The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ROBERT P. HEATHER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 23-cv-3130
)
JAMES BROWN, et. al., )
)
Defendants. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER #2
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend. The matter is
now before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 14). The motion is granted.
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process to identify and
dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A
claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id.
The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that he pleaded guilty in 1993 to a criminal offense that required
registration under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Plaintiff alleges that
SORA amendments that were enacted after 1993 are being retroactively applied to him to require
lifetime registration by Defendants in violation of the ex post facto clause. Plaintiff names as
defendants a Quincy, Illinois police officer, two members of the Illinois State Police, the Illinois
Attorney General, and the Illinois Governor. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have forced him to
comply with SORA provisions that were not in effect in 1993, that publication of his personal
information on a “public access site” (presumably the Illinois Sex Offender Registry website)
places him and his family in danger of hate crimes and discrimination, and that Defendants’
enforcement of SORA amounts to unconstitutional punishment, that he is not able to practice his
religion because children are present at the church he would want to attend.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown arrested him in 2022 for violating SORA’s
provisions. Plaintiff alleges that he was supposed to be released in March 2022 and placed in a
substance abuse treatment facility, but Defendant Brown refused to release him unless he paid
his $100.00 fee for sex offender registration. Online records from the Illinois Department of
Corrections indicate that Plaintiff is currently serving a sentence for SORA violation. Plaintiff
seeks damages and an injunction from future enforcement of SORA registration requirements by
the Defendants.
Claims brought in Illinois pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have a two-year statute of
limitations, and any claims Plaintiff alleges that arise before 2021 are time-barred. Liberty v.
City of Chicago, 860 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, “when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. . . .” Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). If it would, a plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983
“unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 489.
Plaintiff states that he is not seeking relief from his current imprisonment, but from any
future charges for failure to comply with SORA. However, even if Plaintiff is not technically
seeking release from his current imprisonment, his claims would still necessarily imply that his
current conviction is invalid. See Kitterman v. Newton, 721 F. App'x 522, 523 (7th Cir. 2018)
(affirming district court’s order that explained that any ruling that the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights were violated when his SORA registration requirement was extended “would necessarily
imply that he should not have been convicted and imprisoned for failing to register,” making his
claims Heck-barred). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed
for failing to state a cause of action.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [14] is GRANTED.
Clerk is directed to docket the proposed amended complaint attached to the
motion.
2) Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any amendment to the
Complaint would be futile. This case is therefore terminated. All pending
motions are denied as moot. The clerk is directed to enter a judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
3) This dismissal may count as one of the plaintiff's three allotted “strikes”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The Clerk of the Court is directed to
record Plaintiff's strike in the three-strike log.
4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with
this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff
plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does
choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective
of the outcome of the appeal.
Entered this 4th day of March, 2024.
_________/s/ Sara Darrow__________
SARA DARROW
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE