Smith v. Jeffreys

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JIMMIE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-cv-1207

)

ROB JEFFREYS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations

of his constitutional rights at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). (Doc. 1). The case is now

before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s

complaint, and through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the

entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. The Court accepts the factual allegations

as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th

Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

Plaintiff files suit against IDOC Acting Director Rob Jeffreys, Warden Leonta Jackson,

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) member Debbie Knauer, Tactical Response Officers 1 and

2, and the IDOC. First, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims may be barred by the statute of

limitations. Congress did not specify a statute of limitations for civil rights claims under Section

1983. Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2011). In determining the statute of limitations

for Section 1983 claims, federal courts have adopted the forum state’s statute of limitations for

personal injury claims. Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). In Illinois,

the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Thus, a

Section 1983 claim must be filed within two years of the accrual of the claim. A claim accrues for

statute of limitations purposes when a plaintiff knows of the fact and cause of an injury. Amin

Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff alleges that the incident occurred on September 25, 2020. He filed his complaint

more than two years later on May 25, 2023. (Doc. 1). It is unclear, however, when the grievance

process was completed. The limitations period is tolled while a prisoner completes the

administrative grievance process. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing

Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001)). Out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiff

will be permitted to proceed on his claims.

Plaintiff states that Defendants Tactical Response Officers 1 and 2 (“Doe Defendants”)

transported him from Pontiac to UIC hospital in Chicago for a medical evaluation on September

25, 2020. Plaintiff alleges the Doe Defendants placed him in excessively tight handcuffs and leg

shackles and put him in an “aluminum dog kenn[e]l type box” in the back of the transport van.

(Doc. 1 at p. 6). Plaintiff’s leg shackles were attached to a padlock on the floor, which he claims

caused pain and bruising to his ankles during transport. Plaintiff alleges the Doe Defendants

operated the vehicle in a “slow stop and go motion,” causing Plaintiff to slide forward on the bench

and hit his shoulders and the side of his head on the inside of the box. Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff also

claims Defendants deliberately hit potholes, causing his head to repeatedly slam into the ceiling.

As a result, Plaintiff experienced swelling and bruising to the top of his head, severe neck pain,

and headaches. Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive claim against the Doe Defendants.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (a

plaintiff may state a claim even with minimal injury if the defendant used force maliciously).

Plaintiff also alleges that the Doe Defendants drove the transport van in this manner to

retaliate against him for allegedly assaulting other officers and for filing grievances about the

IDOC’s transportation procedures. Plaintiff states a First Amendment retaliation claim against the

Doe Defendants for allegedly retaliating against him based on his grievances. See Babcock v.

White, 102 F.3d 267, 276 (7th Cir.1996) (prisoners have a right to complain of prison conditions

and may not be retaliated against for exercising that right).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Leonta Jackson was aware that he was being

transported in an “unsafe dog kenn[e]l pod” because Plaintiff filed grievances and “verbalized to

him the injuries he repeatedly incurred.” (Doc. 1 at pp. 9-10). Plaintiff claims that Defendant

Jackson took no action to protect him and denied his grievances. It appears that Plaintiff is trying

to hold Defendant Jackson liable for his injuries because he is in a supervisory position at the

prison. However, liability under Section 1983 is based on personal responsibility, and Defendant

Jackson cannot be held liable for the misdeeds of other prison staff simply because of his

supervisory role. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v. Raemisch,

555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Supervisory prison staff can be held liable for deliberate

indifference if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind

eye.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendant Jackson are too tenuous for the Court to conclude that he was subjectively aware that

Plaintiff was at risk of harm and that he condoned, facilitated, or turned a blind eye to the risk.

Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based

on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual

defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). Defendant Jackson is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ARB member Debbie Knauer denied the grievances he

filed about Pontiac’s unsafe transportation procedures. The denial or mishandling of a grievance

does not amount to a constitutional violation. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011)

(“[T]he alleged mishandling of [a prisoner’s] grievance by persons who otherwise did not cause

or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10

(7th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Knauer denied the grievances, his

claim against her is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant IDOC Acting Director Rob Jeffreys disregarded the complaints

he made about Pontiac’s unsafe transportation procedures in grievances he filed and in two letters

he mailed to Defendant Jeffreys. Defendant cannot be held liable merely due to his supervisory

position, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed

under Section 1983. Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992). Simply receiving

correspondence from a prisoner does not make a prison official liable for the alleged constitutional

violation. Norington v. Daniels, No. 11- 282, 2011 WL 5101943, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2011);

see also Diaz v. McBride, No. 93-176, 1994 WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (plaintiff

cannot establish personal involvement and subject a prison official to liability under § 1983, merely

by sending the official various letters or grievances complaining about the actions or conduct of

subordinates). Defendant Jeffreys is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Finally, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim against the IDOC, as the IDOC is

not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.

2001). Therefore, Defendant IDOC is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Pursuant to its merit review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

Court finds that Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim and a First

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Tactical Response Officers 1 and 2.

Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) Plaintiff is advised that unidentified Doe Defendants cannot be served. As a

result, the current Warden of Pontiac Correctional Center, Mindi Nurse, will be added as a

Defendant for the sole purpose of assisting Plaintiff in the identification of Tactical Response

Officers 1 and 2. After the Doe Defendants have been identified, Warden Nurse may move

to be dismissed. Plaintiff is placed on notice that it is his responsibility, through initial

disclosures and discovery, to identify the Doe Defendants. The failure to do so will result in

their dismissal. The Clerk is directed to ADD Mindi Nurse as a Defendant.

3) Defendants Jeffreys, Jackson, and Knauer are DISMISSED without

prejudice, and Defendant IDOC is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk is

directed to TERMINATE Defendants Jeffreys, Jackson, Knauer, and the IDOC from the

docket.

4) Plaintiff's Motion for Status Regarding Merit Review [12] is MOOT.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait

until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice

and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant's counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If

Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the

waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S.

Marshals Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

7) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant's

positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant

files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If

Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry

of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant

has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines.

8) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for

whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant's current

work address, or, if not known, Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be

used only for effectuating service. Documentation of Defendant's forwarding address shall

be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed

by the Clerk.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant's counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendant's counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of

any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to

Defendant's counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the

Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests

and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendant's counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant's counsel has filed an appearance and the Court

has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defense counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff and shall arrange

the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon

request.

13) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release

medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel.

14) The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant

to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

15) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry

of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 10/24/2023

s/ James E. Shadid

James E. Shadid

United States District Judge