Lin v. Shi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

HAN LIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

HONG ZHANG )

a/k/a Nick Zhang, ) Case No. 20-cv-03186

FANG FANG LI )

a/k/a Fangfang Li )

a/k/a Amy Li )

a/k/a Elaine Li, )

CHINA WOK HILLSBORO INC )

d/b/a China Wok, and )

XIN HUA LIN )

a/k/a Sin Lin )

a/k/a Sin H Lin, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United State District Judge:

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs (d/e 94) and Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs (d/e 102). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions (d/e

94, 102) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court

awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $94,823.50, plus costs of

$3,571.62, for Plaintiff Han Lin and against Defendants Hong

Zhang and Fang Fang Li.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff Han Lin filed a Complaint (d/e 1)

against Defendants Jian Yun Shi, Hong Zhang, Fang Fang Li, China

Wok Hillsboro Inc., and Xin Huan Lin. On September 19, 2020,

Plaintiff filed a five-count Amended Complaint (d/e 5) against

Defendants for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act

(FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL), and the Illinois

Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA). Plaintiff worked as a

waiter and a cook at China Wok, a restaurant in Hillsboro, Illinois.

On August 29, 2022, the Court granted in part and denied in

part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 55). Counts I

and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint remained pending against

Defendants Zhang, Li, Lin, and China Wok Hillsboro, Inc., and

Count V remained pending against all Defendants.

Count I of the Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants

Zhang, Li, Lin, and China Wok Hillsboro, Inc. failed to pay Plaintiff

the federally mandated minimum wage for some or all of the hours

Plaintiff worked at China Wok, in violation of the minimum wage

provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Count III alleged

that Defendants Zhang, Li, Lin, and China Wok Hillsboro, Inc.

violated the overtime provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), by

failing to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation at the statutorily

mandated time-and-a-half rate. Count V alleged that Defendants

Shi, Zhang, Li, China Wok Hillsboro Inc., and Lin withheld earned

wages from Plaintiff after Plaintiff left his job, in violation of the

IWPCA, 820 ILCS 115/1.

On May 22, 2023, jury trial proceeded against Defendants Shi,

Zhang, and Li. During trial, the parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Shi be dismissed with prejudice, with

each party to pay his own costs. d/e 83. On May 23, 2023, the

jury entered a verdict for Plaintiff and against Defendants Zhang

and Li, awarding $4,131.44 in overtime wages and $7,305.92 in

minimum wages owed during Plaintiff’s employment as a server

under the FLSA. d/e 85. The jury also entered a verdict for

Plaintiff and against Defendants Zhang and Li, awarding

$14,560.24 in unpaid wages under the IWPCA. d/e 85.

On June 7, 2023, this Court entered judgment against

Defendants Zhang and Li on Counts I and III in the amount of

$22,874.72 and on Count V in the amount of $25,208.24, which

included the amount awarded by the jury on each Count, liquidated

damages on Counts I and III, and the 2% underpayment penalty on

Count V. d/e 93.

Plaintiff then sought attorneys’ fees and costs. In his Motion

for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiff’s counsel Troy Law, PLLC (“Troy Law”)

seeks a fee award of $75,150 and costs of $5,555.26, for a total of

$80,695.26. d/e 95, ¶ 75. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel John C.

Ireland seeks a fee award of $69,471 and costs of $441.18, for a

total of $69,912.18. d/e 95, ¶ 76. In total, Plaintiffs’ counsels seek

$150,607.44 in reasonable attorney fees and costs.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides that, in addition

to any judgment awarded, plaintiffs may recover reasonable

attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court . . . shall . . . , in

addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow

a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of

the action.”). Similarly, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection

Act (IWPCA) provides that “[a]ny employee not timely paid wages,

final compensation, or wages by his or her employer as required by

this Act shall be entitled to recover . . . costs and all reasonable

attorney’s fees.” 820 ILCS 115/14(a). The Court proceeds to

calculate Plaintiff’s FLSA and IWPCA attorney’s fees using the

lodestar method. See Palar v. Blackhawk Bancorporation, Inc., No.

4:11-cv-04039-SLD-JEH, 2014 WL 4087436 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 19,

2014) (applying lodestar method to calculate IWPCA attorney’s fees);

DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, Nos. 10-cv-684-JPG-

DGW, 10-cv-685-JPG-DGW, 2012 WL 5987471, at *5–6 (S.D. Ill.

Oct. 1, 2012) (applying federal principles to lodestar calculation of

attorney’s fees pursuant to IWPCA).

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of

a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 422 (1983); see also Small v. Richard Wolf

Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2001). Known

as the lodestar method, the party seeking fees bears the burden of

proving the reasonableness of the hours worked and rates claimed.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. The court may adjust the award based

on various factors, including “the complexity of the legal issues

involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest

advanced by the litigation.” Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747,

748 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “The standard is whether the

fees are reasonable in relation to the difficulty, stakes, and outcome

of the case.” Id. (quoting Connolly v. Nat’l. Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177

F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999)). If the court decides to reduce the

rate or hours to make them reasonable, the court must provide a

“concise but clear explanation of its reasons” for any reduction.

Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1999).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Adjusts the Lodestar Amount Downward to

Reflect an Appropriate Hourly Rate.

Plaintiffs request a total of $144,611 in attorneys’ fees

calculated as follows:

Attorney Hourly Rate Hours Total per

Attorney

John Troy $650 55.73 $36,224.50

(Managing

Attorney)

John C Ireland $465 149.4 $69,471

(Managing

Associate)

Aaron $400 84.28 $33,712

Schweitzer

(Managing

Associate)

Tiffany Troy $250 9.79 $2,447.50

(Associate)

Preethi Kilaru $200 13.78 $2,756

(Managing

Clerk)

TOTAL 312.98 $144,611

i. The Court deducts attorney hours attributable to

Preethi Kilaru as not reasonably expended.

First, the Court addresses the reasonableness of the hours

expended by Plaintiff’s attorneys litigating this case. The Court

considers the number of hours worked, excluding the hours it

deems inadequately documented or not reasonably expended on the

litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34; see Spegon v. Catholic

Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). If an attorney

has failed to properly exclude or tailor unreasonable entries, “the

district court may reduce the number of hours accordingly.” Batt v.

Micro Warehouse, Inc., 249 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2001); see

Delgado v. Mark, No. 6 C 3757, 2009 WL 211862, at *4 (N.D. Ill.

2009) (“[T]ime entries must be sufficiently detailed to permit the

Court to determine whether the hours expended were reasonable

and necessary to the conduct of the litigation.”).

Plaintiff submitted a motion for attorneys’ fees seeking

compensation for 55.73 hours of Mr. Troy’s time, 149.4 hours of

Mr. Ireland’s time, 84.28 hours of Mr. Schweitzer’s time, 9.79 hours

of Ms. Troy’s time, and 13.78 hours of Ms. Kilaru’s time. d/e 95, ¶

72. Mr. Troy, Mr. Schweitzer, Ms. Troy, and Ms. Kilaru are all

employed by Troy Law, while Mr. Ireland is employed at the Law

Office of John Ireland. The request was accompanied by time

records and declarations from Mr. Troy and Mr. Ireland. d/e 95,

102.

Defendants Zhang and Li argue that Plaintiff’s time entries

must be reduced because of overstaffing. d/e 101, p. 10. Plaintiff

responds that each staff member had a distinct, and not

duplicative, role in the instant case, and argues that the time

entries are reasonable. d/e 104, p. 6. “Counsel for the prevailing

party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary[.]”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

The time entries submitted by Plaintiff detail the staff member

assigned to a task, a short description of the task, and the amount

of time spent on each task. d/e 95, Ex. 1, Ex. 3, Ex. 4; d/e 102,

Ex. 2, Ex. 3. Despite Defendants Zhang and Li’s claim of

overstaffing, the Court’s examination of the time entries submitted

by Plaintiff attribute different tasks and responsibilities to each staff

member.

The Court does note that a handful of time entries contain the

same work description attributed to different staff members. For

example, on September 30, 2021, Mr. Troy and Mr. Schweitzer

billed 0.83 and 1.67 hours, respectively, for “Defend def depo of Plf.”

d/e 95, Ex. 1, p. 5. However, while “the tendency of law firms to

overstaff a case should cause the trial court to scrutinize a fees

petition carefully for duplicative time,” Jardien v. Winston Network,

Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir. 1989), the mere fact that “two

lawyers have billed for the same task does not mean that the hours

should be deducted.” Gibson v. City of Chi., 873 F. Supp. 2d 975,

989 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also Tchemkou v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506,

511–12 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The practice of law often, indeed usually,

involves significant periods of consultation among counsel. Talking

through a set of authorities or seeking advice on a vexing problem is

often significantly more efficient than one attorney’s [sic] trying to

wade through the issue alone.”). Furthermore, the Court did not

observe any glaringly excessive amounts of review on the part of

Plaintiff’s attorneys. But see Lizak v. Great Masonry, Inc., No. 08-

C-1930, 2010 WL 3001906, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2010) (finding

unreasonable the “excessive and unnecessary” rounds of re-reading

or re-writing by an attorney “given the uncomplicated nature” of the

case). As a result, despite the identical work descriptions for

different staff members of Troy Law for a couple of time entries, the

Court does not find those time entries duplicative. Moreover,

Defendants Zhang and Li have not identified which disputed time

entries are a result of overstaffing, and how. The challenger to a fee

petition “must detail his objections to the fee petition such that the

court can determine what portion of the fees, if any, were not

reasonably expended.” RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 854 (7th Cir.

2010). Thus, the Court declines to reduce the number of hours for

Mr. Troy, Mr. Ireland, Mr. Schweitzer, and Ms. Troy as submitted.

However, Troy Law seeks 13.78 hours attributed to Preethi

Kilaru, managing clerk. d/e 95, ¶ 70. Ms. Kilaru’s tasks included

preparing client retainers, setting up telephone lines, following up

on service, and logistics planning for the attorneys. d/e 95, Ex. 1.

These tasks could have been performed by a paralegal or legal

assistant. “Generally, attorney or paralegal time should not be

charged for administrative tasks.” Young v. Accounts Recovery

Bureau, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-255-WTL-DKL, 2012 WL 3764014, at *4

(S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2012) (citing Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553). Here,

from the Court’s examination of Ms. Kilaru’s time entries, it is

apparent that Ms. Kilaru billed for administrative tasks rather than

tasks sufficiently complex to justify the use of a paralegal. See

People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th

Cir. 1996) (“The only inquiry for requested paralegal fees should be

whether the work was sufficiently complex to justify the efforts of a

paralegal[.]”). For this reason, the Court deducts 13.78 billing

hours attributable to Ms. Kilaru sought by Troy Law.

ii. Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates are reduced to

reflect the prevailing market rate in the Central

District of Illinois, the uncomplicated nature of this

dispute, the attorneys’ experience, and the attorney’s

prior fee awards.

Second, the Court addresses the reasonableness of the hourly

rates sought by Plaintiff’s attorneys. A court may award attorneys’

fees for prior years of service based on current billing rates or,

instead, award attorneys’ fees based on the hourly rates applicable

when the services were rendered and then add interest. See

Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 255 n.5 (7th Cir. 1988)

(while applying current billing rates for assessing interest is an

acceptable method of properly compensating the prevailing party for

attorneys’ fees incurred over a period of years, “[t]he courts in this

circuit generally use current rates”). In the instant case, attorneys

for Plaintiff have not provided evidence of current billing rates;

rather, evidence of historical hourly rate awards were submitted.

A “reasonable” hourly rate is “one that is derived from the

market rate for the services rendered.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health

Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Denius v.

Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2003)). It is presumed that an

attorney’s actual billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to

use as the market rate. Denius, 330 F.3d at 930. If that burden is

satisfied, the burden shifts to the other party to offer evidence that

sets forth “good reason” why a lower rate should be awarded.

People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1313 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). If an attorney uses contingent fee arrangements,

the “next best evidence” of an attorney’s market rate is “evidence of

rates similarly experienced attorneys in the community charge

paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee awards the

attorney has received in similar cases.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555.

However, the Seventh Circuit has “expressed a preference for third

party affidavits that attest to the billing rates of comparable

attorneys.” Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640. If the party seeking fees fails

to carry its burden, the Court may properly “make its own

determination of a reasonable rate.” Id. (citation omitted).

1. John Troy

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $650 per hour for the time John Troy,

a managing partner with over 30 years of experience, expended on

the case. d/e 95, ¶ 27. In support of this rate, Mr. Troy lists the

hundreds of wage-and-hour matters he is attorney of record on in

various districts. d/e 95, ¶ 16, 17, 18, 19. The declaration also

contains his professional accomplishments and hourly rates that

courts have previously awarded him. d/e 95, ¶ 26.

Defendants Zhang and Li claim that Mr. Troy’s affidavit is

“self-serving” and that it does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of

proving market rates. d/e 101, p. 5 (citing Uphoff v. Elegant Bath,

Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1999) (“An attorney’s self-serving

affidavit alone cannot satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of establishing

market value for that attorney’s services.”)). The party seeking fees

“bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence—in addition

to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in

line with those prevailing in the community.” Pickett, 664 F.3d at

640 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis

added). In Spegon, the Court found that, in order to shift the

burden, the party seeking fees needed to provide evidence, other

than an affidavit, that the requested rates were the market rates for

someone with comparable experience. 175 F.3d at 556. The party

seeking fees could have accomplished this by “submitting affidavits

from similarly experienced attorneys attesting to the rates they

charge paying clients for similar work or by submitting evidence of

fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases.” Id. Here,

while Mr. Troy provided the Court with past fee awards from

primarily the New York legal market, none of the previous awards of

attorney’s fees cited by Mr. Troy stem from the Central District of

Illinois or other courts within the Seventh Circuit. d/e 95, ¶ 26.

Fee awards from prior similar cases are relevant to the Court’s

determination of a reasonable hourly rate and cannot be ignored

out-of-hand. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 557. In his reply, Mr. Troy

points to several Seventh Circuit cases awarding attorney fees. d/e

104, p. 4. See, e.g., Goesel v. Boley Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., 806 F.3d 414,

420 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding rate of $300 per hour and $180 per

hour reasonable for a partner and associate, respectively); Coffman

Law Offices, P.C. v. Damore, No. 18-cv-00649 (ABJ), 2019 WL

2005921, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. May 6, 2019) (finding rate of $350 per

hour and $300 per hour reasonable for a partner and associate with

experience, respectively); Neuros Co. v. KTurbo Inc., No. 08-cv-

05939 (JWD), 2010 WL 547599, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2010)

(finding rates ranging from $215 to $450 per hour reasonable);

Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, No. 05-cv-04265 (MFK), 2006

WL 3694851, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug 9, 2006) (approving rates of $565

and $495 per hour for Jenner & Block because it “normally charges

clients at the above rates and plaintiffs actually paid counsel at

these rates”); Jones v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 05-cv-00432

(DHC), 2009 WL 631617, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2009) (finding

rates of $250 to $465 per hour reasonable).

A survey of recent fee awards in this district reveals a much

lower range of hourly rates than those requested by Mr. Troy. See,

e.g., Jackson v. City of Peoria, No. 17-cv-1129, 2019 WL 5103806,

at *6–8 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2019) (finding $425 per hour the

prevailing market rate and a reasonable hourly rate for attorney

who provided affidavits of other local attorneys and prior fee

agreements); Donaldson v. MBR Cent. Ill. Pizza, LLC, No. 18-cv-

3048, 2019 WL 447969, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2019) (noting that

plaintiffs’ attorneys’ rates of $250 to $400 per hour “are in line with

the rates that have recently been approved in this District” when

reviewing FLSA settlement); Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-

3276, 2018 WL 6601083, at *3 (Dec. 17, 2018) (awarding $300 per

hour for experienced attorney and $250 per hour for less

experienced associate in the Central District of Illinois); Abellan v.

HRDS Le Roy IL, LLC, No. 16-cv-1037, 2018 WL 6247260, at *10

(C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2018) (approving fee award where attorneys and

paralegals billed rates between $150 and $400 per hour).

Moreover, other districts within the Seventh Circuit have found

lower market rates reasonable for FLSA wage and hours litigation.

See, e.g., Kim v. Korean News of Chicago Inc., No. 17-cv-01300,

2022 WL 18401370, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2022) (finding

attorneys’ rates of $295 per hour reasonable in a case involving

FLSA and IMWL); Cain v. Patel, No. 19-cv-1385-RJD, 2022 WL

1306304, at *5 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2022) (finding attorney’s rates

ranging from $250 and $400 reasonable in a case involving FLSA

and IMWL claims); Gunn v. Stevens Sec. & Training Servs., Inc., No.

17-cv-06314, 2020 WL 5593747, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020)

(approving fee award where attorneys and paralegals billed rates

between $190 and $565 per hour in case involving FLSA, IWCPA,

and IMWL). Moreover, the Court has assessed the reasonableness

of requested attorney’s fees in Second Amendment cases and have

found effective hourly rates of $300 to $600 reasonable. See Pub.

Interest Legal Found., Inc. v. Bernadette Matthews, et al., No. 20-

cv-3190, docket entry 49 (C.D. Ill. June 8, 2022) (awarding

attorneys’ fees of $350 and $525 per hour); Moore v. Madigan, No.

11-cv-3134, docket entry 109 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2015) (awarding

attorneys’ fees of $640 per hour). Those cases involved attorneys of

comparable expertise and experience as Plaintiff’s counsel.

The Court acknowledges that this case involved parties whose

native language was Mandarin Chinese, requiring the use of

translation services and potentially more time on the part of

counsel. However, on a substantive level, this case was

straightforward. It presented no complex employment law issues,

and there is nothing about this case that made it any more difficult

than a typical wage-and-hour matter. Additionally, Mr. Troy did not

provide affidavits from other local attorneys attesting to the

requested $650 per hour rate. See Jackson v. City of Peoria, No.

17-cv-1129, 2019 WL 5103806, at *7.

Taking into consideration Mr. Troy’s professional experience,

the relatively uncomplex nature of this dispute, counsel’s prior fee

awards, the rates awarded by other courts in the Central District of

Illinois, the Court finds $350 a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Troy’s

services in this case.

2. John Ireland

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $465 per hour for the time John

Ireland, local counsel with almost 20 years of experience, expended

on the case. d/e 95, ¶ 34. In support of this rate, Mr. Ireland cites

the $450 per hour rate approved by the Northern District of Illinois

in Mair v. Earthmed LLC. No. 19-cv-8107, d/e 102 (N.D. Ill. June

22, 2022). d/e 102, p. 3. Ireland requests an increased rate of

$465 per hour due to the inflation rate and his increased expertise.

d/e 102, p. 3.

Mair is distinguishable from the instant case because of the

level of complexity involved. Mair was a complex class action

litigation case concerning FLSA and IMWL and involving 84 class

members. Here, while the claims alleged violations of the FLSA and

IMWL were the subject, the instant case only involved five

defendants and the jury returned a verdict for only two defendants.

Moreover, Mair was a federal case in the Northern District of

Illinois, which includes larger legal markets, such as Chicago, than

the legal markets in the Central District of Illinois.

Rather, the Court looks to the recent fee awards previously

cited in this district. Taking into consideration Mr. Ireland’s

professional experience, the relatively uncomplex nature of this

dispute, counsel’s prior fee awards, the rates awarded by other

courts in the Central District of Illinois, the Court finds $350 a

reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Ireland’s services in this case. In

coming to this hourly rate, the Court considers the fact that Mr.

Ireland’s $450 per hour rate was approved in June 2022, less than

a year from when the jury trial in the instant case took place in May

2023. In awarding an hourly rate on the high end of the awards in

this district, the Court does not find that a one-year increase in

experience in the context of a career that spans 20 years justifies a

higher hourly rate.

3. Aaron Schweitzer

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $400 per hour for the time Aaron

Schweitzer, managing associate with approximately five years of

legal experience, expended on the case. d/e 95, ¶¶ 40, 51.

For the reasons previously stated, taking into consideration

Mr. Schweitzer’s professional experience, the relatively uncomplex

nature of this dispute, counsel’s prior fee awards, the rates awarded

by other courts in the Central District of Illinois, the Court finds

$250 a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Schweitzer’s services in this

case.

4. Tiffany Troy

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $250 per hour for the time Tiffany

Troy, associate and court-certified interpreter, expended on the

case. d/e 95, ¶¶ 65, 69. In support of this rate, Plaintiff cites to

past awards received, predominately in the Southern and Eastern

Districts of New York. Id. at ¶ 68. The earliest that Ms. Troy was

admitted to a state bar in 2021. Id. at ¶ 57.

For the reasons previously stated, taking into consideration

Ms. Troy’s professional experience, the relatively uncomplex nature

of this dispute, counsel’s prior fee awards, the rates awarded by

other courts in the Central District of Illinois, the Court finds $200

a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Troy’s services in this case.

B. The Court Declines to Modify the Lodestar Amount on

the Grounds that the Plaintiff Achieved Limited Success

or To Take Into Account Inflation.

Defendants Zhang and Li argue that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees

award should be adjusted because of Plaintiff’s only partial or

limited success. d/e 101, p. 10–13. When a plaintiff has obtained

an excellent result, his attorney should recover a fully compensable

fee (i.e., the lodestar amount), and the fee “should not be reduced

simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention

raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. However, “[i]f . . .

a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a

reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436. A

party may not recover attorney’s fees for hours spent on

unsuccessful claims “distinct in all respects” from the successful

claims. Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1101 (7th Cir.

2000) (quoting Spanish Action Comm. v. City of Chicago, 811 F.2d

1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1987)). Where both successful and

unsuccessful claims “involve a common core of facts or are based

on related legal theories,” time spent on related, unsuccessful

claims may still be compensable. Id. Claims are related where they

“seek relief for essentially the same course of conduct.” Mary Beth

G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1279 (7th Cir. 1983). With

related claims, work performed on unsuccessful claims may still

contribute to an ultimate victory, and litigants should not be

penalized for pursuing multiple alternative theories if a court only

awards relief based on one. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. When

reducing a fee to reflect a partial success, a district court has

discretion to identify specific hours to be eliminated or “simply

reduce the award across the board.” Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at

1279 (quoting Spanish Action Comm., 811 F.2d at 1133).

In the instant matter, Plaintiff initially set forth a five-count

Amended Complaint (d/e 5) against Defendants Shi, Zhang, Li,

China Wok Hillsboro Inc., and Lin for alleged violations of the FLSA,

the IMWL, and the IWPCA. All five counts arose from the same set

of facts. On August 29, 2022, the Court granted in part and denied

in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 55). The

Court granted summary judgment as to Count II of the Amended

Complaint, which alleged that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the

state-mandated minimum wage in violation of the IMWL and Count

IV, which alleged that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff overtime

wages in violation of the overtime pay provision of the IMWL. See

820 ILCS 105/4(a).

At the time of trial, Counts I and III of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint remained pending against Defendants Zhang, Li, Lin,

and China Wok Hillsboro, Inc., and Count V remained pending

against all Defendants. During trial, the parties stipulated that

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Shi be dismissed with

prejudice, with each party to pay their own costs. d/e 83.

While Plaintiff did not succeed on every single claim in his

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a favorable result

for Plaintiff for the fundamental set of facts contained in the

Amended Complaint. On May 23, 2023, a jury entered a verdict for

Plaintiff and against Defendants Zhang and Li, awarding $4,131.44

in overtime wages and $7,305.92 in minimum wages owed during

Plaintiff’s employment as a server under the Fair Labor Standards

Act (FLSA). d/e 85. The jury also entered a verdict for Plaintiff and

against Defendants Zhang and Li, awarding $14,560.24 in unpaid

wages under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA).

d/e 85.

Mr. Troy and Mr. Ireland also argue that inflation justifies

paying them a higher rate than their previous awards. The Court

may set a higher rate for prior billing years to account for inflation,

but it must do so based upon a rational multiplier. Ohio-Sealy

Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 664 (7th Cir. 1985).

In the instant case, because the Court awarded hourly rates on the

higher end of historical trends in the Central District of Illinois and

the Seventh Circuit, the Court refuses to apply an additional

upward adjustment for inflation. See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 548–59

(acknowledging while awarded rates were based off of year-and-a-

half ago rates, not below the current market rates for their

respective services because when it awarded those rates it

considered them to be on the “high” end).

The Court awards Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of

$94,823.50, as follows:

Attorney Hourly Rate Hours Total per

Attorney

John Troy $350 55.73 $19,505.50

(Managing

Attorney)

John C Ireland $350 149.4 $52,290

(Managing

Associate)

Aaron $250 84.28 $21,070

Schweitzer

(Managing

Associate)

Tiffany Troy $200 9.79 $1,958

(Associate)

Preethi Kilaru -- 0 $0

(Managing

Clerk)

TOTAL 299.2 $94,823.50

C. Bill of Costs

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) states that “costs—

other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing

party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. R. 54(d)(1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, a

prevailing party may recover (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2)

fees of the court reporter for printed or electronically recorded

transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and

disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for

exemplification and copies of paper necessarily obtained for use in

the case; (5) docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923; and (6)

compensation of a court-appointed experts and interpreters. 28

U.S.C. § 1920; Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 927 (7th

Cir. 2012). A district court should consider both whether the bill of

costs identified expenses of the type authorized by the statute and

whether the costs were reasonably incurred. Majeske v. City of

Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s Counsels Troy Law and John C. Ireland request

$5,555.26 and $441.18, respectively, in costs incurred in litigating

this case. d/e 95-1, p. 9; d/e 102, Ex. 4. Defendants Zhang and Li

do not dispute the plaintiff’s submitted bill of costs. Plaintiff Han

Lin is the prevailing party in this lawsuit. Thus, the Court will

award reasonable and necessary costs of the action to Plaintiff. The

Court addresses each category of expense in turn.

1. The Court Approves $376 for Attorney Admission

Expenses.

Troy Law seeks reimbursement for $462 for attorney

admissions, $231 each for Mr. Schweitzer and Mr. Troy,

respectively. d/e 95-1, p. 9. A prevailing party may recover “[f]ees

of the clerk and marshal,” which includes a $188 fee for “original

admission of attorneys to practice.” Canter v. AT&T Umbrella

Benefit Plan No. 3, 33 F.4th 949, 959 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1914, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule #10). As

a result, the Court will award $188 for Mr. Schweitzer and Mr. Troy

each for attorney admission fees, for a total of $376.

2. The Court Approves $400 for Filing Fees.

Troy Law seeks reimbursement for $400 in filing fees. d/e 95-

1, p. 9. The costs of filing fees are recoverable pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1920(1). Therefore, $400 for filing fees is allowed.

3. The Court Approves $390 for Process Server Fees.

Troy Law seeks reimbursement for $475 in process server fees.

d/e 95-1, p. 9. The Seventh Circuit has held that fees for private

process servers are taxable as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1),

provided that the rates charged by the process servers do not

exceed those charged by the U.S. Marshals to effectuate service of

process. See Collins v. Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.1996)

(“[T]he prevailing party [can] recover service costs that do not exceed

the marshal's fees, no matter who actually effected service.”).

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3), when the U.S. Marshals serve

process personally, it costs $65.00 per hour for each item served

plus travel costs and any other out-of-pocket expenses.

Troy Law did not submit invoices from the private process

servers in support of its request for summons costs, so the Court

lacks information about the hourly rate charged by the process

server, the actual time spent serving process, or any information

regarding travel or expenses. The Court cannot determine whether

the amount requested for service of process is taxable without

information regarding the amount of time the private process

servers spent serving process and how far they traveled to do so.

See Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 2785,

2003 WL 1720066, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003). The costs appear

to be consistent with what Marshals might charge, but the Court

“will not award potentially unjustified costs based upon

speculation.” Id. Instead, the Court will award the minimum

charge of the U.S. Marshals: $65.00 per incident of service for a

total of $390.

4. The Court Approves $2,405.62 for Interpretation

Services.

Troy Law seeks $2,405.62 for interpretation services. d/e 95-

1, p. 9. A prevailing party may recover “compensation of

interpreters.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). Therefore, $2,405.62 for

interpretation services is allowed.

5. The Court Disallows Expenses for Attorney Travel and

Hotel Accommodations Associated with Trial.

Troy Law seeks $1,481.10 in attorney transportation and

$304.74 in hotel accommodations associated with trial. d/e 95-1,

p. 9. John C. Ireland seeks $441.18 for attorney accommodations

during trial. d/e 102, Ex. 4. Attorney travel and hotel

accommodation expenses are not recoverable as costs. Wahl v.

Carrier Mfg. Co., Inc., 511 F.2d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding

attorney traveling expenses are not recoverable as costs); see also

Mihailovich v. Laatsch, No. 99 C 4780, 2002 WL 91897, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. Jan. 24, 2002) (disallowing attorney travel expenses for a rental

car, airfare to attend a deposition, and hotel bills and parking fees

incurred while attending trial). Such expenses are not listed as

recoverable costs in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Therefore, $1,418.10 for

transportation associated with trial, $304.74 for accommodations

during trial for Troy Law, and $441.18 for hotel accommodations for

trial for John C. Ireland will be disallowed.

For the reasons states above, Plaintiff’s bill of costs is allowed

in part and denied in part. Costs shall be taxed in favor of Plaintiff

Han Lin, and against Defendants Zhang and Li, in the amount of

$3,571.62.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’

fees and costs (d/e 94, 102) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. The Court, in its discretion, awards Plaintiffs $94,823.50 in

attorneys’ fees and $3,571.62 in costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 31, 2023.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE