Dyjak v. Miller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

LOGAN DYJAK, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 21-cv-3206

)

JB PRITZKER, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Logan Dyjak is a civil detainee in the custody of the

Illinois Department of Human Services after having been

adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on a murder

charge. See Dyjak v. Horstman, No. 21-3151-JES, 2024 WL

646343, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2024). Plaintiff is civilly committed

to the Packard Mental Health Center in Springfield, Illinois, and

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their1

constitutional rights. As a result of their NGRI status, Plaintiff is

considered a civil detainee rather than a prisoner. See Dyjak v.

1 Plaintiff uses they/them pronouns and courts including the

Seventh Circuit have followed this practice in rulings in Dyjak’s

cases. E.g., Dyjak v. Harper, No. 22-1419, 2023 WL 5928160, at *1

(7th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023).

Harper, No. 22-1419, 2023 WL 5928160, at *3 (7th Cir. 2023).

Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

40) and an accompanying Memorandum (Doc. 41). Plaintiff has

filed a Response (Doc. 54) and Defendants a Reply (Doc. 59). For

the reasons indicated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Prior lawsuit. Plaintiff filed another suit related to his

visitation privileges at Packard – C.D. Ill. Case. No. 21-cv-3084-JES

– in October 2021. That suit related to Plaintiff’s visitation privileges

from when he arrived at Packard through early February, 2019.

That case was dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff’s

allegations fell outside the statue of limitations, and Plaintiff’s

appeal was dismissed. C.D. Ill. Case. No. 21-cv-3084-JES at Docs.

6, 17. This Order therefore addresses only possible claims that

arose from February 2019 onward.

Plaintiff’s request for oral argument. Plaintiff requests oral

argument on the summary judgment pleadings. The Court finds

that oral argument would not materially assist. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Oral Argument (Doc. 53) is DENIED. Williams v. Swenson, 747 F.

App’x 432, 434 (7th Cir. 2019).

Request to alter case caption. Plaintiff moves to alter the

case caption because Defendant Miller (sued in both her individual

capacity and in her official capacity as Hospital Administrator at

Packard) is no longer the Hospital Administrator, having been

replaced by Sarah Broyles. Defendants object, asserting that Miller

was only sued in her individual capacity and that no claim for

injunctive relief is pending. Doc. 51 at 2.

Plaintiff plainly asserts in the Complaint that “all Defendants

are sued in their individual capacities.” (Doc. 1) at ¶6. The Court’s

Merit Review Order states “the Court finds that Plaintiff states a

plausible claim against Defendants Miller and Patarozzi for an

unconstitutionally restrictive policy on visitation rights.” (Doc. 9) at

3. The Court did not find Plaintiff sought to assert official-capacity

claims because Plaintiff plainly stated he was asserting only

individual capacity claims.

Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 45) is DENIED.

MATERIAL FACTS

At all relevant times Plaintiff was a post-acquittal detainee

held at Packard under the authority of the Illinois Department of

Human Services.

Defendant Miller was at relevant times the Hospital

Administrator at Packard. Miller oversaw general operations

including patient care, patient safety, employment safety, and staff

management. Though Miller states she “had nothing to do with the

visitor policies or restricting any visits specifically to Plaintiff,” Doc.

41 at ¶23, Plaintiff’s Affidavit (Doc. 54-3), a reasonable finder of fact

could find Defendant Miller was personally involved in visitation

decisions.

Defendant Patarozzi was the Treatment Services

Administrator. She was “part of the leadership team,” Doc. 41 at

¶24, and “the leadership team set the visitation schedule and

[made] visitation policy.” Id.

Visitor policies changed to be more restricted in October 2019,

were highly restricted due to COVID-19 protocols from March 2020

through February 2022, and in February 2022 resumed in a

somewhat less-restricted form, though still more restricted than

before October 2019.

Plaintiff repeatedly complained to the Illinois Department of

Human Services Human Rights Committee about restrictions on

visitation, and the Committee substantiated violations of Illinois

statute due to restrictions on detainees’ right to have visitors. See,

e.g., Doc. 54-3 at 9 (Miller acknowledging finding in letter dated

August 26, 2019); Doc. 54-3 at 24-29 (report substantiating finding

of rights violations caused by restrictions on visitation and noting

that staff interviews indicated significantly more restrictive

visitation practices than reflected in printed policies).

ANALYSIS

A. First Amendment Freedom of Association

Plaintiff’s claim is that restrictions of his visitation with his

mother and friends violated his constitutional rights.

“An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper

incarceration,” and “freedom of association is among the rights least

compatible with incarceration.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126,

131 (2003). Nonetheless, it is not the case “that any right to

intimate association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is

always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners.” Overton v. Bazzetta,

539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003); see also Easterling v. Thurmer, 880 F.3d

319, 322 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Prisoners retain a limited constitutional

right to intimate association ….”).

The Court is sensitive to Plaintiff’s status as a detainee rather

than as a convicted prisoner. He cannot be punished as a detainee.

In this scenario, though, the rational relationship test from Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) is the “appropriate structure” to

assess such claims, because considerations of institutional

security, maintaining order, and maintaining safety of detainees

and the public remain legitimate State interests in the civil

detention context. Brown v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.

2015). “Turner requires that, for the state to restrain a civil

detainee’s First Amendment rights, the restraint must be rationally

connected to the state’s interests ….” Id.

Plaintiff argues the “professional judgment” standard from

Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), should apply. The Court

disagrees. “As we have previously explained, Youngberg does not

require professional judgment to dictate every aspect of civil

commitment—just decisions about mental health treatment.” Dyjak

v. Harper, No. 22-1419, 2023 WL 5928160, at *4 (7th Cir. Sept. 12,

2023) (finding objective unreasonableness standard from Kinglsey

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) properly governed

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, rather than Youngberg).

Turner identified the following factors relevant to determining

whether a First Amendment restriction is reasonably related to a

legitimate government interest: 1) whether the restrictions are

rationally connected to achieving the stated legitimate and neutral

governmental interests; 2) whether the detainees have alternate

ways to exercise their First Amendment rights; 3) whether and to

what extent accommodating Plaintiffs would adversely impact staff

and other detainees; and, 4) whether the restrictions are an

“exaggerated response,” for example if “ready alternatives” for

achieving the same interests exist. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78–79.

Though this case presents a close call, the Court finds a

reasonable finder of fact could determine that Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of association. Most

notably for purposes of this Order is that fact that the Human

Rights Committee substantiated violations of Plaintiff’s rights under

Illinois law. Though these findings are by no means determinative of

Plaintiff’s constitutional claim, at summary judgment they provide

evidence that, combined with the other evidence in the record,

could allow a reasonable jury to find Defendants did violate

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

B. Qualified Immunity on Freedom of Association Claim

Defendants Miller and Patarozzi argue they are entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s First Amendment freedom of

association claim.

To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified

immunity, a two-part inquiry is required: (1) whether a

constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged,

and (2) whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly

established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Courts may

exercise their discretion in deciding which of the two prongs should

be addressed first in the circumstances in the case at hand.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009).

The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s First Amendment freedom of association

claim. The rights at issue for qualified immunity purposes must be

defined with enough factual specificity to give clear direction to

prison officials that what they are doing violates the law. Reciting a

general right is not enough. See Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346 (7th

Cir. 2017) (affirming qualified immunity, and holding that Turner

merely creates a generalized framework to analyze claims and

cannot create clearly established law outside an obvious case).

Plaintiff has not identified a clearly analogous case where a

Court has determined that visitation restrictions of the kind at

issue here have led to individual liability under § 1983, and the

Court has not identified any such precedent either.

The right Plaintiff pursues here cannot be said to have been

clearly established. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified

immunity on these claims.

C. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff’s complaint did not seek to pursue relief on a First

Amendment retaliation theory, nor did his allegations assert that

any action by Defendants was taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court’s merit review

order does not authorize a retaliation claim. Plaintiff did not seek to

amend his complaint to add a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Although shortly before Defendants filed their summary judgment

motion Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint, see (Doc. 37),

Plaintiff did not attach a proposed amended complaint and did not

specify what amendments he would have sought. The Court denied

that motion because the Court had already granted Plaintiff

multiple extensions of time to complete discovery and because the

Court found it unreasonable to further delay adjudication of the

case.

Based on these facts there is no First Amendment retaliation

claim pending before the Court.

Nonetheless, Defendants’ brief includes a section dedicated to

First Amendment retaliation. In response, Plaintiff includes

extensive briefing seeking to demonstrate that Defendants’ actions

could support such a claim.

Even if such a claim was before the Court it would fail.

To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment

retaliation, a plaintiffs must establish that she (1) engaged in

activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness

from engaging in First Amendment activity in the future, and (3)

that the First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor”

in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v.

Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Daugherty v.

Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff has engaged in protected activity, in filing many

lawsuits, complaints, grievances, and requests for investigations.

Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence from which a

reasonable jury could determine that a person of ordinary firmness

would be deterred from undertaking future protected activity based

on Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff argues at length that they are not a

person of ordinary firmness, Doc. 54-1 at 58, but that argument

support’s Defendants’ view that under the relevant objective test

(i.e., a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred) no jury could

find retaliation.

Plaintiff has also failed to show that they were targeted for

more restrictive visitation rights due to their protected activities.

Plaintiff acknowledges that the visitation policies at issue “were

blanket policies which affected Plaintiff even as they applied and

apply to each and every patient at the hospital.” Doc. 54-1 at 22.

Plaintiff has put forth insufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of

fact to determine that Defendants were personally involved with

altering Packard’s visitation policies for the purpose of retaliating

against Plaintiff for exercise of their First Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [40], [41], DENIES

Plaintiff's Motion to Alter Caption [45], and DENIES Plaintiff's

Motion for Oral Argument [53]. The Clerk is directed to enter

judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiff and close this case.

ENTERED: This 29th of March, 2024.

___s/Sue E. Myerscough___

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE