Frederickson v. County of Will

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

REX ALLEN FREDERICKSON,

Plaintiff, No. 11 C 3484

v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin

DETECTIVE TIZOC LANDEROS AND

DETECTIVE JAMES SCARPETTA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rex Frederickson alleges that he was prevented from registering as a sex

offender by Detectives Tizoc Landeros and James Scarpetta of the Joliet Police

Department in violation of rights provided by the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants have moved for summary

judgment. R. 207. For the following reasons, that motion is granted in part and

denied in part.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all

of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013).

To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than “a mere

scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).

Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not

return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

Background

Frederickson is a convicted sex offender. R. 217 ¶ 38. Sex offenders in Illinois

are required to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”),

730 ILCS 150.1 Frederickson was also homeless during the time period relevant to

this motion. R. 217 ¶ 4.

I. SORA

SORA requires sex offenders to personally register with the relevant law

enforcement agency for the jurisdiction in which they reside. 730 ILCS 150/3.

Registration requires the offender to provide certain information, including

residential and work addresses. Id. Offenders with a fixed address are required to

register only once a year, while homeless offenders must register weekly and report

each place they have stayed during the prior seven days. 730 ILCS 150/6. Any

offender who violates “any” provision of SORA is guilty of a felony, and will be

1 SORA applies to two classes of convicted felons: the general class “sex offenders”

and the subset “sexual predators.” Frederickson’s precise classification under the

statute is “sexual predator.” Frederickson’s particular classification is irrelevant to

this motion, so the Court will use the more generic terms “sex offender” or

“offender.”

“required to serve a minimum period of 7 days confinement in the local county jail.”

730 ILCS 150/10.

Law enforcement agencies record SORA registration information in the Law

Enforcement Agency Data System (“LEADS”), which is a statewide information

database. R. 208 at 6 n.3. The jurisdiction where a sex offender is registered is said

to have “ownership” of the offender’s LEADS file. R. 217 ¶ 19. Only the jurisdiction

that has “ownership” of a LEADS file can update the LEADS file. See R. 209-1 at 21

(77:20-22); R. 196 at 23 (82:20–83:2), at 23-24 (85:10–86:2).

SORA contemplates that offenders can have both “residences” and

“temporary domiciles,” and that offenders must register in both jurisdictions.2

“[T]he place of residence or temporary domicile is defined as any and all places

where the sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of 3 or more days

during any calendar year.” 730 ILCS 150/3 (emphasis added). Any offender who

plans to be away from his registered residence for more than three days must report

that absence to the law enforcement agency where he resides within three days.3

The offender must also report to register with the relevant law enforcement agency

in the location he is visiting within three days. See footnote 2 above. Since the

statute requires registration in more than one jurisdiction when an offender has a

2 “The sex offender . . . shall register . . . with the chief of police in the municipality

[or sheriff in the county] in which he or she resides or is temporarily domiciled for a

period of time of 3 or more days.” 730 ILCS 150/3.

3 “A sex offender or sexual predator who is temporarily absent from his or her

current address of registration for 3 or more days shall notify the law enforcement

agency having jurisdiction of his or her current registration, including the itinerary

for travel, in the manner provided in Section 6 of this Act for notification to the law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction of change of address.” 730 ILCS 150/3.

“temporary domicile” in addition to a “residence,” but a LEADS file is only ever

“owned” by one jurisdiction, it is unclear how a “temporary domicile” should be

recorded in LEADS.

An offender who plans to permanently move his residence must report this to

both his old and new jurisdictions of residence within three days of the move.4

However, Bolingbrook’s records clerk and Bolingbrook Detective Talbot testified

that the requirement to report a move to an offender’s old jurisdiction is often not

enforced. R. 246 ¶¶ 26, 28. Rather, the new jurisdiction simply calls the old

jurisdiction to report that an offender has moved into their jurisdiction and the old

jurisdiction transfers ownership of the LEADS file to the new jurisdiction. Id.

Law enforcement agencies responsible for recording SORA information are

also responsible for verifying that information “at least once per year.” 730 ILCS

150/8-5. The statute provides assistance to law enforcement agencies to “locate and

apprehend” offenders “who fail to respond to address-verification attempts or who

otherwise abscond from registration.” Id.

II. Frederickson’s Case

Frederickson began registering as a sex offender in Joliet in 2004. R. 246 ¶ 1.

At that time, Detective Moises Avila was responsible for taking SORA registrations

4 “[I]f the offender leaves the last jurisdiction of residence, he or she, must within 3

days after leaving register in person with the new agency of jurisdiction. If any

other person required to register under this Article changes his or her residence

address, place of employment, [etc.] . . . he or she shall report in person, to the law

enforcement agency with whom he or she last registered, his or her new address,

change in employment, [etc.] . . . within the time period specified in Section 3.” 730

ILCS 150/6.

in Joliet. Id. ¶ 2. Frederickson never had a conflict with Detective Avila. Id.

Detective Avila never refused an update Frederickson reported to his SORA

information. Id. ¶ 3.

In 2006, Detective Landeros took charge of taking SORA registrations for

Joliet. R. 217 ¶ 8. Beginning in 2008, Frederickson began asking Landeros to

correct the name of his employer in his SORA registration from “Greg’s Auto Body”

to “Greg’s Body Shop,” and to have the registration reflect the fact that he was

employed as a contractor. R. 246 ¶ 5. Detective Landeros did not make these

changes to Frederickson’s registration. See R. 209-1 at 52-53 (201:12–204:4).

Frederickson testified that sometime in late 2007 or early 2008 he also

informed Detective Landeros that he planned to leave Joliet. According to

Frederickson, Landeros responded by threatening to arrest him. See R. 209-4 at 24

(300:18–302:4).

On May 15, 2008, Landeros arrested Frederickson and charged him with

failure to register. R. 246 ¶ 10. On June 1, 2009, Frederickson was acquitted of this

charge. Id.

On November 23, 2010, when Frederickson entered the police station to

register, Detective Landeros arrested Frederickson on a charge of driving on a

suspended license, based on Detective Landeros witnessing Frederickson driving a

week earlier. R. 246 ¶¶ 11-12. Detective Avila and another Joliet police officer

deposed in this case testified that, although they had made more than 100 arrets for

driving on a suspended license, they had never made such an arrest when the

person charged was not actually driving a car at the time of the arrest. See R. 209-8

at 32-33 (121:21–122:4);R. 216-5 at 18 (216:3-11).

Frederickson testified that on January 26, 2011, he again told Detective

Landeros he planned to leave Joliet and move to Bolingbrook. According to

Frederickson, Detective Landeros responded by again threatening to arrest

Frederickson. R. 209-4 at 23 (297:1–298:19). Frederickson testified that on February

2, 2011, he wrote “all rights reserved” on his Joliet registration because Detective

Landeros had told him that he would be arrested if he attempted to register in any

other jurisdiction. R. 209-3 at 17 (59:8-24).

On February 8, 2011, Frederickson applied for a job in Bolingbrook. R. 246 ¶

18. The next day, he attempted to register at the Bolingbrook Police Department. R.

246 ¶ 19. Bolingbrook accepted his registration form. Id. ¶ 20.

Upon receipt of Frederickson’s registration form, the Bolingbrook records

clerk contacted the Joliet Police Department to request release of Frederickson’s

LEADS file. R. 246 ¶ 21. Although the records clerk does not remember who she

spoke with, her notes indicate that she spoke with Detective Landeros. R. 246 ¶ 22.

The records clerk testified that the person she spoke to from Joliet told her that

“they knew [Frederickson] was still living in Joliet,” and his residence was “under

investigation.” R. 196 at 18-19 (65:19– 66:1), 38 (145:5-9). The records clerk testified

further that Joliet refused to transfer Frederickson’s LEADS file to Bolingbrook. R.

196 at 18-19 (65:17–66:1). The Bolingbrook records clerk testified that prior to

Frederickson’s case she had encountered about 20 instances of the LEADS file for

an offender registered in Bolingbrook being owned by a different jurisdiction, and in

every instance the jurisdiction transferred the LEADS file upon request. R. 246 ¶

26. A Bolingbrook detective and another Bolingbrook administrator responsible for

LEADS files also testified that they could not recall a single instance of a

jurisdiction refusing to transfer a LEADS file. R. 246 ¶ 28.

Detective Landeros also spoke to a Bolingbrook detective about Frederickson

during the time period Frederickson was working in Bolingbrook and attempting to

register there. R. 246 ¶ 30. Detective Landeros testified that he “advised

Bolingbrook that [Frederickson] was a homeless sex offender employed in Joliet,

and . . . his LEADS file belonged to the Joliet Police Department.” R. 246 ¶ 24. The

Bolingbrook detective testified that Detective Landeros told him that Frederickson

was not actually residing in Bolingbrook and was trying to “pull the wool over

[Bolingbrook’s] eyes,” and that Detective Landeros was investigating the situation.

R. 246 ¶ 31.

Yet, Detective Landeros also testified that he had no reason to believe that

Frederickson was not residing in Bolingbrook, see R. 209-1 at 55 (210:15-19);5 R.

209-2 at 5 (228:23–229:5),6 and that he could not think of a reason to prevent a

5 Q: Did you have any reason to believe that Mr. Frederickson wasn’t

homeless in Bolingbrook?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: And you didn’t have any reason at the time?

A: No.

6 Q: You previously testified on the first day of this deposition that you had

no reason to believe Mr. Frederickson was not homeless in

Bolingbrook, correct?

[Objection made: “I don’t believe he’s ever said that.”]

LEADS file from being placed into moving status, see R. 209-2 at 5 (226:24–227:5).7

He also testified that he registers homeless offenders “regardless” of whether the

information they provide is accurate. R. 209-1 at 32 (121:5-14).8

After the Bolingbrook detective’s conversation with Detective Landeros, an

email was circulated among the Bolingbrook Police Department stating that

Bolingbrook should “not take [Frederickson’s] registration due to the fact he lives in

Joliet he is not homeless.” R. 246 ¶ 34. The email also claimed that “[Joliet Police

Department] has alerted us to the fact that this guy doesn’t want to pay their

mandatory fee so he is going to try and scam us into doing it.” Id.

Between February 9 and 16, 2011, Frederickson worked in Bolingbrook on

three or four different days and was in the process of moving his belongings from

Joliet to Bolingbrook. Id. ¶ 36. On February 16, Frederickson was in Joliet picking

up some of his tools. Id. ¶ 37. He was unsure whether he would be able to get a ride

back to Bolingbrook that day, so he registered at the Joliet Police Department that

morning. Id. ¶ 37. When he was able to get a ride to Bolingbrook that afternoon,

A: Correct.

7 Q: Have you ever prevented a LEADS file from being placed into a moving

status?

A: No.

Q: And there’s no reason that you would do that, correct?

A: Yeah, I can’t think of one.

8 Q: And if the information they provided on where they had been the

previous week was accurate you would register them?

A: I would register them regardless, it’s just whether they’re getting

arrested for giving the false information.

Q: Okay. So you would always register them, but if they provided false

information you would arrest them?

A: Correct.

Frederickson also reported to the Bolingbrook Police Department to register. Id. ¶

38. Bolingbrook refused to register Frederickson and ordered him to return to Joliet.

Id. ¶ 40. Despite Bolingbrook’s refusal to register him, Frederickson resided in

Bolingbrook from February 16 through 23, living in a truck parked there. Id. ¶ 43.

Frederickson again attempted to register in Bolingbrook on February 23. Id.

¶ 44. Bolingbrook demanded that Frederickson provide the locations he planned to

stay, even though its regulations do not require such information. Id. ¶¶ 44-45.

When Frederickson declined to provide this information, he was refused

registration and told to return to Joliet. Id. ¶ 46. Frederickson attempted to file a

complaint at Bolingbrook Village Hall. Id. ¶ 47. The Clerk refused to accept the

complaint and Frederickson was escorted out of the building by Bolingbrook police

officers. Id. ¶ 49. Frederickson is the only person Bolingbrook has ever refused to

register. Id. ¶ 41.

Since he was unable to register in Bolingbrook, Frederickson quit his job

there. Id. ¶ 50. He testified that he then attempted to register in Joliet on February

28, March 1, 2, and 3. Defendants contend that Frederickson appeared at the Joliet

Police Department on those days but refused to register. See R. 217 ¶¶ 99-102. On

March 3, Frederickson was arrested for failing to register. Id. ¶ 102. He was

convicted on this charge and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 104-05.

Analysis

I. Detective Scarpetta

As an initial matter, summary judgment is granted in favor of Detective

Scarpetta. Frederickson claims he was prevented from registering as a sex offender

in Bolingbrook, which eventually led to his arrest when he returned to Joliet. The

only allegations against Detective Scarpetta are that he received a grievance from

Frederickson about Detective Landeros’s conduct during the relevant time period,

and that Detective Scarpetta failed to adequately investigate Frederickson’s

grievance. Even assuming that Detective Scarpetta failed to properly investigate

Frederickson’s grievance, the Court cannot see how this failure proximately caused

the injury at issue in this case, i.e., that Frederickson was prevented from

registering in Bolingbrook.

Frederickson’s causation theory might be that if Detective Scarpetta had

conducted a proper investigation, Detective Landeros might have been prevented

from thwarting Frederickson’s attempt to register in Bolingbrook. But there is no

evidence that Detective Scarpetta intended to prevent Frederickson from

registering in Bolingbrook, or that he conspired with Detective Landeros to do so.

His failure to conduct an adequate investigation (to the extent that allegation is

true) is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Detective Scarpetta

had such intent. To the extent an inadequate investigation may have contributed to

Landeros’s ability to violate Frederickson’s constitutional rights, that connection is

too attenuated for a reasonable jury to find that Detective Scarpetta has any

liability in this case.

Frederickson also alleges that Detective Scarpetta was the person who

refused his registration when he first returned from Bolingbrook to register in Joliet

on February 28. To the extent Frederickson claims that this alleged refusal violated

his due process and equal protection rights, that claim is foreclosed by

Frederickson’s criminal conviction for failure to register during that particular time

period, and his conviction’s affirmance on appeal. A finding that Detective Scarpetta

improperly refused Frederickson’s registration attempt on February 28 would

undermine Frederickson’s criminal conviction that he was responsible for his failure

to register, and such a claim is not cognizable under the doctrine of Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Therefore, the remaining question in this case is

whether a reasonable jury could find that Detective Landeros improperly stymied

Frederickson’s attempt to register in Bolingbrook in violation of the Due Process or

Equal Protection Clauses.

II. Detective Landeros

Frederickson alleges that Detective Landeros’s conduct violated (1) his

substantive due process right to intrastate travel; (2) his procedural due process

right to register under SORA; and (3) his right to equal protection of the laws. The

Court finds that Detective Landeros is entitled to qualified immunity on

Frederickson’s substantive and procedural due process claims, so we start there.

A. Due Process (Counts I & II)

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2017). In other words, “[a]

state official is protected by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows: (1) that

the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit recently reviewed the standard for determining whether

a right is clearly established:

“To be clearly established at the time of the challenged

conduct, the right’s contours must be sufficiently clear

that every reasonable official would have understood that

what he is doing violates that right . . . .” Gustafson v.

Adkins, 803 F.3d 883, 891 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rabin

v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2013)). “[T]he crucial

question [is] whether the official acted reasonably in the

particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff

v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).

Plaintiffs need not point to an identical case finding

the alleged violation unlawful, “but existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308,

(2015) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

“[W]e look first to controlling Supreme Court precedent

and our own circuit decisions on the issue.” Jacobs v. City

of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000). If no

controlling precedent exists, “we broaden our survey to

include all relevant caselaw in order to determine

‘whether there was such a clear trend in the caselaw that

we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the

right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of

time.’” Id. (quoting Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881

F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1989)). In the absence of

controlling or persuasive authority, plaintiffs can

demonstrate clearly established law by proving that the

defendant’s conduct was “so egregious and unreasonable

that . . . no reasonable [official] could have thought he was

acting lawfully.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, Illinois, 705

F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Jacobs, 215 F.3d at

767 (“In some rare cases, where the constitutional

violation is patently obvious, the plaintiffs may not be

required to present the court with any analogous

cases . . . .”).

Before we can determine if the law was clearly

established, “the right allegedly violated must be defined

at the appropriate level of specificity.” Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). “The Supreme Court has

‘repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established

law at a high level of generality.’” Volkman v. Ryker, 736

F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742); see, e.g., White v.

Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix,

136 S. Ct. at 308; City & County of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775-76 (2015). Instead, “[t]he

dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of

particular conduct is clearly established.’” Mullenix, 136

S. Ct. at 308 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). In other

words, “the clearly established law must be

‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White, 137 S. Ct.

at 552 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)); see also Volkman, 736 F.3d at 1090 (“[T]he

Seventh Circuit has long held that ‘the test for immunity

should be whether the law was clear in relation to the

specific facts confronting the public official when he

acted.’” (quoting Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308

(7th Cir. 1987))).

Kemp, 877 F.3d at 351-52.

1. Substantive Due Process (Count I)

With regard to Frederickson’s substantive due process claim, the right to

intrastate travel is not clearly established. Although the right to interstate travel is

well known, neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit have addressed

whether intrastate travel is a fundamental right, see Mem. Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty.,

415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974); Schor v. City of Chicago, 576 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.

2009), and at least one circuit court has held that it is not. See Wright v. City of

Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901-03 (5th Cir. 1975). More recently, some circuits have

held that there is such a right. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498

(6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the right to intrastate travel is “an everyday right, a

right we depend on to carry out our daily life activities. It is, at its core, a right of

function”); Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Though the

Supreme Court has dealt only with the right to travel between states, our Court has

held that the Constitution also protects the right to travel freely within a single

state.”). And the Seventh Circuit has cited at least one these cases with implicit

approval. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing

Johnson). This authority is sufficiently varied and uncertain that the Court cannot

find there was an established right to intrastate travel during the relevant time

period. Therefore, the Court finds that Detective Landeros has qualified immunity

on Frederickson’s substantive due process claim, and the Court grants summary

judgment to Detective Landeros on Count I.

2. Procedural Due Process (Count II)

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a

protected liberty or property interest. Frederickson argues that he has a liberty

interest in registering under SORA. Detective Landeros does not dispute this, but

argues that Frederickson did not have “a right to register where he wanted to

register . . . without having to first ‘register out’ of Joliet.” R. 208 at 12. While SORA

does impose a requirement to “register out,” as Defendants put it, there is evidence

that this requirement is not enforced as long as the offender reports for registration

in his new jurisdiction. The testimony in the case shows that law enforcement

agencies in an offender’s old jurisdiction always comply with a request from the law

enforcement agency in the new jurisdiction to transfer the LEADS file even when

the offender failed to “register out.” Moreover, SORA provides a three-day grace

period to “register out,” and there is genuine question of fact as to whether the three

days were up when Detective Landeros convinced Bolingbrook to block

Frederickson’s registration. There is also a genuine question of fact as to whether

Frederickson attempted to “register out,” as he testified that he told Detective

Landeros he planned to move out of Joliet, to which Detective Landeros responded

with a threat of arrest.

Courts in this district have held that preventing a homeless offender from

registering under SORA constitutes a procedural due process violation. See Derfus

v. City of Chicago, 42 F. Supp. 3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Saiger v. City of Chicago, 37

F. Supp. 3d 979 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Johnson v. City of Chicago, 2016 WL 5720388 (N.D.

Ill. Sept. 30, 2016). However, those cases were decided after the events in this case

occurred, and those courts held that the liberty interest in registering under SORA

was not clearly established during the relevant time period. Frederickson concedes

as much. See R. 215 at 37 (“[T]he right of a Homeless Offender to register under

SORA was [not] ‘clearly established’ as of February 2011[.]”).

Frederickson also argues that “Defendants’ conduct, motivated by ill will, in

placing Frederickson in legal jeopardy by refusing to allow him to register without

any rational purpose in doing so” is “patently violative” of Frederickson’s rights,

such that qualified immunity is not appropriate. R. 215 at 37. But procedural due

process is not concerned with the defendant’s motivation.9 And neither is qualified

immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (“[W]e conclude

today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government

officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We

therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.”); Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 538 (7th

Cir. 2015) (“Harlow purged qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective

components, meaning that the defendants’ actual state of mind or knowledge of the

9 In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the Court must determine (1)

whether the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property

interest, and (2) how much process was due. Leavell v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 600

F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2010). Next, to determine how much process is due, the

Court “must balance three factors: ‘[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected

by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional

or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’” Schepers v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep't

of Corr., 691 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 335 (1976)). The defendant’s motive is not relevant to any of these elements.

law is irrelevant to whether the asserted conduct would have been legally

reasonable.”). To the extent motive is a part of the equation in this case, it must be

relevant to whether the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that

Detective Landeros committed a constitutional violation. As is discussed further

below, motive or “personal animus” is relevant to the elements of Frederickson’s

equal protection claim. But it is not relevant to the elements of Frederickson’s due

process claims, and is not relevant to whether the due process rights at issue in

those claims were clearly established or the alleged conduct was “patently violative”

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Therefore, the Court holds that Detective Landeros is entitled to qualified

immunity on Frederickson’s procedural due process claim, and grants summary

judgment to Detective Landeros on Count II.

B. Equal Protection (Count III)

As discussed, the Court holds that the rights at issue in Frederickson’s due

process claims were not “clearly established” during the relevant time period. This

holding is dispositive of those claims without the need for a determination on the

merits of whether Detective Landeros violated Frederickson’s due process rights. As

is discussed below, however, the Courts holds that Frederickson’s equal protection

right to “police protection uncorrupted by personal animus” is clearly established.

See Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 496 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, it is necessary to first

address whether a reasonable jury could find that Detective Landeros violated that

right.

1. Merits

Frederickson claims that Detective Landeros violated his equal protection

rights by thwarting his attempt to register in Bolingbrook. The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme

Court has said that this “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,

439 (1985). To prevail on an equal protection claim, plaintiffs usually show that

they are members of a “suspect class” or that they were denied a “fundamental

right.” Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). In the absence of

either scenario, however, a plaintiff can show that the defendant discriminated

against the plaintiff in particular—a so called “class-of-one” claim—which require

the plaintiff to show that “the plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently

from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.” Id. To make such a showing, the “plaintiff must negate any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Jackson v. Village of

Western Springs, 612 Fed. App’x. 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2015). Whether the plaintiff has

succeeded in proving that no “reasonably conceivable state of facts” exists is a

question for the jury. See Knaus v. Town of Ledgeview, 561 Fed. App’x 510, 514 (7th

Cir. 2014); RJB Props., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 468 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th

Cir. 2006).

Detective Landeros contends that his actions were reasonable because it was

his:

obligation . . . to keep track of [Frederickson’s]

whereabouts. If [Frederickson] could register in

Bolingbrook one week, Downers Grove the next, and

Peoria the following week, all because he lacks a fixed

residence, without ever notifying the agency charged with

jurisdiction over him as to his whereabouts, the purpose

of the statute would be defeated.

R. 208 at 18. On the basis of this logic, Detective Landeros appears to argue both

that (1) he had a duty to prevent Frederickson from registering in Bolingbrook

because he believed Frederickson continued to reside in Joliet, see R. 235 at 7

(“Landeros only delayed the immediate transfer of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

LEADS file because of suspicions over the legitimacy of plaintiff’s move to

Bolingbrook.”); and (2) Frederickson’s failure to “register out” of Joliet before

moving to Bolingbrook was the real reason he wasn’t able to register in Bolingbrook,

see R. 235 at 14 (“[P]laintiff had the keys to any registration problem he faced . . . .

In light of plaintiff’s own failure to register out of Joliet within three days of

registration in Bolingbrook, Landeros’[s] follow-up investigation certainly was

rational.”). Neither argument is sufficient to support summary judgment in

Detective Landeros’s favor.

First, Detective Landeros cites no authority supporting his contention that he

was under an obligation to investigate Frederickson’s residence prior to transferring

ownership of his LEADS file to Bolingbrook. Although law enforcement agencies are

tasked with verifying the information reported by offenders, the statute requires

only that this verification occur “at least once a year.” Nothing in the statute

required Detective Landeros to verify the particular report Frederickson made to

Bolingbrook. Further, Detective Landeros’s argument that he was required to

investigate contradicts his own testimony that he had no reason to question

Frederickson’s report of residence in Bolingbrook. Additionally, an offender has a

three-day grace period to report new addresses. There is a genuine question of fact

as to whether Frederickson was in violation of this requirement, such that an

investigation would be warranted. In general, there is a question of fact regarding

whether Frederickson was attempting to evade the registration requirements.

Rather than indicating evasion, the evidence tends to show that Frederickson was

continually providing information to both Joliet and Bolingbrook about where he

was residing and working.

Nevertheless, rather than simply recording Frederickson’s reports, Detective

Landeros took it upon himself to confirm Frederickson’s residence. This quest then

led Landeros to refuse to transfer Frederickson’s LEADS file and to convince

Bolingbrook to refuse Frederickson’s registration. Based on this evidence, a

reasonable jury could find that there is no rational explanation for Detective

Landeros to refuse to transfer ownership of Frederickson’s LEADS file and

otherwise advise Bolingbrook not to register him, such that Landeros violated

Frederickson’s equal protection rights.

Second, Detective Landeros cites no authority supporting his contention that

Frederickson’s failure to “register out” from Joliet was a basis to prevent him from

registering in Bolingbrook or threaten him with arrest. Although SORA requires an

offender to report a change in residence to his prior registering law enforcement

agency, Bolingbrook officials testified that this requirement is regularly unenforced

as long as the offender presents himself for registration in the new jurisdiction.

Even Detective Landeros testified that he normally does not refuse a request to

transfer LEADS files or to register offenders who report. In any case, Frederickson

testified that he told Detective Landeros that he planned to move out of Joliet and

that Detective Landeros responded by threatening to arrest him. Whether or not

Detective Landeros threatened to arrest Frederickson, it is clear that Detective

Landeros decided not to believe Frederickson’s assertion of his intent to move.

Having rejected Frederickson’s attempt to report his move, Detective Landeros

cannot now claim that his efforts to prevent Frederickson’s registration in

Bolingbrook were justified by Frederickson’s failure to withdraw from Joliet. A jury

could reasonably find that Frederickson acted reasonably by leaving Joliet to

attempt to register in Bolingbrook and avoid Detective Landeros’s irrational

application of SORA.

Additionally, SORA’s requirement to report a move is largely implicated here

only because Frederickson is homeless. Joliet and Bolingbrook are only about 15

miles apart. A person with a permanent residence in that area, who also owned a

car, easily could leave a job in Joliet and take a job in Bolingbrook without the need

to change residences, and register such a change under SORA. But since

Frederickson is homeless, his “residence” essentially travels with him, such that

any change in his personal circumstances triggers greater SORA reporting

requirements than for an offender with a permanent residence. And more pertinent

to the facts of this case, a change in residence also triggers the need to transfer

ownership of a LEADS file, whereas a change in employer does not. Given the

evidence that law enforcement agencies normally do not enforce the “register out”

requirement, a reasonable jury could find that Detective Landeros should have been

cognizant of this circumstance and should have been satisfied with Frederickson’s

attempt to register in Bolingbrook despite his failure to “register out” of Joliet.

Detective Landeros also argues that Frederickson’s equal protection claim

must fail because Frederickson has failed to allege a similarly situated

“comparator” who was treated differently than Frederickson—i.e., a homeless

offender who failed to register out of Joliet whose LEADS file was nevertheless

transferred to the new law enforcement agency having jurisdiction. “Normally, a

class-of-one plaintiff will show an absence of rational basis by identifying some

comparator—that is, some similarly situated person who was treated

differently.” Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015). But, “[i]f

animus is readily obvious, it seems redundant to require that the plaintiff show

disparate treatment in a near exact, one-to-one comparison to another individual.”

Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing a grant of

summary judgment to defendants on a class-of-one equal protection claim for lack of

comparator evidence); see also Geinsoky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 748 (7th

Cir. 2012) (“But in this case, requiring [the plaintiff] to name a similarly situated

person who did not receive twenty-four bogus parking tickets in 2007 and 2008

would not help distinguish between ordinary wrongful acts and deliberately

discriminatory denials of equal protection. Such a requirement would be so simple

to satisfy here that there is no purpose in punishing its omission with

dismissal. Here, the pattern and nature of defendants’ alleged conduct do the work

of demonstrating the officers’ improper discriminatory purpose.”). As discussed,

Frederickson has shown that a request for transfer of a LEADS file is not normally

rejected; that the requirement to first register out of an old jurisdiction before

registering in a new jurisdiction is not enforced; and Detective Landeros testified

that he had no reason to question Frederickson’s report of residence in Bolingbrook.

This is strong enough evidence of irrational conduct such that comparator evidence

is not required to deny summary judgment on Frederickson’s equal protection

claim.

There is an open question as to whether a class-of-one plaintiff must also

prove that the defendants acted with personal animus or malice in treating the

plaintiff differently. See Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.

2012). The Court need not take a side on that dispute, however, because in this case

Frederickson must prove that Landeros acted out of personal animus against him;

otherwise, Landeros’s conduct is protected by qualified immunity.

2. Qualified Immunity

In the context of class-of-one equal protection claims like Frederickson’s, the

Seventh Circuit has held that the right to “police protection uncorrupted by

personal animus” is clearly established. Hanes, 578 F.3d at 496 (citing Hilton v. City

of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000) (“If the police decided to withdraw

all protection from [the plaintiff] out of sheer malice, or because they had been

bribed by his neighbors, he would state a claim . . . .”)). Thus, qualified immunity is

unavailable to a police officer who “deliberately sought to deprive [a plaintiff] of the

equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties

of the defendant’s position.” Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1008.

Here, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Detective

Landeros was motivated by personal animus towards Frederickson when he

stymied his attempt to register in Bolingbrook. There is evidence that Detective

Landeros had a history of conflict with Frederickson. Detective Landeros also

testified that he had no reason to believe that Frederickson was not residing in

Bolingbrook when he sought to register there, leading to the inference that

Detective Landeros’s motivations were personal. Furthermore, there is evidence

that Detective Landeros’s actions were extraordinary. No homeless offenders in

Joliet or Bolingbrook have ever been denied transfer of their LEADS file.

Additionally, unlike in Frederickson’s case, the requirement that an offender report

to his former residential jurisdiction that he has moved is generally waived once the

new jurisdiction requests transfer of the LEADS file. Because this evidence is

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Landeros acted with personal animus

towards Frederickson, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not

appropriate at this time. See Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir.

2009) (“When the qualified immunity inquiry cannot be disentangled from disputed

facts, the issue cannot be resolved without a trial.”).

In sum, Detective Landeros’s contention that his decisions to prevent the

transfer of Frederickson’s LEADS file and to tell Bolingbrook not to register

Frederickson, were justified because Frederickson failed to register out of Joliet,

rings hollow. The evidence here is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that

Detective Landeros took the actions he did out of personal animus towards

Frederickson that developed over time out of his frustration with his experiences

taking Frederickson’s registrations. Therefore, Landeros’s motion for summary

judgment on Frederickson’s equal protection claim is denied. 1°

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to the claims against Scarpetta,

and Counts I, IJ, IV, and V against Landeros. It is denied as to Count III against

Landeros. A status hearing is set for March 21, 2018, at which time the parties

should be prepared to set a trial date.

ENTERED:

Ahnias MW Butler.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: March 7, 2018

10 Since Detective Landeros is the only remaining defendant, and the Court has

denied his motion for summary judgment on the claims underlying the conspiracy

counts, Frederickson’s conspiracy claims are superfluous and are dismissed.

25