Shaw v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TELVIN SHAW,

Plaintiff, Case No. 16-cv-1065

v.

TARRY WILLIAMS, et al., Judge John Robert Blakey

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Telvin Shaw sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and

various IDOC employees for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12203 (Counts I and VII); Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Count II); and the Eighth Amendment (Counts

III, IV, V, and VI). [68]. Defendants moved for summary judgment. [170]. For the

reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendants’ motion.

I. Background

A. Local Rule 56.1 and Evidentiary Rules

The facts in this discussion come primarily from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1

statement of material facts [171] and Plaintiff’s statement of additional facts [174].

Defendants ask this Court to admit all of their fact statements due to Plaintiff’s

inadequate denials of those facts. See, e.g., [189] at 4.

This Court has broad discretion to enforce the local rules governing summary

judgment. See, e.g., Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014);

Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the local

rules, a party’s responses to the other party’s statements of fact must contain “specific

references” to record evidence to justify any denial. Local R. 56.1(b)(3); see also Malec

v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Thus, purely argumentative denials,

legal conclusions, and unsupported general denials do not belong in Local Rule 56.1

statements. See Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771

(N.D. Ill. 2012); Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584. District courts may disregard any improper

denials and deem the opponent’s corresponding fact statements admitted. See

Aberman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 242 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

District courts may also disregard supplemental affidavits that “contradict

prior depositions or sworn testimony.” Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d. 899, 910 (7th

Cir. 1996) (citing Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Generally, a party may not create issues of fact by introducing affidavits that

contradict prior testimony unless the affidavit explains any discrepancies, mistakes,

or ambiguous testimony in earlier depositions. Id. at 910–11.

Accordingly, this Court disregards Plaintiff’s denials to the following

paragraphs of Defendants’ statement of facts: 18, 19, 22, 23, 29, 30, 32, 33, 38, 41,

and 43. Those denials fail to cite record evidence that refutes Defendants’ statements,

and merely denying a fact that has evidentiary support “does not transform it into a

disputed issue of fact sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Roberts

v. Advocate Health Care, 119 F. Supp. 3d 852, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2015). This Court also

disregards Plaintiff’s denials of paragraphs 35, 37, and 39, which cite portions of the

record that fail to refute the statements of fact. This Court deems admitted

Defendants’ corresponding statements of fact. See Aberman, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 677.

This Court also disregards the portions of the following paragraphs of

Plaintiff’s statement of facts that rely upon Plaintiff’s affidavit: 1, 2, 10, 21, and 24.

The cited sections of the affidavit impermissibly attempt to “create issues of fact” by

contradicting Plaintiff’s prior testimony without providing any explanation for the

discrepancy. See Dunn, 880 F.3d. at 910–11. Thus, this Court strikes the improper

sections of the affidavit and the statements of fact that rely upon those sections.

B. Stateville Facilities

Plaintiff is an inmate in IDOC’s custody. [171] ¶ 1. At all times relevant to

his claims, IDOC held Plaintiff at Stateville Correctional Center. Id. ¶ 16. At

Stateville, inmates live in several cell houses, with cells organized into multiple

levels, or “galleries.” [174] ¶¶ 9–10. Stateville does not have elevators for inmates

to travel between levels, so all inmates must use the stairs. Id. ¶ 9. The cell houses

share a few common features, such as a guard house and showers. Id. ¶ 10. The

Healthcare Unit, dining hall, facilities for religious services, commissary, and visitor

meeting areas are on the ground level, in a central area separate from the cell houses.

Id. In 2014, Plaintiff initially resided in a cell on the third floor of the “F” cell house.

[171] ¶ 16.

C. Plaintiff’s First Injury

On March 11, 2014, Plaintiff injured his right ankle playing basketball. Id. ¶

17. A nurse in the Healthcare Unit examined Plaintiff and noted that he expressed

some “movement pain.” Id. ¶ 18. The nurse also observed that Plaintiff’s ankle

showed “no redness or bruising,” but exhibited “slight” swelling, tenderness, and a

limited range of motion. Id. The nurse gave Plaintiff crutches and prescribed

acetaminophen, ice, and a “lay in” permit, which let Plaintiff eat meals in his cell. Id.

Plaintiff used crutches from March 11, 2014 until July 13, 2014. Id. ¶ 19. When

Stateville failed to provide Plaintiff with lay-in meals, he ate food he previously

bought from the commissary to avoid walking down the stairs to the dining hall. Id.

¶ 21. But Plaintiff used his crutches to walk down several flights of stairs to the

visiting room, worship area, and other ground-floor facilities. Id. ¶ 19.

While he remained on crutches, Plaintiff wrote weekly request slips to

Defendants Tarry Williams—Stateville’s Warden—and Karen Rabideau—

Stateville’s Placement Officer—asking for a transfer to a cell in the lower gallery. Id.

¶ 20. Plaintiff never received a response. Id. In his deposition, Williams did not

recall speaking to Plaintiff or having any written communication with Plaintiff. Id.

¶ 23. Williams further testified that he did not review any mail or letters sent to him

in his capacity as Warden; instead, his secretary would review the letters he received

and direct them to the relevant individuals for review. [171-7] at 37–38.

On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff visited the Healthcare Center for a follow up

appointment. [171] ¶ 24. The nurse renewed his lay-in permit and his prescriptions

for ice, crutches, and pain medicine. Id. On March 26, an X-ray of Plaintiff’s right

ankle showed no signs of a fracture. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff returned to the Healthcare

Unit the next day, however, because his right ankle felt “swollen all the time”; the

nurse again extended his lay-in permit and prescribed him pain medication, ice, and

crutches. Id. ¶ 26. In early April, Plaintiff saw Dr. Saleh Obaisi for an evaluation.

Id. ¶ 27. Obaisi determined that Plaintiff had sprained his right ankle and prescribed

an anti-inflammatory. Id.

As Stateville’s Placement Officer, Rabideau controlled inmate cell transfers.

[171-5] at 5. On June 19, 2014, Rabideau transferred Plaintiff from his cell in the “F”

cell house to a cell in “E” house three flights above the ground floor. [171] ¶ 28.

Rabideau testified—and Stateville records indicate—that this transfer was a routine

matter. [171-5] at 12, 55. In her deposition, Rabideau explained that a “routine

transfer” means any move not based upon a “medical reason.” Id. at 12.

On July 11, Plaintiff visited Obaisi again; Obaisi determined that Plaintiff’s

ankle “had no swelling” and “no heat” and that Plaintiff could move his ankle “within

normal limits.” [171] ¶ 29. Plaintiff still complained of pain and asked for crutches.

[171-3] at 59. Obaisi prescribed Plaintiff a single crutch for one week, pain

medication, and a permit for Plaintiff to move to a low bunk in the lower gallery for

30 days. [171] ¶ 29.

Obaisi testified that he provided Plaintiff with a lower cell and bunk permit

for Plaintiff’s comfort rather than for medical reasons. Id. ¶ 30. Obaisi stated that

“he never felt [Plaintiff] was disabled,” and that no medical reason required Plaintiff

to reside in a lower-level gallery because “if he is walking and carrying his weight

everywhere, he can carry his weight on the stairway.” Id. ¶ 31; [171-3] at 19, 58–59.

Plaintiff disagreed with Obaisi and said that as of July 11 he was not “walking and

carrying his weight everywhere.” [173] ¶ 31.

Following the July 11 appointment, Plaintiff gave his low gallery and bunk

permit to Defendant Jackson, a correctional officer. [171] ¶ 33. Rabideau stated that

the lower galleries throughout the facility were overcrowded that month and “very

few beds were open.” Id. ¶ 34; [171-5] at 9–10. Before Plaintiff’s second fall on July

13, 2014—discussed below—Rabideau testified that she had not received Plaintiff’s

low gallery and bunk permit. [171-5] at 20. Plaintiff contends that he wrote notes to

Rabideau and Williams before July 13 asking to move to a lower gallery cell. [175-3]

¶ 10.

IDOC must adjust an inmate’s housing or provide medical assistive devices

when a physician or nurse completes a permit or referral for the move or device. [174]

¶ 11. As of July 2014, when an inmate received a low gallery and bunk permit from

a physician, a copy of the permit was given to the inmate and a second copy went to

the correctional officers in the inmate’s cell house. [171-5] at 21–22. After officers

received the permit from either the inmate or the Healthcare Unit they would inform

Stateville’s Placement Officer—Rabideau, in this case—who was responsible for

arranging the transfer. Id. Defendant Sykes, a lieutenant, testified that correctional

officers did not have the authority to grant transfer requests. [171-8] at 24, 29, 30.

Cell-house sergeants maintain a log of all permits received from inmates who

have been approved for cell accommodations, and they update the log every 30 days.

Id. at 31. Sykes testified that he did not remember seeing Plaintiff’s medical permit.

Id. at 51–53. Plaintiff, however, contends that on two occasions between July 11,

2014 and July 13, 2014, he spoke with Sykes, Jackson, and Defendant Officer Parker

about honoring his medical permit. [171] ¶ 40. According to Plaintiff, the officers

told him that if he did not return to his cell, they would send him to segregation. Id.

D. Plaintiff’s Second Injury

On July 13, 2014, while using one crutch to walk down a flight of stairs from

his cell to the yard, Plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his leg and fell. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff

testified that he lost consciousness for a minute and suffered injuries to his neck,

back, ankle, and head. Id.

Plaintiff testified that Defendant Kimberly Aye, a Correctional Medical

Technician (CMT), directed inmates to place Plaintiff on a stretcher without safety

straps, causing Plaintiff to twist and turn and suffer more pain. [175-3] ¶ 12. Aye

completed an incident report, in which she noted that she found Plaintiff between

galleries seven and five and transported him in a stretcher to the Healthcare Unit.

[171] ¶ 43. Aye contradicted Plaintiff’s statement that she had inmates help

transport him, testifying that she had no authority as a CMT to direct inmates or to

permit them to move from one cell house to another. Id. ¶ 44.

At the Healthcare Unit, a nurse evaluated Plaintiff and determined that he

suffered possible injuries to his neck, back, and right ankle. Id. ¶ 45. The nurse gave

Plaintiff painkillers and, with Obaisi’s approval, Plaintiff traveled via ambulance to

an outside hospital. Id. At the hospital, a doctor evaluated Plaintiff, gave him pain

medication, and ordered X-rays of Plaintiff’s neck, back, and ankles. Id. ¶ 46. The

X-rays indicated that Plaintiff had no broken bones. Id. Plaintiff returned to

Stateville’s Healthcare Unit in the evening and reported that he felt better. Id. ¶ 47.

A Stateville nurse prescribed Plaintiff pain medication, a lay-in permit, crutches, and

ice. Id. Plaintiff testified that when the medication from the hospital wore off, he

again experienced severe pain. [175-3] ¶ 16.

Around July 13 or14, Rabideau transferred Plaintiff from his cell on gallery

seven to a cell on the ground floor. [171] ¶ 48. On July 30, Plaintiff saw a nurse who

extended his lay-in permit for another two weeks. Id. ¶ 49. On August 4, Obaisi

evaluated Plaintiff and confirmed that he had suffered a sprained neck and back after

his fall on July 13. Id. ¶ 50. Obaisi noted that Plaintiffs’ X-rays were normal, referred

him to physical therapy, and provided Plaintiff with crutches and a low gallery and

bunk permit for 30 days. Id.

E. Plaintiff’s Third Injury

On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff slipped and fell again while walking down a

flight of wet stairs with the assistance of a crutch, injuring his ankle and head. Id. ¶

51. Plaintiff saw Obaisi and another doctor, Martija, on September 10; they

diagnosed Plaintiff with a back injury. Id. ¶ 52. Obaisi and Martija noted that

Plaintiff’s ankle was not swollen or warm and that he could bear weight on it. Id.

The doctors prescribed pain medication and discontinued Plaintiff’s use of crutches.

Id. Obaisi concluded that Plaintiff was “too uncoordinated to use” crutches on steps

“in slippery conditions,” so the crutches could cause “greater injury.” Id.

About a week later, Plaintiff borrowed another inmate’s crutch to walk to the

prison’s visiting room. Id. ¶ 53. On his way back, a correctional officer took Plaintiff

to see Chanel Barnett in the Healthcare Unit; Barnett told Plaintiff that he was not

allowed to use a crutch and had him return to his cell without it. Id.

F. Administrative Remedies

IDOC has a formal grievance process set out in the Illinois Administrative

Code. [171] ¶ 54; see also Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, §§ 504.800–70. Pursuant to Part

504F, the initial step in the grievance process requires inmates to attempt to resolve

grievances through their counselor. [171] ¶ 55. If the grievance remains unresolved

after 60 days, an inmate may file a written grievance with the prison’s designated

Grievance Officer. Id. This officer investigates the merits of the inmate’s grievance

and generates a report with the findings of the investigation, a conclusion, and any

recommendation for relief. Id. The inmate’s grievance and the Grievance Officer’s

report are then forwarded to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) or their designee

for review and signature. Id. The final decision goes back to the inmate. Id.

As the final step in the grievance process, the inmate may appeal the CAO’s

decision in writing to the IDOC Director by submitting the Grievance Officer’s report

and the CAO’s decision to the Administrative Review Board (ARB). Id. ¶ 56. The

ARB, as the Director’s representative, reviews the appeal and determines whether

the inmate’s grievance can be handled without a hearing. Id. If so, the ARB notifies

the inmate of this determination. Id. Otherwise, the ARB schedules a hearing to

interview the inmate, examine relevant documents, and call witnesses. Id. The ARB

submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director or the

Director’s designee, who reviews the report and makes a final determination on the

grievance. Id. The inmate then receives a copy of the report and the Director’s final

decision. Id. The ARB maintains the original documents in its files pursuant to

Department Rule 504F: Grievance Procedures for Committed Persons. Id. IDOC’s

grievance process provides for no further review or appeal beyond this step. Id.

Part 504F also provides that an inmate can request expedited review by

submitting a grievance marked “emergency” directly to the CAO rather than to the

inmate’s counselor or the Grievance Officer. Id. ¶ 57. If the CAO determines that

the complaint reveals a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious

harm to the inmate, IDOC may handle the grievance on an emergency basis. Id. If

the CAO determines that the grievance does not warrant emergency review, the

inmate must resubmit the grievance in accordance with the regular grievance process

described above. Id.

According to Defendants, Stateville informs all inmates of the proper process

for submitting and appealing grievances within IDOC and specifically at Stateville;

inmates can also access grievance policies and procedures at any time through their

counselor or at the law library. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff contends that he did not receive a

copy of the documents explaining the grievance mechanisms and did not know that

the grievance process required him to take any steps if he received no response from

an IDOC official. [173] ¶ 59.

On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance about his July 13 fall

and the pain he experienced while being transported to the Healthcare Unit. [171] ¶

60. Plaintiff claimed that on July 11 he had received a low gallery and bunk permit

to move cells immediately, but Jackson, Sykes, and an IDOC sergeant refused to

honor the permit. Id. Plaintiff asked to see a specialist immediately to assess his

medical issues and requested that the Healthcare Unit stop denying him adequate

healthcare. Id.; [171-11] at 19.

On August 20, the CAO determined that Plaintiff’s grievance did not constitute

an emergency. [171] ¶ 61. The ARB instructed Plaintiff to resubmit his grievance

through the normal process. Id. Plaintiff subsequently sent his grievance to the ARB,

which responded on October 9, 2014, and told Plaintiff to provide a copy of the original

grievance with the written responses from his correctional counselor, the Grievance

Officer, and the CAO. Id. ¶ 62. After receiving the ARB’s response to his July 28

grievance, Plaintiff submitted the grievance to his counselor but never received a

response and took no further action. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff says that he did not know

IDOC’s grievance requirements and that he attempted to follow the proper procedure

by resubmitting his grievance to his counselor. [173] ¶ 64.

Plaintiff filed another emergency grievance on September 11, 2014. [171] ¶ 65.

The Grievance Officer reviewed that grievance on September 29, and the CAO

ultimately denied it on October 9, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. Plaintiff admits that the

grievance was denied but states that at the time he never received a response. [173]

¶ 66. Thus, Plaintiff says, he never attempted to appeal the September 11 grievance

by submitting it to the ARB and as a result, the ARB never had an opportunity to

make a final determination on the grievance. [171] ¶ 67.

Plaintiff sued Defendants in January 2016. [1]. He amended his complaint in

July 2016, [26], and again in October 2016, [68]. In April 2018, Plaintiff dismissed

his claims against Obaisi, since deceased, and the parties agreed to substitute

Obaisi’s employer, Wexford, as a defendant. See [167, 168, 169]. Defendants then

moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts. [170].

II. Legal Standard

Courts should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows that no

genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the evidence weighs so heavily in

the moving party’s favor that the moving party “must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon the evidence, a

reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To

show a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must point to

“particular materials in the record,” and cannot rely upon the pleadings or

speculation. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).

At summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and refrain from making credibility

determinations or weighing evidence. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.

2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the burden of

establishing the lack of genuine disputes as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

III. Analysis

A. Failure to Exhaust

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.,

prisoners cannot file suit challenging prison conditions unless they first exhaust all

available administrative remedies. See § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85

(2006) (under the PLRA, “a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even

where the relief sought—monetary damages—cannot be granted by the

administrative process”). Defendants bear the burden of proof when they assert

failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655

(7th Cir. 2004).

Proper exhaustion requires prisoners to comply with agency deadlines “and

other critical procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90; see also Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (“a prisoner must file complaints

and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require”).

Thus, filing an untimely appeal or failing to appeal constitutes a failure to exhaust,

meaning a court must dismiss the claim. See Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 285

(7th Cir. 2005).

A prisoner’s subjective beliefs about or misunderstanding of administrative

grievance procedures do not excuse compliance. See King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889,

893 (7th Cir. 2015) (a prisoner must exhaust all available remedies “even if he expects

the process will ultimately be futile”); Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F. App’x 594, 596 (7th

Cir. 2007) (noting that § 1997e(a) says nothing about a prisoner’s subjective beliefs

about available administrative remedies). That said, the Seventh Circuit recognizes

an exception to the exhaustion requirement that applies when prison officials make

the grievance process “impossible to comply with,” effectively making the process

unavailable to the inmate. King, 781 F.3d at 893. This exception applies when prison

officials fail to respond properly to inmate grievances. See Brengettcy v. Horton, 423

F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2002).

Similarly, if a prison requires inmates to file grievances in a specific manner, but fails

to make instructions about that process available to inmates, then “no available”

remedy exists. Dale, 376 F.3d at 656.

Here, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims arising before

July 28, 2014, and on any claims related to his crutches being taken away in

September 2014, on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. [172] at 13–14.

1. First Emergency Grievance: July 28, 2014

Plaintiff filed his first emergency grievance on July 28, 2014, in which he

complained about his July 13 fall and the pain he experienced while being

transported to the Healthcare Unit. [171] ¶ 60. On August 20, the CAO determined

that Plaintiff’s grievance did not constitute an emergency and instructed Plaintiff to

resubmit the grievance through the normal process. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff then sent his

grievance to the ARB (rather than his Correctional Counselor), which asked Plaintiff

to provide a copy of his original grievance with written responses from his

Correctional Counselor, the Grievance Officer, and the CAO. Id. ¶ 62; [171-11] at 18.

After receiving the ARB’s response, Plaintiff then submitted the grievance to his

counselor but never got a response and took no further action. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff

argues that Stateville failed to inform him of the necessary steps to exhaust his

administrative remedies. [175] at 15.

According to the ARB’s Return of Grievance record, the ARB instructed

Plaintiff to “provide a copy” of his written grievance, “including the counselor’s

response” and “the Grievance Officer’s and Chief Administrative Officer’s response,

to appeal.” [171-11] at 18. Plaintiff denies that he received a guidebook explaining

the grievance procedures, [173] ¶¶ 54–59, but admits that the ARB gave him the

instructions outlined above, id. ¶ 62.

Whether Plaintiff personally received a guidebook containing Stateville’s

grievance procedures remains disputed. But Plaintiff does not dispute that all

inmates can access the grievance policies and procedures “at any time” through their

counselor or the law library. See id. ¶ 59. Thus, under the Seventh Circuit’s objective

standard, Stateville made its process available to Plaintiff. See Dole v. Chandler, 438

F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006); Twitty, 226 F. App’x at 596. Indeed, here the ARB

specifically told Plaintiff how to submit his grievance properly. See [171] ¶ 62.

According to Plaintiff, however, he followed the instructions he received (both

the CAO’s instruction to submit the non-emergency grievance “in the normal manner”

and the ARB’s instruction to “provide a copy” of the counselor’s response) when

Plaintiff eventually submitted the grievance to his counselor, who never responded.

[173] ¶ 64; [175-3] ¶¶ 18–19; [171-11] at 18-19. Under Plaintiff’s version of events,

the counselor’s subsequent failure to respond to his grievance prevented Plaintiff

from moving forward with his grievance and “effectively rendered” the process

unavailable. Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682; see also Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (“a remedy

becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed

grievance”). Accordingly, this Court cannot grant summary judgment to Defendants

for failure to exhaust because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether

Plaintiff meets the unavailability exception.

2. Second Emergency Grievance: September 11, 2014

Plaintiff filed a second emergency grievance on September 11, 2014, regarding

his fall and resulting injuries from September 9. [171] ¶ 65. The Grievance Officer

reviewed the grievance on September 29 and the CAO denied it on October 9. Id. ¶¶

65–66. Plaintiff contends that he never received a response to this emergency

grievance and thus never attempted to appeal the denial by submitting the grievance

to the ARB. [173] ¶ 67.

The record does not establish when or whether prison officials notified Plaintiff

of this denial, so Defendants have not met their burden to establish Plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust. See Dale, 376 F.3d at 655. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant summary

judgment to Defendants for failure to exhaust.

B. Qualifying Disability

This Court addresses Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim together with his

ADA claims because the same analysis governs both claims. See Foley v. City of

Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004). Under both statutes, Plaintiff must

show that: (1) he is a qualified person; (2) with a disability; and (3) IDOC denied him

access to a program or activity because of his disability. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,

684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The ADA defines a disability as either “a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities”; “a

record of such an impairment”; or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42

U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(b) (Rehabilitation Act’s definition of

disability refers to the ADA). Major life activities include walking, standing, bending,

and caring for oneself. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672.

Before Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAA),

“substantially limits” meant that an individual could not perform a major life function

or was “significantly restricted” in “condition, manner or duration” from performing

“a particular major life function, as compared to the average person in the general

population.” Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.

1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i–j)). But the ADAA broadened the definition of

disability. Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC, No. 16-C-1146, 2018 WL 2220289, at *6

(N.D. Ill. May 15, 2018) (discussing amended text of the statute and subsequent

regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). After

the 2008 amendments, an “impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely

restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered

substantially limiting.” Id.; see also Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., 865 F.3d.

475, 476 (7th Cir. 2017).

Now, courts assess whether an impairment substantially limits a major life

activity without regard to the “ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except

ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.” 28 C.F.R § 35.108(d)(1)(viii). Relevant factors

include “the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration

of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact of the

impairment.” Smith v. Concentra, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 778, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

Plaintiff experienced recurring back pain. [175-3] ¶ 7; [175-17] at 17. But

Plaintiff does not assert any claim arising from his back pain or contend that it

qualifies as a disability. See generally [68, 175]. Nor does Plaintiff claim that his

back pain comprised part of an underlying disability or related to his ankle injuries

(aside from the fact that he experienced back pain at the same time he experienced

ankle pain). See [175-3] ¶ 1. Thus, this Court examines only whether Plaintiff’s ankle

injury constitutes a disability under the ADA, as amended by the ADAA.

The ADA does not categorically exclude temporary impairments from its

definition of a disability. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (2d

Cir. 2014)). That said, the “duration of an impairment” may help determine “whether

the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” Id. at 329. Impairments

that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered under the ADA unless

they are sufficiently severe. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (app.). Examples of

temporary, non-disabling impairments include “broken limbs, sprained joints,

concussions, and influenza”—in other words, “non-chronic impairments” with “little

or no long term or permanent impact.” Id.

Thus, many district courts have found that run-of-the-mill short-term injuries

do not qualify as disabilities under the ADA. See Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., No. 3:14-

cv-00204, 2016 WL 853529, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016) (broken foot that took two

months to heal did not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Martinez v. N.Y. State

Div. of Human Rights, No. 1:13-cv-1252-GHW, 2015 WL 437399, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 2, 2015) (temporary injuries from fall did not constitute a disability); Mastrio v.

Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-564, 2014 WL 840229, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014)

(short-term pain from kidney stones did not qualify as a disability); Budhun v.

Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 10-6921, 2011 WL 2746009, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July

14, 2011) (broken finger did not qualify as a disability); see also Idell M. v. Vilsack,

E.E.O.C. Doc. 0120140792, 2016 WL 4426506, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 4, 2016)

(affirming finding that ordinary, temporary recovery from foot surgery did not qualify

as a disability).

According to Plaintiff, the ankle injury he sustained in March 2014 affected his

ability to walk and limited his access to religious services, family visits, and the

commissary. See [175-3] ¶ 8. The record shows that Plaintiff’s March 2014 fall

resulted in a painful ankle sprain for which he was prescribed pain medicine,

crutches, and ice. [173] ¶ 18. Evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, this Court accepts that Plaintiff’s ankle injury impaired his ability to walk

unassisted by crutches, which demonstrates some impairment of a major life activity.

See, e.g., Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at *4; [173] ¶ 17. That said, considering the nature

and severity of Plaintiffs’ ankle injury, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s ankle injury

did not substantially limit his major life activities as required to establish a claim

under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

First, nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff’s injury was severe or

presented anything beyond an ordinary sprain. According to medical documentation,

Plaintiff did not break any bones. [173] ¶ 25. Instead, the undisputed facts show

that Plaintiff merely sprained his ankle and received ordinary treatment for such an

injury, including ice, crutches, and over-the-counter pain medication. See [171-9] at

227; [173] ¶ 31. As of July 2014, Plaintiff’s ankle was no longer swollen, he had

recovered his full range of motion, and “it was not medically necessary for Plaintiff to

use crutches.” [171] ¶¶ 30–31. Although this Court accepts Plaintiff’s statements

that he continued experiencing some pain, Plaintiff offers no evidence to contradict

Obaisi’s medical findings as to the nature or progress of his condition. Ordinary,

temporary injuries that neither cause nor relate to longer-term impairments

generally do not demonstrate a disability under the ADA, so those circumstances

militate against finding that Plaintiff had a qualifying disability. See Clark, 2016

WL 853529, at *4 (collecting cases).

Second, Plaintiff fails to identify any precedent establishing that a sequence of

unrelated injuries may be linked together to demonstrate a substantial limitation on

a major life activity. Even construing all of Plaintiff’s injuries as one injury—despite

a total lack of evidence connecting them—Plaintiff’s own timeline of events begins on

March 11, 2014, and ends on September 9, 2014, a period just shy of six months. [68]

¶¶ 15, 36. As noted above, such a short-term impairment may qualify as a disability,

but only if “sufficiently severe.” See Summers, 740 F.3d at 329.

Here, Plaintiff fails to show such severity: the record shows that Plaintiff

experienced ordinary recovery time between his injuries and suffered no lasting

consequences from any of them. Cf. id. (finding that plaintiff had a qualifying

disability where he remained wholly unable to walk for seven months and, absent

surgery, medication, and physical therapy, likely would not have walked for an even

longer period). Obaisi testified that Plaintiff could put weight on his foot by July

2014, indicating that Plaintiff’s initial injury healed normally. [171-3] at 19, 58–59.

Plaintiff denies this statement in his affidavit, stating that at the time he was not

“walking and carrying his weight everywhere.” [173] ¶ 31. But Plaintiff’s prior

deposition testimony shows that, at a minimum, he could place some weight on the

injured ankle because he walked from his cell down the stairs using only one crutch

in July. See [175-17] at 55–57, 129.

In any event, Plaintiff’s medical records show that by September 9, 2014,

Plaintiff could walk unassisted by crutches. [171] ¶ 52. Thus, the entire period of

Plaintiff’s impairment lasted no more than six months, and for portions within that

period, Plaintiff demonstrated significant improvement and increased mobility. The

record contains no evidence of any lasting consequence or impairment past that

period. These circumstances—brief, temporary periods of impairment which did not

require surgery or other non-routine treatments—weigh against finding that Plaintiff

suffered a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at

*6 (finding that a broken foot that affected the plaintiff’s ability to walk for up to five

months, but did not create any complications or long-term impact, did not qualify as

a disability); cf. Summers, 740 F.3d at 329–33 (finding that the plaintiff presented a

qualifying disability where an accident impaired his ability to walk for seven months

and required surgery and therapy).

Overall, this Court finds no support in the law to conclude that Plaintiff’s

sprained ankle qualifies as a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Guary v. Upstate

Nat’l Bank, 618 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the “plaintiff’s

broken ankle, resulting in twelve-week disability leave,” did not qualify as a

disability); Street v. Maverick Tube Corp., No. 4:15-cv-02736, 2016 WL 8711338, at *6

(S.D. Tex. June 17, 2016) (noting that “a temporary injury, such as a broken foot, is

not considered a ‘disability’ under the ADA.”).

Because Plaintiff did not suffer a qualifying disability, this Court grants

summary judgment to Defendants on Counts I, II, and VII.

C. Failure to Accommodate

This Court’s finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a qualifying disability under

the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act disposes of his claims arising from his alleged

disability. Even if Plaintiff had a qualifying disability, however, his failure to

accommodate claims would still fail.

To establish a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must

prove that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) a public entity denied

him the benefits of its services, programs, or activities or otherwise subjected him to

discrimination; and (3) the denial or discrimination occurred because of his

disability. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jaros, 684

F.3d at 672); see also Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir.

1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The analysis for the Rehabilitation Act remains

functionally identical, with the additional requirement that the agency that denied

the plaintiff services must accept federal funds, which IDOC does. See Wagoner, 778

F.3d at 592 (citing Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672).

Under either statute, a reasonable accommodation does not require a perfect

cure for the problem. See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 112 (7th Cir.

1996); see also Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593 (holding that restricted access to facilities

which resulted in longer wait times for a disabled prisoner did not establish a denial

of services under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act). In defining a reasonable

accommodation in correctional facilities, courts consider the accommodation “in light

of the overall institutional requirements,” including security and safety concerns and

“administrative exigencies.” Love, 103 F.3d at 561. This determination remains

“highly fact-specific” and requires a case-by-case analysis. Dadian v. Village of

Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001).

Although Plaintiff offers evidence that his location on a higher gallery made it

difficult for him to access the commissary, religious activities, and family visits, that

evidence alone does not prove that IDOC failed to accommodate him. Plaintiff admits

that, from the date of his initial injury in March 2014 until Stateville moved him to

a lower gallery cell on July 13, 2014, he could “go from place to place at Stateville”

when using crutches—albeit at a slower pace than normal—including down the

stairs. [175-3] ¶¶ 4, 19. IDOC also provided Plaintiff with accommodations including

lay-in permits for meals and crutches. Plaintiff testified, however, that Stateville

sometimes failed to provide his lay-in meals, in which case he ate food he purchased

from the commissary. Id. ¶ 21. Overall, like the Wagoner plaintiff, Plaintiff had

access to prison services but experienced inconveniences in the form of using crutches,

walking more slowly, and occasionally relying on the food he purchased for himself.

Those minor, short-term inconveniences do not amount to a failure to accommodate

under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593 (holding

that IDOC’s failure to repair an inmate’s wheelchair did not result in a denial of

services even though it “impeded” the inmate’s access to some facilities). Moreover,

delays of weeks (or even months) in organizing an accommodation do not

automatically constitute a failure to accommodate; here, Plaintiff received a lower

gallery assignment within four months of his initial injury, which remains reasonable

under the requisite standard. See Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1177–

78 (7th Cir. 2013) (four-month delay in securing accessible parking was not failure to

accommodate), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d

760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016); Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir.

2000) (20-month delay did not render accommodation unreasonable).

Plaintiff claims that IDOC violated his rights by refusing his continued

requests to move to a lower gallery. Plaintiff says that between his initial injury in

March 2014 and his second fall in July 2014, he wrote to Rabideau and Williams

multiple times requesting to move to a cell in a lower gallery; Defendants deny ever

receiving the letters. See [173] ¶ 20.

Here, however, that factual dispute is immaterial: even if this Court found that

Defendants delayed Plaintiff’s accommodation through July 13—the day Plaintiff

suffered his second fall and Defendants honored his permit from Obaisi—the ADA

excuses some bureaucratic delay in providing reasonable accommodations. As

discussed above, such delays may extend over several months and remain reasonable,

absent a showing of bad faith (which Plaintiff has not made here). See Jay, 233 F.3d

at 1017.

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him a reasonable

accommodation after his second fall on July 13, 2014, when he was moved on a

stretcher without safety straps and carried by medical technicians and other inmates

to the Healthcare Unit. [68] ¶ 26. IDOC’s rules prohibit the use of inmates to assist

or transport other inmates during a medical emergency, and Defendants deny that

other inmates moved Plaintiff onto the stretcher. [188] ¶¶ 8, 29. Even crediting

Plaintiff’s account, it remains unclear how improper transportation to the Healthcare

Unit constitutes a failure to accommodate under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff does not support this claim or even address it in his response to Defendants’

motion, see generally [175], and therefore waives that argument, see Crespo v. Colvin,

824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). Besides, a reasonable accommodation “is a process,

not a one-off event,” so this single episode does not suffice to sustain a failure to

accommodate claim. Cloe, 712 F.3d at 1178. Thus, this Court grants summary

judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims.

D. ADA Interference

A plaintiff bringing an ADA interference claim must prove that: (1) he engaged

in protected activity; (2) he exercised or enjoyed ADA protected rights; (3) the

defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered on account of his protected

activity; and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate. Frakes

v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2017). Protected activities

under the ADA include opposing or complaining about disability discrimination, such

as by filing formal complaints of discrimination. Id. Interference requires “more than

a quarrel among neighbors or an isolated act of discrimination”; instead, plaintiffs

must demonstrate a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated.” Bloch v.

Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is, to demonstrate the requisite intent, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant’s actions reveal a discriminatory pattern of harassment and an intent to

discriminate based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class—those with

disabilities. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388

F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004)

Plaintiff claims that he engaged in protected activity when he requested

accommodations between March and July 2014. [175] at 9. Plaintiff alleges that

IDOC interfered with his ADA rights when they transferred him to cell on a higher

gallery floor and did not immediately grant his requests for accommodation. Id. In

addition, Plaintiff testified that between July 11, 2014 and his fall on July 13, 2014,

he had two conversations with Sykes and Jackson about honoring his low gallery and

low bunk permits and they threatened Plaintiff with segregation if he did not return

to his cell. [173] ¶ 40. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that IDOC interfered with his ADA

rights when they confiscated his crutch after his third fall in September 2014. [175]

at 10. Overall, this Court must determine whether Defendants interfered with

Plaintiff’s protected activity and, if so, whether that interference arose from an intent

to discriminate. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.

The record shows that Plaintiff moved from his cell in F House to a cell on a

higher gallery on June 19, 2014. [171] ¶ 28. Stateville’s records, corroborating

Rabideau’s statement, show that Plaintiff moved to a higher gallery as a matter of

routine. [171-5] at 54–55. Plaintiff disputes Rabideau’s explanation for his transfer

and speculatively interprets the Stateville records to mean that the transfer was for

“medical reasons.” [173] ¶ 28.1 But Defendants’ unrebutted evidence—including

Rabideau's statement and Stateville’s transfer records—shows that Plaintiff’s

transfer resulted from “routine procedures within Stateville.” [171-5] at 12.

In September 2014, Plaintiff fell while walking down a flight of wet stairs.

[173] ¶ 52. After this fall, Obaisi revoked Plaintiff’s crutches because he feared

Plaintiff would injure himself further if he continued using them. Id. Nothing in the

record suggests that these incidents formed part of a continued pattern of

discriminatory practices against Plaintiff. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783. Instead,

Obaisi’s uncontested testimony shows that IDOC confiscated Plaintiff’s crutches out

of concern for his safety. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that wardens and other prison bureaucrats may properly “relegate to the

prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care”).

On July 11, Obaisi provided Plaintiff with a medical permit allowing him to

move to a lower gallery. [171] ¶ 29. As to Plaintiff’s interactions with Sykes and

1 During her deposition, Rabideau explained the transfer records in detail. [171-5] at 12–19. Her testimony and the

transfer records categorize the June 19 move as “routine.” [171-5] at 55. Presumably, Plaintiff believes the move

occurred for a medical reason because the row above the row for the June 19 move lists “medical reason” as the

explanation. Id. But that row actually reflects that Plaintiff’s July 13 move to a ground-floor cell after he returned

from the outside hospital occurred for a medical reason. [171-5] at 55. Plaintiff’s speculation to the contrary cannot

create a genuine issue of material fact here. See Consolino v. Towne, 872 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 2017).

Jackson about the permit, the nature of their conversation remains disputed, and

may constitute an act of discrimination. Even accepting that as true, however,

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a “pattern of harassment” based upon that isolated

episode alone. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants

engaged in a pattern of harassment motivated by discriminatory intent. As noted

above, Plaintiff offers no evidence showing that his first transfer to a higher gallery

resulted from discriminatory intent and he fails to rebut Defendants’ evidence that

the transfer was a matter of routine within a crowded prison. See [171-5] at 18–19.

Overall, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he lacks evidence of either a pattern of

discrimination or any intent to discriminate. Here, Plaintiff merely identifies a

number of different actors involved in isolated episodes, which does not suffice to

show a “pattern of harassment.” Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783; see also DiCenso v. Cisneros,

96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996).

Crucially, Plaintiff offers none of the circumstantial evidence that typically

supports finding discriminatory intent, such as discriminatory comments, different

treatment for inmates outside of the protected class, or repeated expressions of

animus. See, e.g., Bloch, 587 F.3d at 786; Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d

1521, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s entire theory of discriminatory intent appears

to be that Defendants took various actions (removing his crutch, failing to

immediately honor his low bunk permit, and so on) while knowing of his impairment.

See [175] at 10. But—absent a disparate impact theory that Plaintiff does not

advance—discriminatory intent requires showing that Defendants acted “because of”

and not merely “in spite of” a prohibited factor. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 785. Plaintiff

offers no evidence and makes no argument showing that Defendants acted “because

of” his alleged disability. Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to Defendants

on Plaintiff’s ADA interference claim.

D. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment entitles prisoners to adequate medical care. Johnson

v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment

claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference

towards his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 2010). Even

assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff establishes the requisite elements under

the Eighth Amendment, his claims fail because he cannot overcome the qualified-

immunity defense that Defendants raised in their opening brief. [172] at 14–15.

The doctrine of qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

Thus, qualified immunity protects officers who make “mere mistakes” of law, fact, or

a mix of the two. Id. When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to show two things: (1) that the defendant violated a statutory

or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of

the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). A court

may address the prongs in whichever order it prefers. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The

defendant merits qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to meet his burden on either

prong. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017).

“Clearly established” means that existing precedent “placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate” at the time of the alleged violation. Id.

Plaintiff must show that “every reasonable official would understand” that his actions

violated a given right. Id. Finally, a plaintiff cannot succeed by identifying clearly

established law “at a high level of generality” not “particularized” to the facts of his

case. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).

Here, contrary to well-settled precedent, Plaintiff fails to address his burden

of overcoming Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. See [175] at 15

(“Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that they are entitled to qualified

immunity unless Shaw can point to an analogous case that establishes that he had a

right to be free from the conduct he challenges in his Section 1983 claim.”). Instead,

Plaintiff offers a one-paragraph response on qualified immunity and argues that

Defendants do not merit qualified immunity simply because the Seventh Circuit “has

long been clear that deliberate indifference to an inmates [sic] serious medical needs

violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556,

566 (7th Cir. 2017)). That general legal proposition holds true in the abstract, but it

lacks any connection to the facts of this case and thus does not help Plaintiff. See

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (a plaintiff cannot defeat qualified immunity by defining

clearly established law “at a high level of generality”). Plaintiff’s failure to meet (or

even attempt to meet) his burden on the second prong of the qualified-immunity

analysis entitles Defendants to qualified immunity. See Green, 868 F.3d at 633.

Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Counts III, IV, V, and

VI.

IV. Conclusion

This Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment [170]. The Clerk

shall enter judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiff. All dates and deadlines

are stricken. Civil case terminated.

Dated: August 7, 2018

Entered:

John Robert Blakey A

United States District Judge

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