Ayoubi v. Baker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

FIRAS AYOUBI, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-4220

)

LATOYA HUGHES et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Firas Ayoubi, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”), filed a

Complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff also filed a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc.

3), a Motion for Injunctive Relief, a Motion to Supplement (Doc. 6) his Motion for

Injunctive Relief, and Motions for Expedited Screening (Doc. 9) and Ruling (Doc. 10).

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Petition

Before the Court conducts a Merit Review screening of Plaintiff’s pleading,

Plaintiff must make the requisite showing that he is in imminent danger of serious

physical injury because Plaintiff has, on three or more occasions, filed complaints that

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which Plaintiff acknowledges

in his pleading. (Pl. Compl. Doc. 1 at 9.)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides as follows:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a

judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if

the prisoner has, on [three] or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on

the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Section 1915(g) “does not preclude a prisoner from bringing suit in federal court

entirely; rather, the prisoner may either prepay in full all filing fees or make a showing of

imminent danger of serious physical injury … to proceed with a federal suit.” Isby v.

Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 520 (7th Cir. 2017).

“[T]o meet the imminent danger requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the ‘threat or

prison condition [must be] real and proximate.’” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002)). “Allegations of past

harm do not suffice; the harm must be imminent or occurring [when] the complaint is

filed.” Id. See also Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the

imminent danger exception does not apply where there is no present danger or where

the plaintiff “faced imminent danger sometime in the past.”).

Plaintiff’s pleading alleges deficient conditions of confinement at Hill, which

include exposure to black mold, sewage, and floor adhesive, among others. Plaintiff’s

allegations, taken as true at the pleading stage, are sufficient to meet the relatively low

criteria required to satisfy the imminent danger standard he faces as a three-strike

litigant. See Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 330 (concluding that it is improper to adopt a

“complicated set of rules [to discern] what conditions are serious enough” to constitute

“serious physical injury”). Therefore, Plaintiff may proceed with his claims without

prepaying the $405 filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 3) is granted. The

Clerk of the Court is directed to calculate the appropriate initial filing fee remittance.

II. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The court must “screen” the complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim

or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing

the complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them

in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,

conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422

(7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff names as Defendants the Illinois Department of Corrections Director

LaToya Hughes, Hill Warden Tyrone Baker, an unidentified contractor, and an unnamed

manufacturer.

Plaintiff’s allegations concern the conditions of his confinement at Hill

Correctional Center since his arrival at the receiving unit in April 2023, where he noticed

human waste, blood, and “other toxic substances on the walls and ceilings.” (Doc. 1 at

10:6.) Plaintiff adds that there were persistent leaks, exposed floor adhesive where tiles

had been removed that could not be removed by scrubbing, and mold in the shower and

living areas. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff adds that staff informed him that construction at Hill

was ongoing, necessitating inmate movement.

Plaintiff was moved to “[two] house,” where he witnessed broken floor tiles

throughout, “serious” leaks coming from plumbing closets, mold in the shower areas

near ventilation units and ceilings, floor adhesive that had a “greasy look,” and severe

roof leaks coming into the dayroom. (Id. at 9:9-12.) Sometime later, Plaintiff was moved

to one house because of construction, where he observed similar conditions described in

two house. After a few months, Plaintiff was moved to three house “[w]hich had

strikingly the same deficiencies.” (Id. at 10:18.)

Plaintiff was then moved back to two house, which was “allegedly fixed.” (Id. at

10:19.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Baker, Hill’s Warden, and contractors inspected

two house before its reopening. However, Plaintiff claims he observed all the floor tiles

were removed, leaving exposed adhesive in all areas, including cells, a huge pond of

sewage water in the dayroom, the showers and ventilation units were littered with black

mold, and chipping paint on almost every wall. (Id. at 10:22-25.) Plaintiff was later moved

to four house where he observed mold everywhere, leaks, and exposed floor adhesive.

(Id. at 11:27.) Plaintiff claims he suffers from cough, chest pain and tightness, headaches,

and difficulty breathing. (Id. at 14:60, 62.)

C. Analysis

“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subjecting prisoners to

conditions of confinement amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.” Giles v. Godinez,

914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). “As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an objective and a subjective

component.” Id. “The plaintiff must first establish ‘an objective showing that the

conditions are sufficiently serious—i.e., that they deny the inmate “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and

safety.’” Id. at 1051 (quoting Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017)). “The plaintiff

must next establish ‘a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of mind.’” Id.

“[T]he state of mind necessary to establish liability is deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s health or safety.” Giles, 914 F.3d at 1051.

Despite naming Defendant Hughes, Plaintiff does not describe the acts or

omissions Hughes took to infer her personal involvement. See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469,

478 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable under § 1983 for a

violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights, the inmate must show that the defendant

was personally responsible for that violation.”).

However, Plaintiff does state that Defendant Baker inspected the housing area and

knew about the deficient conditions, which is sufficient to state a conditions of

confinement claim against him. See Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2001)

(holding that the facility’s warden is the proper defendant to answer for claims regarding

conditions of confinement and to conduct any injunctive relief granted). However,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the unidentified contractor and unnamed

manufacturer.

“Section 1983 only permits an individual to sue a ‘person’ who deprives that

individual of his or her federally-guaranteed rights under color of state law.” Snyder v.

King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). Neither a contracting company nor manufacturer

are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th

Cir. 2015). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s account does not permit the reasonable inference that

the contractor or manufacturer acted under the color of law as contemplated by § 1983.

See Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels, Inc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The fact that

a “private entity performs a function that serves the public does not transform its conduct

into state action.’”) (quoting Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996)).

III. Injunctive Relief

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, whether through a temporary restraining

order or preliminary injunction, the movant is required to show that “(1) his underlying

case has some likelihood of success on the merits, (2) no adequate remedy at law exists,

and (3) he will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.” Merritte v. Kessel, 561 Fed.

App’x. 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2014). “A harm is ‘irreparable’ if it ‘cannot be prevented or fully

rectified by the final judgment after trial.’” Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts

of the United States of Am. Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roland Mach.

Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)).

“The plaintiff who seeks an injunction has the burden of persuasion—damages are

the norm, so the plaintiff must show why his case is abnormal.” e360 Insight v. Spamhaus

Project, 500 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co.,

B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Rust Env’t. & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen,

131 F.3d 1210, 1219 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a party seeking a preliminary injunction

must satisfy each element). Although Plaintiff moves for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) and preliminary injunction, the Court construes Plaintiff’s filing (Doc. 5) as a

TRO only because a district court “may not issue a preliminary injunction without

advance notice to the adverse parties.” Wheeler v. Talbot, 770 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief because Plaintiff has not

sufficiently addressed any aspect of his threshold burden. Plaintiff asserts in his filing

that he had satisfied the mentioned elements conclusively without elaboration. The Court

also denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement his Motion for Injunctive Relief. (Doc. 6.)

Plaintiff’s supplement contains a sworn statement of another inmate who raises similar

claims, which is irrelevant to Plaintiff satisfying his burden of persuasion. See Ray v.

Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 1983 claims are personal to the

injured party.”) (citing Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that parents

may sue only for constitutional injury to themselves, not for constitutional injuries to their

son). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief, concluding

that he has not clearly shown a basis for such relief.

IV. Remaining Motions

With the entry of the Court’s Order, Plaintiff’s Motions for Expedited Screening

(Doc. 9) and Ruling (Doc. 10) are moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 3) is granted. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to calculate the appropriate initial filing fee remittance.

2) The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5) and

Motion to Supplement (Doc. 6) for the reasons stated in the Court’s Order.

3) Plaintiff’s Motions for Expedited Screening (Doc. 9) and Ruling (Doc. 10) are

MOOT with the entry of the Court’s Order.

4) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to state and Eighth

Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendant Baker.

Plaintiff’s claims proceed against Baker in his individual capacity only.

Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s

discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15.

5) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Latoya Hughes,

Unknown Contractor, and Unknown Manufacturer as Defendants.

6) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to

give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will

generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence

to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

7) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a

waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer.

If Defendant has not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within

ninety days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting

the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter

an Order to set discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

8) If Defendant Baker no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff,

the entity for whom Baker worked while at that address shall submit to the

Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket

nor disclosed by the Clerk.

9) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should

include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order.

In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not

rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a

motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be

considered.

10) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically

receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff

with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the

Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses.

Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff

must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendant’s

counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will

explain the discovery process in more detail.

11) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place

of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

12) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in

his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the

Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

13) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to

effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant

and will require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

14) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order

under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

15) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the

standard procedures.

ENTERED June 13, 2024.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

___________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE