McMahon v. City of Beardstown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

LISA McMAHON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 21-3271

)

IAN DENNIS, et. al, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Defendant Ian Dennis’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (d/e 23). For the reasons set forth below, the

motion is DENIED.

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging various violations of her

constitutional rights. In Counts I, II, and III Plaintiff alleges

Defendant Ian Dennis violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights

during an unreasonable seizure, Fourteenth Amendment rights

during a false arrest, and utilized excessive force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, respectively. (d/e 1, pp. 4-7). In Count IV,

Plaintiff brings a state law claim for malicious prosecution and in

Count V, an indemnification claim pursuant to statute.

On August 24, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (d/e 23) and a Memorandum in Support (d/e

24). Plaintiff filed her response on October 12, 2023 (d/e 26), and

Defendant filed his Reply on November 11, 2023 (d/e 30).

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims because they arise under the United States Constitution

and are brought pursuant to a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331

("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States."). Because Plaintiff’s state law claims against Ian Dennis and

the City of Beardstown are related to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

such that the claims form part of the same case or controversy, the

Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See

28 U.S.C § 1367(a).

The events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Cass

County, Illinois, which is located within the boundaries of the Central

District of Illinois. Venue is, therefore, proper in this district. See 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (stating that a civil action may be brought in "a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred").

III. FACTS

The Court draws the following facts from the parties’ statements

of material facts in the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (d/e 23), Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support

(d/e 24), Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition (d/e 26), and

Defendant’s Reply (d/e 30). Any fact submitted by any party that was

not supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the

Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly

disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed

admitted. Id.

On February 15, 2021, Lisa McMahon was in Beardstown,

Illinois visiting a friend, Mr. Surratt. (d/e 24, p. 2). During the

evening, it was very snowy. (d/e 24, Ex. B; d/e 26, Ex. 1). While

visiting Surratt, she drove to the Wheel Inn to play slot machines at

approximately 3pm. (d/e 24, Ex. A). Ms. McMahon left the Wheel Inn

sometime between 6:45 and 7pm and did so on foot, although she

drove to the bar. Id. While McMahon was at the bar, she observed an

individual put his car “into a ditch” and knew the police were coming.

(d/e 24, p. 3). After observing this car going into the ditch, Ms.

McMahon utilized her smartphone to record a video of people

attempting to move the car from the ditch. Id.

Officer Ian Dennis was on his routine patrol on February 15,

2021, when he heard a radio call concerning an accident outside of

Wheel Inn. (d/e 24, Ex. B). On the same date and approximate time,

officer Christopher Baer was employed as a patrol officer for the City

of Beardstown and responded to this reported accident. (d/e 24, Ex.

C). This accident was near the intersection of West 6th Street and

Arenz Street in Beardstown. Id. After his arrival at this intersection,

Officer Baer encountered Ashley R. Evans and Carlos D. Mitchell,

who had witnessed the accident. (d/e 24, Ex. C). Mitchell and Evans

told Officer Baer that an unknown white female, wearing a gray jacket

left on foot from the scene of the accident. Further, these witnesses

told Officer Baer that the female was intoxicated, tried to dissuade

them from calling the police, and discussed “blackmailing” the driver

involved in the accident. (d/e 24, p. 6). Lastly, these witnesses told

Officer Baer where Ms. McMahon’s vehicle was parked and that she

took a video of the accident. (d/e 26, Ex. 1; d/e 30).

While Officer Baer was speaking to individuals at the scene,

Officer Dennis began heading in the direction of the bar and

determined Officer Baer arrived on the scene first. Officer Baer

advised Officer Dennis that a female had walked off from the Wheel

Inn. Id. Officer Baer further provided a description of the female after

speaking to Mitchell and Evans and noted she was white and in a

gray jacket. (d/e 24, p. 4; d/e 26, p. 3). While speaking to individuals

at the Wheel Inn, Officer Baer spoke with the driver of the vehicle

that had slid off the road, who told Baer that he was alone in his

vehicle. (d/e 26, Ex. 1).

Officer Dennis arrived on scene and began searching the area

to see if any female matching the description given could be located.

(d/e 24, Ex. B). During this search, Officer Dennis located footprints

in the snow and followed them back to the Wheel Inn, more

specifically, near the accident site. Id. Officer Dennis then followed

the footprints leading away from the Wheel Inn to Surratt’s residence

a few blocks away.

After Officer Dennis parked his car near the residence, a woman

opened the man door of the garage. (d/e 24, p. 4). This woman, Ms.

McMahon, matched the description given to Officer Dennis by Officer

Baer. Id. After making eye contact with Officer Dennis, Ms. McMahon

went back inside the garage then exited the side door and walked

toward the officer. (d/e 24, pp. 4-5; d/e 26, p. 5). The parties dispute

the first statement of Officer Dennis to Ms. McMahon, but agree Ms.

McMahon’s response was that she was not in an accident. (d/e 24,

p. 5). Ms. McMahon voluntarily identified herself to Officer Defendant

when asked to. (d/e 26, Ex. B).

Ms. McMahon further informed the officer that she knew the

person in the auto accident, and the person involved was a “short

white guy” and a “teacher at the school.” (d/e 24, Ex. A, p. 53). Ms.

McMahon did not have identification on her, but provided a birthdate

and driver’s license number. (d/e 24, Ex. B, p. 81). Ms. McMahon

followed Officer Dennis to his car so he could get a piece of paper to

write down her information. (d/e 26, Ex. B). Once this information

was provided to Officer Dennis, Ms. McMahon heard and observed

Officer Dennis on his radio, and he didn’t have much more

conversation with her. Id. During this interaction Officer Dennis

overheard some radio traffic where Officer Baer ran the license plate

of Ms. McMahon’s car which was still at the Wheel Inn. (d/e 24, Ex.

B, pp. 82-83).

According to the Computer Aided Dispatch, or CAD records, at

approximately 7:41 pm, Officer Dennis sent a radio transmission

noting the address where he was and that a female ran into a garage.

(d/e 26, Ex. B, p. 3).1 Two minutes later, at 7:43 pm Officer Baer

directed Officer Dennis to detain the female at the residence. Id. The

parties dispute whether Ms. McMahon was already in handcuffs

before receiving the 7:43 pm transmission from Officer Baer. The

parties do not dispute that the reason Ms. McMahon was detained,

was based on the information Officer Baer provided to Officer Dennis.

(d/e 24, p. 5, UMF 33, d/e 26, p. 3).

After Ms. McMahon followed Officer Dennis to his car, he

informed Ms. McMahon that she was going to be detained and placed

her in handcuffs. (d/e 24, Ex. A, pp. 60-61; d/e 26, Additional

Material Facts 9, 12; d/e 30, p. 3).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

1 Although the Parties agree that CAD Systems entries do not represent a verbatim real

time record of what transpired (d/e 24, 25), the Court finds it helpful it detailing a general

chronology.

When moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the moving party bears the burden

of showing, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); Hummel v.

St. Joseph Cty Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (7th Cir.

2016). “The moving party has the burden of either: (1) showing that

there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of

the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence

that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.”

Id. But even where there is no dispute as to the basic facts of a case,

summary judgment will not be appropriate “if the parties disagree on

the inferences which may reasonably be drawn from those

undisputed facts.” Cent. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of

Md., 626 F.2d 537, 539–40 (7th Cir. 1980). The facts and all

reasonable inferences derived therefrom are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545,

550 (7th Cir. 2008).

V. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Lisa McMahon alleges Officer Ian Dennis violated her

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to be free from

unreasonable seizure, excessive force, false arrest, and malicious

prosecution. (d/e 25, p. 1). Defendant moves for partial summary

judgment solely as to Count I as to an unreasonable seizure.

A. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff McMahon’s Unreasonable Seizure Claim.

i. Seizure and Terry Stop

Defendant Dennis argues that he had reasonable suspicion to

believe Ms. McMahon was involved in a motor vehicle crash and she

may have fled the accident, therefore, the Terry stop was justified.

Further, Defendant relies on the “collective knowledge doctrine” in

furtherance of this argument, as he was provided information from

Office Baer from the scene of the accident to justify his suspicions.

A Fourth Amendment inquiry requires the Court to determine

(1) whether a seizure actually occurred, and if so, (2) whether the

seizure was reasonable. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253

(1991); Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 2010).

A “seizure” occurs when a person’s “freedom of movement is

restrained” either “by means of physical force or show of authority.”

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980). “If a

reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then

he or she has not been seized.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.

194, 201 (2002). This standard is objective and is “made on the basis

of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the encounter.”

United States v. Jerez, 18 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1997). In

considering the totality of the circumstances, factors include:

(1) Whether the encounter occurred in a public place; (2)

whether the suspect consented to speak with the officers; (3)

whether the officers informed the individual that he was not

under arrest and was free to leave; (4) whether the

individuals were moved to another area; (5) whether there

was a threatening presence of several officers and a display

of weapons or physical force; (6) whether the officers deprived

the defendant of documents she needed to continue on her

way; and (7) whether the officers’ tone of voice was such that

their request would likely be obeyed.

United States v. Barker, 476 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2006).

Taking these factors into consideration, the Court finds that Ms.

McMahon’s detention was a seizure. Once Officer Dennis arrived at

the home of Mr. Surratt, Ms. McMahon was generally agreeable to

providing the officer with information. She provided her name and

other personal information and willingly walked back to Officer

Dennis’ car so he could write down the information he was given.

This conversation occurred at the home of Surratt and she was never

told she was free to leave. These facts, among others, indicate that

this detention was indeed a seizure. Additionally, although Ms.

McMahon clearly felt she was being ignored while telling Officer

Dennis she was not involved in an accident, she did not feel free to

leave, although she was getting more and more frustrated. Further,

Defendant Dennis at his deposition testified that if someone is

“detain(ed)” that means they are not free to leave. (d/e 24, Ex. B, p.

85).

Next, the Court must determine whether the seizure was

unreasonable. Defendant admits that McMahon was “detained” and

argues that he was conducting a Terry stop based on the reasonable

suspicion that she was involved in the car accident and had fled the

scene. See d/e 24, pp. 7-9. Specifically, Officer Dennis argues he

relied on knowledge from Office Baer who was at the scene, pursuant

to the “collective knowledge doctrine,” citing Untied States v. Eymann,

962 F.3d 273, 283-84. (7th Cir. 2020).

A Terry stop may be conducted if the officer has reasonable,

articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about

to commit a crime. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22; United States v.

Booker, 579 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2009). This investigatory stop of

an individual should be brief when conducted by law enforcement

officers. Id. A reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard”

than probable cause. United States v. Lopez, 907 f.3d 472, 479 (7th

Cir. 2018). However, the officer initiating the investigatory stop must

be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that suggest

criminality, rather than basing his actions on a mere hunch. Terry,

392 U.S. at 21-22. Reasonable suspicion is an objective inquiry based

upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the

time the stop is made. United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558 (7th

Cir. 2008).

Defendant argues that he had reasonable suspicion to detain

Ms. McMahon based upon witness statements at the scene to Officer

Baer. Specifically, the witnesses provided Officer Baer: (1) a

description of a woman in a grey coat who walked away from the

Wheel Inn, (2) that this woman was intoxicated, (3) she wanted to

blackmail the driver of the car in the ditch, and (4) she had tried to

dissuade them from calling the police. (d/e 24, p. 4-6, UMFS 43-45;

d/e 26, pp. 3-4). Additionally, Defendant argues that along with this

knowledge, he followed Ms. McMahon’s footsteps in the snow from

the Wheel Inn to Mr. Sutter’s home and a vehicle registered to Ms.

McMahon was parked at the Wheel Inn.

Of particular note, Ms. McMahon admits that various witnesses

gave statements to Officer Baer with a description fitting her (a

woman who walked home in a grey coat) and that they alleged she

was intoxicated, interested in blackmail, and tried to dissuade them

from calling the police. (d/e 24, UMFs 44, 45; d/e 26 UMFs 44, 45).

Plaintiff does, however, argue and dispute the timeline of these facts

and when they were provided to Officer Dennis.

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition are mainly in two parts.

First, that the seizure cannot be reasonable because Officer Baer had

information indicating that Plaintiff was not involved in any criminal

activity and, therefore, no reasonable suspicion existed that Officer

Dennis could rely on in justifying a Terry stop, collective knowledge

not withstanding. Second, that Officer Dennis seized the Plaintiff

before he was provided any information that could indicate that a

criminal activity had or was occurring. This Court disagrees.

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Officer Baer received

a description of the Plaintiff, information that she was intoxicated,

possibly wanted to attempt blackmail and was against calling the

police. Additionally, a review of vehicle registration of a car at the

Wheel Inn parking lot, revealed it was indeed registered to the

Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff argues that Officer Baer was told by the

alleged driver of the vehicle involved in the collision that he was the

only one in the car, knowing one individual left the scene on foot

before the police arrived would require verification they were not

involved.

While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than

probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than

preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth amendment requires at

least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000) citing United States

v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate

more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion of ‘hunch;”

of criminal activity. Terry at 27.

At a minimum, Plaintiff’s behavior was suspicious and would

warrant further conversation and possible investigation. See Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious

individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status

quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be the most

reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time”).

Considered holistically, the totality of the circumstances including

Plaintiff’s departure from the bar on foot, witness statements and

description, easily satisfy the “minimal level of objective justification”

required to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Wardlow

at 123.

The analysis regarding Officer Dennis is similar. Officer Dennis

overheard radio traffic of a disturbance at the Wheel Inn and was en

route. Once he arrived and learned there was a female who left on

foot from the bar, Officer Dennis followed a set of footsteps from the

bar and arrived at the home of Surratt. Officer Dennis was provided

a description of the individual from Officer Baer over the radio given

by witnesses of the Wheel Inn as female, intoxicated, and wearing

specific clothing. (d/e 24, UMF 17, 18, 44, 45; d/e 26, UMFs pp. 3-

4).

Officer Dennis could rely upon this information pursuant to the

“collective knowledge doctrine” which allows the arresting officer to

rely on the knowledge of others in the agency to establish the facts in

support of probable cause. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, at 284. Given the

facts here are referring to a Terry stop, as opposed to an arrest, the

bar is lower in terms of what the established facts must show.

Specifically, reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable

cause. In order for the collective knowledge doctrine to apply, (1) the

officer taking the action must act in objective reliance on the

information received, (2) the officer providing the information – or the

agency for which he works – must have facts supporting the level of

suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be not more intrusive than

would have been permissible for the officer requesting it. See United

States v. Sands, 815 F.3d 1057, citing United States v. Williams, 627

F.3d 247 (7th 2010).

As discussed supra, reviewing a totality of the facts provided to

Officer Baer at the time of this interaction, Officer Baer had a

reasonable suspicion Ms. McMahon was engaged in some sort of

illegal activity. This information, including Ms. McMahon’s alleged

intoxication, departure from the scene, and description was

communicated to Officer Dennis who relied on it, especially during

his interaction with Ms. McMahon. Officer Dennis personally

observed the Plaintiff who spoke to him willingly and began taking

her personal information. At some point while speaking with Ms.

McMahon Officer Dennis was provided additional information

relating to Ms. McMahon’s vehicle remaining at Wheel Inn although

she left on foot.

Plaintiff cites United States v. Lenoir, noting the Seventh Circuit

held that a “police observation of an individual, fitting a police

dispatch description of a person involved in a disturbance, near in

time and geographic location to the disturbance establishes a

reasonable suspicion that the individual is the subject of the

dispatch” can justify a Terry stop. United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d

725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff seeks to distinguish herself from

this case, but the situation at bar is similar, although the individual

subject in Lenoir was alleged to have a gun and Plaintiff was not.

Here, there was a specific description given to Officer Dennis,

regarding a woman in a gray coat, heading northbound from an

accident at the Wheel Inn close in time and geographic location and

the footsteps ended at the residence she was visiting. A Terry stop

gives officers a chance to verify (or dispel) well-founded suspicions

that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal

activity. United State v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1091 (7th 1993) citing

United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 992 (7th 1988).

Both Officer Baer and Officer Dennis, through the collective

knowledge doctrine, clearly had a reasonable suspicion as to

Plaintiff’s involvement with some criminal activity. The departure on

foot, fitting a clear description and allegation of intoxication warrants

further investigation. Clearly this is what Officer Dennis sought to do

after receiving the initial description and information from Officer

Baer. Therefore, Officer Dennis had the requisite reasonable

suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, especially while more information

was sought from the Wheel Inn by Officer Baer to preserve the status

quo and collect more information.

ii. Use of Handcuffs

Although the Court has now found that the interaction between

Ms. McMahon and Officer Dennis was a seizure and Officer Dennis

did have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, the Court’s

analysis does not stop there. A Terry stop is intended to be as brief

and minimally intrusive as possible. United States v. Bullock, 632

F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, when relying upon a theory of the

collective knowledge doctrine, any intrusion must be not more

intrusive than would have been permissible for the officer requesting

it. See United States v. Sands, 815 F.3d 1057, citing United States v.

Williams, 627 F.3d 247 (7th 2010).

Plaintiff argues that the stop and handcuffing of Plaintiff was

not as brief and minimally intrusive as possible: specifically, that

Officer Dennis’ conduct was “vastly out of proportion to any

investigative need.” (d/e 26, p. 11). Defendant states that Plaintiff

was immediately irate upon his arrival at Mr. Surratt’s residence, was

seemingly intoxicated with slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol.

Defendant also alleges Ms. McMahon began shouting and yelling

when notified he was detaining her, became combative, and resisted

being put in handcuffs by leveraging her weight against the squad

car.

In evaluating whether the force that an officer used to effectuate

the investigatory stop was so disproportionate to the purpose of such

a stop as to convert the encounter into a full arrest, the Seventh

Circuit has considered whether the surrounding circumstances gave

rise to a justifiable fear of personal safety on the part of the officer.

Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 824 (7th 2008).

Ms. McMahon, unlike the plaintiff in Rabin v. Flynn, did not

have a fully loaded firearm on her, or any other type of weapon visible

to the Defendant that would be an immediate safety concern to an

officer. Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2013).

In further support, Plaintiff refers to cases in which the Seventh

Circuit has expressed distaste for the use of handcuffs during Terry

stops in certain circumstances. However, the Court did not prohibit

the use of handcuffs, but rather expresses some concern. Indeed, the

Seventh Circuit has noted that “[t]he proliferation of cases in this

court in which ‘Terry’ stops involve handcuffs and ever-increasing

wait times in police vehicles is disturbing, and we would caution law

enforcement officers that the acceptability of handcuffs in some cases

does not signal that the restraint is not a significant consideration in

determining the nature of the stop.” Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716

F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Smith,

3F.3d 1088, 1094 (7th Cir. 1993).

As discussed supra, at the summary judgment stage, the facts

must be taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Here,

Plaintiff argues she was not fighting back, there was no cause for

concern to officer safety, and that Officer Dennis detained her by

handcuffing her for “no reason”. (d/e 24, Ex. A, p. 134). Thereafter,

she fell to the ground and allegedly sustained injuries. Officer Dennis’

sworn testimony at his deposition further supports Plaintiff’s

contention that there was no perceived threat to him and that

Plaintiff was placed in cuffs immediately after Officer Dennis noted

he would be detaining her.

Although the use of handcuffs could be justified as Officer Baer

may have sought to detain Plaintiff as she specifically left the scene

seemingly to avoid police interaction, there is no dispute that Plaintiff

did not have a weapon at the time of the initial stop and subsequent

hand handcuffing. The facts taken in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff provide an issue of material fact as to whether the use of

handcuffs was necessary and minimally intrusive, and thereby

whether the Terry stop conducted was reasonable. In sum, the

immediacy of the use of force and the seeming lack thereof any threat

to officer safety further supports this conclusion. See Mwangangi v.

Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 82-827 (2022) citing United States v. Glenna,

878 F.2d 967, 973 (“while there is no categorical rule that an officer’s

decision to place a suspect in handcuffs always transforms the

interaction from a Terry stop into an arrest, it is the “rare case” in

which common sense and ordinary human experience convince us

that an officer believed reasonably that an investigative stop could be

effectuated safely only in this manner.”) Defendant has not proven

that as a matter of law he is entitled to summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim, as there is a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the utilization of handcuffs and what effect it

hand on the interaction at issue in Plaintiff’s Count I.

B. Defendant Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in the Fourth

Amendment context if a reasonable officer could have believed that

"arguable" reasonable suspicion (for a traffic stop) or "arguable"

probable cause (for an arrest) existed to detain the plaintiff. See Huff

v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Humphrey v.

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998) (arguable reasonable

suspicion and probable cause are established "when a reasonable

officer 'in the same circumstances and . . . possessing the same

knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed

that [reasonable suspicion or] probable cause existed in light of well-

established law.'"); Rouei v. Vill. of Skokie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 765, 778

(N.D. Ill. 2014) ("[Q]ualified immunity exists in a false arrest case

where there is 'arguable' probable cause, ... and thus [qualified

immunity] likely exists in a false Terry stop case where there is

'arguable' reasonable suspicion.").

In practice, this means that a government actor is entitled to

qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows that: (1) the facts, read

in favor of the non-moving party, amount to a constitutional

violation; and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at

the time of the alleged violation. See Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d

640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019); Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.

2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2722, 206 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2020)

(qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once a defendant

properly raises the defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat

it). The Court need not always address both questions in the qualified

immunity analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-42, 129

S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). "[I]f the law was not clearly

established, there is no need to tackle the (often harder) question

whether the challenged conduct violated the Constitution."

Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647. But where the law was clearly

established, both qualified immunity questions must be addressed.

Id.

Defendant argues that qualified immunity is appropriate here

because it shields from liability police officers, “who act in ways they

reasonably believed to be lawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 638 (1987). Defendant further argues that qualified immunity

provides “ample room from mistake in judgment” and protects all but

the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.”

(d/e 24, p. 10). The Court has previously found that a genuine issue

of material fact remains that allows for a reasonable jury to make two

differing conclusions regarding the use of handcuffs and whether

said use of force was more than minimally intrusive in violation of

Terry.

If the Terry stop was not minimally intrusive, then Officer

Dennis violated Ms. McMahon’s clearly established right to be free

from unreasonable seizures. As a result, the Court cannot find that

the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Nettles-Bey v.

Williams, 819 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that where the

admissible evidence would permit two inferences, one of which would

implicate violations of a plaintiff's clearly established constitutional

rights, the case must proceed to trial, and the officers are not entitled

to qualified immunity). Therefore, Defendant’s Partial Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim is

DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendant has failed to carry his burden showing an absence of

issue of material fact relating to Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure

claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment

(d/e 23) as to Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 25, 2024.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE