Whitfield v. Lashbrook

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

HEZEKIAH WHITFIELD, (B14293), )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 17 C 8760

v. )

) Hon. Marvin E. Aspen

JACQUELYN LASHBROOK, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge:

Petitioner Hezekiah Whitfield, a prisoner incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center,

brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging

his 2014 murder conviction from the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Illinois.

(Dkt. 1.) He argues that the state court erred in: (1) its application of the harmless error standard

regarding the failure to videotape his confession made to the police; and, (2) its preclusion of

certain evidence that he wished to present at trial regarding James Edwards. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court denies Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the merits, and declines to

issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the following factual history from the state court record. (Dkt. 9.) State

court factual findings have a presumption of correctness, and Petitioner has the burden of

rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,

2282 n.8 (2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1)). Petitioner has not made such a showing.

Petitioner was convicted of the 1994 murder of Fred Reckling. Illinois v. Whitfield, 78

N.E.3d 1015, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). The prosecution’s evidence at trial showed that on

December 9, 1994, Reckling’s body was discovered at the Grand Appliance store that he owned

in Waukegan, Illinois. Id. at 1018, 1026. His head had been beaten in. Id. at 1018. The murder

appeared to have occurred during the course of a robbery.

Reckling was last seen at his church the night before around 8:30 p.m. Id. at 1026. He

left the church driving his black Lincoln Town Car. Id. Reckling’s practice was to work on

paperwork in the store during the evenings. Id. at 1026-27. He would also drop the day’s

deposits off at the bank on the way home. Id. at 1027. Additionally, one of Reckling’s

employees, who had borrowed $20 dollars from Reckling the day before his murder, saw that

Reckling’s wallet was full of cash, estimating it to be several hundred dollars. Id. at 1027.

On the day that Reckling’s body was discovered, a customer and employee arrived

around 8:15 a.m. Id. at 1026. They observed signs of a disturbance by the store’s front door

(glass from a shattered fluorescent light bulb and a ladder lying on the floor), and that Reckling’s

Lincoln Town Car was not in his normal parking spot. Id. at 1027. Reckling routinely arrived to

work by 8:00 a.m. Id. at 1026. Reckling’s car was also not at his home. Id. at 1027. It had

snowed the night before, and there were no tire tracks in either Reckling’s home driveway, or in

his store parking spot. Id.

The store’s front door was unlocked, and there was a faint alarm. Id. at 1026. The store

had a security alarm, but it was not connected to the police department due to technical glitch.

Id. at 1027. The alarm would sound loudly for fifteen minutes, and then switch to a quieter

sound. Id. Upon entering the store, the employee and customer found a number of papers on the

floor including customers’ checks, credit card slips, and deposit slips. Id. The deposit slips

indicated a cash deposit of $1700, but no cash was found in the store, and the bank deposit bag

was missing. Id.

Reckling’s body was discovered lying motionless near the refrigerators with blood

pooled under his head. Id. He was wearing his clothes from the night before including his jacket

as if he had been preparing to leave the store. Id. Reckling suffered scalp and head wounds. Id.

There were blood splatters on a nearby refrigerator door along with gouges on the door. Id. at

1028. A forensic expert testified that the evidence suggested that Reckling was bludgeoned to

death with a metal object. Id. Four blood “droplet-type” stains were recovered from the carpet

by the store’s front door. Id.

Reckling’s Lincoln Town Car was spotted the next day parked on a residential side street

on Chicago’s northside. Id. A local resident would eventually call the police reporting the

vehicle abandoned. Id. The police found that the spare tire was on the car, and there were

grocery bags in the back of the car. Id. at 1029. The grocery bags were from Franklin Food in

Waukegan, a store at which Reckling often shopped. Id. Blood stains were also discovered on

the car’s steering wheel, on the driver’s seat, and the floor between the driver’s side door and

seat. Id. at 1030.

Two days after the car was recovered by police, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority

workers found Reckling’s wallet on Interstate 94 near an onramp at Route 60.1 Id. at 1029. The

wallet contained Reckling’s driver’s license. Id. Previously, on the day that Reckling’s body

was discovered at his store, a second tollway worker found jumper cables from Reckling’s car at

the southbound entrance ramp to Interstate 94 at Route 60. Id. A tire, rim, and car jack stand

were also discovered at the intersection. Id. The jack was missing from Reckling’s car when

the police recovered his car in Chicago. Id. at 1030.

1 The intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 is south of Waukegan on the way towards

Chicago.

The police passed out flyers at the intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 in an attempt

to locate eyewitnesses. Id. at 1029. The police located three eyewitnesses. The first, Jason

Howell, worked at a local mall on the evening of Reckling’s murder. Id. He drove past the

intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 around 11:30 p.m. or midnight that evening. Id. He

witnessed two cars on the side of the road, one in front of the either. Id. A red compact car was

in front, and the black Lincoln was in the rear. Id. A person wearing black clothes and a white

hat was bending over the rear of the Lincoln, but Howell could not make out the person’s

features. Id. Howell saw a second man, who was white and in his 30s, getting out of the red

compact car. Id. Petitioner is African American. Id. at 1035. (The other two witnesses,

Michael and Holly Wales, were presented in the defense case discussed below).

Regarding the recovered blood evidence from the store and victim’s car, the crime

laboratory during that period could only perform tests identifying blood type and certain genetic

markers for blood enzymes. Id. at 1030. The lab did not perform DNA testing at that time. Id.

Beyond the blood evidence, the police also recovered various fingerprints from the store, car,

and items recovered on the highway. Id. at 1033.

A little more than a year after Reckling’s murder, James Edwards was arrested for a

series of robberies in the Waukegan area. Id. at 1018. He also confessed to murdering Reckling.

Id. Edwards was convicted with the confession being the sole source of evidence against him.

Illinois v. Edwards, 704 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). In 2011, Edwards was cleared of

the crime after it was shown that neither his fingerprints, nor his DNA matched the recovered

fingerprint and blood evidence. Whitfield, 78 N.E.2d at 1018, 1031, 1033.

Following the dropping of the charges against Edwards, the blood evidence was

compared to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database, which revealed a

probable match to Petitioner. Id. at 1018. The Waukegan police procured a warrant to obtain a

DNA sample from Petitioner. Id. at 1030. In June 2011, the Waukegan police stopped Petitioner

while he was driving, and took him to the hospital to obtain the sample. Id. at 1030-31.

Testing later revealed that all fifteen loci from the car DNA matched Petitioner, and that

the odds of this match occurring randomly would be one in 22.3 sextillion African Americans.

Id. at 1031. The DNA from the store’s carpet only had fourteen loci, however, and although the

store carpet DNA was consistent with Whitfield’s DNA, the expert only used the term “match”

when all fifteen loci could be compared. Id. (the expert nonetheless noted the chance of this

match occurring randomly as “astronomical”). There was no innocent explanation as to how

Petitioner’s blood could end up in the store and car as he did not live or work near the store, and

had never been a customer or employee of the store. Id. at 1039.

Shamiya Mathis, a woman Petitioner had begun dating a few months earlier, was riding

with Petitioner when he was stopped by the police for the collection of the DNA sample. Id. at

1018. The police returned Petitioner to his vehicle after securing the sample, and he and Mathis

drove away. Id. at 1032. Mathis testified that Petitioner was shaking, smoking cigarettes, and

crying when he returned following the police taking his DNA sample. Id. at 1031. She asked

him what was wrong, and he confessed to Reckling’s murder. Id. Petitioner related that he was

on heroin at the time, and was looking for someone to rob. Id. He hit Reckling over the head

three times with a gun, and then took his wallet, car, and some money from the register. Id.

Petitioner explained the he got a flat tire as he drove towards to Chicago, and flagged down

someone to help him change the tire. Id.

A few days after the police took Petitioner’s DNA sample, he called Mathis asking that

she search the Internet to see if he was wanted for murder. Id. She told him no. Id. Petitioner

contacted Mathis a few weeks later to repeat the Internet search, and again she said there was no

indication he was wanted. Id.

In July 2011, Petitioner called Mathis and told her he was in Indonesia. Id. She then

went to the Waukegan police telling them what Petitioner had told her. Id. She learned about

the crime on the Internet during this period. Id. It also appears that Mathis’s relationship with

Petitioner soured after she learned that Petitioner married a woman while in Indonesia. Id. at

1033.

Despite this, Petitioner and Mathis saw each other again in Chicago in April 2012. Id. at

1032. Mathis claims she attacked Petitioner with a pipe in self-defense during the April 2012

incident because Petitioner had tried to cut her. Id. The Chicago police took both Mathis and

Petitioner to the police station. Id. at 1031. Petitioner was taken to the station after declining

medical care at the hospital. Id. at 1018.

Mathis was transported to a police station by Chicago police officer Jacquelyn

Spaargaren. Id. at 1018. On the way to the station, Mathis told Spaargaren that Petitioner was

wanted for murder in Waukegan. Id. at 1031. At the station, Spaargaren Mirandized Petitioner

and questioned him about the Waukegan case. Id. Spaargaren testified at trial that Petitioner

told her, “they DNA tested me for murder in Waukegan, and then I found out they knew that I

did it, I left out to Indonesia.” Id. He then told her he did not want to talk anymore, and she

stopped the questioning. Id. Spaargaren conceded that she did not videotape Petitioner’s

statement as required by Illinois law, but claimed she was not covered by the Illinois requirement

because she was a patrol office, as opposed to a detective. Id.

In sum, the prosecution’s strongest evidence against Petitioner was Petitioner’s DNA

matching the blood found in the store and Reckling’s car. Additionally, there was Petitioner’s

confessions to Mathis and Spaargaren.

The defense presented testimony from Michael and Holly Wales. The Wales were the

two other eyewitnesses who drove through the intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 on the

night of the murder. They passed through intersection around 10:30 p.m. that evening. Id. at

1033. They worked together and were each driving their respective cars home with Holly

following directly behind Michael. Id. They both only saw one car at the intersection. Id.

Michael Wales said it was a black car, while Holly Wales identified it as a “dark nice car, a

larger style.” Id.

By a matter of apparent coincidence, Michael Wales and Petitioner had been in culinary

school together in 1993 in Evanston, but Wales said he had not seen or heard from Petitioner in

the intervening two decades. Id. Michael Wales explained that he recognized Petitioner’s name

when he received his trial subpoena for Petitioner’s 2014 murder trial. Id. He said he was

positive that he saw a white man in a hoodie standing by the car, and that it was not Petitioner.

Id.

The defense also presented James Edwards’ confession to the Reckling murder, as well as

evidence that a white man appeared to be casing a neighboring business on the night of the

murder. Id. at 1034.

In closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized the DNA evidence arguing that there

was no innocent explanation for why Petitioner’s blood was both in the store and in Petitioner’s

car. Id. The prosecution also pointed to Petitioner’s two confessions to Mathis and Spaargaren,

and Petitioner’s flight to Indonesia. Id.

The defense countered in closing that there were multiple witnesses who said they saw a

white man, not an African American, changing the Town Car tire. Id. As to the DNA evidence,

the defense argued there was no evidence as to how old the blood evidence was, or how it was

deposited in the store or car. Id. Additionally, the defense pointed out there no blood or

fingerprint evidence on the items the murderer would have handled that evening such as the

spare tire and tire jack. Id. The defense also argued that Edwards confessed to the crime, and

that Mathis and Spaargaren were not believable. Id.

The jury sent out a note during its deliberation asking to see Spaargaron’s report

regarding Petitioner’s confession to her. Id. The trial court refused the request and told the jurors

to keep deliberating. The jury found Petitioner guilty, and his conviction was affirmed on direct

appeal. He now brings the present habeas corpus petition.

ANALYSIS

1. Claim One: Challenge to the Harmless Error Standard applied by the

Appellate Court of Illinois

Claim One arises out of Petitioner’s pretrial motion in limine to bar the state from

introducing his confession to Chicago police officer Spaargaren. Id. at 1019. The motion in

limine invokes 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1. Id. This statute prohibits the use of a statement made

during custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention in a murder trial

unless the statement was electronically recorded. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b-5). However, “the

presumption of inadmissibility” “may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the

statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.” 725

ILCS 5/103-2.1(f).

The state trial court held a multi-day hearing on the motion receiving testimony from

three police officers (including Spaargaren), and also from Petitioner. In sum, the officers

testified that they found Petitioner walking in an alley with a laceration on his head and blood on

his shirt when responding to the domestic violence call. Id. at 1020. The officers saw no sign

that Petitioner was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and was calm other than the agitation

caused by the assault. Id. (Petitioner said he had a small amount of alcohol prior to the incident

with Mathis. Id. at 1023.) He also did not complaint about being in any pain. Id. at 1020.

Petitioner was 42 years old and had finished three years of college at the time of the incident. Id.

at 1022.

Petitioner initially refused to be taken to the hospital, but the police transported him per

protocol. Id. at 1021. He was observed by a doctor who signed off on Petitioner’s refusal to

accept treatment. Id.

Petitioner was then brought to the police station where he was handcuffed to a bench in a

processing room. Id. The room is 15 by 20 feet with four computers and two benches. Id.

Petitioner was conscious, did not complain of pain, or request water, food, or to use the

bathroom. Id. Petitioner remained in the processing room for the next ten to fifteen minutes

while two of the officers worked on typing up a report. It was during this time that Spaargaren

spoke to Petitioner. Id.

Spaargaren, having received Mathis’s statement in the squad car that Petitioner was

involved in the Waukegan murder, spoke to Petitioner while he was handcuffed to the bench in

the processing room. Id. She explained that she Mirandized Petitioner “off the top of her head.”

Id. She then raised his alleged involvement with the Waukegan murder to which Petitioner

mentioned that he had his DNA tested, and that he had fled to Indonesia. Id. Petitioner then said

he did not want to talk anymore, and Spaargaren terminated her questioning. Id. Spaargaren

conceded that she did not obtain a written statement from Petitioner regarding his Miranda

rights. It was somewhat loud in the processing room, and the two other officers said they did not

hear the substance of Spaargaren’s conversation with Petitioner. Id. at 1021-22.

Petitioner refuted Spaargaren’s testimony stating that he did not confess to her. Id. at

1022. He also said that he did not recall Spaargaren or anyone else explained to him his

Miranda rights. Id. at 1023. He did agree that none of the officers used physical force or

threatened him in any way. Id. Petitioner stated that the questioning by Spaargaren lasted five

minutes, and he refused to answer her questions. Id. at 1022. Petitioner was held at the station

until the next morning. Id. at 1023. He went to the hospital and received five stiches following

his release. Id.

The trial court denied the motion in limine holding that although Spaargaren failed to

record Petitioner’s statement as required by Illinois law, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b-5), the

presumption that the statement was inadmissible was overcome by the prosecution’s showing

that Petitioner’s statement was voluntarily given and reliable, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(f). Whitfield,

78 N.E.3d at 1025

In finding the statement was voluntary, the trial court said that it saw no evidence that

Petitioner was intoxicated, suffering from a physical disability, or was subject to undue coercion

of any type of lengthy custodial interrogation that would make his statements involuntary. Id.

The trial court also found that Petitioner was Mirandized at the time he gave the statement. Id.

On appeal, the appellate court explained that the trial court’s analysis was incomplete.

Id. at 1038. According to the appellate court, the trial court focused predominately on the

voluntariness question without giving sufficient attention to the question of whether the

statement was also reliable. Id. The reliability question was also in dispute because Petitioner

disputed Spaargaren’s testimony that she had Mirandized him, and that he had confessed as she

claimed. Id. This dispute was heightened by the fact that the two other police officers said they

had not heard the conversation between Petitioner and Spaargaren. Id.

Despite the concerns over the trial court’s failure to perform a full reliability analysis, the

state appellate court held that it need not go further because any error was harmless. Id. The

state appellate court, the last court to rule on the issue, applied a harmless error standard of:

An evidentiary error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained, or when no reasonable

probability exists that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the

error.

Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In finding any error harmless, the appellate court concluded that “[b]y far, the most

damning evidence against the defendant was the DNA evidence . . . .” Id. That court explained

that the blood evidence in both the store and the victim’s car resulted in a “match that was

astronomically unlikely to occur randomly.” Id. This is “overwhelming evidence.” Id.

Additionally, the state court noted Petitioner’s confession to Mathis. The state appellate court

concluded that, “there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the

defendant even if the motion in limine had been granted.” Id. at 1040.

Petitioner argues in Claim One that the appellate court applied the wrong harmless error

standard. (Dkt. 1, pgs. 17-21.) The problem that Petitioner faces is that the appellate court was

considering whether a trial court error in the application of a state statute was harmless. As a

general principle, state law errors are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Illinois’s Recording Law, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1, mandating that confessions resulting from

custodial interrogations are presumptively inadmissible unless they are recorded is not required

by the United States Constitution. United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 366 (7th Cir. 2018),

petition for cert. filed, No. 18-5528 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2018); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d

1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that although some states, including Illinois, now require the

recording of custodial interrogations, this requirement is not required by the United States

Constitution, and “we see no hint that the Supreme Court is ready to take such as major step.”).

Thus, the question of whether 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1 was violated with the introduction of his

confession is a non cognizable issue for a federal habeas corpus petition because Illinois’s

prophylactic measure is not required by the Constitution. Nor does the state appellate court’s

application of the state’s harmless error standard implicate a constitutional concern because a

state court ruling as to whether a ruling of state law is harmless implicates only state law.

Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that

states apply their own harmless error law when evaluating state law errors and that is an issue of

state law separate and distinct from the harmless error standard used for review of federal

constitutional errors); Atterberry v. Korte, No. 16 C 3063, 2017 WL 55263251, at *5 (N.D. Ill.

Nov. 9, 2017) (same). In sum, Claim One is fails because it raises a non cognizable issue of state

law.

For completeness purposes, the Court notes that the Petitioner would be unsuccessful if

the Court’s foregoing analysis --- that the state appellate court’s decision did not implicate a

federal constitutional right --- is incorrect. Even if the state appellate court misapplied the

federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), as

Petitioner alleges, he would still be unable to meet the standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619 (1993). “[I]f the state court never conducted the harmless error analysis or otherwise

applied Chapman unreasonably, the federal court must make an independent decision as if the

state court never addressed the subject at all. Hence, here, the Brecht standard is appropriate in

determining if the error was harmless.” Brown v. Rednour, 637 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011)

(citing Johnson v. Acevedo, 572 F.3d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also, Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.

Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015).

Brecht establishes the harmless error standard applied in habeas corpus cases of an error is

harmless unless it had a substantial and injurious effort or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631). As the state

appellate court explained, the DNA was “the most damning evidence” against Petitioner, and

found the evidence “overwhelming” considering Petitioner neither lived nor worked near

Reckling’s store. Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039. We agree with the Illinois Appellate Court that

the strength of the other physical evidence in this case, including DNA evidence from the scene

of the crime and the victim’s vehicle, meant that there is no reasonable doubt the jury would

have acquitted Petitioner absent the admission of his challenged confession. Whitman v. Bartow,

434 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]rial errors are often found harmless where the record is

replete with overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.”).

Furthermore, even if Mathis was partially impeached, her testimony recounted Petitioner’s

confession to the same crime. Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039–40. Mathis’ testimony also

provided much more detailed evidence about Petitioner: while Spaargaren testified Petitioner

said the police knew he committed “a murder in Waukegan,” Mathis testified that Petitioner

admitted detail about the time, location, injury to the victim, age of the victim, and that he took

the victim’s car but later got a flat tire. Id. at 1032. Given Mathis’ testimony, Petitioner’s

confession to Spaargaren is cumulative. Brown v. Rednour, 637 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner specifically argues that the note from the jury asking for Spaargaren’s police

reports means the jury necessarily considered Petitioner’s confession in rendering their verdict.

(Reply at 17–18.) We agree that the jury undoubtedly contemplated or discussed Spaargaren’s

testimony when deliberating. However, merely proving the jury considered inadmissible

evidence does not mean harmless error occurred. See Brown, 637 F.3d at 767 (finding harmless

error under Chapman after the jury accidentally was given an inadmissible police report that a

sheriff witnessed a juror reading , and after it was removed from the juror room, the jury later

sent a note to the judge requesting the report). Considering the strength of the other evidence in

the case and the cumulative nature of the substance of Spaargaren’s account, any alleged error

did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

In sum, Claim One raises a non cognizable issue of state law. But even if Petitioner did

raise a cognizable issue, any error by the state court was harmless under the Brecht standard.

The evidence of Petitioner’s guilty is overwhelming. Claim One is denied.2

2 Respondent’s answer frames Claim One as asserting that Petitioner’s confession to

Spaargaren was given involuntarily resulting in a due process violation from its introduction at

trial. (Dkt. 8, pg. 5.) However, as discussed above, Petitioner’s claim was that the state court

erred its application of harmless error when allowing the introduction of his confession under

Illinois’s Recording Law. (Dkt. 1, pgs. 17-21.)

Respondent’s improper framing of the claim resulted in a red herring in the parties’

briefing. Respondent argued that Petitioner failed to exhaust a federal involuntary confession

claim before the state courts because Petitioner had only raised the Illinois Recording Law issue

in the state courts. (Dkt. 8, pgs. 5-6.) Petitioner countered that his claim was properly

exhausted because Miranda caselaw was cited through the parties’ briefing before the state

appellate court, and in the state appellate court decision. (Dkt. 11, pg. 6.)

The problem with the Petitioner’s argument is that the Illinois Recording Law draws

upon Miranda case law for determining whether a statement is giving voluntarily and reliable so

as to be admissible even when the statement is not videotaped. Illinois v. Harris, 977 N.E.2d

811, 821-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Illinois has chosen to use Miranda case law in the

implementation of an Illinois statute; it is not using Miranda case law to carry out a federal

constitutional requirement because, as explained above, there is no federal requirement that

confessions be recorded. In fact, Illinois courts recognize this fact by “[emphasiz[ing] that

Miranda case law serves only as a guidance; it is not determinative.” Harris, 977 N.E.2d at 821-

22 (emphasis in original).

Finally, for completeness purposes, the Court notes that even if it misunderstands the

claim, and Petitioner is actually trying to raise a federal involuntary confession claim, this claim

would be baseless. There is nothing in the record to suggest, based on the totality of the

circumstances, that there was any type of coercion resulting in Petitioner’s statement to

Spaargaren. See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 303-304 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). There is

no allegation that Petitioner was physically or mentally coerced into confessing to the police. He

was offered medical care for his injury (that he declined), and was in police custody for less than

24 hours. There is also nothing in the record to refute the state court’s ruling that Petitioner

received Miranda warnings before being questioned by Spaargaren.

2. Claim Two: State Court’s Exclusion of Evidence Regarding James Edwards

Petitioner’s remaining claim involves his attempt to introduce evidence regarding the

police’s questioning of James Edwards. As discussed above, Edwards was originally convicted

of Reckling’s murder, but he was later cleared after it was found that his DNA did not match the

blood evidence at the crime scene and the victim’s car. The defense at Petitioner’s trial called

the police detectives who questioned Edwards in order to present Edwards’ confession to the jury

in an attempt to establish reasonable doubt. Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1034. Thus, the traditional

positions taken by a prosecutor and defense counsel were effectively flipped in this case. It was

the defense attorney attempting to enter a confession into evidence through a police officer’s

testimony, while the prosecutor was trying to limit the impact of the confession before the jury.

The prosecutor took multiple steps to limit Edwards’ confession. He argued the confession

was not supported by the DNA evidence. Id. at 1041. The prosecution also attempted to

emphasize on cross-examination the inconsistencies between Edwards’ confession and the

evidence at the crime scene. Id. at 1034. Finally, the prosecution moved to preclude a

discussion of Edwards’ other crimes before the jury. Id. at 1040. The limitation on other crime

evidence is what is at issue in this claim.

As to the other crime evidence, the prosecution moved to bar both testimony regarding the

fact that Edwards committed a series of robberies prior to his arrest, and questioning about the

robberies that resulted in his confession to the police. Id. The prosecution believed the evidence

was irrelevant because the circumstances of Edwards’ other robberies were too dissimilar to the

robbery in this case. Id.

The defense responded that exclusion of the robbery cases would create a false impression

before the jury. Id. The police questioned Edwards first about the robberies, and the murder

confession did not occur until more than 24 hours after his arrest. Id.

The trial court ruled that Edwards’ other crime evidence was not relevant to Petitioner’s

trial because those crimes were too dissimilar, and there was no indication that Edwards’

robberies were intertwined with Reckling’s murder. Id. The trial court, however, instructed the

prosecution to not give the false impression that the officers had only been questioning Edwards

about the murder. Id. The officers would testify that they questioned Edwards about “other

matters” before questioning his about the murder. Id.

On appeal before the state appellate court, the last court to consider Petitioner’s claim on

the merits, Petitioner raised what one could characterize as a “what’s good for the goose is good

for the gander” type argument.3 Petitioner pointed out that the prosecution explicitly used the

evidence of Edwards’ robberies in Edwards’ case while taking the opposing position in his case.

Id. at 1041. Edwards had accused the police of fabricating his confession, and the prosecution

used the robbery other crime evidence in an attempt to bolster authenticity of the confession

before the jury in his case. Id. Petitioner argued that he should be able to take the same

approach of using Edwards’ robberies in an attempt to bolster the credibility of Edwards’

confession in an attempt to establish reasonable doubt at his trial. Id.

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court held that pursuant to Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), Petitioner had a due process right to introduce evidence

that someone other than him --- Edwards --- confessed to murdering Reckling. Whitfield, 78

N.E.2d at 1040. The state appellate court, however, rejected Petitioner’s argument that the fact

that other crime evidence was admissible in Edwards’ case as it related to his confession should

also mandate the admissibility of this same evidence in Petitioner’s case. Id. at 1041. In sum,

3 Neither the parties nor the state court used the “good for the goose, good for the gander” phrase

the Court now uses. It is doing so now simply for illustrative purposes.

the state court concluded that Petitioner’s right was limited to the introduction of only Edwards’

confession. Id. at 1042.

Petitioner now renews this argument in Claim Two before this Court that he should have

been allowed to introduce the other crime evidence regarding Edwards’ robberies for the

purposes of bolstering Edwards’ confession before the jury. As this claim was adjudicated by

the state appellate court, the Court’s review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Petitioner cannot obtain relief unless he can show that the

“state court decision is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly established

federal law.” Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)). Under the AEDPA, a state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent

when it applied a rule different from controlling law set forth in Supreme Court precedent, or if it

reaches a different decision than the Supreme Court has already reached on “materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000); see also Burr, 546

F.3d at 831. “A state court unreasonably applies clearly established law if it ‘identifies the

correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.’” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). For a state court’s application to be

“unreasonable,” it must have “been more than incorrect or erroneous,” and must be “objectively

unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Under either prong, the prisoner

bears the burden of establishing he is entitled to habeas relief. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Habeas review is deferential to state courts; we must “attend closely”

to state court decisions and “give them full effect when their findings and judgments are

consistent with federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 383. Accordingly, because we must defer to

state court decisions “to a great extent,” habeas relief of a state criminal conviction is “not easy

to come by.” Thompkins v. Pfister, 698 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2012).

The Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to present a complete defense, but this

is not an unfettered right as the states have board latitude in establishing evidentiary rules

governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. Caffey v. Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 895 (7th Cir.

2015) (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

683, 690 (1986)). Chambers, along with a line of Supreme Court cases building upon it, are

understood as guaranteeing a defendant’s right to introduce evidence and testimony on his own

behalf as long as that evidence is “essential to the defendant’s ability to present a defense.”

Kubsch v. Neal, 838 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The evidence that defendant

wishes to present must be reliable and trustworthy. Id. However, state evidentiary rules still

apply to preclude a defendant’s introduction of evidence that is “cumulative, impeaching,

unfairly prejudicial, or potentially misleading.” Id. Finally, and most noteworthy to this case,

the state court’s exclusion of evidence “cannot operate in an arbitrary manner. . . . Arbitrariness

might be shown by a lack of parity between the prosecution and the defense; the state cannot

regard evidence as reliable enough for the prosecution, but not for the defense.” Id.

With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the state appellate court ruling. The

state decision is not contrary to the relevant constitutional standard. The state court recognized

that the issue is one involving Petitioner’s ability to present a defense while balancing the state’s

court’s right to regulate the introduction of evidence. The state court also cited to, and discussed,

the relevant Supreme Court standard. Petitioner cannot demonstrate the state court ruling was

contrary to clearly established federal law.

The unreasonable application prong of the analysis is a much closer call. The reason is that

there are two competing principles at issue in this case. On one hand, the state court decision is

consistent with Supreme Court principles in that the state court is allowing the prosecutor to

exclude potentially misleading information. However, the fact that the prosecutor argued for the

introduction of this same material in Edwards’ case while taking the opposite position in

Petitioner’s case suggests an impermissible arbitrariness as demonstrated by a lack of parity

between the state court’s treatment of the prosecutor and defendant.

However, the Court’s resolution of this case is governed by the AEDPA’s demanding

standard. The AEDPA requires the state court’s resolution of the issue to be objectively

unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 383. In light of the closeness of the issue, the Court cannot

say that Petitioner has met the AEDPA’s rigorous standard.

Finally, even if the Court could meet the AEDPA standard, he would still be unsuccessful

as a Chambers claim is subject to review under Brecht. Fry, 551 U.S. at 115, 120. As discussed

in Claim One, Petitioner cannot meet the substantial and injurious effort or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict Brecht standard. Although the jury did not hear about the other

crimes evidence involving Edwards, they did hear that he confessed to the murder. Additionally,

as discussed above, the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. Claims Two is denied.

The habeas corpus petition is denied on the merits.

3. Certificate of Appealability and Notice of Appeal Rights

The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner cannot make a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, or that reasonable jurists would debate,

much less disagree, with this Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claims. Arredondo v. Huibregtse,

542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)).

Petitioner is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If Petitioner

wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of

judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Petitioner need not bring a motion to reconsider this

Court’s ruling to preserve his appellate rights. However, if Petitioner wishes the Court to

reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or

60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of this judgment. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal

until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b)

motion must be filed within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or

(3), must be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(c){1). The time to file a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A

Rule 60(b) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled

upon only if the motion is filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(vi).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition (Dkt. 1.) is denied on the merits. Any pending

motions are denied as moot. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk

is instructed to: (1) correct the spelling of Respondent’s name on the docket as Jacqueline

Lashbrook, and, (2) enter a judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. Civil Case

Terminated.

ENTERED:

min Cfer—

Marvin E-Aspen @

United States District Judge

Dated: September 12, 2018

Chicago, Illinois

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