Winston v. Jumper

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ANDRE WINSTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-cv-4208-SEM-KLM

)

TRACY KEITHLEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER ON AMENDED COMPLAINT

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint (Doc. 21) filed by Plaintiff pro se Andrew Winston, who is

a civil detainee at the Illinois Department of Human Service’s

Treatment and Detention Facility at Rushville, Illinois (“Rushville”).

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Background

Plaintiff alleged in his initial Complaint that Defendants

violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by engaging

in actions designed to result in his continued detention at

Rushville. The Court held that Plaintiff could not proceed on the

initial Complaint because he failed to allege with specificity how

each of the named Defendants violated his rights and because his

claim appeared to be moot due to his scheduled release date from

Rushville.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion asserting that he had not

been released from Rushville, and the Court agreed that this case

was not moot. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint.

III. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff’s suit identifies the following Rushville staff as

Defendants: Carly Rode, C. Waterkotte, S. Jumper, P. Lodge, A.

Cobb, Greg Donathan, Tracy Keithley, Flackrel, and John Doe.

First, Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants falsified or

falsely represented that a video recording showed Plaintiff engaging

in a rules violation at Rushville.

Defendants Rode and/or Doe wrote an incident report falsely

accusing him of the rules violation. Defendant Waterkotte

investigated and sent a report to Cook County to institute

subsequent civil proceedings against Plaintiff, but Waterkotte edited

the video evidence to misrepresent what had occurred. No one

provided notice to Plaintiff that further civil proceedings could be

initiated against him based upon a Rushville rules violation.

Defendants Jumper, Lodge, and Cobb were members of the

behavior committee at Rushville that held a hearing on the alleged

rules violation by Plaintiff. The committee did not provide him with

the underlying incident report or disclose other evidence at last 24

hours in advance of the hearing. The information that the

committee relied on when finding Plaintiff guilty of a rules violation

was concealed from him, to prevent cross-examination. As a result,

Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 days in segregation, during which he

could not access his property or speak with his family.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants entrapped

him into violating Rushville’s rules. Defendant Keithley directed

Plaintiff to enter an unauthorized area in the facility. Defendant

Flackrel found Plaintiff in the unauthorized area, resulting in

Plaintiff being placed on “close” status. Plaintiff alleges that this

could derail any future release from Rushville.

Finally, as the Program Director, Defendant Donathan

presided over and denied all of Plaintiff’s grievances and was

responsible for final authorization of all determinations at Rushville.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc.

21) is granted.

To state a claim against Defendants for violating his

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, Plaintiff must allege

that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property. See Miller v. Dobier,

634 F. 3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Without a deprivation of liberty

or property (or life…) there is no constitutional duty to

provide due process; but if there is such a deprivation the duty

attaches”). Put differently, a plaintiff’s right to due process is not

violated if the plaintiff has not been deprived of a constitutionally

protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-

86 (1995).

For Rushville detainees, a distinction is drawn, as a matter of

law, between “close” status and segregation. Simply put,

segregation implicates a liberty interest, while “close” status does

not. See Miller, 634 F. 3d at 415 (“Close” status avoids the

“extremes…encountered in segregation units,” and the restrictions

of “close” status “are too limited to amount to a deprivation of

constitutional liberty”) (collecting cases); see also Brown v. Scott,

720 Fed. Appx. 296, 298 (7th Cir. Dec. 7, 2017).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in segregation as a

result of the first incident report with falsified video. Therefore, he

was entitled to due process. Plaintiff may proceed with his

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Rode, Doe,

Waterkotte, Jumper, Lodge, and Cobb for their role in falsifying an

incident report, an investigation, and a video, and denying him

proper notice prior to disciplining him with segregation.

However, Plaintiff alleges that the second incident, in which

Defendants Keithley and Flackrel entrapped him, resulted only in

Plaintiff being placed on “close” status. Therefore, because no

liberty interest was implicated, Plaintiff has not stated a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Defendants Keithley and Flackrel. See

Kugler v. Donothan, 2023 WL 2958469, *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2023)

(dismissing amended complaint at screening because Rushville’s

“close” status is not actionable under the Due Process Clause). The

mere possibility that this incident might, at some unspecified point

in the future, derail Plaintiff’s release from Rushville, is too

speculative to support a claim that this incident resulted in a

deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty more generally.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendant Donathan

was the final authority at Rushville, and specifically alleges only

that Donathan denied all of Plaintiff’s grievances. Standing alone,

“the alleged mishandling of [a plaintiff’s] grievances by persons who

otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct

states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.

2011). Furthermore, supervisors and administrators are not liable

based solely on their supervisory roles. See Brown v. Randle, 847

F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Public officials are accountable for

their own conduct, but they are not vicariously liable for the acts of

their subordinates.”). Plaintiff does not allege with any specificity

Donathan’s involvement in the acts of Defendants Rode, Doe,

Waterkotte, Jumper, Lodge, and Cobb in falsifying evidence and

disciplining Plaintiff with segregation. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendant Donathan due only to his supervisory role must

fail.

However, at this time, Defendant Donathan will remain in the

case for the purpose of aiding in identifying the John Doe

Defendant. See Donald v Cook County Sheriff’s Department, 95 F.3d

548, 557 (7th Cir. 1996) (district courts are to aid pro se litigants in

identifying Doe defendants). After the Doe Defendant is identified,

Plaintiff should then seek leave to amend his complaint to add the

individual as a Defendant, and Defendant Donathan will be

dismissed. The Court will explain this process in more detail in a

Scheduling Order that the Court will enter in the future.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

[21] is granted.

2) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with a Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claim against Defendants Rode,

Doe, Waterkotte, Jumper, Lodge, and Cobb. Claims against

Defendants Keithley and Flackrel are DISMISSED.

Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except

at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good

cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3) Defendant Donathan remains in this case only for the

purpose of aiding in the identification of the Doe

Defendant.

4) The Court directs the CLERK to TERMINATE Tracy

Keithley, A. Hoyt, D. Lucas, B. Wallance, B. Wallace,

Flackrel, and K. Hanning from this case.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions, to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff

need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

waivers of service. Defendants have sixty days from

service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed

their Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety

days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have

been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that

Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to

the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not

known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This

information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the

public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The Answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file

a motion. Therefore, no response to the Answer is

necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance,

Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic

notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with

the Clerk. Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies

of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed

with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does

not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk.

Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery

requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, and the

Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain

the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall

arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED April 26th, 2024.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE