Opinion

Alvarez v. Dykstra

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
Apr 10, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.6%

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JUAN ALVAREZ, )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-2204

)

FELICIA ADKINS, et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER – AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, files suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his

constitutional rights at Danville Correctional Center (“Danville”). This cause is before the Court

for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 11). The Court is required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A to “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and through such process to identify and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. A claim is legally

insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A.

In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as true, liberally

construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to

“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422

(7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff files suit against Danville Warden Felicia Adkins, Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) Director Rob Jeffries, Sergeant Renfroe, Lieutenant Drikstra, Correctional

Officer John Doe, and Health Care Unit (“HCU”) Director Jennifer Chacon.

Plaintiff did not name John Does (Various IDOC/Danville Employees) as Defendants in

his Amended Complaint. Therefore, they are dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges that a rat bit him multiple times on his upper right arm while he was

sleeping in his cell in the R3 housing unit on December 1, 2022. Plaintiff immediately jumped

from his bed, turned on the cell light, and killed the rat. Plaintiff pressed the emergency call button

in his cell, and Defendant Correctional Officer John Doe responded. Plaintiff informed Defendant

John Doe about the incident and showed him his right arm and the dead rat. Plaintiff asked to be

taken to the HCU for medical attention, but Defendant John Doe denied his request and told him

to submit a nurse sick call request.

Later that day, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Sergeant Renfroe, who also instructed

Plaintiff to submit a nurse sick call request.

Plaintiff then spoke with Defendant Lieutenant Drikstra about the incident and showed him

his injury. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Drikstra laughed and did not help Plaintiff get medical care.

Plaintiff states that he submitted several emergency nurse sick call requests and an

emergency grievance, but he was not treated by medical staff until December 8, 2022. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant HCU Director Chacon did not follow procedure or make any effort to

provide immediate assistance for the rat bite.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Warden Adkins failed to respond and take immediate action

after the situation came to her attention.

Plaintiff alleges he had bruising and discoloration on the bite area and experienced stomach

pain, chills, headaches, depression, and had difficulty sleeping due to the bite. Plaintiff state he

continues to experience anxiety, itchy arms, and difficulty breathing.

ANALYSIS

It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as

a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim

of deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must

demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively

serious medical condition is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment

or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”

Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the

prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The

official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the

defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct approached

intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d

1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Plaintiff alleges he informed Defendant Correctional Officer John Doe about the incident,

showed him his arm, and the dead rat and asked for immediate medical attention for his bite, but

Defendant refused to assist him. Plaintiff alleges he also spoke with Defendant Lieutenant Drikstra

about the rat bite, showed him his injury, and requested emergency medical care, but he laughed

and refused to provide immediate medical treatment. Plaintiff claims he developed stomach pains,

chills, and other symptoms due to the bite. Based on his allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has

stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants John Doe and

Drikstra.

Regarding Defendant Sergeant Renfroe, Plaintiff alleges only that he spoke with him on

December 1, 2022, and that Defendant instructed Plaintiff to submit a nurse sick call request. It is

unclear what Plaintiff told Defendant Renfroe and if he saw Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff’s

allegations are too tenuous to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Renfroe. He is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant HCU Director Chacon did not follow procedures or make

any effort to provide immediate medical care for the rat bite. Plaintiff provides no further details

about what procedures Defendant Chacon allegedly failed to follow or how she was aware he

needed immediate care. Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Warden Adkins is that she

failed to respond and take immediate action once the situation came to her attention. It appears

that Plaintiff is trying to hold Defendants Chacon and Adkins liable because they hold supervisory

positions. However, liability under § 1983 is based on personal responsibility, and Defendants

cannot be held liable simply because of their supervisory roles. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d

492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Supervisory prison

staff can be held liable for deliberate indifference if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it,

approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir.

2019). Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Chacon and Adkins are too tenuous for the Court

to conclude that they were subjectively aware that Plaintiff was at risk of harm. Vance v. Peters,

97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability

and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or

participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). Defendants Chacon and Adkins are dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Finally, Plaintiff names IDOC Director Jeffreys as a Defendant, but he did not include any

allegations related to Defendant Jeffreys in his Amended Complaint. Defendant Jeffreys is

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants John Doe and Drikstra for allegedly failing to provide medical attention to treat

Plaintiff's rat bite in December 2022. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above,

except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Drikstra (Lieutenant) and John Doe (Correctional

Officer) as Defendants.

3) Defendants Renfroe, Jennifer Chacon, Felicia Adkins, Rob Jeffries, and John Does

(Various IDOC/Danville Employees) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to

TERMINATE Defendants Adkins, Jeffries, and John Does.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service. If

Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver

is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals

Service on Defendants and will require Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues

and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court

does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore,

no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not filed an answer

or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a

scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom

Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendants’ current work

address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by

the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel has

filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to

Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.

However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin

until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,

which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

9) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s

place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing

address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.

12) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release

medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel. The

Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act.

13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this

Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 4/10/2024

s/ James E. Shadid

James E. Shadid

U.S. District Court Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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