Brown v. Bryant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSE BROWN, }

)

Plaintiff, )

) _ No 15C 10445

Vv. )

) Chief Judge Rubén Castillo

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BRYANT, ) □

COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, and )

THOMAS J. DART, ) □

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jose Brown (“Plaintiff”), a detainee at the Cook County Department of Corrections,

brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer Bryant (“Bryant”),

County of Cook, Illinois (“Cook County”), and Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County (“Dart”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) based on Bryant’s alleged use of excessive force. (R. 45, Am.

Compl.) Before the Court is a joint motion by Cook County and Dart to dismiss the claims

asserted against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 56, Mot.; R. 45,

Am. Compl.) For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the motion. |

BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2015, he was engaged ina

physical altercation with another detainee in his cell, (R. 45, Am. Compl. ff 19-20.) A

correctional officer observed the altercation and alerted other officers over his two-way radio.

(id. § 21.) After the altercation ended and the other detainee returned to his own cell, Bryant

attived in Plaintiff's cell in response to the first officer’s alert. 7d. 4] 22.) Plaintiff alleges that

correctional officers typically take detainees to a medical facility after physical altercations are

reported. (/d.) Assuming that he would be taken to the medical facility, Plaintiff began to fully

clothe himself. (/d.) Upon entering Plaintiff's cell, however, Bryant allegedly pushed Plaintiff to

the ground, kneed him several times, and used racial slurs against him. (id. 23-24.) A struggle

between Plaintiff and Bryant ensued, after which Bryant was able to place Plaintiff's left hand in

hand cuffs. (Id. § 25.) With one of Plaintiff's hands cuffed behind his back, Bryant allegedly

struck Plaintiff in the face, causing his nose to bleed. Ud. § 26.) Bryant then proceeded to place

Plaintiff's right hand in handcuffs. fd.) At this point, other correctional officers arrived, and

escorted Plaintiff to Post 78 where he was interviewed by Correctional Officers Velez and

Durant. (Ud. J] 27-28.) After providing his account of the incident to Velez and Durant, Plaintiff

was taken to the hospital where he was treated for his injuries. dd. { 29.)

As aresult of the altercation, Plaintiff was disciplined with 35 days of segregation.

(Ud. { 30.) He subsequently filed a grievance against Bryant, which was denied. (Ud. {| 31.)

Plaintiff filed an appeal of the denial of his grievance, but his appeal was also denied. Ud. □ 32.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Cook County Department of Corrections (“DOC”) operates

under a “pervasive and long-standing ‘code of silence’” whereby correctional officers are

prevented from reporting misconduct by fellow officers. (id. Jf 33-34.) He alleges that this “code

of silence” is sanctioned by high-level officials of Cook County, including Dart, resulting in a

widespread failure to investigate and punish correctional officers’ use of excessive force. (Jd. □□

34.) The amended complaint further alleges that Dart’s office failed to enforce its own policies

designed to protect detainees. Ud.)

Plaintiff also alleges that the Cook County DOC maintains a policy of encouraging

correctional officers to falsely report that the use of force is justified as a response to assault or

threats of physical harm by detainees. (/d. □□□ 36-38.) Plaintiff alleges that these false reports

provide correctional officers with “blanket immunity from discipline” and perpetuate a culture in

which Cook County “turns a blind eye” to unlawful use of excessive force. Ud. § 38.) Plaintiff

alleges that the current grievance procedures as set forth in the Cook County DOC’s “General

Orders” do not adequately protect detainees, and additionally that Dart fails to adequately

enforce these policies. id. J 39-43.) The amended complaint also alleges that correctional

officers within the Cook County DOC do not receive adequate training, and that Dart’s policy

regarding investigations of excessive force is inadequate. (Ud. | 43.)

Plaintiff asserts a variety of claims against Bryant, Cook County, and Dart. @d.) In Count

I, Plaintiff asserts an excessive-force claim against Bryant under the Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. (/d. {] 44-51.) In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a failure-to-protect claim

against Dart under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (/d. ff] 52-62.) In Counts III

and IV, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Bryant for assault and battery under Illinois law. Ud. {ff

63-73.) More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Dart’s failure to protect is a consequence of a

systemic failure by Cook County and Dart to promulgate and enforce adequate policies and to

effectively monitor correctional officers. (Id. 57.) Plaintiff alleges that this failure is persistent

and widespread, and further, that Dart has been deliberately indifferent by failing to remedy this

failure. (id. 58-59.) In Count V, Plaintiff brings a Monell claim against Dart in his official

capacity. (Ud. {] 74-84.) Last, in Count V1 Plaintiff brings a statutory indemnification claim

against Cook County pursuant to 745 ILL. Comp. STAT. 10/9-102 for the recovery of any

judgements entered against Bryant or Dart. Ud. {J 85-88.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his initial pro se complaint against Bryant on November 18, 2015, (R. 1,

Compl.) On December 9, 2016, the Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. (R. 37,

Order.) On April 10, 2017, with counsel’s assistance, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint,

adding Cook County and Dart as co-Defendants. (R. 45, Am. Compl.) On August 25, 2017,

Bryant filed an answer. (R. 51, Answer.) On October 5, 2017, Cook County and Dart moved to

dismiss Counts II and V of Plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to state a claim, R. 56,

Mot. at 1.)

In their motion, Cook County and Dart argue that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a

federal claim against them in Counts IT and V. □□□ at 3.) As to Count II, the failure-to-protect

claim against Dart, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has fails to plausibly allege that Cook County

and Dart have maintained an official custom, policy, or practice which caused Plaintiff injury.

(ld. at 4-6.)

As to Count V, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has also failed to plausibly allege that Dart

was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety. /d. at 8.) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff must plausibly allege that Dart had personal knowledge that a substantial risk of harm to

Plaintiff existed on October 18, 2015, and that Dart personally failed to protect Plaintiff from

that risk. (id. at 8-9.) Because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to make it plausible

that Dart had a personal involvement in Plaintiffs alleged violation of constitutional rights,

Defendants move to dismiss Count V. (/d.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d

822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. Doe vy. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2015). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content which allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Ighal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 356 (2007)).

When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and

views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, inc.,

761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). However, mere conclusory statements are insufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss, and the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Individual-Capacity Claim Against Dart (Count ID

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim against Dart in his individual capacity should be

dismissed. (R. 56, Mot. at 7-9.) In order to state a claim against Dart, Plaintiff must plausibly

allege that Dart was personally responsible for the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). There is no theory of respondeat

superior in Section 1983 cases; however, an official satisfies the personal responsibility

requirement if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a

blind eye for feat of what they might see.” Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708

(7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Plaintiff must therefore allege factual content sufficient to

make it plausible that there is some causal connection or affirmative link between the action

complained of and the official being sued. Gentry, 65 F.3d at 561.

;

In order to state an individual-capacity claim against Dart, Plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts to make it plausible that Dart was (1) aware of substantial risk of known harm to Plaintiff,

and (2) that Dart failed to protect him from that danger. Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178, 181 (7th

Cir. 2011). This requires factual content sufficient to show that the alleged harm suffered by

Plaintiff was objectively serious, and that Dart was subjectively aware of “facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw that

inference.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015). “[C]learly localized”

allegations of random misconduct by Dart’s subordinates, where Dart is not alleged to have had

knowledge of the facts underlying the claim, would not give rise to individual liability under

Section 1983. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

sheriff and jail director could not be held personally liable for “localized,” non-systemic

violations such as the denial of requests to attend religious services, taking and destroying

property by jail staff, and ignoring requests for psychological treatment), However, where a

Plaintiff alleges “systematic claims” from “patterns of behavior” in numerous imcidents, that may

clear the hurdle and give rise to individual liability against a high-ranking prison official. /d.

at 1429-30,

Plaintiff alleges that Dart failed to act to investigate and punish correctional officers for

instances of excessive force and that he failed to enforce policies to protect Plaintiff and other

pre-trial detainees. (R. 45, Am. Compl. {ff 33-35.) Plaintiff further alleges that during his time at

the Cook County DOC, he endured “numerous physical attacks by other correctional officers . ..

has filed several grievances, with no results, except to engender further wrath from guards,

who administer further beatings in retaliation.” Ud. 45.)

Plaintiff pleads that the constitutional deprivation he suffered was a “consequence of the

systematic failure of .. . the Sheriff's Office to promulgate and enforce adequate policies, and

train, monitor, supervise, investigate, and discipline correctional officers” for instances of

excessive force, of which Dart had actual or constructive notice. (Id. §] 57-58.) Where officials

like Dart “can be expected to know of or participate in creating systemic, as opposed to

localized, situations,” they may be individually liable under Section 1983. Antonelli, 81 F.3d at

1429. Construing the allegations in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff has therefore plausibly alleged that

Dart may be individually liable for the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

il. Monell Claim Against Dart (Count V)

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against Dart in Count V.

(R. 56, Mot. at 4-6.) In order to state a viable Monell claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that

he suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights as a result of an official government custom,

policy, or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). This requirement is met where: (1) a municipality has an express policy that causes a

constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) there exists a widespread practice, that, although

unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a “custom or practice” with the

force of law; or (3) a person with final policymaking authority caused the constitutional injury.

Thomas y. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). Additionally, Plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to make it plausible that Dart was (1) aware of the risk created by the

policy, custom, or practice, and (2) failed to take appropriate steps to protect Plaintiff. Thomas,

604 F.3d at 303; Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that

plaintiff must allege that defendant was “deliberately indifferent as to known or obvious

consequences” of the custom or practice).

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional deprivation was the result of a widespread practice

“so well-settled and permanent so as to create an official custom or policy of the Cook County

jail.” (R. 45, Am. Compl. { 79.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “there was in place in the

Cook County Department of Corrections a custom or policy under which [correctional officers]

routinely caused serious injury and harm to detainees .. . in their custody.” Ud. J 78.) He also

alleges that a “code of silence” exists regarding the use of excessive force on pre-trial detainees,

and that it is both well-known and sanctioned by Dart. (/d. J] 33-35.) Plaintiff alleges that his

and other inmates’ constitutional rights were violated on numerous occasions with Dart’s alleged

knowledge and sanction of this custom. (/d. {{[ 77-81.) Last, Plaintiff alleges that Dart has

“turned a blind eye” and has shown deliberate indifference to the beatings, grievances, and

additional charges brought against pre-trial detainees who have been attacked by correctional

officers for non-penal purposes. (/d. [¥ 37-38, 48.)

In White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit concluded

that a plaintiff may adequately state a Monell claim based on their own experience—that is, a

plaintiff is “not required to identify every other or even one other individual” whose

constitutional rights have been violated by the complained-of policy, custom, or practice. White,

829 F.3d at 844. Although Plaintiff has not alleged any other specific instances where the policy

or practice caused constitutional violations, he need not do so in order to survive a motion to

dismiss. White, 829 F.3d at 844; see also Stokes v. Ewing, No. 16 C 10621, 2017 WL 2224882,

at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2017) (plaintiff's allegations that he was falsely arrested pursuant to a

“custom, practice, and policy” that “promoted illegal arrests of innocent individuals” sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss under White); Zinn v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL

783001, at *6-7 (ND, Ill. Mar. 1, 2017) (holding that plaintiffs sufficiently pled a Monell claim

;

under White where plaintiffs alleged that they suffered a constitutional deprivation “pursuant to

[defendant village’s] widespread practice of illegally and unconstitutionally seizing private

property” and charging monetary fees for its return (citation omitted)); Williams v. City of

Chicago, No. 16-cv-8271, 2017 WL 3169065, at *9 (N.D. ILL. July 26, 2017) “Under the binding

precedent set by White ... Plaintiff's allegations of a pattern or practice of ignoring complaints

of discrimination are enough to survive a motion to dismiss.”). The Court therefore finds that

Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded factual content in Count V to survive dismissal.

Il. Excessive-Force Claim Against Cook County and Dart

In their motion to dismiss, Cook County and Dart also moved to dismiss Count I insofar

as it asserted an excessive-force claim against them. Plaintiff, in response to the motion,

conceded that “Bryant is the only proper defendant for the excessive force claim in Count I,” (R.

62, Resp. at 3), and sought leave to file a second amended complaint clarifying that Count I is

asserted only against Bryant, (see R. 62-1, Proposed Second Am, Compl. {| 44). Therefore, the

motion to dismiss Count I against Cook County and Dart is denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cook County and Dart’s motion to dismiss (R. 56) is

- DENIED. The parties are directed to exhaust all remaining possibilities to settle this case in light

of this opinion, and the settlement conference set for May 30, 2018, at 10:15 a.m. will stand.

Chief Judge Rubén Castillo

United States District Court

Dated: May 14, 2018