Farris v. Kohl

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JACQUELINE FARRIS, )

Plaintiff,

v. ) No. 17-cv-3279

ERIK KOHLRUS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris is a former resident of the Logan

Correctional Center, a facility operated by the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC). Less than three weeks after arriving at Logan,

Ms. Farris was sexually assaulted by Defendant Erik Kohlrus, a

correctional officer assigned to Ms. Farris’s housing unit.

After completing her sentence, Ms. Farris sued IDOC and

nineteen of its employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She

alleges that these Defendants violated the First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments by, among other things, failing to protect

her from a known, serious risk of custodial sexual abuse at Logan.

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This matter comes before the Court on three motions for

summary judgment, each filed by a group of current or former

IDOC employees. See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., d/e 215; Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J., d/e 217; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., d/e 219.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Parties

Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris is a former resident of Logan

Correctional Center and Decatur Correctional Center. Ms. Farris

entered Logan in December 2015 and remained there until January

2016, when she was transferred to Decatur. She completed her

term of incarceration in September 2018.

Defendant Angela Locke was a correctional officer at Decatur

and Logan at all relevant times. Major Locke served as Logan’s

acting warden, or chief administrative officer, from October 2013 to

June 2015. In that capacity, Major Locke was responsible for

overseeing day-to-day operations at Logan, including compliance

with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA); for promulgating

rules, regulations, policies, and procedures to ensure the safety of

the women housed at Logan; and for supervising, training,

assigning, and disciplining Logan’s counselors, correctional officers,

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internal-affairs investigators, and other staff. After completing her

temporary assignment at Logan, Major Locke resumed her service

as a shift supervisor at Decatur.

Defendant Christine Brannon served as Logan’s warden from

August 2015 until February 2016. Warden Brannon was

responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations at Logan, including

compliance with PREA; for promulgating rules, regulations, policies,

and procedures to ensure the safety of the women housed at Logan;

and for supervising, training, assigning, and disciplining Logan’s

correctional officers, internal-affairs investigators, and other staff.

Defendant Clara Charron was Logan’s Assistant Warden of

Programs at all relevant times. Ms. Charron implemented and

oversaw certain policies and practices at Logan, including Logan’s

mental-health, educational, and religious programming. Ms.

Charron also served as Logan’s PREA compliance manager from the

fall of 2013 until November 2015, when she was succeeded by

Defendant Norine Ashley. In that capacity, Ms. Charron was

responsible for ensuring compliance with PREA regulations and

standards and for developing, planning, and overseeing efforts to

address the problem of custodial sexual assault at Logan.

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Defendant Norine Ashley was a staff psychologist at Logan at

all relevant times. Dr. Ashley served as Logan’s PREA compliance

manager beginning in November 2015. Like Ms. Charron, Dr.

Ashley was responsible for Logan’s compliance with PREA

regulations and standards and for developing, planning, and

overseeing programs to address the problem of custodial sexual

assault at Logan. Defendant Lisa Johnson, the head of Logan’s

health-care unit, served as Dr. Ashley and Ms. Charron’s backup

PREA compliance manager through the relevant period.

Defendant Alex Adams was a correctional officer at Logan at

all relevant times. Officer Adams was assigned to the nightshift in

Ms. Farris’s housing unit and was in the unit’s control room when

Ms. Farris was assaulted.

Defendant Trina Snyder was a correctional officer at Decatur,

with the rank of lieutenant, at all relevant times. As head of

Decatur’s internal-affairs office, Lt. Snyder bore principal

responsibility for investigating allegations of staff and prisoner

misconduct at Decatur.

Defendant Jeff Gabor was an external investigator employed

by IDOC at all relevant times. In that capacity, Investigator Gabor

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was responsible for investigating allegations of staff and prisoner

misconduct throughout the Department of Corrections.

Defendant Patrick Keane served as IDOC’s systemwide PREA

coordinator between July 2013 and November 2015, when he was

succeeded by Defendant Michael Funk. Among other duties, Mr.

Keane and Mr. Funk were tasked with ensuring IDOC facilities’

compliance with PREA, facilitating PREA-related staff trainings and

overseeing IDOC’s federally mandated PREA audit.

Defendant Alan Pasley served as Superintendent of Logan’s

Reception & Classification Center (“R&C”) from 2013 to 2017. Mr.

Pasley also served as Mr. Funk’s backup PREA coordinator until

May 2016, when Mr. Pasley replaced Mr. Funk as agency PREA

coordinator.

B. Facts

The Court draws these facts from the parties’ statements of

undisputed facts and the evidence they submitted. The Court

deems admitted those facts not in dispute or disputed without an

evidentiary basis. See L.R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2).

1. Logan Correctional Center.

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Logan Correctional Center is a mixed-security women’s prison

located in Lincoln, Illinois. Logan opened in 1978 as a men’s

facility. By the early 1990s, IDOC had converted Logan into a

mixed-gender facility. Logan reverted to housing only men just a

few years later.

In early 2013, IDOC consolidated “the populations of the

state’s two largest women’s prisons” into Logan. See Pl.’s Resp. ex.

32, d/e 235-32, at 15 (““GIPA Report”). Before the transition, Logan

held around 1,500 medium-security male prisoners. Afterward,

Logan was charged with “managling] a population of 2,000 (or more)

women across all security classifications,” in addition to serving as

the statewide reception and classification center for each of the

2,900 or so women incarcerated in Illinois every year. Id. As the

John Howard Association of Illinois, a nonprofit prison-monitoring

organization, would later report, the Logan conversion was “under|-

]resourced and ill-conceived.” Id. An IDOC-led study similarly

found that the transition “took place with limited planning, staff

training|[,] and efforts to take into account the unique nature and

needs of such a large, complex women’s prison population.” Id.

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In March 2015, IDOC commissioned a gender-informed

practice assessment (GIPA) at Logan. See id. at 7. Over a four-day

period in November 2015, the GIPA team surveyed nearly 1,000

Logan prisoners, staff members, and external stakeholders. The

team sought to evaluate Logan’s ability to respond to the needs of

its unique population and to devise and propose “evidence-based”

and “trauma-informed” improvements.

The GIPA team found that Logan’s “divisive facility culture”

had engendered an “unstable environment that undermines the

safety of both the women [prisoners] and staff.” Id. at 18. For

example, although women of color predominated in Logan’s

custodial population, the facility was managed “by a predominantly

white and male staff” with “little, if any, training on cultural

responsivity.” Id. at 21. Staff members, too, “voiced concerns

about being unprepared to work with the Logan population, where

770 women are identified as SMI [seriously mentally ill], 60% are

estimated to be suffering from PTSD, and 75% have been the

victims of sexual abuse.” Id. at 20. Of the 800 prisoners surveyed,

84.4% indicated that Logan staff failed to treat the women in their

custody with respect.

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The study also identified systemic deficiencies in Logan’s

handling of grievances—written requests or complaints submitted

by prisoners. The GIPA team concluded that Logan’s grievance

process “[p]revent[ed] management from [k]nowing about and

[cJorrecting [p]roblems.” Id. at 18. The team’s findings revealed

that grievances were “not being properly tracked, logged, and

returned back to the grievance officer or the warden in a timely

manner and according to departmental policy.” Id. at 18-19. The

team further found that some Logan staff members “intimidate

women and throw grievances out or dismiss them prematurely.” Id.

at 19. Women at Logan reported “losing their job assignments,

being arbitrarily moved, [and otherwise] being mistreated by staff”

for complaining about staff misconduct. Id. And other staff and

supervisors deterred prisoners from filing grievances simply by

telling them that their complaints or allegations would “not be

believed.” Id.

2. Jacqueline Farris’s Incarceration Before December 28,

2015.

On November 30, 2015, Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris pled guilty

in Illinois state court to possessing between one and fifteen grams

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of cocaine, a Class 4 felony. People v. Farris, No. 2015-CF-1602

(Cir. Ct. Champaign Cnty.). The circuit court then sentenced Ms.

Farris to six years in IDOC custody. See Def.’s Mem. ex. B, d/e

214-2, at 2. In issuing its “Impact Incarceration Sentencing Order,”

the circuit court found that Ms. Farris’s offense “was committed as

the result of the use of... or addiction to... a controlled

substance.” Id. The circuit court further found that Ms. Farris met

“the eligibility requirements for possible placement in the Impact

Incarceration Program.” Id.

The Impact Incarceration Program, or “boot camp,” provides

individuals under Illinois felony sentence with “an alternative to

prison styled after the familiar military basic training program.”

United States v. Gajdik, 292 F.3d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2002). A

prisoner who completes boot camp is entitled to a reduction in his

sentence to time served. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1(a). If the prisoner “is

not accepted for placement” or “does not successfully complete the

program, his term of imprisonment shall be as set forth by the

court in its sentencing order.” Id.

Participation in boot camp ordinarily follows from a sentencing

judge’s recommendation. See id.; see also 20 II. Admin. Code §

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460.20. However, a judicial recommendation satisfies only one of

eight statutory eligibility requirements, and the sentencing judge’s

word is neither sufficient nor necessary. Cf. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1()

(enabling IDOC to “identify candidates for participation in the

program that were not previously recommended and formally

submit the names to” the committing state’s attorney); see also

Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 871 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000)

(noting that IDOC previously had rejected prisoners recommended

by sentencing judge). To enroll, a prisoner also must:

1) Be between 17 and 35 years of age;

2) Never have participated in the program before or served

more than one prior sentence of imprisonment for a felony

offense;

3) Not have been convicted of certain serious felonies such as

murder, rape, kidnapping, and arson;

4) Have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight

years or less;

5) Be physically able to participate in the program;

6) Not have any mental disorder or disability that would

prevent participation; and

7) Consent in writing.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1(b)(1-7). However, even if a prisoner

satisfies all the statutory eligibility criteria, IDOC still “may

consider, among other matters, .. . whether [the offender’s]

participation in the impact program may pose a risk to the safety or

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security of any person.” Id. The program’s enabling statute

therefore leaves to IDOC’s discretion the decision whether to admit

a particular candidate.

Certain categories of prisoners are definitionally ineligible for

boot camp, including prisoners who require psychotropic

medication for mental or emotional illness. Before a prisoner may

be admitted to boot camp, he must undergo a mental-health

evaluation “that focuses on ‘current and previous mental health

issues that could compromise the offender’s ability to successfully

complete the rigorous physical requirements or adhere to strict

disciplinary requirements of the program.” Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at

5 7 30. If IDOC finds “no evidence of current mental disorder that

would compromise [a prisoner’s] participation in the program,”

IDOC categorizes the offender as “Priority #1,” which means that

the offender does “[nJot have any mental disorder or disability that

would prevent participation.” Id. at 3 | 12. Ifthe offender reports a

“history” of psychological diagnoses or treatment, IDOC categorizes

the offender as “Priority #2” and performs further screening to

determine whether the “chronic or episodic mental health problem .

.. may influence [the offender’s] ability to complete the program.”

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Id. § 13. And if the offender’s “mental health needs require|]

psychotropic medications,” IDOC classifies the offender as “Priority

#3” and deems him ineligible for boot camp. Id. at 5 § 28. IDOC’s

internal directives and policies do not contemplate an exception to

this rule. Instead, IDOC expressly “prohibits .. . deeming a

prisoner on psychotropic medication eligible for the Impact

Incarceration Program.” Id. at 6 { 36.

Ms. Farris was admitted to Logan’s Reception & Classification

Center (“R&C”) for processing and placement on December 4, 2015.

When Ms. Farris began her sentence, she was 31 years old, a first-

time felony offender, a first-time prisoner, and under a six-year

sentence. Cf. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1(b)(1-4). Upon arrival, Ms. Farris

received a grey uniform screen-printed with the words “boot camp.”

She also received a one-page memorandum instructing her not to

“loan [her] IIP [Impact Incarceration Program] clothing to other IIP

inmate [sic].” See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ex. 9, d/e 223-9, at 1. Ms.

Farris then signed two forms: a release identifying her as “the

undersigned participant in the Impact Incarceration Program,” and

another release bearing the title “Impact Incarceration Form

Consent to Participate.” Id. ex. 10, d/e 223-10, at 1-3; cf. 730 ILCS

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/5-8-1.1(b)(7) (requiring that boot-camp participants “consent in

writing”). Ms. Farris also was furnished with a copy of Logan’s

orientation handbook. In relevant part, the handbook advised its

newly incarcerated readers that:

Sexual abuse and _ custodial sexual

misconduct are against the law.

The Department is committed to your safety

and the safety of staff. Sexual abuse

compromises everyone’s safety.

The Department has ZERO TOLERANCE of

sexual abuse. That means we are committed

to investigating EVERY allegation, getting

services to EVERY victim, and punishing

EVERY perpetrator. That includes involving

law enforcement and prosecutors.

Pl.’s Resp. ex. 10, d/e 235-10, at 6 (IDOC handbook).

Ms. Farris underwent a first-level mental health screening

later that day. The screening consisted of a brief interview with

Amy Rude, a licensed clinical social worker and IDOC contractor.

Ms. Rude memorialized the screening by checking two boxes on

Logan’s “Mental Health Impact Incarceration” form. One check

designated Ms. Farris as “Priority #1,” indicating that Ms. Rude had

found “no evidence of current mental disorder... that may

compromise the offender’s participation.” See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.

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ex. 11, d/e 223-11, at 1. The other check affirmed that, “[b]ased on

the medical screening above,” Ms. Farris was “[a]pproved to

participate in the Impact Incarceration program.” Id.; cf. 730 ILCS

/5-8-1.1(b)(6) (requiring that boot-camp participants “not have

any mental disorder or disability that would prevent participation”).

Ms. Farris also underwent a medical screening. Robert

Allison, a physician’s assistant and IDOC contractor, conducted Ms.

Farris’s examination. Like Ms. Rude, Mr. Allison found that Ms.

Farris satisfied IDOC’s physical-health qualifications and was

“(a]pproved to participate in the Impact Incarceration Program.”

See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ex. 13, d/e 223-13, at 1; see also 730 ILCS

5/5-8-1.1(b)(5) (requiring that boot-camp participants “be

physically able to participate in physical activities”).

On December 21, Logan submitted Ms. Farris’s “Offender

Classification Form” to IDOC’s transfer coordinator. See Pl.’s Mot.

Summ. J. ex. 14, d/e 223-14, at 1. The form indicated that Logan’s

superintendent had approved Ms. Farris for admission to boot

camp. Id. at 4. At Logan’s recommendation, Ms. Farris was to be

placed at “VIENNA: DIXON SPRINGS BOOT.” Id. As of December

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27, Ms. Farris remained approved and eligible for boot camp. See

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Second Interrogs., d/e 223-15, at § 2.

3. Ms. Farris’s Assault; Aftermath.

Ms. Farris awaited boot camp in the B-Wing of Housing Unit

15, which houses Logan’s Reception & Classification Center. By

day, Ms. Farris “had some freedom of movement within B Wing.”

Defs.’ Reply, d/e 249, at 90. By night, Ms. Farris was confined to

her cell, where she remained until breakfast. A correctional officer

monitored the housing unit’s electronic security systems for any

signs of unauthorized nighttime movement.

Ms. Farris lived under the watchful eye of housing-unit

correctional officers. One of these officers was Defendant Erik

Kohlrus. Officer Kohlrus began working at Logan in 2012, when it

still was a men’s facility. When Ms. Farris arrived, Officer Kohlrus

had just begun a 90-day rotation as the B-Wing’s overnight wing

officer. From 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Officer Kohlrus walked up

and down the B-Wing, looking for signs of improper activity.

Ms. Farris first met Officer Kohlrus when, about a week after

moving into the B-Wing, Officer Kohlrus “approached her cell and

asked her why she was there.” Id. For the next several weeks, he

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“would approach Plaintiffs locked cell multiple times during each

shift.” Id. If Ms. Farris “was sleeping, Kohlrus would sometimes

wake her up.” Id. Officer Kohlrus eventually began passing an

increasingly sexually charged series of notes through the slot in Ms.

Farris’s cell door. One evening, just a few days before Christmas,

Officer Kohlrus approached Ms. Kohlrus’s cell and instructed her to

disrobe and “spin in a circle.” Id. Ms. Kohlrus “complied, doing

what she was told.” Id.

Officer Kohlrus worked the last scheduled nightshift of his 90-

day rotation on December 27. At around 3:30 a.m., he awoke Ms.

Farris and her cellmate and instructed them to distribute breakfast

trays. After the two had finished, Officer Kohlrus ordered Ms.

Farris’s cellmate back into her room and directed Ms. Farris “to stay

behind for extra detail work.” Id. at 92. He then took Ms. Farris

into the B-Wing laundry room, told her to get on her knees, and

pushed her head toward his penis. “While she was performing oral

sex” on Officer Kohlrus, Ms. Farris “began to shake uncontrollably”

and ran out of the laundry room back to her cell. Id. at 93-94.

All of this transpired in full view of the B-Wing’s control

room—known as the “bubble”’—in which several officers, including

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Defendant Alex Adams, were monitoring the halls and cells for

improper movement. And while “the lights were off in the laundry

room,” there still was “a ray of light that shone directly . . . where

Plaintiff and Kohlrus were located.” Id. at 93. Officer Kohlrus later

returned to Ms. Farris’s cell and told her that he would “direct her

to return to the laundry room” once it was clear. Id. at 94. He left

Ms. Farris’s cell door unlocked.

Once the laundry room was available, Officer Kohlrus

“motioned for Plaintiff to return.” Id. Ms. Farris again followed

Officer Kohlrus into the laundry room, where he pulled Ms. Farris’s

pants down and began to engage in sexual intercourse. Officer

Kohlrus soon “removed his penis, turned Plaintiff around and to her

knees, pulled Plaintiffs head forward, and directed Plaintiff to open

her mouth before ejaculating.” Id. at 95. He then ordered Ms.

Farris “to open her mouth again, kissed her, and told her that she

was a ‘good girl.” Id. Before Ms. Farris left the laundry room,

Officer Kohlrus warned her “that if she told anyone, she would not

go to boot camp and would get in trouble.” Id. All of this transpired

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in full view of the control room.! Ms. Farris “returned to her cell,

where she lay on the floor crying.” Id. at 95-96.

Around 9:30 that morning, Ms. Farris told Robert Allison, a

mental-health staffer and IDOC contractor, that a correctional

officer—whom she identified as “Mr. K”*—had engaged in several sex

acts with her during his overnight shift. Ms. Farris reported feeling

“anxious” and asked to speak with a psychiatrist. Ms. Farris also

shared that she had “minimized” her history of psychiatric

treatment “because of rumors she’d heard about the advisability of

denying symptoms to get cleared for boot camp.” Def.’s Mem., d/e

214, at 4. Mr. Allison then memorialized Ms. Farris’s account in an

IDOC incident report, see Pl.’s Resp. ex. 62, d/e 235-62, at 2, and

contacted Defendant Lisa Johnson, his supervisor.

1 The parties agree that Ms. Farris and Officer Kohlrus had sex and

that Ms. Farris promptly reported it. The parties dispute only

whether the sex was consensual. As this Court previously has

found, however, IDOC “prisoners cannot consent to sex with prison

staff under any circumstances... . That constitutes staff sexual

misconduct which is against IDOC policy and against the law.” Doe

v. Macleod, No. 18-3191, 2023 WL 2698672, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Mar.

29, 2023) (citing 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2(e) (“A person is deemed

incapable of consent, for purposes of this Section, when he or she is

a probationer, parolee, releasee, inmate in custody of a penal

system or person detained or civilly committed under the Sexually

Violent Persons Commitment Act, or a person in the custody of a

law enforcement agency or employee.”)).

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Warden Christine Brannon quickly reported the suspected

assault to IDOC’s Investigations Unit, which assigned the matter to

Defendant Jeff Gabor, an IDOC external investigator. Investigator

Gabor interviewed Ms. Farris that afternoon and provided her with

a rape kit. He warned Ms. Farris that false reporting carried heavy

consequences, including the possibility of spending “way more time”

in prison. Defs.’ Reply, d/e 249, at 98. Once the interview ended,

Investigator Gabor placed Ms. Farris on “investigative status” and

assigned her to Logan’s health-care unit.

Investigator Gabor interviewed Officer Kohlrus on December

30, more than 36 hours after the assault allegedly had transpired.

Officer Kohlrus promptly admitted to “engaging in sexual activity”

with Ms. Farris. Id. at 104. He then resigned.

On December 31, Ms. Farris was evaluated by Dr. Jose

Mathews, a psychiatrist and IDOC contractor. According to Dr.

Mathews, Ms. Farris reported that she had been diagnosed with

and treated for an anxiety disorder before her incarceration. Dr.

Mathews noted that Ms. Farris previously had been prescribed at

least fifteen different psychotropic medications, including the

antidepressants Prozac and Wellbutrin and the anti-anxiety

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medications Ativan and Xanax. Dr. Mathews diagnosed Ms. Farris

with generalized anxiety disorder and prescribed Ms. Farris low

doses of three psychotropic medications: the sleeping aid trazadone

and the anti-anxiety medications hydroxyzine and buspirone.

On January 5, 2016, Ms. Rude completed a second “Mental

Health Impact Incarceration” form on behalf of Ms. Farris. The

form classified Ms. Farris “as a Priority #3, deemed ineligible to

participate in the Impact Incarceration Program because her mental

health needs required psychotropic medications.” Def.’s Mem., d/e

214, at5 7 28. Asaresult, Ms. Farris automatically was “denied

acceptance to the Impact Incarceration program because of her

prescription for psychotropic medications.” Id. at 7 7 28. She was

transferred to the Decatur Correctional Center three weeks later.

Ms. Farris discussed the circumstances of her transfer with

several other prisoners and staff members during her first few

weeks at Decatur. At least one of these individuals passed Ms.

Farris’ reports along to Defendant Trina Snyder, Decatur’s lead

internal-affairs officer. On February 5, Lt. Snyder instructed Ms.

Farris to sign a memorandum acknowledging that she would refrain

(with limited exceptions) from talking about her assault. Lt. Snyder

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told Ms. Farris that this arrangement was necessary to preserve the

integrity of IDOC’s ongoing investigation into Officer Kohlrus.

On March 24, Lt. Snyder sent Defendant Angela Locke a

disciplinary report alleging that Ms. Farris had violated a “direct

order during an interview conducted with her on 3/7/16 not to be

discussing the current investigation.” Pl.’s Resp. ex. 99, d/e 235-

99, at 2. Major Locke then “sign[ed] off on the ticket.” A. Locke

Dep., d/e 235-3, at 171:7-16. Ms. Farris received three months’

relegation to C-grade status—thereby losing all but a few of her

institutional privileges—and a monthlong restriction on telephone

use. See Pl.’s Resp. ex. 100, d/e 235-100, at 2.

Ms. Farris was released from custody in September 2018.

C. Procedural History

After completing her sentence, Ms. Farris brought this suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. She twice amended

her complaint. Am. Compl., d/e 14; Second Am. Compl., d/e 170.

In addition to the motions now before the Court, IDOC and

Ms. Farris also sought summary judgment on Ms. Farris’s ADA and

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Rehabilitation Act claims. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. d/e 213; Pl.’s Mot.

Summ. J., d/e 223. On February 13, 2023, this Court granted

partial summary judgment to Ms. Farris on liability and reserved

the question of damages for trial. Op. & Ord., d/e 128.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Ms. Farris brought this civil-rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and 29 U.S.C. § 794 et

seq. This Court, therefore, has federal-question jurisdiction over

her claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has supplemental

jurisdiction over Ms. Farris’s state-law claims, which share a

common nucleus of operative fact with her federal claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367 (district courts have jurisdiction “over all other claims

that are so related to claims .. . within such original jurisdiction

that they form part of the same case or controversy”). Venue is

proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Ms.

Farris’s claims occurred within this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no

genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of

the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant

believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A

genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact

could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698

F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). This Court construes all facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542

F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on six of Ms. Farris’s

thirteen claims.

A. Count III - Failure to Protect

Count III of Ms. Farris’s Second Amended Complaint alleges

that eight of the named Defendants are liable for failing to protect

her from a known, substantial risk of custodial sexual abuse.

In prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth

Amendment further requires that prison officials “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety” of the prisoners in their care.

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Therefore, to survive

summary judgment on Count III, Ms. Farris must offer evidence

from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants

were deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

A claim of deliberate indifference comprises two elements.

First, “the harm to which the prisoner was exposed must be an

objectively serious one.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. Second,

considered subjectively, the official must have had “actual, and not

merely constructive, knowledge of the risk” of harm and disregarded

that risk all the same. Id. On this element, “the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But while “this inquiry

focuses on an Official's subjective knowledge, a prisoner need not

present direct evidence of the official's state of mind.” Gevas, 897

F.3d at 480. Rather, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to

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demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

A general risk of harm is not enough to establish the existence

of a “substantial risk.” See Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178, 181 (7th

Cir. 2011). Still, if a plaintiff presents evidence that a risk of

attacks was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the

circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had

been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must

have known about it,” then an inference of actual knowledge ofa

substantial risk of harm may be permissible. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

843. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, an official’s actual

knowledge of a substantial risk “can be inferred by the trier of fact

from the obviousness of the risk.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641

(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Individual liability under section 1983 requires personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation. Gonzalez v. McHenry

Cnty., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022). To establish personal

liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the official

“caused the constitutional deprivation at issue or acquiesced in

Page 25 of 56

some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.” Id.

“Each case must be examined individually, with particular focus on

what the officer knew and how he responded.” Dale v. Poston, 548

F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has

explained:

[I]Jn order to hold an individual defendant liable

under § 1983 for a violation of an inmate’s

constitutional rights, the inmate must show

that the defendant was personally responsible

for that violation. A defendant will be deemed

to have sufficient personal responsibility if he

directed the conduct causing the

constitutional violation, or if it occurred with

his knowledge or consent. While the

defendant need not have participated directly

in the deprivation of the plaintiffs

constitutional right to be held liable, he or she

must nonetheless have known about the

conduct, facilitated it, approved it, condoned

it, or turned a blind eye for fear of what they

might see.

Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

Liability under section 1983 “is direct rather than vicarious.”

Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations

omitted). High-ranking officials and supervisors “are responsible

for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to

ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Id. But

Page 26 of 56

an official “responsible for setting prison policy” still may “be held

liable for a constitutional violation if they are aware of a systematic

lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety

yet fail to enforce that policy.” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 423

(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir.

1998)) (cleaned up). “[I|fa plaintiff presents evidence showing that

a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding and pervasive

or noted by prison officials in the past, and a defendant has been

exposed to information regarding the risk, then the evidence could

be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the official in fact

had actual knowledge.” Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938-39

(7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants do not dispute that sexual assault constitutes an

“objectively serious” harm. See J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367,

376 (7th Cir. 2020) (“To say that sexual assaults [that a guard]

committed against [the plaintiffs] objectively imposed a serious risk

to their safety would be an understatement.”). And Defendants

concede taking no action to prevent Ms. Farris’s assault. To defeat

summary judgment, Ms. Farris must present “enough evidence for

a reasonable jury to conclude that” Defendants actually knew that

Page 27 of 56

she “faced an ongoing, substantial risk of serious harm.” Balsewicz

v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2020).

1. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from

Count III.

Defendants all raise the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity on Count III. Qualified immunity insulates public

employees from liability for money damages if “their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Van den Bosch v.

Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S 223, 231 (2009)). In evaluating a qualified-

immunity defense, this Court asks two questions: whether “the

facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a

constitutional right,” and, if so, “whether the right at issue was

clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.”

See id. (cleaned up). A clearly established right is one that “is

sufficiently clear that any reasonable official would understand that

his or her actions violate that right, meaning that existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

Page 28 of 56

debate.” Zimmerman v. Doran, 807 F.3d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).

This Court must “approach the qualified-immunity inquiry by

treating as true the evidence-supported facts and inferences

favoring” Ms. Farris. Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 657 (citing Orlowski v.

Milwaukee Cnty., 872 F.3d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 2017)). Ms. Farris

charges that Defendants knew that she and other women at Logan

faced an acute risk of custodial sexual abuse but failed to take

reasonable steps to mitigate it. Defendants contend that these

allegations fall outside the clearly established scope of the Eighth

Amendment. E.g., Defs.” Mem., d/e 216, at 23 (arguing, without

citation or elaboration, that “the facts here do not give rise toa

constitutional violation”). The Court disagrees.

In Farmer, the Supreme Court “made clear that being violently

assaulted ...in prison is a serious harm.” Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at

657 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Farmer Court “also made

clear what a prison official must do when he learns that an inmate

faces an excessive danger of such a harm: take reasonable

measures to abate the danger.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-

33). “There can be no debate,” moreover, that prisoners have a

Page 29 of 56

clearly established right “to be free from deliberate indifference to

rape and assault.” Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.

2005); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir.

2000) (“In the simplest and most absolute of terms, the Eighth

Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was

unquestionably clearly established prior to the time of this alleged

assault [in the mid-1990s], and no reasonable prison guard could

possibly have believed otherwise.”). This right obtains even when

“the specific identity of the ultimate assailant is not known in

advance.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843). It does not matter whether the official

knew that the prisoner-plaintiff “was especially likely to be

assaulted by the [individual] who eventually committed the

assault.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. Nor does it matter “whether a

prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to

him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id.

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from Count III.

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2. Defendant Locke is not entitled to summary judgment

on Count III.

Defendant Angela Locke served as Logan’s acting warden from

March 2013, when the facility transitioned into a women’s prison,

until June 2015, just a few months before Ms. Farris’s arrival. Ms.

Farris claims that Major Locke abdicated “her responsibilities to

implement the IDOC’s sexual abuse prevention and intervention

program, even in the face of rampant violations and an environment

where sexual contact between prisoners and staff was a known and

accepted phenomenon,” thereby incarcerating Ms. Farris and others

in a sexually dangerous environment. Pl.’s Resp., d/e 239, at 67.

Major Locke now moves for summary judgment. She argues

that Ms. Farris “is attempting to... allege a Monell claim against

[her], and that must fail,” and that in any event her stint at Logan

was too attenuated from Ms. Farris’s to be causally related. Defs.’

Mem., d/e 216, at 16-17. Yet a factfinder could reach the opposite

conclusion. Construing the record in Ms. Farris’s favor, a

reasonable jury could find that Major Locke personally fostered a

sexually dangerous, constitutionally infirm culture at Logan. Her

motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Page 31 of 56

Major Locke first disputes that she “personally participated in

or caused the unconstitutional actions of Co-Defendant Kohlrus.”

Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 17. But Major Locke’s argument

misapprehends the nature of Ms. Farris’s claim. “Individual

defendants like [Major Locke], who are responsible for setting prison

policy, can be held liable for a constitutional violation if they are

aware of a systematic lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to

ensuring inmate safety yet fail to enforce that policy.” Sinn, 911

F.3d at 423 (citing Steidl, 151 F.3d at 741) (cleaned up). “[I]fa

plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate

attacks was longstanding and pervasive or noted by prison officials

in the past, and a defendant has been exposed to information

regarding the risk, then the evidence could be sufficient to permit a

trier of fact to find that the official in fact had actual knowledge.”

Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2001).

Ultimately, then, Major Locke need not have known that Ms. Farris

was particularly susceptible to harm—or that Erik Kohlrus could

have committed custodial sexual abuse—to violate Ms. Farris’s

Eighth Amendment rights.

Page 32 of 56

Instead, a reasonable jury could find that Major Locke knew

that staff-on-prisoner sexual abuse pervaded Logan. See id. Major

Locke testified that “staff were [not] properly trained to deal with

female offenders” during her tenure. A. Locke Dep., d/e 235-3, at

80:20-25. When asked about a spate of resignations by staff

members accused of sexual misconduct, Major Locke admitted she

“didn’t have to raise any concern” regarding the staff members’

conduct “because everybody -- I mean, everybody knew about it. So

I didn’t have to tell anybody that there’s concern. I think everybody

at that point had concerns.” Id. at 78:22-79:6.

A reasonable jury also could find that Major Locke “was aware

of systematic lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring

inmate safety yet fail[ed] to enforce that policy.” Sinn, 911 F.3d at

423. As before, Major Locke’s own testimony and statement of

undisputed facts would—standing alone—support such a finding.

Major Locke testified that Logan staff needed “training... to be

gender specific to the female so that the staff knew how to deal with

them.” See A. Locke Dep., d/e 235-3, at 81:1-6. She also

acknowledged taking no steps to provide gender-informed training

to an overwhelmingly male staff. See id. at 83:14-16 (“Q: As

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warden, did you have the ability to order additional training for staff

at Logan? A: I could have, yes.”); but see id. at 82:15-20 (“Q: Did

you implement any training during your tenure as acting warden to

account for this issue of staff, as you said, needing additional

training to understand their new population of prisoners? A: I

personally did not.”). Major Locke also received comprehensive

training on IDOC’s PREA-implementing regulations and

administrative directives while at Logan. Id. at 73:15-21. Yet she

“did not participate in any PREA audits, review of the PREA policy,

or the way the PREA policy was implemented while she was Acting

Warden at Logan.” Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 4 (citation omitted).

And the record contains substantial evidence that, under Major

Burke’s watch, Logan failed to monitor prisoners and staff who

reported sexual misconduct for possible retaliation—despite clear

federal and state mandates to do so. All of this would support a

jury finding in line with Ms. Farris’s interpretation of events: that

Warden Locke knew that enforcing PREA-aligned policies was of

utmost importance but failed to do so.

Major Locke lastly contends that her return to Decatur severed

any causal link to “events that occurred months after she left

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Logan.” See Defs.’ Reply, d/e 244, at 42. But the “requisite causal

connection” for constitutional tort liability can be satisfied “if the

defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew

or should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the

plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d

384, 397 (7th Cir. 1988). The Court has explained how a

reasonable jury could find Major Locke responsible for setting

Logan on a constitutionally deficient course. The same jury could

find that her responsibility—and her liability—were not vitiated by

her departure. See Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 487 (7th

Cir. 2011)).

In short, a reasonable jury could find that Major Locke

fostered a “culture that permitted and condoned violations of

policies that were designed to protect inmates.” Woodward v. Corr.

Med. Servs. of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). And

a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Farris’s assault was an

inevitable byproduct of Major Locke’s leadership. Her motion for

summary judgment on Count III is denied.

Page 35 of 56

3. Defendant Brannon is not entitled to summary

judgment on Count III.

Defendant Christine Brannon succeeded Major Locke as

Logan’s warden in June 2015. She ended her term the following

February. Ms. Farris alleges that Warden Brannon left Ms. Farris

and other women at Logan exposed to an acute risk of custodial

sexual abuse. Like Major Locke, Warden Brannon disputes that

she had any involvement in depriving Ms. Farris of her Eighth

Amendment rights. A reasonable factfinder could disagree.

First, Warden Brannon’s argument confuses vicarious liability,

which is not cognizable under Section 1983, for policymaker

liability, which is. See generally Sinn, 911 F.3d at 423 (citing

Steidl, 151 F.3d at 741) (“Individual defendants . .. who are

responsible for setting prison policy .. . can be held liable for a

constitutional violation if they are aware of a systematic lapse in

enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety yet fail to

enforce that policy.”). Her argument also belies an overwhelming

mass of contrary record evidence, which suggests that Warden

Brannon neglected, or at best misunderstood, all of her obligations.

In fact, Warden Brannon’s deposition testimony—standing alone—

Page 36 of 56

creates a genuine dispute of material fact on each element of Ms.

Farris’s deliberate indifference claim.

As Judge Scudder has keenly observed, the “confinement

setting is a tinderbox for sexual abuse.” J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 382.

Warden Brannon, however, could demonstrate only a slight grasp of

that proposition:

e “Q: Do you believe that... sexual harassment or sexual

misconduct are a problem in prisons? A: I think there are --

I’m sure there may be cases of this, but I don’t think it’s a

longstanding, widespread issue.” C. Brannon Dep., d/e 218-

6, at 24:8-24.

e “Q: Do you believe that sexual assault and sexual harassment

were a problem at Logan Correctional Center? A: No, I do not.”

Id. at 48:1-4.

e “Q: Do you recall making any specific inquiries [after becoming

Warden] about whether sexual assault or sexual harassment

were a problem at Logan? A: No, Ido not.” Id. at 26:1-4.

This testimony does not disprove Warden Brannon’s

knowledge of custodial sexual abuse at Logan. A correctional

officer’s “own testimony that he was subjectively unaware of a

substantial risk of serious harm is not enough for summary

judgment if a jury could find otherwise from the evidence in the

record.” Boyd v. Pork, No. 01-cv-7957, 2003 WL 21011805, at *4

Page 37 of 56

(N.D. Ill. May 2, 2003) (citing Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616,

621 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding correctional officer’s deposition

testimony, which suggested that officer had ignored obvious risks of

harm, “not enough to eliminate a genuine issue of fact”)). Further,

Warden Brannon’s testimony belies both the recollections of her

codefendants and the substantial evidence in the record of staff-on-

prisoner sexual misconduct. Regardless of whether she appreciated

the risk of sexual abuse at Logan, a reasonable jury could discredit

her pleas of ignorance and find that risk too obvious to ignore.

The same must be said of Warden Brannon’s testimony on her

statutorily and internally mandated PREA obligations. Warden

Brannon’s chief responsibility was “to ensure the safety of the staff

and offenders” at Logan. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 218, at 14. As for

IDOC’s PREA program, Warden Brannon “was responsible for

ensuring compliance with PREA postings and guidelines, that the

PREA Compliance Manager had the appropriate training and held

required meetings, and that the proper notifications were made if □

PREA complaint was made.” Id. at 32. She also bore “the ultimate

responsibility to make sure [PREA] retaliation monitoring was done

at Logan.” Id. at 14. Warden Brannon testified both that she could

Page 38 of 56

not recall much, if anything, about her PREA-related work and that

she followed IDOC’s administrative directives to the letter. See C.

Brannon Dep., d/e 218-6, at 162:17-24 (“Q: And do you think there

was still difficulties with getting the word out [on] PREA policies

when you were warden at Logan? A: I don’t recall. Q: You don’t

recall any problems with getting the word out? A: I don’t -- I don’t

recall. I just don’t really recall. I don’t recall.”); but see id. at

247:21-248:9 (“Q: So again, did you do anything to investigate the

number of substantiated allegations of sexual abuse against guards

at Logan? A: No, I did not. Q: Did you take any steps to try to

reduce the number of sexual assaults that were occurring or sexual

abuse that was being committed by guards at Logan? A: I just

ensur|ed]| that the PREA protocol was followed and staff was

following the procedures. Q: I know you already discussed that. Is

there anything else we haven’t already discussed? A: Nothing

additional.”). A jury must resolve these factual discrepancies.

Warden Brannon’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Page 39 of 56

4. Defendants Charron, Ashley, and Johnson are not

entitled to summary judgment on Count III.

Defendant Clara Charron served as Logan’s PREA compliance

manager from 2013 until December 2015, when she was replaced

by Defendant Norine Ashley. Their backup PREA compliance

manager was Defendant Lisa Johnson, the head of Logan’s health-

care unit. As PREA compliance managers, these Defendants were

charged with ensuring “that the PREA Guidelines were initiated,”

with overseeing Logan’s annual PREA compliance audit, and with

monitoring PREA complainants for retaliation. See Defs.’ Mem., d/e

217, at 9-11. In Count III, Ms. Farris alleges that their enforcement

of IDOC’s PREA standards was constitutionally deficient. Assistant

Warden Charron, Dr. Ashley, and Ms. Johnson all move for

summary judgment. However, several triable issues of material fact

remain as to whether any of these Defendants satisfied their PREA-

compliance obligations—or if they did anything more than complete

the occasional round of paperwork.

Take retaliation monitoring, which Warden Brannon testified

was “always done” during her tenure. C. Brannon Dep., d/e 218-6,

at 84:23-85:1. Neither Dr. Ashley nor Assistant Warden Charron

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testified to doing it. In fact, while Dr. Ashley claimed that

retaliation monitoring was within Assistant Warden Charron’s

remit, Assistant Warden Charron could not recall “taking any

actions to monitor retaliation”—or whether PREA prohibited

retaliation in the first place. Compare N. Ashley Dep., d/e 235-4, at

76:5-80:4 (testifying to “not doing the retaliation monitoring,”

because “that was being done by AWP [Assistant Warden of

Programs] Charron”) with C. Charron Dep., d/e 235-8, at 159:15-

163:24 (“A: I can’t remember who monitored [retaliation].”). Ms.

Johnson admitted to having borne responsibility for retaliation

monitoring; she further testified to overseeing some retaliation

monitoring after instances of inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct.

see A. Johnson Dep., d/e 218-4, at 51:2—20. But Ms. Johnson, too,

could not recall doing retaliation monitoring herself. Id. at 50:22-

91:14. Whether these three Defendants ever conducted retaliation

monitoring must be decided by a jury.

The Court locates another triable issue of material fact in the

gap between Defendants’ actions and IDOC’s policies. To illustrate,

Dr. Ashley testified that her role as PREA compliance manager was

a “very important job,” and that it “should be more than just an

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accounting process.” N. Ashley Dep., d/e 235-4, at 61:19-62:2.

Yet Dr. Ashley also testified that “accounting”’—“making sure that

paperwork was done, that we could pass the audit”—was precisely

the expected scope of her portfolio. See id. Assistant Warden

Charron’s recollections aligned with those of Dr. Ashley. See C.

Charron Dep., d/e 218-5, at 91:22-92:5 (“Q: Do you recall any

aspects of your position as PREA Compliance Manager as you sit

here today? A: Just to ensure that the process was followed if

reported and documented and then passed through the process.”).

Construing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Farris, a

jury reasonably could find that these Defendants left Ms. Farris

with no procedural guardrails to protect her from custodial sexual

abuse. Their motion for summary judgment on Count III is denied.

5. Defendants Keane, Funk, and Pasley are not entitled to

summary judgment on Count III.

Defendant Patrick Keane was IDOC’s systemwide PREA

coordinator between July 2013 and November 2015, when he was

succeeded by Defendant Michael Funk. Defendant Alan Pasley,

Logan’s R&C Superintendent, served as a backup systemwide PREA

coordinator at all relevant times. These Defendants primarily were

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tasked with ensuring IDOC facilities’ compliance with PREA,

facilitating PREA-related staff trainings and overseeing IDOC’s

federally mandated PREA audit. Ms. Farris alleges that these

Defendants knew of an ongoing, acute risk of sexual abuse at Logan

and “abjectly disregarded their responsibilities” nonetheless. Pl.’s

Resp., d/e 240, at 107.

A reasonable factfinder, construing the record in Ms. Farris’s

favor, could agree. All three men readily acknowledged the gravity

of their obligations and the consequences of poor compliance and

oversight. See, e.g., P. Keane Dep., d/e 235-14, at 169:21-170:8

(“Q: Do you think you owed a responsibility to the women at Logan

Correctional Center to do your best job to protect them from sexual

abuse by male staffP A: I owed it to every inmate of the Illinois

Department of Corrections. I owed it to every -- staff of the Illinois

Department of Corrections to do the job -- to do my job as best as I

knew how, which is exactly what I did.”). These Defendants further

acknowledged that they had fallen well short. According to Mr.

Funk, Mr. Keane summarized his two-plus years as PREA

coordinator as involving database management and developing a

single course of compliance training. M. Funk. Dep., d/e 235-15,

Page 43 of 56

at 253:20-254:6. And when asked if he believed that his tenure as

“agency-wide PREA Coordinator was a success,” Mr. Keane said

that he did, because he “didn’t get fired.” P. Keane Dep., d/e 235-

14, at 251:1-5. A reasonable jury could evaluate these Defendants’

job performances far more harshly. Their motion for summary

judgment is denied.

B. Failure to Intervene (Count IV)

Defendant Alex Adams, a Logan correctional officer, was

stationed in Housing Unit 15’s control room at the time of Ms.

Farris’s assault. From there, Officer Adams could monitor

electronically any movement in the B-Wing. He also had a window

directly into the housing unit’s laundry room. In Count IV, Ms.

Farris alleges that Officer Adams “could see or had the opportunity

to see the harm occurring to Plaintiff as she was raped, or knew the

rape was going to occur,” but consciously failed to intervene on Ms.

Farris’s behalf. Second Am. Compl. 4§ 70-77, d/e 170.

Contending that the record contains “no evidence, save Plaintiff's

speculation,” of his awareness of the assault, Officer Adams now

seeks summary judgment. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 218, at 36.

Page 44 of 56

A correctional officer “who fails to intervene to try to prevent

known cruel or unusual force, despite a reasonable opportunity to

do so, may be held liable under § 1983.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d

998, 1007 (7th Cir. 2018). To succeed on her claim for failure to

intervene, Ms. Farris must prove that Officer Adams “(1) knew that

a constitutional violation was committed; and (2) had a realistic

opportunity to prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335,

342 (7th Cir. 2017). “Whether an officer had sufficient time to

intervene or was capable of preventing the harm caused by the

other officer is generally an issue for the trier of fact unless,

considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly

conclude otherwise.” Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110

F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Abdullahi v. City of Madison,

423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing Lanigan’s

formulation as a “stringent standard”).

The undisputed record shows that Officer Adams was well

positioned—and obligated—to see Ms. Farris’s assault as it

occurred. As a control officer, Officer Adams was “the eyes for the

housing unit.” A. Adams Dep., d/e 235-5, at 88:8-10. Officer

Adams testified that “if there were prisoners outside of their cell on

Page 45 of 56

the 11 to 7 unit, ... [he had the] responsibility to notice that and

take action in response.” Id. at 88:14-19. And from his vantage

point in the control room, as Alan Pasley and others testified,

Officer Adams had a “clear view” of the laundry room and its

occupants. A. Pasley Dep., d/e 235-6, at 268:17-23.

Whether Officer Adams saw (or could see) Officer Kohlrus or

Ms. Farris remains unanswered. Officer Adams testified that he

could not “recall that day one way or the other.” See A. Adams

Dep., d/e 235-5, at 86:2-87:6. Yet Robert Allison’s incident report,

completed just six hours after Ms. Farris’s assault, quotes Ms.

Farris as expressing concern for “everyone else in the bubble

[control room| who was watching out for” Erik Kohlrus. Pl.’s Resp.

ex. 62, d/e 235-62, at 2. Construing all this evidence in the light

most favorable to Ms. Farris, a reasonable jury could find that

Officer Adams saw what was occurring in the laundry room and did

nothing. His motion for summary judgment on Count IV is denied.

C. Section 1983 Conspiracy (Count V)

In Count V, Ms. Farris alleges that nearly all the Defendants

involved here—Locke, Snyder, Brannon, Charron, Ashley, Johnson,

Gabor, Adams, Keane, Funk, and Pasley—engaged in two discrete

Page 46 of 56

conspiracies to deprive her of her constitutional rights. See Second

Am. Compl. 94 70-77, d/e 170. In the first, Officer Adams and Erik

Kohlrus (along with a third, since-dismissed correctional officer)

conspired to facilitate and then cover up Kohlrus’s sexual abuse of

Ms. Farris. Id. 71-74. In the second, the remaining Defendants

conspired to “deprive Plaintiff and other prisoners” of their First,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and to “protect one

another” from any potential liability. Id. 4 75-77. These

Defendants now move for summary judgment on Count V.

A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons

acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, “the principal element

of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong

against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in

damage.” Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). An

express agreement between the conspirators is unnecessary; the

participants simply must share the same general conspiratorial

objective. Id. Direct proof of such an agreement is rarely available,

of course, since conspiracies are by their nature secretive

endeavors. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 511 (7th Cir.

2015). Even still, although a conspiracy “certainly may be

Page 47 of 56

established by circumstantial evidence, .. . such evidence cannot

be speculative.” Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir.

2003). To survive summary judgment, Ms. Farris must identify

facts from which a reasonable jury could find “(1) an express or

implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of .. . her

constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights in

the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.” Scherer v.

Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988).

Defendants argue that Ms. Farris’s conspiracy claims rest on

speculation rather than evidence. The Court agrees. As in most

conspiracies, the record here does not contain evidence of an overt

agreement between any of these Defendants. Cf. Amundsen v.

Chicago Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff

must show that defendants “directed themselves toward an

unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding” with

evidence suggesting a “meeting of the minds”). Nor does the record

contain sufficient evidence from which an inference of an implicit

agreement could be drawn. Construed in the light most favorable

to Ms. Farris, the record instead reflects an endemic indifference

toward an obvious risk of custodial sexual abuse. That may well be

Page 48 of 56

the sort of systemic pattern or practice cognizable under Monell.

Cf. Woodward, 368 F.3d at 929 (affirming Monell jury verdict “based

on repeated failures to ensure [prisoner’s] safety... as wellasa

culture that permitted and condoned violations of policies that were

designed to protect inmates like [him]”). But it is not a civil

conspiracy. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Count V.

D. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process (Count VI)

Count VI alleges that Defendants Brannon, Charron, Ashley,

Johnson, and Gabor revoked Ms. Farris’ boot-camp eligibility

without notice or a hearing. Second Am. Compl. 78-84, d/e

170. As Ms. Farris does not contest these Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Count VI, see Pl.’s Resp., d/e 241, at 147

n.8, that motion is granted.

E. First Amendment Retaliation (Count VII)

In Count VII, Ms. Farris alleges that seven of the named

Defendants retaliated against her after she made “statements about

her sexual assault to prisoners and prison staff.” See Second Am.

Compl. {{ 85-92, d/e 170. The First Amendment “protects

speakers from threats of punishment that are designed to

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discourage future speech.” Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525

(7th Cir. 2009). To survive summary judgment, Ms. Farris must

identify evidence from which a jury could find (1) that she engaged

in protected First Amendment activity, (2) that she suffered a

deprivation likely to deter future protected speech, and (3) that her

protected speech was “at least a motivating factor” in Defendants’

decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d

941, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).

1. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from

Count VII.

Before proceeding to the merits, the Court must address

Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. As with Count III,

Defendants offer only a brief, generalized argument toward that

end. See Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 23 (“As thoroughly discussed

supra, the facts here do not give rise to a constitutional violation by

Defendants Locke and Snyder and, for the forgoing reasons, they

are entitled to qualified immunity to the respective claims.”). A

prisoner’s “right to tell the officers his account of events” without

consequence, however, has long been clearly established First

Amendment law. McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. App’x 511, 514

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(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551); see also Hughes v.

Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Allegations of retaliation

for complaining about abuse support a claim under the First

Amendment.”). And “the First Amendment protects against

retaliation even if the retaliatory action itself does not amount to an

independent constitutional violation.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951

F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020). Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity from Count VII.

2. Defendants Charron, Ashley, and Johnson are entitled

to summary judgment on Count VII.

Ms. Farris “does not contest summary judgment on her

retaliation claims against Charron, Ashley, and Johnson.” PIl.’s

Resp., d/e 239, at 180 n.19. Their motion for summary judgment

on Count VII is, therefore, granted.

3. Defendants Brannon, Gabor, Locke, and Snyder are not

entitled to summary judgment on Count VII.

Ms. Farris first claims that Warden Brannon and Investigator

Gabor committed unlawful retaliation when, immediately after Ms.

Farris reported her assault, they confined her to Logan’s health-

care unit for more than a week and required her to sign an

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agreement not to discuss her assault. A prison transfer—whether

to a particular cell or a different facility—can be retaliatory if it

would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in

protected activity.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 881 (7th

Cir. 2020). “[A] transfer initiated to punish a prisoner for engaging

in protected activity would satisfy the causation element of

retaliation, but a transfer initiated as a rational, justifiable response

to the substance of the prisoner’s complaint would not.” Id. at 879.

This Court must give considerable “deference to prison

officials’ decisions when . . . maintaining order in a volatile

environment, and [to] the justifications offered for those decisions.”

Id. at 880 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). That

deference requires the Court not to become too “enmeshed in the

minutiae of prison operations.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 562. Still, the

Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Investigator Gabor’s

interview tactics were lawfully coercive. Nor can the Court conclude

that a weeklong stint in segregation was intended to protect Ms.

Farris rather than punish her. Investigator Gabor and Warden

Brannon’s motion for summary judgment on Count VII is denied.

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The same must be said of Major Locke and Lt. Snyder’s

liability on Count VII. Ms. Farris claims that these Defendants

unlawfully punished her “for allegedly discussing the assault...

while incarcerated at Decatur Correctional Center,” nearly four

months after Erik Kohlrus’s resignation and several months after

IDOC had concluded its internal investigation. Second Am. Compl.

4 91, d/e 170. A reasonable jury could agree.

There can be no dispute that the subject of Ms. Farris’s

speech—her sexual abuse at the hands of a correctional officer—

was protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Hughes, 809 F.3d

at 334. Yet Major Locke and Lt. Snyder maintain that their

prosecution of Ms. Farris was justified by valid penological

concerns. They say that Ms. Farris’s actions could have

“compromised” the “integrity of the ongoing investigation of

Plaintiffs sexual assault” and posed a “safety risk” to her and

others. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 22.

Major Locke and Lt. Snyder’s liability cannot be resolved at

summary judgment. The record indicates that IDOC “had no policy

against sexual assault victims speaking to others about their sexual

assaults, even if there is an ongoing investigation.” Pl.’s Resp., d/e

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239, at 81; see also A. Pasley Dep., d/e 235-6, at 248:5-10 (“Q:

There’s no policy requiring [prisoners] not to talk about their sexual

assault, correct? A: Not to my knowledge, no. Q: Was there a

policy that required them not to talk about open investigations? A:

Not to my knowledge.”). Moreover, Investigator Gabor ended his

investigation as early as January 28 and no later than March 7. Lt.

Snyder filed her disciplinary report weeks—if not months—

afterward. So even if Lt. Snyder and Major Locke would have had a

reasonable justification for charging Ms. Farris with insolence

during the investigation’s active period, that justification evaporated

upon the investigation’s conclusion. Their motion for summary

judgment on Count VII is denied.

F. State-Law Negligent Spoliation (Count XIII)

Count XIII alleges that Defendants Brannon, Charron,

Johnson, Ashley, Gabor, Keane, Funk, and Pasley negligently failed

to preserve photographic and video evidence of Ms. Farris’s rape.

Second Am. Compl. □□ 117-121, d/e 170. These Defendants now

move for summary judgment on Count XIII.

The Court finds that summary judgment on Count XIII is

premature. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, a claim of

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spoliation of evidence “is connected to the merits of the underlying

suit.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 510

(7th Cir. 2007). If Ms. Farris “cannot prevail in the underlying suit

even with the allegedly lost or destroyed evidence, then [her] claim

for spoliation will fail because [she] cannot prove damages.” Id.

Seeing as this claim “might not need to be tried at all based on the

jury’s verdicts on the other claims,” the Court will deny Defendants’

motions for summary judgment on Count XIII, though with leave to

refile “once all other claims have been resolved.” Duran v. Town of

Cicero, 653 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2011).

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment are resolved as follows:

1. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Locke and Snyder (d/e 215) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of these

Defendants on Count V of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Brannon, Charron, Ashley, Johnson, Adams, and Gabor

(d/e 217) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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Judgment shall enter in favor of these Defendants on

Counts V and VI of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED, except that

Defendants may renew their motion for summary

judgment on Count XIII after trial.

3. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Keane, Funk, and Pasley (d/e 219) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of

these Defendants on Count V of Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED,

except that Defendants may renew their motion for

summary judgment on Count XIII after trial.

4. status conference in this matter is hereby SET for

October 12, 2023, at 2:30 p.m. Counsel for all parties—

including counsel for Defendant Kohlrus—shall

participate by videoconference, the instructions for which

are attached. Counsel should be prepared to discuss (1)

the status of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Kohlrus

and (2) new trial settings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

FOR THE COURT:

if Suet. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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