Williams v. Chicago Transit Authority

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TIRNELL WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 16 C 9072

)

vs. ) Judge Gary Feinerman

)

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tirnell Williams, currently a state prisoner, filed this pro se suit against the

Chicago Transit Authority (“CTA”) under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and Illinois

law. At the outset of the case, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

allowed Williams’s claims to proceed. Doc. 6. After being served, the CTA moved under Civil

Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. Doc. 27. The court granted the motion but allowed

Williams to replead. Docs. 67-68 (reported at 2017 WL 4467456 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2017)).

Williams filed a first amended complaint, Doc. 69, and a supplement, Doc. 71, and then was

allowed to file a second amended complaint, Docs. 77-78. The CTA now moves under Rule

12(b)(6) to dismiss the second amended complaint.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative

complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N.

Am. Power & Gas, LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider

“documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred

to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice,” along with additional facts set

forth in Williams’s brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts “are consistent

with the pleadings.” Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (7th Cir.

2013). The facts are set forth as favorably to Williams as those materials allow. See Pierce v.

Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth those facts at the pleading stage,

the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank,

N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).

On January 22, 2015, Williams, who is wheelchair-bound, boarded a train at the CTA

Green Line’s Ashland and Sixty-Third Rail Station. Doc. 77 at ¶¶ 4-5. After disembarking at

the State and Lake Rail Station, Williams discovered that the station did not have an elevator. Id.

at ¶ 7. He boarded another Green Line train and travelled one stop to the Clark and Lake Station,

where he disembarked and was again thwarted from descending to the ground level because the

elevator in his direction of travel was out of service. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.

Williams boarded the next train, a CTA Brown Line train, without the assistance of a

CTA employee or a “much needed ramp.” Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. “[T]he train space was not spacious

enough for [Williams] to move properly without obstruction.” Id. at ¶ 12. Because the operator

set the train in motion without waiting for Williams to secure his wheelchair, Williams “was

thrown to the floor with extreme impact” when the train began to move. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. During

all three legs of his trip, and purportedly in violation of the CTA’s internal policies, no CTA

employee affirmatively advised him about elevator availability at the State and Lake or Clark

and Lake Rail Stations or otherwise offered to assist him. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9, 11, 13, 15.

Discussion

As in its earlier opinion, familiarity with which is assumed, the court will refer to the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act together as the ADA, for “[o]ther than some minor differences

not relevant here, the statutes are coextensive.” CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743

F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis,

319 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ADA and the [Rehabilitation Act] … run along the

same path and can be treated in the same way … .”). The court will proceed to address

Williams’s various claims in turn.

First, as to the facilities at the State and Lake Station, the court takes judicial notice of the

historical fact that the State and Lake Station dates back to 1895. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“The

court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.”); BRUCE MOFFAT,

THE “L”: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHICAGO’S RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM 1888-1892 69 (1995). This

is important because, although the ADA requires new public transportation facilities to be

accessible to individuals in wheelchairs, see 42 U.S.C. § 12146, existing facilities need not be

wheelchair-accessible unless they are designated as “key stations,” id. § 12147(b), and Williams

does not allege that the State and Lake Station has been so designated. The ADA also provides

that, when a public entity alters an existing public transportation facility, it must ensure that the

altered portions of the facility are wheelchair accessible, see id. § 12147(a); 49 C.F.R. § 37.43,

but Williams does not allege that the CTA has made any alterations to the State and Lake Station

that would have triggered an obligation to install elevators. See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se.

Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A]lthough it does not generally mandate

that existing public transit facilities be made accessible, the ADA does impose specific

requirements on public entities which build new facilities or make ‘alterations’ to existing

facilities.”); 49 C.F.R. § 37.61 (providing that a public entity is not required “to make structural

changes to existing facilities in order to make the facilities accessible by individuals who use

wheelchairs, unless and to the extent required by § 37.43 (with respect to alterations) or §§ 37.47

or 37.51 (with respect to key stations)”).

Second, as discussed in the court’s earlier opinion, Williams’s inability to use the

elevator at the Clark and Lake Station because it was out of service on January 22, 2015 does not

violate the ADA because isolated outages are not actionable. 2017 WL 4467456, at *2-3.

Third, Williams has no viable ADA claim based on his allegations that CTA employees

at the Clark and Lake Station (or any other station on January 22, 2015) did not affirmatively

offer him assistance, or that the Brown Line train operator set the train in motion before

Williams had secured his wheelchair, because “[i]solated acts of negligence by a city

employee”—assuming that the alleged acts were in fact negligent—“do not come within the

ambit of discrimination against disabled persons proscribed by the ADA.” Foley v. City of

Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 930-31 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2004). Relatedly, the ADA does not require a

carrier to offer assistance to passengers who have not requested aid. See Arrington v. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 721 F. App’x 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that Amtrak was not statutorily

required to preemptively offer assistance to a passenger with a disability who fell when she

attempted to change seats by herself on a train); Martinez v. Walt Disney Co., 2012 WL

12913738, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that Disney World

should be required to train its employees to ask guests with disabilities if they need help when a

ride malfunctions because, “[i]n the absence of any indication that a disabled guest who becomes

stuck on a ride needs (or wants) special assistance, Disney’s frontline employees should not treat

them any differently than nondisabled guests”).

Fourth, Williams charges that CTA employees failed to follow the CTA’s internal

policies requiring they provide affirmative assistance to passengers. Even assuming its truth, this

allegation does not establish an ADA violation, as a government entity’s failure to follow its own

internal practices does not create an enforceable legal duty under the ADA. See McNelis v. Pa.

Power & Light Co., 867 F.3d 411, 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Absent proof of discrimination as

defined by the ADA, an employer’s failure to follow its own internal policies does not in itself

constitute a violation of the ADA.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Fifth, as to his ride on the Brown Line train, Williams alleges that “the train space was

not spacious enough for [him] to move properly without obstruction.” Doc. 77 at ¶ 12. In

response, the CTA notes that 49 C.F.R. § 38.57 requires a minimum clear space of 48 inches by

30 inches on rail vehicles, and it asserts that CTA railcars have 60 inches of maneuverable space.

Doc. 82 at 8. If the CTA’s facts were correct, it would appear to comply with the regulation.

But the dimensions of CTA railcars are not properly presented on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as

they are outside the four corners of the operative complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Any

factual issue regarding the maneuverable space in the Brown Line car must be resolved at

summary judgment or, in the event of a genuine and material dispute, at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(b) (“a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close

of all discovery”) (emphasis added).

Sixth, with respect to Williams’s state law negligence claim, the CTA argues that it had

no legal duty to affirmatively assist Williams in boarding the train or to give him unrequested

information about elevator availability. Doc. 82 at 10. Williams responds by citing written CTA

policies allegedly requiring such assistance, but an organization’s internal rules do not create a

legal duty under Illinois law where none otherwise exists. See Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 652 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Although Wal-Mart’s internal policy requires

employees to continuously monitor [the main aisles of the store], this goes above and beyond the

duties required of businesses by Illinois courts and does not create a new legal standard of

ordinary care requiring the same.”). Because Williams’s only response to the CTA’s argument

for dismissal of this aspect of his negligence claim is meritless, and because he has forfeited any

other argument in defense of those claims, they are dismissed. See G & S Holdings LLC v.

Cont’l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have repeatedly held that a party

waives an argument by failing to make it before the district court. That is true whether it is an

affirmative argument in support of a motion to dismiss or an argument establishing that dismissal

is inappropriate.”) (citations omitted).

Seventh, Williams claims that the Brown Line train operator was negligent in failing to

wait for him to secure his wheelchair before setting the train in motion. The CTA argues that

Williams’s negligent failure to lock his wheelchair, and not any alleged negligence by the train

operator, proximately cause his fall. Doc. 82 at 10-12. But the court cannot make that

determination on a motion to dismiss, where the plaintiff “receives the benefit of imagination, so

long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.” Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop., 875

F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is plausible that the train

operator pulled out of the station so quickly that Williams did not have time to secure his

wheelchair, in which case Williams would not have been negligent at all. Because Williams

would have a viable claim in that scenario, this aspect of his negligence claim survives dismissal.

Williams renews his request for attorney representation, asserting he needs counsel to

respond to the motion to dismiss because the prison law library is inadequate and he is not a

trained attorney. Docs. 89-90. As the Seventh Circuit has observed:

There is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation. District

courts may nonetheless ask lawyers to represent indigent litigants on a

volunteer basis. Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision: Almost

everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent

litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.

District courts are thus placed in the unenviable position of identifying, among

a sea of people lacking counsel, those who need counsel the most.

Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “In deciding whether to

request counsel, district courts must ask two questions: (1) [H]as the indigent plaintiff made a

reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2)

given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Ibid.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

Williams’s motions indicate that he has made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel, so the

court turns to the second question, which requires it to “consider[] both the complexity of the

case and [Williams’s] capabilities.” Ibid. The primary issues remaining in this case are

straightforward and largely factual: How much maneuverable space was there in the Brown Line

car? How quickly did the Brown Line train operator leave the station? Did the operator see that

Williams boarded the train in a wheelchair and was having trouble getting settled? Williams’s

lack of legal training and limited access to a law library will not be major hindrances in

addressing those questions. Moreover, Williams’s written submissions thus far have

competently set forth his version of the facts, and there is no reason to doubt that he can continue

in the same vein at summary judgment. “[T]he relevant substantive and procedural rules” can be

explained to Williams at status hearings and in orders.” Ibid. In sum, the court concludes that

Williams is capable of litigating this case on his own through the summary judgment stage. His

motion for representation accordingly is denied, without prejudice to renewal should the case

proceed to trial.

Williams also requests copies of each document filed in this case, asserting that his

cellmate threw out his legal materials after they accidentally became waterlogged. Doc. 92.

Williams’s in forma pauperis status does not entitle him to free copies of documents from the

court’s docket. See Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “[a]ll

§ 1915 has ever done is excuse pre-payment of the docket fees,” and noting that the litigant

remains responsible for paying those fees as well as any other costs of litigation). Thus,

Williams’s motion is denied; he must pre-pay the costs of obtaining the copies he has requested

before the Clerk may send them to him.

Conclusion

Williams’s motion for free copies is denied, and his motion for attorney representation is

denied without prejudice to renewal should the case proceed to trial. Williams’s federal claims,

other than the claim regarding the allegedly insufficient space on the Brown Line train, are

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion vy. Girl Scouts

of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a plaintiff whose

original complaint has been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be given at least one

opportunity to try to amend her complaint before the entire action is dismissed”). Williams’ state

law claims, other than the claim that the Brown Line train operator began to move the train

before Williams could secure his wheelchair, are also dismissed with prejudice for failure to state

aclaim. See ibid. The CTA shall answer the surviving portions of the operative complaint by

July 12, 2018.

June 21, 2018

United States District Judge