse and mental health counselor fairly regularly

during that time period but had refused to see the doctor on a number of occasions. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Lt. Erickson testified that based on his interactions with plaintiff and the medical staff, he did not

see any reason to believe that plaintiff was not receiving appropriate medical care at the jail in late

2016 and 2017. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Lt. Erickson told plaintiff in response to his verbal complaints in late 2016 and in 2017 that

he, the nurse, and the mental health counselor could not prescribe medication (only the doctor

could), and plaintiff should follow the doctor’s orders. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

On April 3, 2018, plaintiff submitted a grievance in which he complained of stomach

problems, nightmares, a taste of leather or metal in his mouth, and cold sweats, all of which he

said had been brought to the attention of medical and mental health staff. Plaintiff also complained

that medical staff was not following the recommendations of the mental health staff. Plaintiff

expressed dissatisfaction with Dr. Martija and requested to be seen by another doctor for a second

opinion. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff’s April 3, 2018 grievance was forwarded to medical staff. In

response, nurse Jerri Blumhoff reviewed plaintiff’s medical and mental health history and records,

performed a complete health assessment on April 6, 2018, consulted with Dr. Martija, and

responded to the grievance on April 9, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff replied to the nurse’s response

on April 12, 2018, and again asked to consult another doctor. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Lt. Erickson reviewed

the nurse’s response, found it satisfactory, and responded to plaintiff on April 12, 2018. (Id. at ¶

28.)

On April 27, 2018, plaintiff submitted another grievance requesting to be seen by another

doctor, not Dr. Martija. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff’s grievance was forwarded to the medical staff.

Nurse Blumhoff responded to plaintiff on April 17, 2018 and informed him that she had spoken

with her supervisor, and that plaintiff’s medical chart was being reviewed by ACH’s medical

director and staff and asked him to wait until they completed the review. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff

sent a request to Lt. Erickson on May 7, 2018 following up on his April 17, 2018 grievance. Lt.

Erickson responded on May 14, 2018 that the ACH medical director was still reviewing plaintiff’s

medical chart and if medical staff passed on any information to Lt. Erickson, he would address it.

(Id. at ¶ 31.)

During plaintiff’s detention in the jail in 2016-2018, Lt. Erickson did not receive, orally or

in writing, any request or recommendation from Dr. Martija or any other medical provider to send

plaintiff to a medical provider or facility outside the jail for medical care or treatment. (Id. at ¶

32.) Lt. Erickson testified that, not being a medical provider, he relied on the medical judgment

of Dr. Martija and the nurse for the care they provided plaintiff. Based on what plaintiff

complained about and what Dr. Martija and the nurse explained to Lt. Erickson, Erickson did not

see any basis to doubt that plaintiff was receiving proper medical treatment and medications or

question the judgment they exercised with respect to treating plaintiff’s medical problems. Lt.

Erickson assumed the medical staff was aware of and treating plaintiff’s problems adequately. (Id.

at ¶ 33.) Lt. Erickson also testified that based on his knowledge of plaintiff’s complaints and his

conversations with Dr. Martija and the nurse, he did not believe at any time that medical staff

delayed or denied plaintiff any medically necessary care, treatment, or medication. (Id. at ¶ 34.)

C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a).

A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). In determining summary judgment motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of

establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the

adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted). If the non-moving party “’fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ summary judgment must be granted.” Blow v. Bijora,

Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

D. ANALYSIS

1. Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claim of

Inadequate Medical Care

Defendants Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s medical claim because: (1) plaintiff fails to show any serious medical need

in regard to his abdominal issues; (2) that even assuming plaintiff had a serious medical need, they

did not act with deliberate indifference; and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity. ([71] at

pgs. 2-13.) Defendant Lt. Erickson argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claim “because it is undisputed that he investigated plaintiff’s complaints, discussed plaintiff’s

concerns with the medical providers, verified and received assurances from the medical providers

that they were monitoring and addressing plaintiff’s medical needs, and relied on the medical

providers’ professional judgment.” ([74] at pg. 2.) Defendant Lt. Erickson argues further that

because he, a non-medical jail official, reasonably investigated and relied on the medical

providers’ professional judgment and had no reason to know that the medical providers were

failing to treat or inadequately treating plaintiff, he cannot be held liable as a matter of law, whether

or not the medical defendants are found liable. (Id.)

At the outset, the court observes that since its initial screening order of the amended

complaint, the Seventh Circuit has held that the deliberate indifference standard applicable to

convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment does not apply to inadequate medical care claims

brought by pretrial detainees (which plaintiff was at the time of the events complained-of in this

lawsuit) under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th

Cir. 2018). Thus, the court analyzes plaintiff’s allegations that he was provided with

constitutionally-deficient medical care (with respect to his abdominal issues and PTSD/night

terrors) under the modified standard, as set forth below.

To establish that medical care violates the Fourteenth Amendment, a detainee must show

that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, see Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d

645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005), and (2) jail personnel “purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even

recklessly” disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety when treating the condition. Miranda,

900 F.3d 335 at 353-542. Negligence or even gross negligence is not enough. Id. Instead, a

defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, which means that the conduct must be

“more than negligence . . . something akin to reckless disregard[.]” Id.

Defendants Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins argue that plaintiff’s “abdominal issues” are not

an objectively serious medical condition. ([71] at pgs. 2-3, 9.) In support of this contention, they

point out that the ingestion of wrong medication on two occasions could not have resulted in

plaintiff’s complained-of abdominal pain (and related diarrhea) and they point to the affidavits of

Michael Uzer, M.D. and Travis Schamber, D.O. attesting to same.6 Defendants’ argument,

however, is not well-taken given that it narrowly and selectively focuses on plaintiff’s stomach-

related problems (to the exclusion of his other ailments), and fails to take into consideration the

seemingly ongoing nature of plaintiff’s purported pain.

“An objectively serious medical condition is one that ‘a physician has diagnosed as needing

treatment’ or that is so obviously serious ‘that even a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor's attention.’” McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888–89 (7th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009)). “[A] medical condition that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial

pain” can be an objectively serious medical condition. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 523 (7th

Cir. 2008). In this case, plaintiff submitted a sick-call request on March 30, 2016 complaining

that, after having ingested the wrong medication three days earlier, he was experiencing tightness

in his chest, an upset stomach, his “abdominal muscles started like spasming,” and he had “a runny

bowel movement.” ([69-3] at pg. 27; [69-4] at pg. 27.) Later, in June 2016, after returning to the

jail from a short stay at Stateville, plaintiff complained to nurse Warkins that he was still

experiencing abdominal issues. ([69-3] at pgs. 33-35.) In July 2016, plaintiff was seen by medical

personnel for complaints of abdominal pain and diarrhea. ([69-4] at pg. 19.) Plaintiff continued

to complain about abdominal pain. ([69-5].) At the time of plaintiff’s deposition, he claimed that

he was still experiencing abdominal pain. ([69-3] at pgs. 30-1.) Furthermore, plaintiff testified

that prior to his incarceration at the jail, he began suffering from nightmares and waking up with

an unfavorable taste in his mouth. ([69-3] at pgs. 16-18.) As a result of these symptoms, he was

diagnosed with PTSD by the IDOC. (Id.) Upon arriving at the jail, plaintiff was taking Paxil (for

PTSD), Naproxen, and Prazosin (for high blood pressure). ([69-4] at pgs. 1-68.) As such, there is

sufficient evidence in the record to establish that plaintiff had an objectively serious medical

condition.7

However, there is no evidence before this court to suggest that any named defendant acted

in an objectively unreasonable manner with respect to plaintiff’s serious medical condition.

Rather, the record before this court is replete with evidence showing that plaintiff’s medical

concerns (related to his abdominal problems and his PTSD/night terrors) were promptly attended

to and that he received a steady course of medical attention and treatment for same.

Specifically, the record shows that plaintiff frequently met with Dr. Martija during the time

period relevant to the amended complaint for his abdominal issues and his PTSD/night terrors.

The record shows that Dr. Martija attempted to accommodate plaintiff’s concerns related to his

PTSD and sleeping problems/night terrors by trying different combinations and doses of

medication. Plaintiff’s medical records show that plaintiff received Remeron and Prazosin for

some time under Dr. Martija’s care, and that when she believed that plaintiff was complaining that

those medications were not effective (and therefore wanted more than the current dosage), she

discontinued those medications and prescribed a different medication (Clonidine). Although

plaintiff testified that he did not ask for an increase in Remeron and Prazosin, he also testified that

6 The court notes that defendant Lt. Erickson’s brief does not address the first/objective prong of the analysis.

7 Points I(A) and II(A) of defendants’ summary judgment motion, which correspond to this particular issue,

are therefore denied.

he believed Dr. Martija simply confused his request at that time. The record shows further that

Dr. Martija examined plaintiff in response to his complaints of abdominal pain and diarrhea

(symptoms which he believed were caused by his ingestion of the wrong medication) and

monitored him accordingly. Additionally, Dr. Martija was of the opinion that the medications

mistakenly given to plaintiff could not have caused the complained-of symptoms. Rather,

plaintiff’s medical records show that, in July 2017, plaintiff had an infection and blood in his urine,

which Dr. Martija believed may have caused plaintiff’s abdominal pain. Dr. Martija arranged for

the infection to be treated with Bactrim.

Similarly, the record shows that plaintiff was attended to and his medical concerns for his

abdominal problems and PTSD/night terrors were addressed by nurse Warkins beginning in June

2016 up through the time she left the jail in March 2017. The record also shows that nurse Warkins

responded to plaintiff’s concerns about his medication and abdominal issues in June 2016 (after

plaintiff returned to the jail after a short stay at Stateville) when she came to his cell in-person.

Although plaintiff testified that nurse Warkins initially became frustrated with him on this

particular occasion and walked away before he could convey his concerns, he also testified that

she returned to his cell and he explained to her that he was having abdominal pain (which he

believed was attributable to taking the wrong medication). Plaintiff’s medical records also show

that he met with nurse Warkins in early July 2016 complaining of abdominal pain and diarrhea,

and that plaintiff’s concerns were forwarded to a doctor (which led to a prescription for Zantac).

The record also shows at least two instances when plaintiff met with nurse Warkins – for example,

on November 14, 2016 and December 28, 2016 – and he refused to allow her to attend to him/treat

him.

Plaintiff may have not have received the particular care/treatment he would have liked from

the medical staff at the jail (in terms of medications, medication doses, access to

doctors/specialists, the ordering of diagnostic tests, etc.) with respect to his abdominal problems

and his PTSD/night terrors. But, inmates are not constitutionally entitled either to “demand

specific care” or even to receive the “best care possible[,]” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754

(7th Cir. 2011), and it is clear from the copious evidence before this court that plaintiff’s various

medical complaints were promptly responded to and treated accordingly by jail medical personnel,

including Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins, based on the evolving picture of his health (and his

particular concerns/symptoms) during the time period relevant to the amended complaint.

With respect to Lt. Erickson, the evidence shows that his involvement in plaintiff’s medical

care during the time-period at issue in this lawsuit was limited to reviewing and responding to

plaintiff’s oral and written complaints or grievances. The evidence also shows Lt. Erickson

reasonably responded to plaintiff’s medical-related complaints. To be sure, defendants have

provided evidence establishing that: in accordance with his duties and responsibilities as a jail

administrator, Lt. Erickson promptly investigated plaintiff’s concerns about his medical care; that

Lt. Erickson discussed plaintiff’s concerns, at length, with Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins; that Lt.

Erickson verified that medical staff was monitoring and treating plaintiff; and that Lt. Erickson

received assurances from Dr. Martija that she was aware of plaintiff’s medical needs and was

providing him with treatment. There is nothing before this court that suggests that Lt. Erickson

had any reason to believe that the medical staff was not treating plaintiff (or was inadequately

treating him), and, as a non-medical official, Lt. Erickson was entitled to rely on the professional

judgment exercised by plaintiff’s medical providers. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 755 (“Non-medical

defendants . . . can rely on the expertise of medical personnel.”); see also Knight v. Wiseman, 590

F.3d 458, 465 (7th Cir. 2009) (Where non-medical defendants investigate a prisoner’s complaint

and refer it to responsible medical providers, there is a presumption that they are entitled to defer

to the professional judgment of the medical providers on questions of care).

As a final matter, the court notes that there is nothing in plaintiff “response” ([83]) that

changes the above analysis. The portions of plaintiff’s response that are specifically dedicated to

his medical claim (rather than complaints about the fact that he is proceeding pro se in this lawsuit)

are largely focused on two things: (1) his generalized expressions of dissatisfaction with the way

defendants responded to/handled his medical concerns; and (2) his subjective beliefs about the

merits of his case and the fact that he could have – but admittedly did not – gather evidence to

support his claim.8 ([83] at pgs. 1-2.) Plaintiff’s vague, unsubstantiated contentions that

defendants did not act appropriately and/or ignored his medical concerns and his

conclusory/hypothetical statements that he could prevail if he was afforded any opportunity to

litigate this case at the trial phase are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. At this stage of

the proceedings, it is not enough for plaintiff to merely assert, without any evidentiary support,

that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants and that a jury must now decide this issue.

See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (“As we have said before, summary

judgment is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it

has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court finds that defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim. The portions of defendants’

motion pertaining to this issue – [71] at points I(B) and II(B) and [74] at I(A) -- are therefore

granted.

2. The Remaining Arguments in Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim. ([71] at pgs. 8-9, 12-13, points

I(C), II(C).) Because, however, the court finds that defendants Dr. Martija and nurse Warkins are

entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s constitutional claim (as discussed above),

it is not necessary to address their qualified immunity argument. Estate of Phillips v. City of

Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir.1997) (when a court determines in a § 1983 case that no

constitutional violation occurred, it is unnecessary to consider whether defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity). Additionally, given the disposition of plaintiff’s medical care claim (as

against the medical provider defendants), the court finds no need to address defendant Lt.

8 The court notes that plaintiff’s response also refers to certain alleged “retaliatory action” taken on the part of

defendants. ([83] at pgs. 1-2.) As noted above, plaintiff submitted a pro se amended complaint after his recruited

counsel was permitted to withdraw, and the court screened the amended complaint, and determined that it sufficiently

stated a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against Lt. Erickson, Dr. Martija, and nurse

Warkins. (See [20].) For the reasons explained in the court’s June 30, 2017 screening order, all other claims and

defendants – including a claim for retaliation – were dismissed. (Id. at pg. 4.) As such, there is no retaliation claim

before this court.

Erickson’s remaining arguments that he cannot be found liable in this action regardless of whether

the medical provider defendants are found liable. ([74] at pgs. 8-12, points I(B), (C).)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions for summary judgment [69] [72] are

granted. Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim is dismissed with prejudice. Given that there

are no remaining claims or defendants in this action, the case is dismissed in its entirety. Final

judgment shall enter.

If plaintiff wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this court within thirty

days of the entry of judgment. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). If plaintiff appeals, he will be liable

for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. See Evans vy. Ill. Dep’t of

Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). If the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, plaintiff

could be assessed a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Ifa prisoner accumulates three “strikes”

because three federal cases or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failure

to state a claim, the prisoner may not file suit in federal court without pre-paying the filing fee

unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. /bid. If plaintiff seeks leave to proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal, he must file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this

Court. See FED. R. ApP. P. 24(a)(1).

Plaintiff need not bring a motion to reconsider this court’s ruling to preserve his appellate

rights. However, if plaintiff wishes the court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within

28 days of the entry of this judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion pursuant

to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e) motion

suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See FED. R.

P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be filed within a reasonable time and, if

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no more than one year after entry of

the judgment or order. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule 60(b) motion cannot

be extended. See FED. R. CIv. P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the deadline for filing an

appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed within 28 days of the

entry of judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).

Date: 4/09/2019 ENTER:

ile States District Court Judge

Docketing to Mail Notices. (LC)

15