United States v. Corral Valenzuela

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 17 C 8423

)

ELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

The United States seeks to denaturalize Eleazar Corral Valenzuela (Corral), a

naturalized U.S. citizen, under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) on the ground that he obtained U.S.

citizenship illegally or by willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.

Corral has filed a "Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint" in which he requests discovery

and a hearing on certain issues that he claims may warrant dismissal of the action, and

the United States has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment

on the pleadings on three of the five claims in its complaint. For the reasons stated

below, the Court denies Corral's motion and grants the government's motion for

judgment on the pleadings in part.

Background

Corral, who was born in Mexico, was admitted to the United States as a lawful

permanent resident on February 10, 1994. In January 1999, Corral applied for

naturalization using a Form N-400 Application for Naturalization. The form is stamped

January 14, 1999. See Compl., Ex. E at 3. Part 7, Question 15(a) of the Form N-400

asks "Have you ever . . . knowingly committed any crime for which you have not been

arrested?" Id. at 3. On Corral's Form N-400, that question is answered in the negative.

Id. The certification in Part 11 of the form states "I certify . . . under penalty of perjury

under the laws of the United States of America that this application, and the evidence

submitted with it, is all true and correct." Id. at 4. Corral signed this certification on

December 30, 1998. Id. In May 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)1

officer interviewed Corral under oath regarding his naturalization application. On May

10, 2000, the INS approved his naturalization application. Corral took the oath of

allegiance and was naturalized as a United States citizen on June 15, 2000.

Two months later, in August 2000, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois indicted

Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in violation of chapter 720,

section 5/12-16(b)2 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. See Compl., Ex. B (Aug. 9, 2000

Indictment); 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (1998). On November 2, 2000, Corral pled guilty to

count 1 of the indictment, which charged the following:

On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000, Eleazar Corral

committed the offense of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2

Felony[,] in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois

Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defendant, [redacted]

committed an act of sexual conduct with [redacted] in that the defendant

knowingly touched the vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual

gratification of the defendant.

1 Congress transferred the functions of the INS to the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) on March 1, 2003. Mendoza v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 672, 674 n.1 (7th Cir. 2018).

The Court refers to the INS throughout this opinion because that is the agency that was

responsible for naturalization proceedings during the relevant time.

2 Renumbered as 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b) and amended effective July 1, 2011. 2010 Ill.

Legis. Serv. P.A. 96-1551, Art. 2, § 5.

Aug. 9, 2000 Indictment at 1; see also Compl., Ex. C (Nov. 2, 2000 Plea Hearing Tr.).

The state court entered a judgment finding Corral guilty of aggravated criminal sexual

abuse in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), sentenced him to 48 months of sex offender

probation, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. See Compl., Ex. D (Nov. 2,

2000 Judgment).

In November 2017, the United States filed the present denaturalization action

against Corral. The government's complaint to revoke naturalization contains five

counts:

1. Illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral character (crime

involving moral turpitude)

2. Illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral character (unlawful

act adversely reflecting on moral character)

3. Illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral character (false

testimony)

4. Illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral character (unlawful

act of providing false testimony)

5. Procurement of naturalization by concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation

Compl. at 7-12. In January 2018, Corral filed a motion entitled "Defendant's Motion To

Dismiss / Strike Complaint," in which he asks the Court to authorize discovery and hold

a hearing on whether the complaint should be dismissed as barred by laches or as a

violation of Corral's due process or equal protection rights. In February 2018, the

United States moved for judgment on the pleadings on counts 1, 2, and 5 of the

complaint, arguing that because Corral is estopped from denying the essential elements

of the offense to which he pled guilty, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and it

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those counts.

Discussion

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), an individual may not be naturalized as a citizen of

the United States unless he or she (1) meets certain residence and physical presence

requirements during the five-year period immediately preceding the date of filing the

naturalization application, (2) "has resided continuously within the United States from

the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship," and (3) "during all

the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral

character." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The applicant for naturalization "bears the burden of

demonstrating that, during the statutorily prescribed period, he or she has been and

continues to be a person of good moral character. This includes the period between the

examination and the administration of the oath of allegiance." 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), the United States may institute denaturalization

proceedings "for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting [a]

person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that

such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by

concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). A

certificate of naturalization is "illegally procured" if "the congressionally imposed

prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship," including the good moral character

requirement, are not met when naturalization is granted. Fedorenko v. United States,

449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981); see also United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1376 n.1

(7th Cir. 1986) ("Naturalization is illegally procured if any statutory requirement is not

met at the time naturalization is granted.").

The right of citizenship is a precious one. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.

265, 269 (1961); see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943)

(explaining that "[i]t would be difficult to exaggerate" the value and importance of the

right of citizenship). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "severe

consequences may attend" the loss of citizenship and that those consequences are

especially dire for those who have lived and worked in the United States as citizens for

many years. See Costello, 365 U.S. at 269; Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505; Chaunt v.

United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122; see also

Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946) ("[D]enaturalization, like deportation,

may result in the loss of all that makes life worth living.") (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Given the importance of the right of citizenship—and the potentially devastating

toll that loss of that citizenship is likely to take on a naturalized citizen and his or her

family—it is little wonder that the Supreme Court has held that "such a right once

conferred should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof."

Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122. Accordingly, the government carries a heavy burden

of proof when attempting to divest a naturalized citizen of citizenship after it has been

granted: denaturalization is warranted only if the evidence is "clear, unequivocal, and

convincing," such that it does not "leave the issue in doubt." Costello, 365 U.S. at 269

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Firishchak,

468 F.3d 1015, 1023 (7th Cir. 2006); Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1378.

A. Corral's "motion to dismiss / strike complaint"

As previously indicated, Corral's "Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint" is not so

much a motion to dismiss as a request for discovery and a hearing on certain issues

that he contends may warrant dismissal of the action. In support of this motion, Corral

first questions whether the crime to which he pled guilty is necessarily a crime involving

moral turpitude. Corral also argues that the government has failed to adequately

support its contentions that he lied or made a material misrepresentation to the INS

agent who conducted his naturalization interview and that the agent would have been

precluded from approving his application had Corral disclosed his crime during the

application process.3

As previously explained, there is no doubt that the government bears a heavy

burden of proof in a denaturalization proceeding. But the fact that the government has

not proven all of the elements of each count in the complaint at this stage does not

mean that additional discovery and a hearing are necessarily warranted. In its

complaint, the government has presented five separate (albeit overlapping) grounds for

denaturalization. Any of the five counts alleged—if proven by clear, unequivocal, and

convincing evidence—would provide an independent basis for revoking Corral's

citizenship.

As an initial matter, the issue of whether a crime is properly classified as a crime

involving moral turpitude is a question of law. See Lagunas-Salgado v. Holder, 584

F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2009). Secondly, to establish that denaturalization is warranted

3 Corral further argues that such issues are properly resolved by a jury. As the

government notes, however, the case Corral cites in support of this argument,

Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), deals not with 8 U.S.C. § 1451,

which is a civil statute, but with its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). Id. at 1928

("[T]he proper causal inquiry under § 1425(a) is framed in objective terms: To decide

whether a defendant acquired citizenship by means of a lie, a jury must evaluate how

knowledge of the real facts would have affected a reasonable government official

properly applying naturalization law."). The Seventh Circuit has long held that there is

no right to a jury trial in civil denaturalization proceedings. See, e.g., Firishchak, 468

F.3d at 1026; Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1384.

on counts 1 or 2 of the complaint, the government need not prove either (1) that Corral

lied or made a material misrepresentation to the INS agent who conducted his

naturalization interview or (2) that the agent would have been precluded from approving

his application had Corral disclosed his crime during the application process.

Specifically, the question of whether Corral lied or otherwise made a material

misrepresentation to the INS agent who conducted his naturalization interview has no

bearing on whether Corral committed a crime involving moral turpitude (count 1) or an

unlawful act adversely reflecting on moral character (count 2) that would prevent him

from establishing that he possessed the requisite good moral character during the

relevant statutory period. And if the crime to which Corral pled guilty in 2000 is indeed a

crime involving moral turpitude, given the timing of the crime, there is no question that

he would have been precluded from establishing that he possessed the requisite good

moral character through June 15, 2000, the date he became a citizen. See 8 U.S.C. §§

1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) ("[N]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a

person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character

is required to be established," was convicted of or admits having committed "a crime

involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense)" unless one of the

exceptions enumerated in sub-section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) apply); see also 8 C.F.R. §

316.10(b)(2)(i) ("An applicant shall be found to lack good moral character if during the

statutory period the applicant: (i) Committed one or more crimes involving moral

turpitude, other than a purely political offense, for which the applicant was convicted,

except as specified in section 212(a)(2)[A](ii)(II) of the Act. . . ."). Because the Court

does not need to decide the issues raised by Corral to determine whether the

government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on certain counts of the complaint

that provide an independent basis for denaturalization, the Court denies Corral's request

for additional discovery and a hearing on those issues.4

Corral also argues that the Court should allow discovery and hold a hearing on

whether the present action is barred by laches, in light of the fact that the government

did not initiate denaturalization proceedings until seventeen years after Corral's

conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In order for

the defense of laches to apply, there must be proof of both (1) lack of diligence by the

party against whom the defense is asserted and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the

defense. Costello, 365 U.S. at 282; see also Navarro v. Neal, 716 F.3d 425, 429 (7th

Cir. 2013). Corral contends that the government should have to explain why it took

seventeen years to bring this suit and that he will be prejudiced if the INS agent who

conducted his naturalization interview in 2000 is no longer available to testify as a result

of the delay. The government primarily argues in response that the defense of laches

does not apply against the United States in a civil denaturalization action. Alternatively,

the government contends that a laches defense does not apply in this particular case

because Corral cannot show prejudice.

The Court need not decide whether laches is a valid defense to a

denaturalization action. Even if it is, and even if the seventeen-year lapse between

Corral's conviction and the initiation of the present suit reflects a lack of diligence, Corral

cannot establish that he has been prejudiced by this delay with respect to counts 1 or 2

4 As discussed below, the judgment granted by way of this decision is not final because

it does not dispose of all of the government's claims. The remaining claims will have to

be disposed of in some way in order to permit entry of a final judgment. If the

government pursues the remaining claims, Corral may renew his request for discovery.

of the complaint. Even if the INS agent who conducted Corral's naturalization interview

is, as Corral suggests, unavailable to testify, as previously explained, counts 1 and 2 of

the complaint do not depend on the agent's testimony or what happened during the

naturalization interview, and Corral has suggested no other source of prejudice. See

Costello, 365 U.S. at 282-83. For that reason, the Court concludes that additional

discovery and a hearing on Corral's claimed defense of laches is unwarranted.

Lastly, Corral contends that the government's attempt to revoke his citizenship

raises due process and equal protection concerns. Corral suggests that the

government's decision to target him for denaturalization after seventeen years is

constitutionally suspicious in light of the change in administration earlier in the year and

the likelihood that the government has not initiated proceedings against other

naturalized citizens who are known child sex abusers and felons. These allegations

are, on the present record, conjectural, and as such they are insufficient to warrant

discovery or a hearing. Corral's contention that to deny him a hearing on this issue

violates his due process rights is likewise without merit.

The Court therefore denies Corral's "Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint."

B. Government's motion for judgment on the pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on

the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). On a motion for

judgment on the pleadings, the Court considers the complaint, the answer, and any

written instruments attached as exhibits,5 and it views the facts in the light most

5 To the extent that Corral objects to the Court's reference to the unredacted versions of

the exhibits attached to the complaint, the Court notes that it may take into

consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings and may take

favorable to the non-moving party. See N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of

South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998); Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d

333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there is no

disputed issue of material fact and the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017).

As previously noted, the United States has moved for judgment on the pleadings

with respect to counts 1, 2, and 5 of the complaint.

1. Count 1 (illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral

character—crime involving moral turpitude)

The United States first contends that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on

count 1. The government argues that there is no genuine dispute that Corral illegally

procured his naturalization, because he committed a crime involving moral turpitude

within the statutory period during which he was required to establish good moral

character.

As previously noted, in November 2000—less than five months after becoming a

citizen—Corral pled guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in violation

of 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), and the state court entered judgment on the same. See Aug. 9,

2000 Indictment; Nov. 2, 2000 Plea Hearing Tr.; Nov. 2, 2000 Judgment. At that time,

section 5/12-16(b) read as follows: "The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual

abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18

years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member." 720

ILCS 5/12-16(b) (1998). The unredacted version of the indictment leaves no doubt that

judicial notice of matters of public record. See, e.g., Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Flynn,

863 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2017).

the victim was both a minor and one of Corral's family members. The government

contends that, by virtue of his guilty plea and subsequent conviction, Corral is

collaterally estopped from denying that he sexually abused a minor child who was also

a family member.

There is no question that federal courts are obligated to give state court

judgments the "same effect as they would have in the courts of the state rendering

them." Brown v. Green, 738 F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).

The Court is not persuaded, however, that it is appropriate to invoke the doctrine of

collateral estoppel in this context. In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 739 N.E.2d 445 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court6 explained

that "estoppel effect may be accorded to a prior criminal conviction in an appropriate

case." Id. at 387, 739 N.E.2d at 451. Three threshold requirements must be met before

the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied: (1) the issue decided in the prior

adjudication must be identical to the issue in the present suit; (2) there must have been

a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; and (3) the party against whom

estoppel is asserted must have been a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior

adjudication. Id. Additionally, the party against whom estoppel is asserted "must

actually have litigated the issue in the first suit and a decision on the issue must have

been necessary to the judgment in the first litigation." Id. Even when the threshold

requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied, "the doctrine should not be applied

unless it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party sought to be estopped." Id. at

6 "Federal courts must apply a state's preclusion rules to a state court's decision unless

the federal statute being sued under explicitly provides otherwise." Brown, 738 F.2d at

205-06.

388, 739 N.E.2d at 451.

The problem here is that the issue in question—whether Corral sexually abused

a minor child who was also a family member between June 1998 and February 2000—

was not "actually litigated" in Corral's criminal case. Rather, Corral pled guilty to the

offense, and the state court entered a judgment accordingly. Thus the doctrine of

collateral estoppel is not an appropriate fit in this case.

That, however, is not the end of the matter. Under Illinois law, "[a] judgment

rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter" is "binding

upon . . . all parties and privies to it, until it is reversed in a regular proceeding for that

purpose." Malone v. Cosentino, 99 Ill. 2d 29, 32, 457 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Such a judgment, "unless reversed or annulled in some

proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its validity,

verity, or binding effect . . . in any collateral action or proceeding." Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Work Zone Safety, Inc. v. Crest Hill Land Dev., LLC, 2015 IL

App (1st) 140088, ¶ 13, 29 N.E.3d 520, 526 ("'Once a court with proper jurisdiction has

entered a final judgment, that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal, or in one

of the traditional collateral proceedings now defined by statute'—namely, habeas

corpus, relief from judgment under section 2-1401, or a postconviction hearing.")

(quoting Malone, 99 Ill. 2d at 32-33, 457 N.E.2d at 397). The state court entered a final

judgment finding Corral guilty, pursuant to his plea, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse

in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b). See Nov. 2, 2000 Judgment; 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b)

(1998). That judgment is binding on Corral, and the government is entitled to rely on it

in this case. Corral may not collaterally attack the judgment in the present proceeding

(nor has he sought to attack it in state court via one of the mechanisms established

under state law). See, e.g., Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2014 IL App (2d) 130823,

¶ 29, 14 N.E.3d 1222, 1230; see also United States v. Ep, No. 02 CV 780, 2003 WL

22118926, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (noting that the court is "not in a position to

entertain" the defendant's collateral attack on the underlying judgment of criminal

conviction in denaturalization proceedings based in part on that conviction).

Corral contends that "the purported State court 'conviction' was void ab initio"

because count 1 of the indictment did not state either that the alleged victim was under

18 years of age or that Corral was a family member, both of which are elements of the

offense charged. Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 2. This is

incorrect. Although it is not possible to discern from the redacted version of the

indictment filed with the complaint that the victim was a minor or a family member of

Corral, the unredacted version of count 1 of the indictment states unequivocally that the

victim was both a minor and a family member.7 The Court notes that count 1 of the

indictment is less than clear in another way: it states that Corral committed this offense

"on or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000." Aug. 9, 2000 Indictment at 1.

Corral could not have committed the discrete act of aggravated criminal sexual abuse

described in count 1 "on or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000." Id.

(emphasis added). Nonetheless, "[t]he date of the offense is not an essential factor in

child sex offense cases." People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 27, 826 N.E.2d 485,

489 (2005) ("In cases involving the sexual abuse of a child, flexibility is permitted

regarding the date requirement necessary under the Code."). Accordingly, Corral's

7 Out of respect for the victim's privacy, the Court will not specify the familial relationship

in this opinion.

conviction is not void ab initio as Corral suggests. Nor is the lack of specificity regarding

the date of the crime material to the questions to be decided in the present case—the

entire period from June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000 falls within the statutory

period during which Corral was required to prove good moral character, because

although Corral filed his naturalization application in January 1999, he did not take the

oath of citizenship until June 2000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1).

The November 2000 judgment conclusively establishes that Corral committed the crime

of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor child who was also a family member

between June 1998 and February 2000.

The government contends that Corral illegally procured his June 2000

naturalization because the crime of which he was convicted is a crime involving moral

turpitude and he committed it during the statutory period during which he was required

to establish good moral character. An individual shall be found to lack good moral

character if, among other things, "during the period for which good moral character is

required to be established," he or she was convicted of or committed "a crime involving

moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense). . . ." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(3),

1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(i). The term "crime involving moral

turpitude" is not defined by statute. Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734, 737 (7th

Cir. 2013). The Board of Immigration Appeals has described a crime of moral turpitude

as "including 'conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile,

or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed

between persons or to society in general.'" Lagunas-Salgado, 584 F.3d at 710 (quoting

In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 240 (BIA 2007)). In determining whether a particular

crime involves moral turpitude, the Seventh Circuit asks "whether the act is ethically

wrong without any need for legal prohibition (acts wrong in themselves, or malum in se)

or only ethically neutral and forbidden only by positive enactment (acts wrong because

they are so decreed, or malum prohibitum)." Id. at 710-11 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

As previously noted, the relevant subsection of the criminal statute under which

Corral was convicted defined aggravated criminal sexual abuse as "an act of sexual

conduct with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and

the accused was a family member." 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (1998). At the time, the

statute defined "sexual conduct" as follows:

any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the

accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or

breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under

13 years of age, or any transfer or transmission of semen by the accused

upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim, for the

purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.

720 ILCS 5/12-12(e) (2000). The sexual abuse of a minor child—one who is a family

member, no less—is undoubtedly depraved and contrary to the accepted rules of

morality. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) ("The

sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral

instincts of a decent people."); United States v. Dave, No. 13 C 8867, 2015 WL

5590696, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2015) ("The inherent impropriety of sexual contact

between an adult and a child, which animates statutory rape laws, has led numerous

courts to conclude that even strict liability sex offenses involving minors are morally

turpitudinous."); United States v. Gayle, 996 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D. Conn. 2014)

("Sexual abuse against a minor constitutes a crime of moral turpitude because of its

inherently vile and depraved nature."); Ep, 2003 WL 22118926, at *5 ("[C]rimes

involving sexual abuse, especially those involving children, have generally been

recognized as crimes involving moral turpitude."); see also Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I.

& N. Dec. 826, 834 (BIA 2016) (a crime involving intentional sexual conduct by an adult

with a child is one that involves moral turpitude as long as the perpetrator knew or

should have known the victim was a minor). It is therefore plain to this Court that the

crime of which Corral was convicted is one of moral turpitude.

Because Corral committed this crime between June 1998 and February 2000,

there is likewise no question that he was precluded from establishing good moral

character for the relevant statutory period, which began in January 1994 (five years

before the filing date of Corral's application for naturalization) and did not end until he

took the oath of allegiance to the United States in June 2000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a);

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.10(a)(1), (b)(2)(i).

Accordingly, Corral was not eligible to become a naturalized citizen. The Court

concludes that there is no genuine factual dispute and that Corral's June 2000

naturalization was illegally procured based on his inability to establish good moral

character during the requisite period due to having committed a crime involving moral

turpitude. The government has proven by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this count. The Court therefore

grants the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to count 1

of the complaint.

2. Count 2 (illegal procurement of naturalization: lack of good moral

character—unlawful acts adversely reflecting on moral character)

The government has also moved for judgment on the pleadings on count 2. It

argues that even if Corral's crime had not been one involving moral turpitude, he

nonetheless would have been unable to establish good moral character during the

statutory period, because his aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction is an

unlawful act that adversely reflects upon his moral character.

An individual who commits "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon [his or her]

moral character" during the statutory period shall also be found to lack good moral

character unless he or she establishes "extenuating circumstances." 8 C.F.R. §

316.10(b)(3)(iii); see also United States v. Suarez, 664 F.3d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2011)

(according Chevron deference to 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)).

For the reasons explained above, the November 2000 judgment conclusively

establishes that Corral committed an unlawful act of aggravated criminal sexual abuse

between June 1998 and February 2000. There is no question that Corral's crime

adversely reflects upon his moral character, but the pleadings do not establish by clear,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence that there were no extenuating circumstances

that mitigate the severity of that crime. See Suarez, 664 F.3d at 662 ("Extenuating

circumstances are those which render a crime less reprehensible than it otherwise

would be, or 'tend to palliate or lessen its guilt.'") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth

Edition (1990)). The government has alleged that no such extenuating circumstances

exist. See Compl. ¶ 51 ("Corral has not established, and cannot establish, extenuating

circumstances with regard to the crime he committed, and he therefore cannot avoid the

regulatory bar on establishing good moral character found in 8 C.F.R. §

316.10(b)(3)(iii)."). But Corral denied this in his answer, see Def.'s Answer to Compl. ¶

51, and neither his guilty plea nor the state court judgment establish the absence of

extenuating circumstances, because that issue was not before the state court at the

time it accepted Corral's plea.

Because the pleadings do not clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly establish

the absence of extenuating circumstances, the government has not proven that it is

clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Corral would have been ineligible for

naturalization due to unlawful acts adversely reflecting on his moral character.

Accordingly, the government is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to

count 2 of the complaint.

3. Count 5 (procurement of naturalization by concealment of a material

fact or by willful misrepresentation)

Lastly, the government has moved for judgment on the pleadings on count 5.

The government contends that the pleadings clearly and unequivocally demonstrate

that Corral willfully misrepresented or concealed the material fact of his crime and that

he procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation.

Citizenship orders and certificates of naturalization are "procured by concealment

of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation" if four independent requirements are

met: (1) the naturalized citizen misrepresented or concealed some fact; (2) the

misrepresentation or concealment was willful; (3) the fact was material; and (4) the

naturalized citizen procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation. Kungys v.

United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has since explained,

this means that the government must show that that "it is 'fair to infer that the citizen

was actually ineligible'" for naturalization.8 United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 714

8 Like Maslenjak, Latchin dealt with section 1451(a)'s criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. §

1425(a). Latchin, 554 F.3d at 712. The Seventh Circuit explained, however, that the

(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring)); United

States v. Romero-Ramirez, No. 14-C-0522, 2015 WL 4492352, at *4 (E.D. Wis. July 23,

2015).

Corral has denied that the INS agent who conducted his May 2000 naturalization

interview asked him, in accordance with Question 15(a) in Part 7 of the Form N-400, if

he had ever knowingly committed any crime for which he had not been arrested. See

Def.'s Answer to Compl. ¶ 19. Corral further contends that the fact that the INS agent

made a number of red marks through that question on the Form N-400 raises a material

issue of fact regarding whether he actually asked Corral the question during the

interview. See Compl., Ex. E at 3. Corral argues that the government has not met its

burden to show that the INS agent asked the relevant question because the

government's affidavit of good cause for this denaturalization action was prepared by

someone other than the agent who interviewed Corral. See Compl., Ex. A at 9. The

government responds that even if Corral did not make a misrepresentation or willfully

conceal his crime during the naturalization interview, the pleadings nonetheless

constitute clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that Corral procured his

naturalization by concealment or willful misrepresentation of a material fact because he

did not disclose his crime when he first filed his signed naturalization application in

January 1999.

As this Court has already noted, however, the aggravated criminal sexual abuse

charge to which Corral pled guilty and of which he was subsequently convicted could

distinction between the two statutes was trivial on this point, because "both require a

material misrepresentation and procurement of citizenship." Id. at 713 n.3.

have taken place any time between June 9, 1998 and February 26, 2000. See Aug. 9,

2000 Indictment at 1. Thus, Corral could have committed the crime after he signed and

filed his naturalization application on January 14, 1999, in which case, his negative

answer to Question 15(a) on the Form N-400 would not necessarily have been a willful

concealment or misrepresentation. The Court therefore finds that there is a genuine

factual dispute regarding whether Corral procured his citizenship by willful

misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. For this reason, the Court denies

the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings on count 5 of the complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Corral's motion to dismiss / strike the

complaint (and his request for discovery and a hearing) [dkt. no. 8]. The Court grants

the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to count 1 of the

complaint, but denies the motion with respect to counts 2 and 5 [dkt. no. 10]. The case

is set for a status hearing on August 8, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. The government should be

prepared to discuss at that time how it proposes to deal with the remaining claims in its

complaint.

United States District Judge

Date: July 29, 2018

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