Opinion

Brown v. Wexford Health Sources Inc

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
May 23, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.6%

“To amend a pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s Scheduling Order deadline to amend pleadings, the moving party must show ‘good cause’”

How later courts described this case

  • “To amend a pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s Scheduling Order deadline to amend pleadings, the moving party must show ‘good cause’”
  • providing the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits against state officials acting in their official capacities such that it precludes claims for retroactive damages to be paid from a state treasury

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

REGINALD BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-03018-SLD-JEH

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) and Defendants Steven Bowman and Latoya

Hughes’s1 (IDOC Defendants) Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43). For the reasons set forth

below, the Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

I

On January 24, 2023, Plaintiff Reginald Brown (Reginald) filed his original

complaint (Doc. 1) against Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Abdur

Nawoor, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) Rob Jeffreys,

and Medical Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections Dr. Steven Bowman

alleging an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Dr. Nawoor, a Monell

1 Hughes is identified as the Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, and pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), “An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in

an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The

officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Thus, Hughes in her official capacity is

automatically substituted for Defendant Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity who, it appears from the

proposed Second Amended Complaint at Law (Doc. 40-3) ceased being the Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections in 2023.

claim against Defendants Jeffreys, Bowman, and Wexford, and a state law medical

malpractice claim against Defendants Dr. Nawoor and Wexford. On March 14,

2023, Reginald filed his First Amended Complaint at Law (Doc. 8) that included

the same claims against the same Defendants as in his original complaint.

Specifically, Reginald alleged, among other things, that he had been diagnosed

with chronic liver disease and Hepatitis C prior to his admission in 2017 to IDOC,

and he never received proper treatment for his Hepatitis C while in IDOC custody

despite the fact that the Defendants were aware of his condition. In both his

original and First Amended Complaints, Reginald pointed out that this is a re-filed

case; the first-filed case was filed on September 7, 2021 and was dismissed, via

Reginald’s motion to dismiss the case voluntarily, on November 7, 2022. See Brown

v. Hackney, et al., 3:21-cv-03197-CSB-EIL (C.D. Ill.).

In this, the re-filed case, a discovery schedule was put into place on May 24,

2023 and included a deadline of September 1, 2023 to amend the pleadings and/or

add parties. After being extended, the dispositive motion deadline in this case is

now July 30, 2024. On January 18, 2024, Reginald’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss

Defendant Dr. Nawoor with prejudice was granted, and on February 22, 2024,

Defendant Wexford was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the parties’ Joint

Stipulation of Dismissal. On January 9, 2024, the Plaintiff died. The Executor of

the Estate of Reginald Brown, Deceased, filed the instant Motion to amend on

April 5, 2024 seeking to substitute the Executor (Khristi Mitchell) as the plaintiff

and to add additional defendants and claims. The Court allows the substitution

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1).2 See Estrada v. Hamby, No.

04-434, 2010 WL 333701, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2010) (“It is settled that a civil rights

claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a claim that survives under the Illinois

2 A statement noting Reginald’s death on January 9, 2024 was never filed.

Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/27–6”) (citing Anderson v. Romero, 42 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th

Cir. 1994)).

II

The Court notes that the parties fail to recognize that at this stage of the case,

after their deadline to amend the pleadings has expired (here, seven months before

the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to amend), the Plaintiff must show “good

cause” to amend the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent”); Trustmark Ins. Co. v.

Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2005) (“To amend a

pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s Scheduling Order deadline to

amend pleadings, the moving party must show ‘good cause’”). Good cause

requires a showing of diligence by the party seeking the amendment. Trustmark

Ins. Co., 424 F.3d at 553. The heightened good-cause standard of Rule 16(b)(4) is

applied before considering whether the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a)(2) are satisfied. Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719-20 (7th

Cir. 2011).

1

Particularly relevant to the fact that the Rule 16(b) standard must be applied

first is that the Plaintiff cited no authority whatsoever for the relief requested. In

fact, the Plaintiff provided no substantive argument for why amendment to add

claims and defendants at this belated time should be allowed. Given that and the

procedural history in this case, the Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the

belated amendment.

Reginald originally complained of the lack of treatment he received while

in IDOC custody nearly three years ago via his complaint filed in Brown v. Hackney,

et al., 3:21-cv-03197-CSB-EIL (C.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2021). He was released from IDOC

custody nearly two years ago (July 2022). He filed his original complaint in this

case 14 months before the Executor of his estate filed the instant Motion to amend.

Reginald filed his current First Amended Complaint a year before the Executor of

his estate filed the instant Motion to amend. Discovery had been ongoing for

nearly a year when the Executor filed the instant Motion to amend. The Plaintiff

now seeks to: add as defendants John Baldwin, IDOC’s Director from 2015

through 2019, in his individual and official capacities, Steve Meeks, IDOC’s

Medical Director from 2016 through 2020, in his individual and official capacities,

and “currently unidentified defendants” in their individual and official capacities;

a Monell claim against the newly added Defendants; and an Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendants Jeffrey, Bowman, Meeks, Baldwin, and Unidentified

Defendants.3 Given how long Reginald had been litigating his allegations of lack

of medical treatment while in the custody of IDOC before his death (including

nearly a year pursuant to a discovery plan), his Executor cannot now show she

was diligent in pursuing the proposed additional claims against the proposed

additional defendants. Indeed, Reginald had been pursuing iterations of his

Monell claim and Eighth Amendment claim from the very beginning of this case.

As the IDOC Defendants argue, there are no new facts or circumstances which

would lead to a recent discovery of the new claims/defendants; the fact of

Reginald’s death and appointment of an executor of his estate do not amount to

the type of events that would permit a finding of diligence.

2

Even if the Court were to consider the proposed amendment under the

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) standard, the proposed amendment

facially suffers from defects. Rule 15(a)(2) provides in relevant part that the Court

should freely give leave to a party to amend its pleading “when justice so

3 The Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint at Law also now names original Defendants

Jeffreys and Dr. Bowman in their official and individual capacities.

requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). However, leave to amend may be denied

where there is undue delay, bad faith on the movant’s part, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party if the amendment is allowed, or futility. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546,

562 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

The IDOC Defendants lodge the following challenges to the proposed

amendment. As for the Plaintiff’s would-be “Monell Claim Policy and Practice,”

“The [Supreme Court] has been clear . . . that Monell’s holding applies only to

municipalities and not states or states’ departments.” Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of

Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, to the extent the

Plaintiff seeks only damages against the Defendants in their official capacities, the

Eleventh Amendment bars the Plaintiff’s claims. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904,

917-18 (7th Cir. 2005) (providing the Eleventh Amendment bars federal

jurisdiction over suits against state officials acting in their official capacities such

that it precludes claims for retroactive damages to be paid from a state treasury).

The Defendants additionally argue the Plaintiff’s proposed claims of deliberate

indifference and all claims against would-be defendants Baldwin and Meeks are

barred by the statute of limitations. The Defendants’ arguments certainly have

traction in light of the fact that Defendant Baldwin last was IDOC Director in 2019

and Meeks last was the IDOC Medical Director in 2020 and in light of the fact that

the Plaintiff has made no arguments to thwart the denial of her Motion for reasons

such as the statute of limitations or immunity from suit. See Terry v. Chi. Police

Dep’t, 200 F. Supp. 3d 719, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (explaining length of limitations

period for a Section 1983 action is determined by reference to state law personal

injury torts and, in Illinois, “the pertinent limitations provision requires a would-

be plaintiff to bring suit within two years of a cause of action’s accrual”).

Under these circumstances, justice does not require that the Plaintiff’s

amendment be allowed pursuant to Rule 15(a), especially where she cannot satisfy

the Rule 16(b) standard.

III

For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to

substitute Khristi Mitchell, Executor of the Estate of Reginald Brown, Deceased,

for Reginald Brown as the plaintiff in this case.

It is so ordered.

Entered on May 23, 2024.

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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