Carter v. Baldwin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Marvin Carter, )

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 17 CV 3690

v. )

) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

John R. Baldwin, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

For the following reasons, the court grants the motion to dismiss filed by Wexford

Health Sources, Inc. and Timothy Chamberlain, M.D. (“Wexford defendants) [39]. The

court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss filed by Illinois Department

of Corrections personnel John Baldwin, Christopher Barnhart, Sherry Benton, Max

Blackburn, and Lisa Minter (“IDOC defendants”) [46]. The Wexford defendants are

dismissed as defendants, as are IDOC defendants Barnhart, Benton and Blackburn.

Defendant Baldwin remains in the case as to Count II and defendant Minter remains in

the case as to Counts III, IV and V. Defendants Lashard Cameron and Janet Wheat

remain in the case as to Count IV

STATEMENT- OPINION

This matter pertains to the custody and care of Marvin Carter while incarcerated

by the IDOC. Plaintiff Marvin Carter has filed an action against several defendants in

connection with his medical treatment and lack of accommodation for his disability while

incarcerated at the IDOC, specifically Dixon Correctional Center (“DCC”). Plaintiff

names as defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Wexford physician Dr. Timothy

Chamberlain, Acting Director of the IDOC John R. Baldwin, IDOC nurse Lisa Minter,

IDOC Administrative Review Board member Sherry Benton, ADA coordinators at Dixon

Correctional Center Christopher Barnhart and Max Blackburn, as well as Dixon

Correctional Center educational program personnel Lashard Cameron and Janet Wheat.

On May 16, 2017, plaintiff filed his complaint [1]. On August 18, 2017, the

Wexford defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them [39]. On

September 5, 2017, the IDOC defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against

them [46], along with a memorandum of law in support of their motion [47]. On October

16, 2017, plaintiff filed responses to the defendants’ motions to dismiss [54; 55]. On

November 9, 2017, the Wexford defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s response [59]. On

November 22, 2017, the IDOC defendants filed their reply [61].

In reviewing the parties’ respective motions to dismiss, the court is required to

“accept as true all factual allegations in the [] complaint and draw all permissible

inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2017)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). “A complaint will survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim if it ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “That is, while a plaintiff need not plead detailed factual

allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, []he still must provide more than mere labels

and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for [his]

complaint to be considered adequate.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

I. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff, Marvin Carter, was incarcerated at the DCC from mid-2015 through

January 2017. Plaintiff is deaf and mute and suffers from sickle cell disease – a

hereditary blood disorder which requires careful monitoring and treatment. Plaintiff is

fluent in American Sign Language (“ASL”) - his best (and sometimes only), effective

means of communication. [1] at 2. Plaintiff requires an ASL interpreter to assist him in

understanding complex topics related to his medical needs. Defendants at DCC knew

plaintiff had been diagnosed with sickle cell disease and required ASL interpreters, yet

failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. Id.

Plaintiff alleges he was incarcerated at the DCC for five months before the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) coordinator met with him to discuss his need

for accommodations. Plaintiff submitted numerous grievances indicating that defendant

Minter was hurting him while dressing his wounds (stemming from his sickle cell

disease), and that he needed an interpreter to help the nurse better understand his medical

needs. Id. at 7- 8. In his complaint, plaintiff refers to the grievances he had filed noting

that he had told defendant Minter numerous times she was hurting him by pulling the

tape off of his feet, aggressively wiping the wounds, and holding down his feet in order to

put on cream that burned his skin. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff claims his grievances went as high

as the IDOC Administrative Review Board (of which, defendant Benton is a member).

Id. at 9.

In his complaint, plaintiff provides 12 examples of instances from August of 2015

through October of 2016, where he requested a sign language interpreter to assist him in

communicating his medical issues to the medical staff. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges in

March of 2016, defendant Barnhart “recognized that Mr. Carter must be provided []

accommodation.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff quotes defendant Barnhart as stating, “[a]ccording

to Administrative Directive 04.01.111, communication accommodations may be

requested when ‘the information being relayed is complex, exchanged for a lengthy

period of time, or involves legal due process. This may include, but is not limited to,

communications such as medical and mental health services.’” Id. According to

plaintiff, defendant Barnhart directed that plaintiff be provided interpreter services “when

the aforementioned medical services are being provided.” Id. Plaintiff goes on to state

that, despite the fact that an interpreter was present at a “handful” of meetings with

doctors and nurses at the DCC, “nothing changed.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges he was

denied medical treatment for three days up through a week on account of the lack of an

interpreter. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff also complains he was “expelled” from educational programs at the DCC

due to the fact he was not provided a sign language interpreter. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiff

claims he filed multiple grievances in the spring and summer of 2016 requesting an

interpreter so he could participate in educational programs. Plaintiff alleges his

grievances and requests were denied, he was intentionally discriminated against by

defendants Baldwin, Cameron and Wheat, and was not able to take advantage of the

DCC’s educational programs and better himself. Id.

In addition to being denied the reasonable accommodation of an interpreter,

plaintiff also alleges defendants prevented him from receiving blood transfusions

necessary to treat his sickle cell disease and other needed medical care. Id. at 13-14.

Plaintiff alleges he suffered two sickle cell attacks while at the DCC, both requiring

hospitalization. The first attack occurred in May of 2016, where, apparently, plaintiff

was transferred to the University of Illinois at Chicago and remained hospitalized there

for almost two weeks. Id. at 13. After his return to the DCC, plaintiff’s condition

worsened and in July, plaintiff provided defendant Chamberlain a note in the hallway

indicating that he believed he needed a blood transfusion. Id. at 14. In October of 2016,

plaintiff suffered a second sickle cell attack and was, again, hospitalized. Id. Plaintiff

alleges he suffered injuries due to defendants’ actions. Plaintiff claims he exhausted all

administrative remedies available to him prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s claims under ADA and Rehabilitation Act – Defendant Baldwin

Count I and Count II of plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act, respectively, as against defendant

Baldwin in his official capacity as the acting director of the IDOC. By naming defendant

Baldwin in his official capacity, plaintiff has, in effect, brought these claims against the

IDOC. Carver v. LaSalle County, 243 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges

defendant Baldwin failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter in order for him to

participate in educational programs and receive adequate medical treatment. Defendant

Baldwin has moved to dismiss both counts.

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege he is a

“qualified individual with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such

an entity, and that the denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Wagoner

v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015). 42 U.S.C. § 12132. However, while the

ADA applies to prisons, the Seventh Circuit has held, under the guidance of Erickson v.

Board of Governors for Northeastern Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000)

and Stevens v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 210 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2000),

plaintiff must raise his claims under the ADA in state court. “Erickson and Stevens hold

that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not provide Congress with authority to enact

the ADA. Because it rests on the Commerce Clause rather than § 5, the eleventh

amendment precludes private litigation against the state in federal court.” Stanley v.

Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2000). Count I of plaintiff’s complaint is, therefore,

dismissed.

While a claim under the Rehabilitation Act is “functionally identical” to an ADA

claim, the analysis differs slightly. The Rehabilitation Act requires the plaintiff to allege

that (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the defendant denied him

access to a program or activity because of his disability. Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 592.

(citing Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012)).

However, claims under the Rehabilitation Act are not restricted to public entities, and the

relevant entity must accept federal funds. Ruffin v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 181 Fed.

Appx. 582, n.** (7th Cir. 2006). 29 U.S.C. § 794. As to the Eleventh Amendment,

Illinois has waived sovereign immunity as a precondition to receiving “federal largess.”

Stanley, 213 F.3d at 344. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act is not

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

In order to sustain a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must plead facts

which plausibly support each element of his claim. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. First,

plaintiff states in his complaint he is deaf and mute. Therefore, he qualifies as an

individual with a disability under 42 U.S.C. 12102(1)(A) (“The term ‘disability’ means,

with respect to an individual – a physical…impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of such individual.” “Hearing” is a major life activity under

section 12102(2)(A).). This leaves the third prong of the Rehabilitation Act, “the

defendant denied [plaintiff] access to a program or activity because of his disability.”

In his motion to dismiss, defendant Baldwin presents a brief, undeveloped

argument that “[p]laintiff’s challenge to the quality of the medical services that he

received is not cognizable under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.”1 In support of this

position, defendant Baldwin cites to Resel v. Fox, 26 Fed. Appx. 572 (7th Cir. 2001).

However, in Resel, the court held that plaintiff did not allege that he was discriminated

against because he was disabled and that simply a claim for inadequate medical treatment

at the prison would not qualify as a proper claim under the ADA. Resel further cites to

Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). In Bryant, the court found that the

plaintiff did not allege discrimination, only that he was not given a special

accommodation at the prison (i.e. guardrails for his bed). Id. at 249.

Here, plaintiff has alleged that he was not allowed to attend school programs at

the DCC because the facility, in discrimination of his hearing disability, refused to

provide him with a sign language interpreter. The court finds that an educational

program at the DCC qualifies as a “program or activity” under the Rehabilitative Act. 29

1  Defendant Baldwin does not address this issue in his reply brief.

U.S.C. § 794. Regarding whether the DCC has denied plaintiff access to the program (to

substantiate a claim under the Act), the Seventh Circuit has held that “[r]efusing to make

reasonable accommodations is tantamount to denying access; although the Rehabilitation

Act does not expressly require accommodation, the Supreme Court has located a duty to

accommodate in the statute generally.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672. In Norfleet v. Walker,

684 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiff’s action, finding that wheelchair-bound plaintiff/prisoner adequately alleged a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act where he complained that the IDOC refused to allow

him to participate in outdoor recreational activities at the prison because of his disability.

Id. at 689-90. Likewise, the court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of

the Rehabilitation Act by complaining that defendant Baldwin (IDOC) denied him access

to educational programs at the DCC based on his hearing disability. Plaintiff also alleges

in his complaint a violation of the Rehabilitation Act based on the DCC’s failure to

provide him with a sign language interpreter for his medical visits. He states the absence

of a sign language interpreter diminished the quality of his medical care and, therefore,

the facility discriminated against him based on his disability. While this is a closer call

than plaintiff’s allegations regarding the denial of educational programs, the court finds,

at this stage of the litigation, that plaintiff has plausibly pleaded a violation of the

Rehabilitation Act and denies defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss Count II of

`plaintiff’s complaint.

B. Plaintiff’s claims under 8th and 14th Amendments

Defendants have moved to dismiss Count III of plaintiff’s complaint – violation

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on cruel and unusual punishment. The

IDOC defendants and the Wexford defendants each argue plaintiff has failed to state a

plausible cause of action for deliberate indifference against them as to plaintiff’s medical

care and treatment at the DCC, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,

made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, imposes a duty upon the states to provide adequate medical care to

incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Prison officials

have a duty to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “The Eighth Amendment

safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that ‘may result in pain and

suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.’” Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle, 429

U.S. at 103). Prison officials violate the Constitution if they are deliberately indifferent

to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A claim based on deficient

medical care must demonstrate two elements: (1) an objectively serious medical

condition; and (2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition. Zentmyer v.

Kendall County, Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000). “Deliberate indifference may

occur where a prison official, having knowledge of a significant risk to inmate health or

safety, administers ‘blatantly inappropriate’ medical treatment.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792

F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir.

2007)).

Additionally, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to Section 1983

actions. To be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally responsible for

the deprivation of a constitutional right…A defendant will be deemed to have sufficient

personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if

it occurred with his knowledge or consent.” Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612,

651-52 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). “The supervisors must know about the

conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they

might see.” Id. See also Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (a

government official is only liable for his own misconduct to sustain a constitutional

violation under §1983).

As there is no dispute regarding plaintiff’s “objectively serious medical

condition,” the court will address each defendant’s argument regarding “deliberate

indifference” to plaintiff’s condition.

i. Defendants Christopher R. Barnhart and Max Blackburn – ADA

Coordinators at Dixon Correctional Center

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendants Barnhart and Blackburn – ADA

coordinators during some or all of plaintiff’s time at the DCC – were aware of plaintiff’s

serious medical needs (i.e. his sickle cell disease and the ulcers on his legs and feet (as a

result of the disease)), that he required regular wound care, and that he made numerous

requests and filed multiple grievances regarding his need for a sign language interpreter

to assist in his medical care. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Barnhart recognized

that plaintiff should be provided an interpreter but made no effort to see that he was

provided an interpreter and, further, willfully ignored the continuing failure to provide

this service to plaintiff. [1] at 6-7, 9-11.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant Barnhart, in response to one of

plaintiff’s grievances requesting interpreters during (even routine) medical appointments,

recognized that plaintiff “must be provided this accommodation.” Barnhart explained

that “[a]ccording to Administrative Directive 04.01.111, communication

accommodations may be requested when ‘the information being relayed is complex,

exchanged for a lengthy period of time, or involves legal due process. This may include,

but is not limited to, communications such as medical and mental health services.’” Id. at

11. Plaintiff goes on to allege that “[d]efendant Barnhart directed that [plaintiff] be

provided ‘interpreter services when the aforementioned medical services are being

provided.’” Id.

As to defendant Blackburn, plaintiff alleges on two occasions he submitted

“Offender Request” slips to defendant Blackburn requesting an interpreter in order to

communicate with the sick call nurse. Id. at 10.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege defendants Barnhart and Blackburn acted with

deliberate indifference toward his serious medical need. “Deliberate indifference

requires more than negligence or even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the

defendant was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known risk.” Figgs v.

Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges in

his complaint that communication accommodations (i.e. sign language interpreter) may

be requested by an inmate when the information to be conveyed is “complex, exchanged

for a lengthy period of time, or involves legal due process.” [1] at 11. Plaintiff further

states that he was provided a sign language interpreter on a “handful” of occasions.

Plaintiff was, unquestionably, seen and treated by medical personnel at the DCC on

numerous occasions and, as described throughout his complaint, was able to

communicate pain and location of pain to the medical staff without the use of an

interpreter. While the court recognizes that plaintiff may have needed the assistance of a

sign language interpreter for medical visits that may have been more “complex,” or

“lengthy,” it cannot be said, based on the complaint, that plaintiff did not receive the

accommodation for those types of visits. Regardless, it cannot be found, by the face of

the complaint, that defendants Barnhart’s and Blackburn’s conduct toward plaintiff rises

to the level of “deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s need for a sign language interpreter

during his medical visits. On the contrary, it appears defendant Barnhart was well aware

of plaintiff’s request for an interpreter, was familiar with IDOC’s directive on when an

interpreter can be requested and, presumably, he (or defendant Blackburn) did provide

plaintiff with an interpreter on a “handful” of occasions. The motion to dismiss

defendants Barnhart and Blackburn from Count III of plaintiff’s complaint is granted.

As defendant Barnhart and defendant Blackburn are only named in Count III of

plaintiff’s complaint, they are dismissed from this action.

ii. Defendant Sherry Benton – member, IDOC Administrative Review

Board

Plaintiff alleges defendant Benton, a member of the IDOC Administrative Review

Board, demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs by

refusing to take action raised by his grievances. [1] at 9.

However, plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant Benton was personally

responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation. As recently noted by the Seventh

Circuit, “[p]rison officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack

personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.” Owens v.

Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,

740 (7th Cir. 2001)). Without “personal involvement” on the part of defendant Benton,

plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against her under Section 1983. The court is not

persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that his claims against defendant Benton are proper

because defendant Benton ignored grievances that “requested assistance relating to

present and future threats to [plaintiff’s] health.” [55] at p. 11 (emphasis in original). In

addition to be difficult to understand, this argument is unsupported by any case law.

Because defendant Benton was not personally involved in the conduct that gives rise to

plaintiff’s complaint, the court does not find her liable under Section 1983. She is

dismissed from Count III of plaintiff’s complaint.2

2  For the same reasons, defendant Benton is dismissed from Count IV of plaintiff’s complaint –

equal protection. Therefore, defendant Benton is dismissed from this action.

iii. Defendant Lisa Minter – DCC nurse

Plaintiff alleges defendant Minter was deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs by ignoring serious threats to his health and denying him treatment on several

occasions. Plaintiff complains that this lack of care resulted in two hospitalizations for

worsening symptoms of his sickle cell disease. He also asserts defendant Minter directly,

purposely and repeatedly caused him extreme pain while treating his ulcers. [1] at 3-4, 7-

9.

“Deliberate indifference occurs when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk of

serious harm to a prisoner exists, but then disregards that risk.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 776.

Nurses have an independent duty to ensure that inmates receive constitutionally adequate

care. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). “Nurses…may thus be held

liable for deliberate indifference where they knowingly disregard a risk to an inmate’s

health.” Perez, 729 F.3d at 779.

Plaintiff’s claims that defendant Minter, among other things, used a wound

dressing technique that caused him excruciating pain, and that despite his screaming and

other non-verbal protesting, she continued to grab him, pull on him and hurt him ([1] at

8-10) plausibly state a cause of action under Section 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint

sufficiently alleges that defendant Minter’s medical care and treatment was “blatantly

inappropriate.” Perez, 729 F.3d at 777. Like the nurse defendant in Perez, the court

notes that discovery may uncover more information regarding whether defendant

Minter’s actions were, in fact, medically necessary and reasonable. Discovery may also

reveal that defendant Minter provided constitutionally adequate care. However, these are

questions of fact that survive this stage of the litigation. Defendant Minter’s motion to

dismiss Count III against her is denied.

iv. Dr. Chamberlain – (former) Medical Director at the DCC

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant Chamberlain was “responsible” for

plaintiff’s medical care during his stay at the DCC. Substantively, plaintiff claims

defendant Chamberlain knew plaintiff suffered from sickle cell disease, knew the disease

caused pain and that blood transfusion therapy reduces the risk of complications and

symptoms, and was familiar with plaintiff’s medical records wherein plaintiff was able to

communicate his level of pain as well as the progress of the disease and his desire to have

a sign language interpreter during medical visits. [1] at 6, 9-10. Plaintiff’s complaint

also alleges defendant Chamberlain caused plaintiff to go without treatment “for an

extended period of time.” As an example, plaintiff states he was not treated for “three

days.” Id. at 12. Additionally, defendant Chamberlain wrote a note in plaintiff’s medical

record indicating that plaintiff had stopped him in the hallway and had given him a note

stating that he (plaintiff) believed he needed a blood transfusion. Id. at 14.

In his motion to dismiss, defendant Chamberlain argues plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The

threshold issue is whether defendant Chamberlain was sufficiently involved in plaintiff’s

care and treatment to meet the standard required of a Section 1983 action that a defendant

must be “personally responsible” for the constitutional deprivation. “Section 1983

creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus

liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a

constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted). “[Section] 1983 lawsuits against individuals require personal involvement in

the alleged constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim. Although direct

participation is not necessary, there must at least be a showing that [defendant]

acquiesced in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.” Palmer v.

Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003).

The court agrees with defendant Chamberlain that the most significant allegation

of personal involvement of defendant Chamberlain with plaintiff is found in paragraph 50

of plaintiff’s complaint. There, plaintiff recounts a notation in plaintiff’s medical record

where, in July of 2016, defendant Chamberlain was handed a note in the hallway by

plaintiff. The note indicated that plaintiff believed he needs a blood transfusion. [1] at

14.3 Taking all references to defendant Chamberlain in plaintiff’s complaint into

account, the court finds insufficient personal involvement or personal responsibility on

the part of defendant Chamberlain to establish liability under Section 1983 for plaintiff’s

alleged constitutional deprivation. Nevertheless, even if the court were to find that

defendant Chamberlain was sufficiently, personally involved in the alleged constitutional

violation, defendant Chamberlain’s actions do not constitute deliberate indifference.

There are no allegations in plaintiff’s complaint that defendant Chamberlain had

direct knowledge of a serious risk of harm to plaintiff’s health. “Prison physicians will

be liable under the Eighth Amendment if they intentionally disregard a known,

objectively serious medical condition that poses an excessive risk to an inmate’s health.”

Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 2011). “[D]eliberate indifference

may be inferred…when the medical professional’s decision is such a substantial

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate

that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Estate of Cole

by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F. 3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s complaint shows

that plaintiff was seen regularly by the nurse at the DCC. During his medical visits, he

was treated with creams for his wounds. On two occasions, plaintiff was taken to the

hospital when his condition became serious enough to warrant the transfer. Even if

defendant Chamberlain was directly involved in all these medical decisions (which,

according to the complaint, he was not), these decisions do not qualify as a knowing

disregard to plaintiff’s health and safety. Deliberate indifference can be inferred when

the decision is “so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference

that it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d

675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Put another way, plaintiff must show that

defendant Chamberlain’s judgment was so inadequate that “no minimally competent

professional would have so responded under those circumstances.” Roe v. Elyea, 631

F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if the court could find sufficient personal

involvement, plaintiff’s complaint simply does not plausibly plead that defendant

3   Plaintiff’s complaint alleges he was transported to the hospital on two occasion (during his

approximate 20 month stay at DCC) – once in May of 2016, and again in November of 2016.

Chamberlain was deliberately indifferent. Therefore, his motion to dismiss Count III of

the complaint is granted.

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges Wexford maintains policies, including cost-

cutting policies, which violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In the alternative,

plaintiff alleges that Wexford maintains widespread practices that, although they are

unauthorized, are so well-settled they constitute customs or usages maintaining the force

of law. Defendant Wexford argues in its motion to dismiss that plaintiff has failed to

plead that Wexford has violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and, therefore, Wexford should

be dismissed from Count III.4

Liability attaches to Wexford only if it had an unconstitutional policy or practice

that caused plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivation. To state a claim under Monell, a

plaintiff must allege that his constitutional violation was “caused by (1) an express

municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a

decision by a municipal agent with ‘final policymaking authority.’” Milestone v. City of

Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). See also Woodward

v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc. 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). A corporate entity

violates an inmate’s constitutional rights “if it maintains a policy that sanctions the

maintenance of prison conditions that infringe upon the constitutional rights of the

prisoners.” Id. at 927 (citations omitted). Plaintiff must allege “that his injury was

caused by a Wexford policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to medical

needs, or a series of bad acts that together raise the inference of such a policy.” Shields v.

Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014). Additionally, the policy, custom,

or practice “must be the ‘direct cause’ or ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional

violation.” Woodward, 368 F.3d at 927.

Defendant Wexford argues in its motion to dismiss that plaintiff’s Monell claim

must fail because plaintiff has not sufficiently plead that Wexford implemented

unconstitutional policies, that anyone at the DCC followed such policies, or that such

policies caused plaintiff a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff counters his

complaint sufficiently identifies a policy or practice responsible for his injuries, including

Wexford’s “cost-cutting” policies, and that those policies and practices were the “moving

force” behind plaintiff’s mistreatment.

In order to prevail on his Monell claim against defendant Wexford, plaintiff must

plead sufficient “factual content to nudge his claim…across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 618 (7th 2011) (quotations

4 Wexford cannot be held vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability. The

Seventh Circuit in Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) held that

“[r]espondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under § 1983.” Id. at 789.

omitted). Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges Wexford’s “cost-cutting policies” caused

the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In the alternative, plaintiff states

Wexford’s widespread practices, demonstrated by the “bad acts” outlined in his

complaint, resulted in the violations. However, plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to

“nudge his claim” over to plausible. Plaintiff’s reference to Wexford’s “cost-cutting”

policies is not supported by the facts in his complaint. Nowhere in plaintiff’s complaint

does he equate his inadequate medical care to “cost-cutting” measures on the part of

Wexford. Indeed, plaintiff admits he was taken to the hospital on two occasions to

address his medical needs. He also pleads he was seen by medical staff on numerous

occasions and given creams for his wounds. In his brief, plaintiff refers only to those

conclusory allegations in his complaint to support his position that he has adequately

identified these “cost-cutting” measures. Relatedly, plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify

sufficient facts to adequately allege Wexford’s “widespread practice” of unconstitutional

actions. He fails to identify sufficient facts in his complaint to plausibly support his

Monell claim. Therefore, plaintiff’s Monell claim against defendant Wexford (Count III)

is dismissed.

vi. John R. Baldwin – acting director of IDOC

While defendant Balwin’s argument that he should be dismissed from Count III of

plaintiff’s complaint is undeveloped (and only addressed in his reply brief), the court

grants his motion to dismiss as to this claim.

Defendant Baldwin is sued in his official capacity. It is well-established that suits

against government officials in their official capacity are suits against the government

entity of which the officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66

(1985). Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons”

subject to an action for damages under Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). While official capacity suits against state officials seeking

prospective relief are permitted under Section 1983, suits for money damages are not.

Id. at 71. Plaintiff’s complaint seeks money damages, not prospective relief. Because

damage claims against a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, state officials may

not be sued for damages in federal court in their official capacity. Scott v. O’Grady, 975

F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1992). Therefore, defendant Baldwin is dismissed from Count III

of plaintiff’s complaint.5

C. Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment - Equal Protection

Plaintiff has brought an equal protection claim against the Wexford defendants

and IDOC defendants Baldwin, Minter, Benton, Cameron and Wheat.6 Defendants

5  To the extent plaintiff attempts to bring claims under Monell against the IDOC, these claims

are dismissed. The IDOC, a state agency, is not a “person” that can be sued under Section 1983.

Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 437-38 (7th Cir. 2017).

6 Defendants Lashard Cameron and Janet Wheat have not been served and no appearance has

been entered on their behalf. According to the complaint, both defendant Cameron and defendant

Wheat were associated with the educational programs at DCC during plaintiff’s stay. Despite the

argue, generally, that plaintiff has failed to plausibly claim disparate treatment in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the equal protection

clause, [plaintiff is] required to show that he is a member of a protected class, that he is

otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class, and that he was treated

differently from members of the unprotected class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916

(7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). “Often an equal protection violation occurs

when a regulation draws distinctions among people based on a person’s membership in a

‘suspect’ class.” Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009).

Protected (or “suspect”) classes include race, alienage, and national origin. Vision

Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006). Another typical equal

protection claim is based on the denial of a fundamental right, id., which includes

freedom of speech and religion. Id. The constitutional “strict scrutiny” test is applied to

an equal protection analysis under both suspect class and denial of fundamental rights.

Id.

Here, plaintiff falls into neither category of “suspect class” nor “denial of

fundamental rights.” Disabled persons are not members of a suspect class for purposes of

a “strict scrutiny” test under the equal protection clause. U.S. v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870,

876 (7th Cir. 1999). “To withstand equal protection review, classifications which

distinguish between deaf persons and others need only be rationally related to legitimate

government interest.” Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F.Supp. 879, 881 (E.D.Wisc. Aug. 18,

1995). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment allows the State to single out the disabled for

different treatment so long as it has a rational or legitimate purpose.” Stevens v. Illinois

Dept. of Transportation, 210 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2000). Rational basis review

requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) the state actor intentionally treated plaintiff

differently from others similarly situated; (2) this difference in treatment was caused by

the plaintiff’s membership in the class to which he belongs; and (3) this different

treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Smith v. City of

Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 650-51. (7th Cir. 2006). The court, therefore, will analyze the

defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s equal protection claim under the rational basis

review.

i. Defendants Chamberlain and Wexford

lack of service, the court will, sua sponte, include these defendants in this opinion. “A sua sponte

[decision] may apply to a party prior to service of the complaint, particularly where, as here,

plaintiff has had an opportunity to respond to a motion to dismiss. see, e.eg., Baker v. Director,

United States Parole Commission, 916 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (court upheld district court’s

decision to dismiss complaint sua sponte before service of process).” Burgess v. Michaelson,

Case No. 93 C 2680, 1993 WL 348511 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1993). See also, Malak v.

Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1986) (district court may, sua sponte, enter

judgment in favor of additional non-moving defendants if the motion raised by first defendants is

“equally effective in barring the claim against the other defendants and the plaintiff had an

adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion”) (citation omitted).

For reason similar to those recited in section B. iv., supra, plaintiff has failed to

plausibly plead that defendant Chamberlain, by not properly treating plaintiff’s sickle cell

disease and preventing him from receiving needed blood transfusions, treated plaintiff

differently than other inmates at the DCC without a disability. As noted above, it is

questionable whether plaintiff has properly pleaded that defendant Chamberlain had

sufficient personal involvement with plaintiff’s care to justify his status as a defendant;

nevertheless, plaintiff’s complaint is further deficient in pleading defendant Chamberlain

(1) intentionally treated plaintiff differently than other inmates with medical needs, or (2)

treated plaintiff differently than others because plaintiff is deaf. Because plaintiff has

failed to sufficiently plead the first two elements of an equal protection/rational basis

review, the court need not decide if plaintiff’s complaint states a legitimate state interest

in defendant Chamberlain’s alleged actions.

As to Wexford, the court reiterates its reasoning in section B.v., supra. Plaintiff

has failed to properly plead a Monell action against Wexford. The same reasoning found

above regarding plaintiff’s insufficient pleading is the same reasoning that would apply to

plaintiff’s claim that Wexford is liable to plaintiff under the equal protection clause.

For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV as to defendants

Chamberlain and Wexford is granted.

ii. Defendant John R. Baldwin – (acting) director of the IDOC

Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against defendant Baldwin for violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment – equal protection – for the same reasons he cannot sustain his

claims under Count III – deliberate indifference.

As noted above, defendant Baldwin is sued in his official capacity as the acting

director of the IDOC. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is deemed to

be a suit against the state. Because damage claims against a state are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, [absent any exception] state officials may not be sued for damages

in federal court in their official capacity. Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.

1992). Therefore, defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss Count IV is granted.

iii. IDOC defendants Minter, Cameron and Wheat7

The IDOC defendants dedicate three sentences in their opening brief to the

argument that plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the equal

protection clause. Neither party addressed the equal protection claim under the rational

review analysis. Despite the deficiencies in the briefs, the court finds that plaintiff has

sufficiently pleaded a claim under the equal protection clause against IDOC defendants

Minter, Cameron and Wheat.

Plaintiff claims the IDOC defendants intentionally mistreated him because he is

deaf and mute and this mistreatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state

7  See section B.ii., supra, addressing the dismissal of defendant Benton.

interest. For the same reasons the court denied defendant Minter’s motion to dismiss

under plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment – deliberate indifference claim, the court denies

her motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s equal protection claim. Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges defendant Minter mistreated plaintiff by ignoring plaintiff’s attempts to

communicate to defendant Minter his pain during her treatment of him. While this may

not be enough to sustain a claim under the rational basis review of an equal protection

claim, at this stage in the litigation, it plausibly states a claim.

According to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants Cameron and Wheat were

associated with the educational programs at the DCC during plaintiff’s stay. Plaintiff

complains that he was dismissed from the educational programs at the DCC because of

his hearing disability. It is unclear from the complaint who from the DCC (or IDOC) was

involved in the decision to prevent plaintiff from continuing in these programs, but for

purposes of a motion to dismiss, at this stage in the case, the court finds that plaintiff has

plausibly stated a claim that his constitutional rights were violated, under the equal

protection clause, by not having the opportunity to participate in these educational

programs. Therefore, the court finds that the suit may proceed against defendants

Cameron and Wheat as to Count IV.

D. Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff brings a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)

against defendants Chamberlain and Minter. He alleges the defendants’ conduct was

“extreme and outrageous,” and that defendants knew their failure to provide plaintiff with

medical care needed to treat plaintiff’s sickle cell disease would cause plaintiff to suffer

severe emotional distress. [1] at 25. Defendants argue plaintiff has failed to plausible

state this claim against them.

To state a claim for IIED under Illinois law, “the plaintiff must allege that the

defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, the defendant knew it was highly

probable that her conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and the

conduct did, in fact cause the plaintiff’ severe emotional distress.” Williams v. Erickson,

962 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1042 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013). See also Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d

819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010). Liability for IIED “does not extend to mere insults, indignities,

threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities.” Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill.App.3d

929, 936 (1st Dist. 2004). To be considered extreme and outrageous, the conduct “must

be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

intolerable in a civilized community.” Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 438

(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kolegas v. Heftel Broad, Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (1992)).

i. Defendant Chamberlain

For the same reasons articulated above in sections B.iv. and C.i., defendant

Chamberlain’s motion to dismiss Count V is granted. There is insufficient facts to

support a claim that defendant Chamberlain was personally involved in the medical care

and treatment of plaintiff. Even if he was, the facts set forth in the complaint do not

plausibly allege that defendant Chamberlain’s conduct toward plaintiff was “extreme” or

“outrageous.”

il. Defendant Minter

Plaintiffs ITED claim against defendant Minter is a closer call. As noted above,

plaintiff has alleged defendant Minter, nurse at the DCC, caused him extreme pain in the

treatment of his ulcers and wounds.

Courts have found that allegations sufficient to support a deliberate indifference

claim may also be sufficient to support an ITED claim under federal notice pleading

standards. See Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Case No. 15C5190, 2016 WL

3227310 at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016); Piercy v. Whiteside County, Ill., Case No.

14C7398, 2016 WL 1719802 at *8 (N.D. Ill. April 29, 2016); Awalt v. Marketti, 74

F.Supp.3d 909, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Doe ex rel. Doe v. White, 627 F.Supp.2d 905, 921

(C.D. Il. 2009). Therefore, while plaintiff may not, ultimately, prevail against defendant

Minter regarding her treatment of him at the DCC, at this stage in the litigation, the court

finds plaintiff has sufficient pleaded a claim of ITED against her.

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the motion to dismiss filed by

defendants Chamberlain and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford defendants’)

(Counts III, IV and V), in its entirety. The Wexford defendants are, therefore, dismissed

as defendants.

The court grants defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss Count I. The court

denies defendant Baldwin’s motion to dismiss Count II. The court grants the motion to

dismiss filed by defendants Barnhart and Blackburn as to Count II]. Defendants Barnhart

and Blackburn are, therefore, dismissed as defendants. The court also grants the motion

to dismiss Count II] as to defendants Benton, and Baldwin. The court denies defendant

Minter’s motion to dismiss Count III. The court denies the motion to dismiss Count IV

as to defendants Minter, Cameron and Wheat. The court denies defendant Minter’s

motion to dismiss Count V.

The court orders the parties to set this case for an early settlement conference with

Magistrate Judge Johnston given the nature of the allegations, various claims and

multiple defendants sued. The court further notes that plaintiff has made similar but

distinct claims against various defendants in Cook County in case number 15 CV 02019

in the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, which has been settled.

Dated: 2/01/2018 ENTER:

United States District Court Judge

Electronic Notices. (LC)

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