Caudle v. State of ILL.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

STACEY CAUDLE ) No. 18 CV 50230

)

Plaintiff, ) Magistrate Judge Iain D. Johnston

)

v. )

)

STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff brings claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, failure to intervene, and

conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and “hate crimes” relating to an incident at the Clinton

Township Public Library in August 2014. Before the Court are motions to dismiss by defendants

DeKalb County State’s Attorney Office and Sarah Frazier (Dkt. 20) and defendants Nancy

Radke1 and Clinton Township Public Library (Dkt. 23). For the following reasons, both motions

to dismiss are granted with prejudice. If plaintiff wishes to appeal this order, he must file an

appropriate notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

within 30 days after the entry of judgement. Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4(a).

BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff Stacey Caudle brings this action against defendants DeKalb County

State’s Attorney’s Office, DeKalb County Officer Sarah Frazier, the Clinton Township Public

Library (the “Library”)2 and Library Director Nancy Radke alleging false arrest, false

imprisonment, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and “hate crimes.” Dkt. 1 at 2. The following is

drawn from allegations in the Complaint and information from relevant state court documents in

the public record.3

1 The Court granted defendant Radke’s oral motion to join in the Clinton Township Public

Library’s motion to dismiss on November 28, 2018. Dkt. 36.

2 Plaintiff also alleged claims against Library employee Anne Underwood and the State of

Illinois; however, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims against them on January 16, 2019.

Dkt. 43.

3 Defendants Frazier and DeKalb County attached state court documents from plaintiff’s

underlying criminal case to their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Dkt. 21

Exs. A–E. When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the Court may take

judicial notice of public documents. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n. 1 (1986); see

also, e.g., Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1097 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2015) (“As a general

rule, [the Court] may take judicial notice of public records not attached to the complaint in ruling

Plaintiff is a registered sex offender. On about August 22, 2014, plaintiff visited the

Clinton Township Public Library. Library Director Nancy Radke discovered plaintiff’s sex

offender status and didn’t think he should be at the library Dkt. 1 at 4. Eventually, Radke asked

to speak with plaintiff in private, where she also told him to leave the Library as she thought “an

arrest would happen there. . . .” Dkt. 1 at 4. Officer Sarah Frazier came to the Library

“undercover” and later reported to the DeKalb County Court that plaintiff was playing solitaire at

the Library. A warrant issued for plaintiff’s arrest for unlawful association by a sex offender

under Illinois law on August 22, 2014, and he was arrested at his home the same day. See Dkt. 1

at 4; Dkt. 21 Ex. A.

Plaintiff was originally held on bond, then released to home confinement and electronic

monitoring. Dkt. 21 Ex. C. On November 3, 2015, the state Circuit Court removed the home

confinement and monitoring restrictions. Id. Ex. D. On June 30, 2016, plaintiff received a

favorable directed verdict finding in his criminal case. Id. Ex. E. Almost precisely two years

later, on June 29, 2018, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging false imprisonment, false arrest,

conspiracy, failure to intervene, and “hate crimes”. Dkt. 1 at 2.

ANALYSIS

A complaint must contain a short plain statement of the claim that shows the pleader is

entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

a court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and accepts all well-plead

allegations in the complaint as true. Cole v. Milwaukee Area Tech. Coll. Dist., 634 F.3d 901, 603

(7th Cir. 2011). However, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough

facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). Detailed factual allegations are not required, however a plaintiff must allege

sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 555. These requirements are meant to put

defendants on notice of the alleged claims and the bases of those claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556. The complaint must be read and taken as a whole. Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823,

832 (7th Cir. 2011).

Finally, pro se complaints are generally held to a less stringent standard and are more

liberally construed than those drafted by a lawyer; however, pro se plaintiffs may plead

themselves out of court if they plead facts that undermine the claims alleged in the complaint.

Henderson v. Sheehan, 196 F. 3d 839,845–46 (7th Cir. 1999).

on a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6).”). Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the

attached state court documents for the purposes of the instant motions.

I. Eleventh Amendment

As a preliminary matter, the defendant State Attorney’s Office argues that the claims

against it are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court

does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims against it, and, therefore, it

should be dismissed from the suit with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s

response does not address this argument. Dkt. 38. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private

litigants against states or state agencies brought in federal courts. Garcias v. City of Chicago, 24

F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

The State’s Attorney’s Office is an Illinois state agency; therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars

private suits brought against it in federal court. Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep’t, 197 F.3d 256,

265 (7th Cir. 1999). Because the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims brought in federal court

against the DeKalb County State Attorney’s Office, it is dismissed from this lawsuit with

prejudice.

III. Statute of Limitations

Defendants4 principally argue that plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are

time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. 21 at 2; Dkt. 25 at 2. Although

“[o]rdinarily a district court should not dismiss a suit based on the affirmative defense of the

statute of limitations . . . it may do so if the dates provided in the complaint establishes that the

suit is ‘hopelessly time-barred’ . . . .” McNeil v. The Salvation Army, No. 18-2508, 2019 U.S.

App. LEXIS 5873, at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019) (quoting Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus

Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill.,

875 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal based on statute of

limitations appropriate where “the complaint contains everything necessary to establish that the

claim is untimely.”)

A. Claims Brought Under § 1983

To determine the statute of limitations period for § 1983 actions, federal courts look to

the applicable limitations period in state law personal injury actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a);

Regains v. City of Chicago, 15-2444, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7381, at *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 13,

2019) Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). The statute of limitations for

personal injury actions in Illinois, and, therefore, also for federal § 1983 claims brought in

Illinois, is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13-202; Regains, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7381, at *6–7; Tobey

v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 645 (7th Cir. 2018). Defendants argue that plaintiff’s suit filed on

June 29, 2018, based on events that occurred in 2014, is untimely. In response to defendants’

argument that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, plaintiff briefly states in his

response brief that time begins to accrue for limitations purposes at the time the state court ruled

in his favor in his underlying criminal prosecution, or June 30, 2016. Dkt. 38 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff

4 The State Attorney’s Office also argues dismissal based on statute of limitations theories. The

Court notes that assuming the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the claims against the State’s

Attorney’s Office, the claims would still be time-barred as discussed below.

cites no authority to support this argument. The Court shall address the parties’ timeliness

arguments by claim.

1. False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 based on

his arrest at his home on August 22, 2014. Dkt. 1 at 2. A false arrest claim accrues on the date a

plaintiff is first held by legal process, not the date the plaintiff ultimately receives a favorable

ruling in his underlying criminal action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–92, 397 (2007);

Regains, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7381, at *8–9; Serino, 735 F.3d at 591.

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendants arrested him on August 22, 2014 without

probable cause. Dkt. 1 at 2. According to documents in the public record, plaintiff was held in

custody by legal process, bond, on August 23, 2014. Dkt. 21 Ex. B. The state court then released

him to home confinement with electronic monitoring on August 28, 2014. Later, on November 3,

2015, the court removed all home restrictions. Id. at Exs. C, D. Plaintiff’s cause of action for

false arrest thus accrued at the latest on August 23, 2014, the date he was held by legal process,

not June 30, 2016, the date he received a favorable ruling in his underlying criminal case.

Plaintiff had until August 23, 2016 to file his false arrest claim, but he filed his complaint on

June 29, 2018, approximately one year and ten months after the two-year period had passed.

Therefore, plaintiff’s false arrest claim is time-barred and dismissed with prejudice.

2. False Imprisonment

Plaintiff also alleges false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment under §

1983 stemming from the same August 22, 2014 arrest. Dkt. 1 at 2. For false imprisonment, the

claim accrues when a plaintiff is held pursuant to legal process or, to the extent a plaintiff claims

they were held without probable cause, when his detention ends, not at the time the plaintiff

eventually receives a favorable court finding. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–91 (2007);

Regains, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7381, at *8–9; Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670

(2018) (false imprisonment claims contest time spent in custody, not nature of pre-custody

events like false arrest; false imprisonment claims accrue when allegedly false imprisonment

ends), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18-1093); Brown v. Dart, 876 F.3d 939,

940 (7th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff was arrested on August 22, 2014 pursuant to an arrest warrant. Dkt. 21 Ex. A.

Plaintiff was later put on electronic home monitoring and associated restrictions, but the state

court removed those restrictions on November 3, 2015. Id. at Ex. D. Measuring from the latest

date from which the limitations period could arguably be said to apply, when plaintiff’s home

monitoring restrictions were removed on November 3, 2015,5 plaintiff had until November 3,

2017 to file the false arrest claim. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 29, 2018, approximately

5 The DeKalb County defendants dispute that GPS electronic monitoring constitutes

imprisonment or detention. Dkt. 21 at 3. However, the Court need not address this issue because

plaintiff’s claim is barred by the limitations period even assuming detention ended, and the cause

of action accrued, on November 3, 2015.

seven months after the two-year statutory period had passed even under the calculation most

favorable to the plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims under § 1983 are

barred by the two-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice.

3. Failure To Intervene

Plaintiff alleges defendants failed to intervene to protect him from violation of his civil

rights during the August 22, 2014 arrest. Dkt. 1 at 2. Failure to intervene claims under § 1983

must be premised on an underlying constitutional violation; thus, the failure to intervene claim

“is timely to the extent it encompasses timely constitutional actions.” Gordon v. Devine, No. 8

CV 377, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81234, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2008) (citing Harper v. Albert,

400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005)).

In this case, the underlying constitutional violation that the plaintiff alleges generally is

his August 22, 2014 arrest. Dkt. 1 at 2. However, as discussed above, plaintiff’s constitutional

claims premised on his August 22, 2014 arrest are time-barred, and plaintiff alleges no other

timely constitutional violations in his complaint. Therefore, the failure to intervene claims

relating to the time-barred constitutional claims are also time-barred and dismissed with

prejudice.

4. Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges the defendants conspired together to violate his civil rights.6 Dkt. 1 at 2,

¶ 6; Dkt. 38 at 51. For conspiracy claims brought under § 1983 or § 1985, the claim accrues

when the plaintiff becomes aware that he is suffering from a wrong entitling him to civil

damages. Johnson v. Illinois, No. 96-4102, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17963, at *5 (7th Cir. July

14, 1997); Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992). In other words, “the timeliness

analysis for accrual of conspiracy actions is the same as that for the underlying acts.” Hobley v.

Lotito, 3 CV 3678, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20844, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2004).

In this case, plaintiff alleges defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his

constitutional rights by falsely arresting him on August 22, 2014, and falsely imprisoning him

over the next few months. However, the false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-

barred by the two-year statute of limitations as discussed above, and plaintiff has not otherwise

alleged any timely constitutional claims upon which a conspiracy claim could be based.7 The

latest any conspiracy claim based on any constitutional violation alleged in the complaint

6 In his response, plaintiff attached a copy of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which criminalizes conspiracy

against the United States. Dkt. 38 at 54. However, as the Court explains in its analysis of

plaintiff’s “hate crimes” allegations, federal criminal statutes do not create constitutional rights

cognizable under § 1983.

7 As discussed in greater detail below, plaintiff arguably alleges a conspiracy to deprive him of

his First Amendment rights in his response brief. See Dkt. 38 at 51. Because the possible First

Amendment claims are time-barred, see infra at III, for the same reasons the conspiracy claims

as to the false arrest and imprisonment claims are time-barred, any conspiracy claims based on

the First Amendment claims are also time-barred.

accrued is November 3, 2015, the latest date on which the underlying false imprisonment cause

of action could have accrued. Any conspiracy claim based on plaintiff’s false imprisonment had

to be filed by November 3, 2017. Because the underlying alleged constitutional violations are

time-barred, and plaintiff has not otherwise alleged any timely constitutional claims, the

conspiracy claims relating to them are also time-barred and are therefore dismissed with

prejudice.

B. State Law Claims

To the extent plaintiff’s complaint can be construed to allege any Illinois state law

claims, see Dkt. 1 at 5, ¶14, they are also time-barred. The statute of limitations for state law tort

claims against a local entity or its employees in Illinois is one year. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (Illinois

Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act) (the “Act”); Palmer v.

Board of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1995). The Clinton Township Public Library is a

local public entity of the state of Illinois as defined by the Act, thus the one-year period applies

to claims brought against it. See 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (public entity definition includes “library

systems” and other non-profit corporations); Simmons v. Chicago Pub. Library, 860 F. Supp.

490, 495 n. 5 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1994) (applying one-year statutory limitation to claims against

the Chicago Public Library). DeKalb County Officer Frazier and Library employee Radke are

public employees as defined by the Act. Id.; 745 ILCS 10/1-207; see also Bourke v. County of

DuPage, 8 CV 7200, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118969, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2009)

(explaining that the Act excludes state, not county, employees).

As a result, any state tort claims plaintiff alleges against these defendants had to be

brought within a year of the date they accrued to be actionable. Plaintiff failed to file his

complaint in time to avoid the two-year limitations period; thus, he has not filed this suit alleging

state law claims based on the same factual allegations in time to meet more stringent one-year

statute of limitations imposed by 745 ILCS 10/8-101. See Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867,

869–70 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Cooperwood v. Farmer, 315 F.R.D. 493, 499–500 (N.D. Ill.

2016). Relatedly, even assuming the one-year statute of limitations is inapplicable, plaintiff

failed to file this suit in time to avoid the generally applicable two-year statutory bar for the

relevant personal injury actions in Illinois. Either way, the state law claims are time-barred.

Because the state law claims against the remaining defendants had to be brought within, at most,

two years from the date they accrued, the state law claims alleged against the remaining

defendants based on the August 22, 2014 arrest are also time-barred and dismissed with

prejudice.8

III. Hate Crimes

Plaintiff also generally alleges “hate crimes” against the defendants. Dkt. 1 at 2.

However, § 1983 only permits a civil claim where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s constitutional

8 Further, because no federal claims remain, even if the state law claims were timely filed, the

Court in its discretion would decline the exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those remaining

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 881 F.3d 1032, 1041 (7th

Cir. 2018).

or federal statutory rights under the color of state law. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31

(1986); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 557 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009). Though

federal law does cover hate crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 249, federal criminal statutes do not create

constitutional rights which are cognizable under § 1983. See, e.g., United States v. Claflin, 97

U.S. 546, 547 (1878) (“That act contemplated a criminal proceeding, and not a civil action . . . .

It is obvious, therefore, that its provisions cannot be enforced by any civil action . . . .”);

Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 509 (7th Cir. 1991) (generally no right for private litigants to

enforce criminal statutes); Weiland v. Byrne, 392 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Because hate

crimes are federal criminal statutes and are not cognizable under § 1983, the hate crimes claim is

dismissed with prejudice.9

IV. First Amendment Claim

In his response, plaintiff attempts to allege an entirely new cause of action under § 1983

for violation of his First Amendment rights. Dkt. 38 at 2. Plaintiff states that defendants, though

it is unclear which ones, violated his First Amendment “right to receive information” when they

kept him from entering the Library on August 22, 2014. Id. In support of this new allegation,

plaintiff attached a copy of Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) to his

response, a Tenth Circuit case where a plaintiff brought a First Amendment facial challenge to a

city ordinance banning registered sex offenders from entering public libraries. Id. at 3.

Though a Court may consider new factual allegations alleged in a response brief to a

motion to dismiss, see Help at Home, Inc. v. Med. Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir.

2001), a plaintiff may not raise entirely new claims or amend a complaint in a response brief to a

motion to dismiss. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co.,

631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 14 CV 0401, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 101192, at *13 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2014). However, though ordinarily a court should

“freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),

where amending a complaint to add a claim is futile, a court may deny leave to amend. See e.g.,

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (indicating leave to amend may be denied if new claim

would be futile); Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519–21 (7th

Cir. 2015)(“a plaintiff whose original complaint has been dismissed under 12(b)(6) should be

given at least one opportunity to try to amend her complaint before the entire action is dismissed

. . . [u]nless it is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or

otherwise unwarranted.”); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010).

First Amendment claims under § 1983 accrue when a plaintiff knows or should know that

his constitutional rights have been violated. Wilson, 956 F.2d at 740. Here, plaintiff claims that

his right to information under the First Amendment was violated when he was denied access to

the Library on August 22, 2014 because of his sex offender status. Based on plaintiff’s

allegations and relevant state court documents, plaintiff knew he was denied access to the

9 Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard are better taken as a state statutory civil claim under the

Illinois Hate Crime Act, which does provide a civil remedy for alleged hate crimes in lieu of a

criminal conviction for hate crimes. 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1(c). However as previously discussed,

plaintiff’s state law claims, including the hate crime claim, are time-barred. See supra at II.B.

Library because he was a sex offender on August 22, 2014, the day he was denied access to the

Library; therefore, he knew all the relevant facts necessary to bring a § 1983 action for violation

of his First Amendment rights at that time. Therefore, plaintiff had two years from that date, or

until August 22, 2016, to file this lawsuit. However, he filed this suit on June 29, 2018, almost

two years later. Because any possible First Amendment claims stemming from the day plaintiff

was turned away from the Library on August 22, 2014 are time-barred, the Court will not grant

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to add them.

V. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants also argue plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). Dkts. 21 at 4; 25 at 3. The Court has already found plaintiff's claims either time-

barred or not cognizable under § 1983, and the claims against the State’s Attorney’s Office

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the Court need not address the failure to state a

claim arguments.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss [20] [23] are granted as follows: the

DeKalb County State’s Attorney’s Office is dismissed from this case with prejudice; plaintiff’s

claims against the remaining defendants are dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. If plaintiff

wishes to appeal this order, he must file an appropriate notice of appeal with the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit within 30 days after the entry of judgement. See Fed. R.

App. P. 3, 4(a). This case is closed.

Date:__February 5, 2019 x S&X SS

Magistrate Judge Iain D. Johnston