Koontz v. Deal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SHAUN M. KOONTZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 24-cv-3039

)

IDOC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER – THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his

constitutional rights at Graham Correctional Center. This cause is before the Court for a merit

review of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 29). The Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §

1915A to “screen” Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, and through such process to identify and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. A claim is legally

insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A.

In reviewing the Third Amended Complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as true, liberally

construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,

conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(internal citation omitted).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff files suit against Lieutenant Chad Huber and Correctional Officer Deal. Plaintiff

did not name the IDOC, Steven Kotteman, Candie Brown, and Stefanie Howard as Defendants in

his Third Amended Complaint. Therefore, they are dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Deal placed him in cell A-52 of the Receiving and Classification

Unit at Graham on August 8, 2023. Plaintiff noticed the toilet was filled with the previous

occupant’s urine, feces, and toilet paper, was emitting a strong odor, and would not flush. Plaintiff

immediately called for Defendant Deal and informed about the toilet. Twenty minutes later, the

facility’s plumber arrived, inspected the toilet, and determined it needed a part, which would have

to be ordered.

After the plumber left, Plaintiff asked Defendant Deal if he would move him to a different

cell, but Defendant Deal informed Plaintiff no other cells were available and told him to push the

emergency call button when he needed to use the bathroom. Plaintiff alleges other cells were

available.

Plaintiff alleges he remained in cell A-52 until August 30, 2023, for at least twenty-two

hours a day. Plaintiff states he pushed the emergency call button when he needed to use the

bathroom, but it often took thirty minutes or more for his cell door to be opened. On a few

occasions, he was not let out of his cell to use the bathroom and was forced to urinate in the toilet

on top of the waste or in the sink.

Plaintiff states he wrote a letter to Defendant Huber on August 18, 2023, to inform him

about the conditions and requested to move to a different cell. Defendant Huber did not respond

to Plaintiff’s letter. Plaintiff states that Defendant Huber oversees the placement of inmates in the

Receiving and Classification Unit and is responsible for ensuring the cells are in working order.

ANALYSIS

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir.

2008) (citations omitted). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an

objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective

prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a

prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food,

clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458,

463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). In addition,

“[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination

when each alone would not do so.” Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493. On the subjective prong, the prisoner

must show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was housed in a cell with an inoperable toilet filled with another

inmate’s urine and feces from August 8-30, 2023. Due to the length of time Plaintiff was without

a functioning toilet—coupled with the fact the toilet was filled with waste and emitted a strong

odor—the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the objective component of a conditions of

confinement claim. Plaintiff has also established the subjective prong because he allegedly

informed Defendant Deal about conditions, but Defendant Deal refused to move Plaintiff to

another cell. Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim against Defendant Deal. See Howard v. Wheaton, 668 F. Supp. 1140, 1143

(N.D. Ill. 1987) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim based on the alleged

lack of a functioning toilet and hot water for 13 days); White v. Knight, 710 Fed. App’x 260, 261-

62 (7th Cir. 2018) (While “long-term deprivations of modern toilet facilities” can potentially

violate the Eighth Amendment, “temporary imposition[s]” do not.).

Plaintiff alleges he wrote a letter to Defendant Lieutenant Huber, who oversaw the

Receiving and Classification Unit, about the inoperable toilet and requested to be moved, but

Defendant Huber did not respond to his letter. Merely sending a letter does subject a prison official

to liability under § 1983. See Diaz v. McBride, 1994 WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994)

(holding that a plaintiff could not establish personal involvement and subject a prison official to

liability under § 1983, merely by sending the official various letters or grievances complaining

about the actions or conduct of subordinates). Plaintiff did not include any specific allegations in

his Third Amended Complaint to demonstrate that Defendant Huber was personally involved in

any constitutional deprivation. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983

creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does

not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).

There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. In other words, Defendant Huber cannot be liable

based only on his status as a supervisor. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019).

Defendant Huber is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint

[29] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim against Defendant Deal based upon Plaintiff's allegations that he was housed

in a cell with a toilet that would not flush and was filled with the previous occupant's waste from

August 8-30, 2023. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court’s

discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. The Clerk is directed to ADD Correctional Officer Deal as a Defendant.

3. Defendant Chad Huber is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

4. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants IDOC, Chad Huber, Steven

Kotteman, Candie Brown, and Stefanie Howard.

5. This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

6. The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If

Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver

is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals

Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

7. Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver

of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues

and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s position. The Court

does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore,

no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not filed an answer

or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling

order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

8. If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom

Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant’s current work

address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by

the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

9. This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has

filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to

Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.

However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin

until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,

which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

10. Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place

of confinement. Counsel for Defendant shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11. Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing

address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

12. Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.

13. Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release

medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel. The

Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act.

14. The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this

Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 5/21/2024

s/ James E. Shadid

James E. Shadid

U.S. District Court Judge